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Abstract 
Developing Asia achieved steady economic growth in 2013 as the region adapted to a changing global 
landscape. Demand from the advanced economies picked up as recovery gathered momentum. Yet this 
improvement was tempered somewhat by moderated growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as it 
continued its shift toward more balanced growth. These two trends help shape the regional forecast. The 
Asian Development Outlook 2014 estimates that regional growth will edge up from 6.1% in 2013 to 6.2% 
in 2014 and 6.4% in 2015. 
As the United States (US) continues to phase out its unconventional monetary policy, combined GDP 
growth in the US, the euro area, and Japan is expected to almost double to 1.9% in 2014 from 1.0% in 
2013. Growth in these economies will strengthen more to 2.2% in 2015. While the US policy shift may 
bring further volatility in financial markets, the tightening of global liquidity can be mitigated by 
accommodative monetary policy in the euro area and Japan. 
Reform is key to the outlooks for the region’s two largest economies: the PRC and India. Growth in the 
PRC slowed to 7.7% in 2013 as credit growth tightened, wages rose, the currency appreciated, and the 
authorities continued implementing policies to promote economic expansion that is more equitable, 
sustainable, and balanced. As reform gathers pace, growth in the PRC is forecast to slow to 7.5% in 2014 
and 7.4% in 2015. In contrast, India’s outlook depends on its ability to successfully implement structural 
reforms and spark stronger growth. If successful, reform in India may accelerate economic growth from 
4.9% in 2013 to 5.5% and 6.0% in the next 2 years. 
Risks to the outlook have eased compared to the recent past, and policy makers in the region can manage 
them. Yet three areas continue to warrant close monitoring. First, another shock to global financial 
markets from changes in US monetary policy cannot be ruled out. Second, data on the recovery in 
advanced economies have been mixed, leaving the possibility that demand for developing Asia’s exports 
may be softer than forecast. And finally, if efforts in the PRC to curb credit expansion are too abrupt or 
excessive, a deeper slowdown could drag down prospects for its trading partners. 
As Asian governments manage these risks, they must also act to ensure that steady growth can continue 
in the decades ahead. The region’s past economic growth lifted hundreds of millions of Asians out of 
poverty, but now widening inequality is undermining this success. During the 1990s and 2000s, more than 
80% of the region’s population lived in countries with worsening Gini coefficients, a common measure of 
inequality. The same market forces that enhanced growth—globalization, technological progress, and 
market reform—now exacerbate inequality. 
International experience shows that public spending can reduce income inequality. Government spending 
on education and health care, for example, broadens access for the poor to these vital services and levels 
the playing field. 
Pragmatic fiscal policy has endowed many economies in the region with scope to direct more public 
resources toward enhanced inclusion. But this opportunity may not last. Fiscal space will be squeezed in 
the coming decades by rising costs for health care and other needs common to rapidly aging societies. 
To ensure the ability to invest in inclusive growth, regional authorities must explore a wide range of 
options to raise revenue. These include broadening the base for personal income tax and value-added tax, 
enlarging corrective taxes and nontax revenues, and introducing naturally progressive taxes on property, 
capital gains, and inheritance. Improving tax collection is also important. 
Fiscal policy can and should play a bigger role in promoting inclusive growth in the region. Asian 
governments need to actively target inclusion when formulating fiscal plans and thereby build economic 
growth on broadly shared benefits. Achieving inclusive growth is a long-term challenge. As regional 
growth stabilizes, now is the time to plan and act for a more inclusive future. 
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Foreword
Developing Asia achieved steady economic growth in 2013 as the 
region adapted to a changing global landscape. Demand from the 
advanced economies picked up as recovery gathered momentum. Yet 
this improvement was tempered somewhat by moderated growth in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as it continued its shift toward more 
balanced growth. These two trends help shape the regional forecast. 
The Asian Development Outlook 2014 estimates that regional growth will 
edge up from 6.1% in 2013 to 6.2% in 2014 and 6.4% in 2015.
As the United States (US) continues to phase out its unconventional 
monetary policy, combined GDP growth in the US, the euro area, and 
Japan is expected to almost double to 1.9% in 2014 from 1.0% in 2013. 
Growth in these economies will strengthen more to 2.2% in 2015. While 
the US policy shift may bring further volatility in financial markets, 
the tightening of global liquidity can be mitigated by accommodative 
monetary policy in the euro area and Japan.
Reform is key to the outlooks for the region’s two largest economies: 
the PRC and India. Growth in the PRC slowed to 7.7% in 2013 as 
credit growth tightened, wages rose, the currency appreciated, and 
the authorities continued implementing policies to promote economic 
expansion that is more equitable, sustainable, and balanced. As reform 
gathers pace, growth in the PRC is forecast to slow to 7.5% in 2014 
and 7.4% in 2015. In contrast, India’s outlook depends on its ability to 
successfully implement structural reforms and spark stronger growth. 
If successful, reform in India may accelerate economic growth from 
4.9% in 2013 to 5.5% and 6.0% in the next 2 years.
Risks to the outlook have eased compared to the recent past, and 
policy makers in the region can manage them. Yet three areas continue 
to warrant close monitoring. First, another shock to global financial 
markets from changes in US monetary policy cannot be ruled out. 
Second, data on the recovery in advanced economies have been mixed, 
leaving the possibility that demand for developing Asia’s exports may 
be softer than forecast. And finally, if efforts in the PRC to curb credit 
expansion are too abrupt or excessive, a deeper slowdown could drag 
down prospects for its trading partners. 
As Asian governments manage these risks, they must also act 
to ensure that steady growth can continue in the decades ahead. 
The region’s past economic growth lifted hundreds of millions of 
Asians out of poverty, but now widening inequality is undermining this 
success. During the 1990s and 2000s, more than 80% of the region’s 
population lived in countries with worsening Gini coefficients, a 
common measure of inequality. The same market forces that enhanced 
growth—globalization, technological progress, and market reform—now 
exacerbate inequality.
International experience shows that public spending can reduce 
income inequality. Government spending on education and health care, 
for example, broadens access for the poor to these vital services and 
levels the playing field.
Pragmatic fiscal policy has endowed many economies in the region 
with scope to direct more public resources toward enhanced inclusion. 
But this opportunity may not last. Fiscal space will be squeezed in 
the coming decades by rising costs for health care and other needs 
common to rapidly aging societies. To ensure the ability to invest 
in inclusive growth, regional authorities must explore a wide range 
of options to raise revenue. These include broadening the base for 
personal income tax and value-added tax, enlarging corrective taxes 
and nontax revenues, and introducing naturally progressive taxes on 
property, capital gains, and inheritance. Improving tax collection is also 
important.
Fiscal policy can and should play a bigger role in promoting inclusive 
growth in the region. Asian governments need to actively target 
inclusion when formulating fiscal plans and thereby build economic 
growth on broadly shared benefits. Achieving inclusive growth is a 
long-term challenge. As regional growth stabilizes, now is the time to 
plan and act for a more inclusive future.
TAKEHIKO NAKAO 
President 
Asian Development Bank
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Definitions
The economies discussed in the Asian Development Outlook 2014
(ADO 2014) are classified by major analytic or geographic group. For 
purposes of this publication, the following apply:
•	 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam.
•	 Developing Asia refers to the 45 developing member countries of the 
Asian Development Bank. 
•	 Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
•	 East Asia comprises the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; 
the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China.
•	 South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
•	 Southeast Asia comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
•	 The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, 
Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu.
Unless otherwise specified, the symbol “$” and the word “dollar” refer to 
US dollars.
ADO 2014 is generally based on data available up to 14 March 2014.
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADO Asian Development Outlook
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FY fiscal year
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
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PIT personal income tax
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PPP public–private partnership
PRC People’s Republic of China
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RMI Republic of the Marshall Islands
saar seasonally adjusted annualized rate
SOE state-owned enterprise
US United States of America
VAT value-added tax

Developing Asia is expected to extend its steady growth. The region’s growth 
is projected to edge up from 6.1% in 2013 to 6.2% in 2014 and 6.4% in 2015. 
Moderating growth in the People’s Republic of China as its economy adjusts to 
more balanced growth will offset to some extent the stronger demand expected 
from the industrial countries as their economies recover. 
Risks to the outlook have eased and are manageable. The monetary policy 
shift in the United States may invite some volatility ahead in financial markets, 
albeit mitigated by accommodative monetary policy  in Japan and the euro area. 
The regional growth outlook depends on continued recovery in the major 
industrial economies and on the People’s Republic of China managing to contain 
internal credit growth smoothly.
Widening income gaps in developing Asia strengthen the case for greater use 
of fiscal policy to foster equality of opportunity. While the region has benefited 
from fiscal prudence in the past, demographic and environmental challenges are 
expected to compete for public resources in the coming years. To boost public 
spending on equity-enhancing programs such as education and health without 
undermining fiscal sustainability, the authorities will need to explore a wide 
range of options for mobilizing revenue and to build equity objectives into their 
fiscal plans.
ADO 2014—Highlights
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Key messages
• Developing Asia’s gross domestic product (GDP) expanded steadily by 6.1% in 2013, the 
same pace as in the previous year. Higher demand from recovering advanced economies 
will be dampened somewhat by moderating growth in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), such that growth in the region is forecast to edge up to 6.2% in 2014 and 6.4% 
in 2015.
• The major industrial economies—the United States (US), euro area members, and 
Japan—grew by a collective 1.0% in 2013. The momentum is expected to quicken to 1.9% 
in 2014 and 2.2% in 2015. US monetary authorities began phasing out their direct asset 
purchases as the US economy strengthened, but the consequent tightening of global 
liquidity can be mitigated by accommodative monetary policy in the euro area and Japan.
• Output in the PRC grew by 7.7% in 2013, matching the performance of the previous year. 
However, growth is set to slow somewhat in the years ahead as policy promotes growth 
that is more equitable, sustainable, and balanced. A downtick in growth to 7.5% is forecast 
for 2014 with additional easing to 7.4% in 2015.
• Growth in India is picking up to 4.9% in FY2013 (ending 31 March 2014), but the economy 
is still operating below its potential. Reform to resolve impediments to investment could 
allow growth to accelerate to 5.5% in this fiscal year and further to 6.0% FY2015.
• Soft global commodity prices continue to lighten pressure on consumer prices, allowing 
inflation to ease to 3.4% in developing Asia. Although further declines in food and fuel 
prices are envisaged, inflation is forecast to rise to 3.6% in 2014 and 3.7% in 2015 as the 
authorities in some countries adjust subsidized fuel and power rates.
• The region’s current account surplus has flattened, after falling continuously since 
its peak in 2007. The narrowing surplus recorded by the PRC as it rebalances toward 
domestic demand will be offset somewhat by the pickup in exports from other export-
oriented manufacturing economies and from some natural resource producers.
• Risks to the outlook have eased, and developing Asia can manage them. A shock to PRC 
growth, or recovery faltering in the major industrial economies, could undermine demand 
for the region’s exports. Another risk that cannot be ruled out is a shock to global 
financial markets from changes in US monetary policy. 
• During the recent period of US quantitative easing, countries that allowed capital inflows 
to fuel real exchange rate appreciation and undermine their current account balances 
are most vulnerable to the risk of destabilizing capital outflows. Fortunately, most 
regional economies have strengthened their economic fundamentals. Looking ahead, 
strengthening macroprudential measures before the boom can help avert sudden capital 
reversals that accompany the bust.
• For resource-dependent economies, commodity price swings matter more than volatile 
capital flows. However, they share equally with other economies the need to strengthen 
underlying macroeconomic fundamentals and institutions, which can insulate their 
economies from the destabilizing impacts of commodity price shocks. Better fiscal 
management and capital budget planning and implementation can convert the benefits 
of commodity booms into permanent social and physical assets.
Highlights  xiii
• Fiscal policy can help the region tackle rising inequality by fostering equality of 
opportunity. In the past, Asia used fiscal policy more to support growth than to affect 
income distribution. The challenge ahead for Asian policy makers is to expand well-
designed investments in inclusive growth without jeopardizing the fiscal prudence that 
has served the region well.
• Public spending on education, health care, and direct transfers can contribute to equity, 
but Asia underspends not only the advanced economies in these areas but also its peers 
in Latin America. Though many countries have headroom to increase public spending on 
equity-promoting programs, sizable future fiscal demands such as those from an aging 
population will compete for scarce resources. Generating sufficient resources to reverse 
rising inequality and maintain fiscal sustainability will require exploring all revenue 
categories.
• Strategic planning and innovative policies can contribute to more inclusive fiscal policy 
in Asia. A medium-term fiscal framework for inclusive growth should systematize plans 
for incorporating equity objectives into fiscal policy. Support for such a framework 
comes from fiscal data able to inform evidence-based policy and from strong political 
commitment. Innovative measures, such as leveraging information and communication 
technology for more efficient tax administration, can amplify how effectively fiscal policy 
supports inclusive growth in the region.
Charting a course for steady growth
Developing Asia’s growth prospects
• Developing Asia adapts to the shifting global landscape. The US is winding down its 
crisis-response stimulus as tentative recovery takes hold there. The prospect of tighter 
global liquidity, mitigated by accommodative monetary policy in Japan and the euro area, 
has investors pulling back from emerging financial markets. However, developing Asia 
has managed to stay on top of this transition. Even with reversals of foreign capital flows 
knocking the region’s equity markets and currencies at midyear, GDP expanded by 6.1% in 
2013, the same pace as in 2012. With moderating growth in the PRC somewhat balancing 
improved demand from the advanced economies, developing Asia should expect steady 
growth extending to the forecast horizon, edging up to 6.2% in 2014 and to 6.4% in 2015. 
» Growth momentum is building in the major industrial economies. Combined 
GDP growth in the US, the euro area, and Japan is expected to pick up to 1.9% in 
2014 from 1.0% in 2013 before strengthening further to 2.2% in 2015. Prompted 
by the strengthening economy, the US Federal Reserve started phasing out its 
unconventional monetary policies—policies that helped keep the US from sinking 
back into recession but also spilled over into international capital markets. While the 
policy shift may mean further volatility ahead in financial markets, developing Asia 
can manage the risk with appropriate policy responses. 
» PRC growth is moderating as authorities engineer a more balanced model. 
GDP growth in the PRC slowed to 7.7% in 2013 for several reasons: tightened credit 
growth, pared industrial overcapacity, deepening local government debt, rising wages, 
currency appreciation, and the continuing shift in the government’s development 
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priorities away from quantity toward quality. These underlying factors remain largely 
relevant. PRC economic expansion is forecast to slow to 7.5% in 2014 and 7.4% in 
2015, which will drag somewhat on regional growth.
» Despite a forecast pickup in growth, India still underperforms its potential. 
India’s 4.9% GDP expansion in FY2013 remained well below the estimated long-term 
pace of 6.0%. Despite this cyclical slowdown, India’s capacity for more rapid growth 
over the long term is high, with a promising outlook for labor, worker skills, capital, 
infrastructure, and productivity. But reforms are needed before the economy can 
achieve and sustain this faster pace. Although growth is envisaged accelerating—to 
5.5% in FY2014 and then to 6.0% in FY2015—this forecast rests on the elimination of 
structural bottlenecks that impede investment.
» Country-specific factors are temporarily softening growth in the ASEAN-5.
After expanding by 5.2% in 2013, growth in the five largest economies in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam—will be steady into 2014. Domestic factors and moderating 
growth in the PRC will largely offset the benefits of higher demand expected from 
the major industrialized economies. The growth outlook improves to 5.6% in 2015, 
driven by better performances in the two largest ASEAN economies as inflation cools 
in Indonesia and political disruption recedes in Thailand.
• Declining international commodity prices will keep regional inflation low.
Developing Asia experienced relatively mild inflation in 2013, with consumer prices rising 
by 3.4% on average. Commodity price movements are expected to continue to keep 
inflation low in the years ahead. The price of crude oil is forecast to soften as higher 
output from producers outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
offsets rising demand. International food prices, which declined by 7.1% in 2013, will fall 
further as supplies pick up. Inflation in developing Asia is projected to rise gradually to 
3.6% in 2014 and 3.7% in 2015, partly because some authorities are taking advantage of 
soft oil prices to adjust subsidized fuel and power rates.
• After 5 consecutive years of decline, the trend for the region’s current account 
surplus has flattened out. In 2007, before the global financial crisis, developing Asia’s 
current account surplus peaked at 6.5% of its GDP. After narrowing to 1.8% of GDP in 
2012, the surplus widened slightly to 2.1% in 2013. However, it is forecast to narrow again 
to 1.9% through the forecast period. A declining surplus in the PRC, from that economy’s 
shift toward more reliance on domestic demand, is expected to be offset by the widening 
surpluses (or narrowing current account deficits) of some export-oriented East and 
Southeast Asian economies and several natural resource exporters.
• Risks to the outlook have diminished, and regional policy makers can manage them. 
The outlook already envisages some slowing of growth in the PRC. However, if efforts 
there to curb credit expansion are too abrupt and excessively undermine growth, the 
PRC’s deeper slowdown could drag down prospects for its trade partners. Similarly, data 
on the recovery in the major industrial economies have been mixed, pointing to the 
possibility that demand for the region’s goods from these countries may be softer than 
envisaged. Finally, most markets have so far taken the ending of US quantitative easing in 
their stride, but a shock to global financial markets from changes in US monetary policy 
cannot be ruled out.
Highlights  xv
Navigating unpredictable financial flows
• Price stability and prudent fiscal policy are key defenses against external financial 
shocks. All countries that received large foreign capital inflows during the episodes of US 
quantitative easing took on the risk that eventual tapering would trigger sudden outflows. 
The most vulnerable were those that allowed the influx of capital to induce rapid 
appreciation in their real exchange rates, undermining their current account balances. 
Other factors determining the extent of the impact were past inflation and the size of 
the fiscal deficit. In this respect, emerging Asia economies were no different than other 
emerging markets across the globe.
• Macroprudential policies should be preemptive to capital flow reversals, not 
remedial. Policies that restrain domestic credit expansion and stabilize real exchange 
rates soften the impact that external shocks have on domestic financial systems. 
Evidence suggests that economies with such measures in place before US authorities 
hinted at tapering their quantitative easing were largely spared the subsequent market 
turmoil. Macroprudential measures should therefore be implemented during boom times, 
as they can later help preempt the busts that would otherwise follow capital outflow. 
• Most regional economies have strengthened their economic fundamentals, but 
more is needed. The countries that were most buffeted by turnarounds in capital flows 
in mid-2013 showed symptoms of vulnerability in at least four areas: very high domestic 
credit growth, escalating inflation, widening current account deficits, and worsening fiscal 
deficits during the capital-influx stage. Economies in developing Asia have generally 
improved these indicators but still need to do more to further safeguard their financial 
sectors. Now may be the time to tighten macroprudential policies, as capital is currently 
flowing back into the region.
Coping with volatile export prices 
• For resource-dependent economies, commodity price swings matter more than 
capital flow reversals. Unexpected commodity price movements account for 10%–30% 
of real GDP fluctuation in resource-dependent economies. Market-based instruments 
like forward contracts to hedge against price volatility remain underdeveloped. While 
precautionary saving is often suggested as a form of insurance, simply setting up a wealth 
fund is insufficient to guard against commodity market instability. Moreover, resource-
dependent countries need to develop diverse economic sectors apart from resources to 
make themselves less vulnerable to external shocks.
• Strengthening absorptive capacity can buffer commodity price shocks to foster 
stability in resource-dependent economies. As with financial flows, how vulnerable 
an economy is to swings in export commodity prices often depends on domestic factors. 
A country’s absorptive capacity—that is, the skills mastered by its bureaucracy, the state 
of its infrastructure, and the quality of its institutions—affects its ability to use a sudden 
influx of funds effectively. Economies with the skills, capital, and institutions to put a 
windfall to good use can apply these strengths to manage a price swing. 
• Better capital budget planning and implementation is needed to prolong the 
benefits of commodity booms. How efficiently a government uses revenues from 
natural resources often determines whether windfalls help make growth sustainable. 
Developing Asia has room to improve its absorptive capacity. Papua New Guinea and 
Timor-Leste, for example, struggle to meet planned public investment spending despite 
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currently having sufficient funds. These economies need to strengthen their budget 
planning and implementation and enhance the skills of their civil servants. 
• To translate natural resource wealth into inclusive growth, build institutional and 
human capacity. Fiscal policy can play a vital role in narrowing inequality if it is well 
designed and implemented. As explored in the theme chapter of this publication, public 
spending on education and health can directly improve the well-being of the poor and 
augment their productive capacity.
Outlook by subregion
• Global and regional headwinds will have disparate impacts on subregions in 
developing Asia. Just as the financial shock in mid-2013 from the prospective end of US 
quantitative easing had divergent impacts on emerging financial markets in the region, 
the gradual US exit is likely to be felt more in financially open economies. Similarly, 
the extent that growth moderation in the PRC stymies the growth pickup in the major 
industrial economies depends on patterns of trade. In the absence of major external 
shocks, though, domestic factors are playing primary roles in individual country outlooks.
• East Asia sees its growth trend flatten as growth moderates in the PRC.
The subregion grew by 6.7% in 2013, a slight uptick from 2012, and is expected to 
maintain that rate into 2014 and 2015. GDP expansion in the PRC that is forecast to 
moderate from 7.7% in 2013 to 7.5% in 2014 and 7.4% in 2015 is offsetting upswings in 
the newly industrialized economies of the Republic of Korea; Hong Kong, China; and 
Taipei,China. As policies tighten to curb inflation, growth in Mongolia will moderate in 
2014 and remain broadly stable in 2015. Inflation in East Asia hit a 4-year low of 2.4% in 
2013 and will remain manageable at 2.5% in 2014 and 2.9% in 2015. Other than Mongolia, 
where concerted efforts are needed to end double-digit inflation, consumer price 
increases will be mild across the East Asian economies. Inflation in the PRC will remain 
at 2.6% in 2014 but rise to 3.0% in 2015 following energy price reforms.
• South Asia needs successful reform in India to accelerate growth. Although growth 
is inching up, South Asia remained one of the slowest growing subregions, with GDP 
expanding by 4.8% in 2013. Moderation in India—marked by stalled infrastructure and 
corporate investment, persistent inflation, and fiscal and external imbalances—had 
an outsized impact on the subregional average. Growth is forecast to improve to 5.3% 
in 2014 and 5.8% in 2015, with projected recovery in India to 5.5% and 6.0%, assuming 
the implementation of long-delayed structural remedies. Wide-ranging adjustments in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan to strengthen economic fundamentals are expected to bear 
fruit with higher growth in 2015. Inflation in South Asia eased to 6.2% in 2013 as global 
commodity and oil prices were broadly stable. Inflation is expected to edge up to 6.4% 
in 2014 before subsiding to 6.2% in 2015 on country-specific factors such as currency 
depreciation, pressures on food prices, and energy price adjustments as subsidies are 
withdrawn.
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• Southeast Asia displays growth patterns dominated by country factors. 
Subregional GDP decelerated to 5.0% in 2013 as soft export markets and slowdowns 
affected Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. Growth in Indonesia, the biggest of these 
economies, was dampened by policies the government adopted to subdue inflation 
after it sharply raised fuel prices. Against this trend, GDP in the Philippines quickened 
to 7.2%, driven by stronger private consumption and fixed investment. Subregional 
growth is forecast to be similar in 2014, as gains from better export markets are offset 
by moderating domestic demand. However, labor tensions in Cambodia and political 
unrest in Thailand are restraining growth in these neighbors. The outlook improves in 
2015, with growth picking up in Indonesia after inflation ebbs, and Thailand’s economy 
rebounding if political disruption recedes. Southeast Asia’s inflation rate accelerated to 
4.2% in 2013, driven by hikes in administered fuel prices in Indonesia and Malaysia. It is 
forecast to inch up further to 4.3% in 2014 but to ease again to 4.0% in 2015 on lower 
global commodity prices.
• Central Asia should maintain its growth pace as its largest economy boosts public 
spending. Unexpectedly strong performance in Kazakhstan, which accounts for nearly 
half of subregional GDP, and sharp gains in Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic raised 
Central Asia’s growth rate by nearly a percentage point to 6.5% in 2013. The subregion 
is forecast to maintain this rate through 2015, though tensions arising from events 
in Ukraine pose downside risk. Increased public spending in Kazakhstan to mitigate 
the effects of the sharp currency devaluation will help support growth there, while 
high government outlays and rising private consumption should maintain growth in 
Uzbekistan. However, plateauing oil production in Azerbaijan and slackening investment 
in the Kyrgyz Republic will dampen growth in these economies, while additional gas 
exports will give only a temporary fillip to Turkmenistan’s 2014 output. Inflation in 
Central Asia is projected to accelerate sharply to 9.0% in 2014, reflecting currency 
depreciation in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan and higher growth 
in Georgia and Turkmenistan. Inflation should slow to 7.4% in 2015 as the impact 
of depreciation wanes and as growth decelerates in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.
• The Pacific will rebound as natural gas production in its largest economy drives 
growth. GDP growth slowed in the Pacific for the second consecutive year, falling to 
4.8% in 2013 as construction on the liquefied natural gas project in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG)—the subregion’s predominant economy—wrapped up. The commencement of 
gas exports in late 2014 and the first full year of production in 2015 will boost growth in 
PNG and the subregion in aggregate through the forecast period. Meanwhile, growth in 
most other Pacific economies is expected to pick up in 2014, contributing to subregional 
GDP growth that is projected to reach 5.4% in 2014 before skyrocketing on PNG gas 
exports to 13.3% in 2015. Inflation rose to 4.5% in 2013 and is projected to rise further 
to 5.9% in 2014 before ebbing to 5.1% in 2015. Currency depreciation in late 2013 and 
surging government investment will stoke PNG inflation to 6.5% in 2014. Increased 
government spending in Timor-Leste is expected to keep inflation close to double-digit, 
at 9.5% in 2014 and 9.0% in 2015.
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Fiscal policy for inclusive growth
The emerging case for inclusive fiscal policy
• Widening income gaps in developing Asia strengthen the case for government 
response. The region’s past economic growth boosted living standards and lifted 
millions out of poverty, but now widening inequality is undermining this success. 
Asian Development Outlook 2012 notes that, during the 1990s and 2000s, more than 
80% of the region’s population lived in countries with worsening Gini coefficients, a 
common measure of inequality. The same market forces that have enhanced growth—
globalization, technological progress, and market reform—now exacerbate inequality.
• Fiscal policy that fosters equality of opportunity can help tackle the region’s rising 
inequality. International experience shows that public spending can reduce income 
inequality. For example, government spending on education and health care broadens 
access for the poor to these vital services and thus levels the playing field. But policy 
makers in developing Asia have generally used fiscal policy more to support growth than 
to affect income distribution. Authorities in advanced economies, by contrast, have 
extensively used fiscal tools to improve social equity. 
• The region has benefited from a legacy of fiscal prudence. Sound fiscal positions 
have served the region well in the past, promoting macroeconomic stability and 
ensuring the ability to respond in times of economic crisis. Pragmatic fiscal policy has 
given many regional economies scope today to direct more public resources toward 
enhanced inclusion. Future scope may narrow, though, as long-term demographic and 
environmental trends encroach on fiscal space and the spending flexibility it provides.
• The dilemma facing developing Asia is how to use fiscal policy to promote inclusion 
while maintaining fiscal sustainability. Making the growth process more inclusive is 
likely to require some expansion of public spending. But expanding public expenditure 
without adequate revenue mobilization can be unsustainable. Governments thus need to 
calibrate spending programs to better meet the needs of the poor as they strengthen the 
revenue base through improved mobilization. 
Public spending to foster inclusive growth
• Among fiscal policy tools, government expenditure, more than taxation, has a 
tangible effect on inequality. Policies on both spending and revenue can promote 
inclusive growth through, for example, antipoverty programs and progressive taxation. 
The evidence from advanced and developing economies alike suggests that government 
expenditures have somewhat stronger impact on income distribution than do revenues 
because spending can easily target low-income groups. However, revenue provides the 
resources required for such programs, in addition to redistributing income.
• Public expenditures can mitigate inequality if well designed and implemented.
Public spending on education and health care, targeted subsidies and transfers, and 
physical infrastructure can all contribute. 
» Education and health services directly improve the well-being of the poor and 
augment their productive capacity. Policy simulations suggest that permanently 
raising public spending on education by the equivalent of 1 percentage point of GDP 
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lowers the Gini coefficient by 1.1 percentage points within a decade; doing the same 
for health care buys a gain of 0.3 percentage points. 
» Targeted subsidies and transfers protect the most vulnerable and deprived 
segments of society. Moreover, replacing distortionary general subsidies with 
targeted assistance to the poor can contribute to growth, as shown by analysis of fuel 
subsidy reform in India, Indonesia, and Thailand.
» Extending public infrastructure can magnify the inclusive impact of public 
spending on education and health. Spending 1 percentage point of GDP more 
on infrastructure can boost growth by an estimated 1.3 percentage points. Further, 
making infrastructure affordable and accessible allows the poor to take better 
advantage of the economic opportunities that come with improved education 
and health.
• Developing Asia lags other regions in fiscal spending to promote equity. Public 
spending on education averages 5.3% of GDP in the advanced economies, 5.5% in 
Latin America, but only 2.9% in Asia. The difference is starker for health care (8.1% in 
advanced economies, 3.9% in Latin America, but only 2.4% in developing Asia) and 
doubly so for social protection (20.0% in advanced economies, 12.0% in Latin America, 
but only 6.2% in developing Asia).
• While the amount of fiscal spending is important, so is its composition. Education 
policy can amplify how public spending promotes inclusion by prioritizing basic 
education or expanding technical and vocational training to give students the practical 
skills and knowledge they need for work. Public health policy can do the same by 
dedicating the last dollar to a new rural clinic rather than to the latest medical marvel for 
the urban rich.
Public revenues to safeguard fiscal sustainability
• The region currently has the fiscal space to finance government programs that 
mitigate poverty and inequality. Policy makers in developing Asia generally have 
a strong record of fiscal prudence, granting the region some scope today to expand 
inclusive expenditures. There are, however, some exceptions in South and Central Asia.
• Yet medium-term demographic and environmental challenges will pose their own 
fiscal demands. Structural changes will compete for public finances with efforts to 
make growth more inclusive. Aging populations in the region will raise the share of public 
spending on health care from 2.4% of GDP in 2010 to 7.3% by 2050. For fast-aging East 
Asia, the increase is particularly dramatic, from 3.0% to 9.7% in the same period. As 
policy makers should not assume that current fiscal space guarantees future fiscal space, 
the region needs stronger revenue systems that can efficiently mobilize fiscal resources.
• Developing Asia needs to expand and strengthen its comparatively limited fiscal 
resource base. During the 2000s, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP averaged 17.8% in 
developing Asia, below the 21.8% recorded in Latin America, 31.9% in the OECD, and 
28.6% worldwide. This clearly shows that the region must improve its mobilization of 
fiscal resources across all categories. A stronger and broader fiscal resource base will 
secure the fiscal space needed to accommodate inclusive fiscal policies. 
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• Greater mobilization of fiscal revenues requires exploring all possible sources. 
Options include broadening the base for personal income tax and value-added tax (VAT), 
enlarging corrective taxes and nontax revenues, and introducing naturally progressive 
taxes on property, capital gains, and inheritance. 
» Broadening the base for personal income tax and VAT offers scope for raising 
far more revenues. This can be done by reducing various exemptions, deductions, 
and tax incentives. For some Asian countries, lowering income thresholds for the 
higher tax rates can net more personal income tax revenues. Expanding VAT—or 
introducing one where it does not exist—generates revenue efficiently. Earmarking 
new VAT revenues to increase public social spending can make this regressive tax 
progressive on balance.
» Corrective taxes and nontax revenues can promote efficiency and equity 
while raising revenue. Evidence from the Philippines suggests that a sin tax on 
cigarettes—a form of corrective tax—yields a triple dividend of equity, efficiency, and 
fiscal revenues. Nontax revenues are lower in Asia than in the rest of the world and 
could be new contributors. 
» Taxing property, capital gains, and inheritance can make the tax structure more 
progressive and equitable. These taxes are inherently progressive because the poor 
own less capital and usually less valuable property. Further, property tax is a good 
revenue source for local governments.
Planning and innovation for a more inclusive Asia
• A medium-term fiscal framework for inclusive growth should systematize plans 
for incorporating equity objectives into fiscal policy. Such frameworks require careful 
annual review of inclusive government programs. They must align concrete medium-term 
targets with the means to finance them. Importantly, the inclusive elements must be 
integral to the overall medium-term fiscal framework to preserve fiscal sustainability.
• Support for a framework comes from fiscal data able to inform evidence-based 
policy and from strong political commitment. Improved fiscal data will enable Asian 
policy makers to better track public programs and assess their effectiveness toward 
improving their design and implementation. Political commitment will safeguard fiscal 
sustainability and ensure a more equitable allocation of scarce fiscal resources.
• Innovative measures can amplify how fiscal policy contributes to inclusive growth. 
Examples include leveraging information and communication technology to enhance tax 
administration efficiency, and forging public–private partnerships in social infrastructure 
to extend the reach of education and health care services. Such measures can provide 
additional financing for public services and improve their delivery, thus promoting equity.
• Fiscal policy can and should play a bigger role in promoting inclusive growth in Asia. 
To put the region on a growth path of broadly shared benefits, Asian governments need 
to actively target inclusion in their fiscal plans. Because achieving inclusive growth is 
necessarily a long-term challenge, policy makers must plan and act now.
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Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia 6.8 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.5
Azerbaijan 0.1 2.2 5.8 5.0 4.8
Kazakhstan 7.5 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.4
East Asia 8.2 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7
China, People’s Rep. of 9.3 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.4
Hong Kong, China 4.8 1.5 2.9 3.5 3.6
Korea, Rep. of 3.7 2.0 2.8 3.7 3.8
Taipei,China 4.2 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.2
South Asia 6.4 4.7 4.8 5.3 5.8
Bangladesh 6.7 6.2 6.0 5.6 6.2
India 6.7 4.5 4.9 5.5 6.0
Pakistan 3.7 4.4 3.6 3.4 3.9
Sri Lanka 8.3 6.3 7.3 7.5 7.5
Southeast Asia 4.8 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.4
Indonesia 6.5 6.3 5.8 5.7 6.0
Malaysia 5.1 5.6 4.7 5.1 5.0
Philippines 3.6 6.8 7.2 6.4 6.7
Singapore 6.0 1.9 4.1 3.9 4.1
Thailand 0.1 6.5 2.9 2.9 4.5
Viet Nam 5.9 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8
The Pacific 8.9 6.1 4.8 5.4 13.3
Fiji 2.7 1.7 3.6 2.8 3.0
Papua New Guinea 11.3 7.7 5.1 6.0 21.0
Developing Asia 7.4 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.4
Major industrial economies 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.9 2.2
Notes: Developing Asia refers to the 45 members of the Asian Development Bank. Central Asia comprises Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. East Asia comprises the 
People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China. South Asia comprises 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Southeast Asia comprises Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
(continued on the next page)
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Inflation (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia 8.9 5.1 5.9 9.0 7.4
Azerbaijan 7.9 1.1 2.4 4.0 3.5
Kazakhstan 8.3 5.1 5.8 11.5 8.8
East Asia 5.0 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.9
China, People’s Rep. of 5.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.0
Hong Kong, China 5.3 4.1 4.3 3.8 3.7
Korea, Rep. of 4.0 2.2 1.3 2.1 2.5
Taipei,China 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.1 1.3
South Asia 9.5 7.8 6.2 6.4 6.2
Bangladesh 10.9 8.7 6.8 7.5 6.5
India 8.9 7.4 5.9 6.0 5.8
Pakistan 13.7 11.0 7.4 9.0 9.2
Sri Lanka 6.7 7.9 6.9 5.0 6.0
Southeast Asia 5.5 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.0
Indonesia 5.3 4.0 6.4 5.7 4.8
Malaysia 3.2 1.7 2.1 3.2 3.5
Philippines 4.6 3.2 3.0 4.3 4.0
Singapore 5.2 4.6 2.4 3.0 2.9
Thailand 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.4 2.6
Viet Nam 18.7 9.1 6.6 6.2 6.6
The Pacific 8.5 4.2 4.5 5.9 5.1
Fiji 7.3 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.5
Papua New Guinea 8.4 2.2 4.0 6.5 5.0
Developing Asia 5.9 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.7
Major industrial economies 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.6 1.6
(continued from the previous page)
Major industrial economies comprise the United States, the euro area, and Japan.
Data for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are recorded on a fiscal-year basis. For India, the fiscal year spans the current year’s 
April through the next year’s March. For Bangladesh and Pakistan, the fiscal year spans the previous year’s July through the 
current year’s June. 
Charting a course 
 for steady growth
1

The global environment is changing as the fear of a return to 
recession has diminished in most industrial economies. Most notably, 
with recovery strengthening in the United States (US), the Federal 
Reserve has scaled back each month in 2014 its direct asset purchases. 
Developing Asia has taken the US monetary policy shift in stride, 
and the region is set to grow steadily through 2015 (Figure 1.0.1). 
While moderating growth in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is a positive sign of policy makers’ intent to achieve 
more balanced growth, the slower pace is acting as a drag on 
the other economies in the region.
Although unlikely to materialize, some severe risks 
to the regional outlook cannot be ruled out. The outlook 
already envisages some slowing of growth in the PRC. 
If efforts there to rein in credit expansion, for example, 
are too abrupt, a deeper slowdown in the PRC could drag 
down prospects for its regional trade partners. Similarly, the 
expected recovery in the major industrial economies could 
falter, as recent mixed indicators have hinted. Demand from 
these countries for the region’s exports may be softer than 
envisaged. Finally, financial volatility could return. Although 
most markets anticipate a smooth ending of US quantitative 
easing within 2014, any unexpected changes in US monetary 
policy can trigger abrupt shifts of financial flows.
In any case, developing Asia should be able to manage 
the shocks through the policy tools at hand—whether 
monetary, macroprudential, or fiscal. Sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals and institutions are essential to weather shocks. During 
the recent period of US quantitative easing, countries that allowed 
capital inflows to undermine their competitiveness and current account 
balances suffered the worst capital flow reversals. While the global 
environment is relatively calm, and the significant shocks that could 
roil it look unlikely, the authorities need to strengthen macroeconomic 
fundamentals and to address bottlenecks that hinder effective policy 
execution such as weak institutions.
Charting a course for  
steady growth
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1.0.1  GDP growth outlook, developing Asia
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Developing Asia endures amid 
modest global recovery
Developing Asia ended 2013 with growth of 6.1%, matching 
its 2012 pace. Growth is expected to accelerate marginally 
during the coming 2 years, to 6.2% in 2014 and 6.4% in 2015, 
reflecting ongoing adjustments in some of the region’s larger 
economies and a pickup in global activity (Box 1.1.1). Average 
inflation in the region slowed to 3.4% in 2013 and is forecast 
to remain below 4.0% through 2015, absent a surge in global 
commodity prices (Figure 1.1.1). The region’s current account 
surplus expanded to 2.1% of gross domestic product (GDP) last 
year but is expected to narrow to 1.9% in 2014 and 2015.
Domestic and external factors 
underlying growth 
Slowing growth in the PRC and India dragged heavily on 
growth in developing Asia in 2013. The PRC expanded by only 
7.7%, the same growth rate as in 2012. The slowdown came 
as the government steered the economy away from export- 
and investment-led growth toward a more balanced and 
sustainable growth path. Likewise, India’s growth is estimated 
to have been only 4.9% during FY2013 (ended 31 March 2014), 
0.4 percentage points above the revised figure for FY2012, 
as structural bottlenecks that constrained investment, 
consumption, and industrial activity retarded expansion. 
Developing Asia sustained growth of 6.1% in 2013 despite tepid 
demand from the PRC and India, as improving economic conditions in 
the advanced economies helped some economies expand more quickly. 
More than half of the economies in the region saw their growth rates 
sink below the rates recorded in 2012; of these, some 13 economies saw 
growth moderate for the second year in a row. But stronger growth in 
the more open and export-oriented newly industrialized economies of 
Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China—
comprising more than 15% of developing Asia’s GDP—helped cushion the 
impact of deceleration in other economies. 
That improvements in external demand were only tentative 
combined with various domestic issues to exert downward pressure 
in some economies. In South Asia, power shortages, other structural 
bottlenecks in infrastructure, and political uncertainty in Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan kept growth virtually unchanged 
at 4.8%. In Southeast Asia, the average growth rate slowed to 5.0% in 
2013 from 5.7% in 2012. Growth accelerated in only four economies, 
as Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam enjoyed strong 
expansion in private consumption and investment, and Myanmar and 
1.1.1  GDP growth and inflation, developing Asia
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1.1.1 Industrial economies gradually strengthening
Growth continues to gain traction in the major industrial 
economies. GDP expansion in the US will be stronger 
than in the euro area or Japan. GDP growth for these 
economies together is seen strengthening from an 
estimated 1.0% in 2013 to 1.9% in 2014 and 2.2% in 2015 
(box table). Inflation will remain low in the forecast 
horizon, as the combined output gap will close only 
gradually and weak prospects linger for international 
commodity prices. 
The US GDP expanded by 1.9% in 2013 after growth 
accelerated in the second half. Consumption grew 
steadily throughout the year, but investment picked up 
only in the second and third quarters. After boosting 
investment growth in the third quarter, private inventory 
fell significantly in the fourth. The US net foreign trade 
and services position improved, but government spending 
dragged. GDP growth decelerated to a seasonally adjusted 
annualized rate (saar) of 2.6% in the fourth quarter 
from 4.1% in the previous quarter, but this is seen as a 
temporary effect of extreme winter cold. 
The unemployment rate declined steadily from 7.9% 
in January 2013 to 6.7% in December, but the average 
duration stayed elevated. Inflation remains under control, 
with negligible risk of taking off. As such, the Federal 
Reserve is anticipated to keep interest rates low, but 
the degree of monetary policy accommodation will be 
gradually curtailed. Fiscal risks have receded, and the low 
interest rate environment is expected to catalyze lending 
by commercial banks. 
Industrial indicators are mixed but point to expansion 
continuing in 2014 and 2015. Recurring positive signs for 
investment, consumption, housing, employment, and credit 
suggest that the economy is on track for continued gradual 
strengthening. Growth in the US is forecast to accelerate 
to 2.8% in 2014 and further to 3.0% in 2015. 
The euro area GDP contracted by 0.4% in 2013 but 
grew in the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2013, 
after 6 consecutive quarters of continuous shrinkage. 
It grew at a saar of 1.1% in the fourth quarter of 2013, 
improving on a 0.6% increase in the previous quarter. 
Recovery in the euro area is projected to gather strength, 
as consumer confidence and business conditions improve, 
financial markets recover slightly, and fiscal pressures 
ease. However, indicators sketch a recovery that is still 
fragile, with persistent growth differentials between 
member countries. For example, the Netherlands grew by 
2.8% in the last quarter and Germany by 1.5%. Yet France 
grew by only 1.2%, Italy by 0.3%, and Spain by 0.7%. 
Credit remains constrained in euro area economies, and 
problematic financial fragmentation persists, with bank 
lending rates to households and businesses higher in the 
periphery than in the core countries.
As a whole, the outlook for the euro area is for mildly 
recovering growth and subdued inflation. A nagging 
concern in most of the euro area continues to be 
unemployment, which can have a detrimental effect on 
consumption and growth. Investment must recover as well 
to boost real GDP growth. The euro area is expected to see 
modest 1.0% acceleration in growth in 2014, picking up to 
1.4% in 2015. 
Japan posted annual growth of 1.5% in 2013. Although 
domestic demand held up well throughout 2013 as 
consumers bought ahead of the April 2014 hike in the 
value-added tax (VAT) from 5% to 8%, growth turned 
sluggish in the second half of 2013, rising by a saar of 
less than 1% as exports to developing Asia weakened. 
Private consumption and public demand were the main 
drivers of growth. Public demand (combining public 
investment and government consumption) contributed 
about 1 percentage point to growth in every quarter of 
2013. Private investment also strengthened in the second 
half, driven by new investments in construction and 
services. Imports of goods and services continued to pick 
up along with strong domestic demand. Exports remained 
subdued despite the cheaper yen. Currency depreciation 
did, however, contribute to consumer price index (CPI) 
inflation by pushing up prices for imported products. 
Japan’s announced fiscal stimulus will likely mitigate 
concern over the planned VAT hikes, allowing private 
consumption to remain resilient. External demand, 
particularly in the US and euro area, is forecast to gain 
strength, and Japanese monetary policy will remain 
accommodative. Considering these factors, GDP growth in 
Japan is forecast to be constant at 1.3% in 2014 and 2015. 
Short- and long-term interest rates alike are assumed to 
remain low to support economic activity, and headline 
CPI inflation is forecast to continue increasing gradually. 
The yen may depreciate further, but impacts on the real 
exchange rate are expected to be limited as domestic 
prices surge in Japan.
GDP growth in major industrial economies (%)
2012 2013 2014 2015
Area Actual ADO projection
Major industrial economies   1.3   1.0  1.9 2.2
 United States   2.8   1.9  2.8 3.0
 Euro area –0.7 –0.4 1.0 1.4
 Japan   1.4   1.5  1.3 1.3
Notes: Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method. 
More details in Annex table A1.1. 
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,  
http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic 
and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp (all accessed 
20 March 2014); ADB estimates.
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1.1.2  Demand-side contributions to growth, 
selected developing Asia
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Viet Nam also saw exports revive. However, growth in the 
rest of the subregion slowed, with Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand suffering economic setbacks as investment and 
exports weakened and consumption stalled. 
While showing little overall change, growth in developing 
Asia was broad-based during 2013, driven by domestic and 
external factors alike. Domestic demand remained the major 
contributor to growth, contributing more than half in 2013 in 
almost all economies. External demand—which dragged on 
growth in 2012, particularly in the more open, trade-oriented 
economies in East and Southeast Asia—improved to become a 
major contributor to growth in 2013 (Figure 1.1.2).
The nascent recovery in the major industrial economies 
and improved income prospects raised consumer confidence 
and thus consumption, particularly in East Asia (Figure 1.1.3). 
This is particularly evident in the Republic of Korea and 
Taipei,China, where consumer confidence indices surged for 
most of the year as the outlook for global demand improved. 
Consumer confidence was fairly steady in Hong Kong, China 
as income and employment were stable. In Southeast Asia, 
the index remained generally low compared with a year 
earlier, as consumer confidence was dented by renewed 
weakness in local currencies, rising inflation, sluggish 
employment prospects, strikes, and prolonged political strife. 
Consumer confidence weakened the most in Malaysia and 
Thailand, declining for at least 11 consecutive months during 2013 in 
response to rising inflation and poorer job prospects in Malaysia and 
the deteriorating political situation in Thailand. In the Philippines, 
devastation from a major earthquake and severe typhoons eroded 
consumer confidence in the last quarter of the year.
1.1.3 Consumer confidence and expectations, selected developing Asia
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Despite continuing weakness in the global outlook and a 
general slowdown from 2012 rates of expansion, retail sales 
remained resilient in six of nine major economies in East and 
Southeast Asia (Figure 1.1.4). Retails sales in Indonesia and 
Hong Kong, China slowed in most of the second half of last 
year but quickly recovered in December. In Singapore and 
Thailand, retail sales fell below their 2012 levels, the decline 
particularly steep in the latter as political turmoil intensified. 
Investment was uneven across developing Asia in 2013 
but remained resilient in some of the major economies 
(Figure 1.1.5). Expansion was particularly robust in the 
Philippines, underpinned by higher demand for housing 
buoyed by urbanization, an increase in the number of 
people entering the workforce, and robust remittances from 
overseas workers. Investment in the PRC remained resilient 
for the year as a whole despite a slowdown toward the end. 
It was supported by a pickup in agriculture and by gains 
in infrastructure, manufacturing, and particularly real 
estate, where strong demand contributed to continued rapid 
expansion. In Taipei,China and the Republic of Korea, private 
investment rebounded from the decline in 2012 as private 
companies moved to enhance manufacturing capacity in 
anticipation of stronger external demand.
In other large economies in Southeast Asia, investment 
growth slowed in 2013 in tandem with consumption. In 
Malaysia, investment growth remained high despite slowing 
significantly from massive expansion in 2012 as public 
enterprises moderated their capital spending, government 
expenditure declined, and the private sector spent less 
as real estate investment slowed. In Thailand, prolonged 
political disruption dented business confidence and delayed 
the implementation of some government infrastructure 
projects, particularly big-ticket investments in flood and water 
management. Investment contracted sharply in Singapore 
following robust growth in 2012, largely reflecting a 28% drop 
in private sector transportation investment after rules for 
financing vehicle purchases were tightened. 
Diverging outlooks for the two giants
Developing Asia’s two large economies, the PRC and India, 
face significant challenges. Though both have achieved some 
advances in industrial and electricity production since the last 
quarter of 2013, the outlook diverges for the two countries 
over the next 2 years, with growth expected to slow in the 
PRC and quicken in India. 
In India, manufacturing ended 2013 on an encouraging 
footing as the purchasing managers’ index (PMI) rose 
above 50.0 for 2 consecutive months beginning in October 
2013. Although weaker than its long-run trend, the PMI 
average in the third quarter of 2013 was, at 50.5, higher than 
1.1.5  Contributions to investment growth, 
selected developing Asia
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1.1.4  Retail sales, selected developing Asia
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1.1.6 Purchasing manager’s index and exports, PRC versus India
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the 49.4 recorded in the previous quarter, indicating higher output. 
The February 2014 reading also signaled increased production capacity 
in the first quarter of the year. The gradual resolution of India’s 
lingering structural concerns should strengthen growth momentum 
in the coming quarters, though growth will remain below its potential 
(Box 1.1.2).
By comparison, the PMI in the PRC has been flat, signaling a 
weak start for the economy in 2014, but it remained slightly above 50, 
indicating stable expansion in manufacturing (Figure 1.1.6). Moreover, 
growth in manufacturing is expected to accelerate in the months 
ahead as the advanced economies recover. The PRC will likely end the 
year on a lower growth trajectory, however, dragged down by various 
constraints on market demand and the government’s efforts to reduce 
industrial overcapacity, curb local government debt, and rein in credit 
growth by limiting financial innovation (Box 1.1.3).
Subregional trends in growth and inflation
While the external environment remains sluggish, South Asia 
and the Pacific are the only two subregions in developing Asia 
that are projected to grow more quickly this year and next 
than in 2013. In 2015, Southeast Asia is expected to become 
the third subregion with accelerated growth (Figure 1.1.7). 
Inflation, by contrast, is forecast to rise in 2014 as many 
countries adjust their administered prices, taking advantage 
of the absence of global price pressure, and as currency 
adjustments boost inflation in some Central Asian countries 
(Figure 1.1.8). 
In East Asia, economic growth will stall over the 
next 2 years at 6.7%, the same rate as in 2013. Despite 
this stagnation, East Asia will remain the fastest-growing 
subregion in 2014. Growth in the PRC is projected to 
moderate to 7.4% in 2015 from 7.5% in 2014, reflecting the 
1.1.7 GDP growth, by subregion
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1.1.2 Is India’s trend growth slowing?
GDP growth in India decelerated from 8.5% in FY2011 
(ended 31 March 2012) to 6.5% in FY2012 and further 
to 4.9% in FY2013, raising concerns that growth may 
be slowing permanently. As the trend growth rate for 
real GDP in the last 3 decades since 1981 has been an 
impressive 6.0%, the reasons for this strong trend must 
be understood before any attempt is made to assess the 
possibility of its continuing in the future. 
Patnaik and Pundit (forthcoming) examined the main 
drivers of India’s growth over the past 3 decades, in 
particular labor and human capital, and physical capital 
(including infrastructure capital) and productivity. By 
projecting the input variables over the next few decades, 
the study asks whether long-term trend GDP growth is 
rising or declining.
Labor supply has two components: the size of the 
workforce and its human capital. India has a young 
demographic, with 65% of its population in the 
working-age group aged 15–64. That percentage figure 
comes from 2010, but population projections suggest that, 
despite an aging population, the working-age proportion 
will remain high for the next 30 years. Moreover, human 
capital has improved significantly in the past 30 years, and 
further improvement is expected. By 2010, the literacy 
rate had reached 70% , and it is expected to reach 100% 
in the next 3 decades. All indicators of education—such as 
years of schooling and the proportion of the population 
to attain primary, secondary, and tertiary education—have 
improved, and further improvement over the coming 
decades is anticipated.
Physical capital, measured as net capital stock, has 
also risen. Data from nonfinancial firms show that, except 
during the global financial crisis, the number of projects 
under implementation and projects completed has been 
growing rapidly. The case is similar for infrastructure 
capital. Since the crisis, the pace of new projects has 
slowed, but this may be a correction from past over-
exuberance. If current institutional reforms continue, 
investment can be expected to return to its long-run 
average over the next few years. Aside from stalled 
projects, actual additions to highways and metro lines 
signal potential for further growth in urban infrastructure. 
The globalization of domestic firms has brought new 
technologies and management practices along with 
substantial inflows of skills, labor, and capital. The scope 
for total factor productivity growth built on learning 
from advanced countries is immense. The rapid growth 
of services in India—in particular information technology, 
communication, and internet use—should accelerate future 
growth in productivity. 
Using an estimated production function, box figure 1 
shows how much each factor of production contributes to 
growth in GDP per worker. The contribution of capital has 
always been important through the decades; infrastructure 
and human capital also contributed to growth, almost in 
equal measure. Total factor productivity dragged down 
growth in the 1980s, but since liberalization its share 
has increased to make it the main driver of growth in 
recent years.
As fluctuations around the trend will remain, the recent 
slowdown in GDP growth below 5% is likely cyclical. 
The forecast for 2014 and 2015 shows slight acceleration in 
GDP growth, reflecting an improving global environment 
and higher exports attributable mainly to currency 
depreciation. However, higher growth requires more 
investment. This may take time to achieve, as reforms are 
needed to eliminate bottlenecks in infrastructure, taxes, 
and business and financial regulations. 
Over the long run, productivity will be the main driver 
of economic growth. Accelerating growth in productivity 
will require the timely and consistent implementation of 
reforms to improve institutional quality and capacity.
Reference
Patnaik I. and M. Pundit. 2014. Is India’s trend growth declining? 
forthcoming ADB Working Paper.
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authorities’ intention to rein in credit growth and implement reforms 
that may hinder investment. Tighter policies will similarly slow growth 
in Mongolia in 2014, though faster expansion should resume in 2015 as 
restrictive policies are eased. Growth will accelerate in the rest of the 
subregion on rising domestic demand and an improving global economy. 
Inflation in East Asia will rise to 2.5% in 2014 and 2.9% in 2015 but 
remain below inflation in other subregions, except in Mongolia, where 
1.1.3 Reform efforts under the third plenum in the PRC
The Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the PRC issued two documents 
in November 2013 that articulated a major reform plan 
for the PRC in the coming years. The program ranges 
over much of national life. Building on this blueprint, 
conferences took place to flesh out the objectives 
presented in the government work report of March 2014. 
Reform now seems focused on further economic opening 
(especially to trade in services), relaxing administrative 
constraints and boosting reliance on markets to allocate 
factors of production, improving transparency and 
reducing waste and corruption, rationalizing state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and strengthening the role of the 
private sector.
The PRC kept its economic growth target unchanged 
at 7.5% in 2014, accepting that growth may be slightly 
lower to accommodate structural reform. Growth below 
the target would provide greater space for more ambitious 
structural reforms that are likely to have adverse 
implications for growth in the short term. Moreover, 
attaining the growth target will be hard without allowing 
the kind of investments in infrastructure and real estate 
that have in the past swollen local government debt 
and encouraged shadow banking. In terms of macro 
management, the PRC will continue to implement a 
proactive fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy. 
The 2014 inflation target has been set at 3.5%, unchanged 
from last year.
High on the government’s agenda for 2014 is containing 
local government debt. Reform involves initiating credit 
ratings for local governments and early warning systems 
while allowing local governments to issue debt for 
revenue-earning and other projects through standard 
mechanisms. This is part of the broader objective of 
establishing an effective and efficient fiscal system with 
improved budget management, reformed taxation, budget 
transparency, and responsibility to match expenditure to 
revenue. The government has clamped down on wasteful 
expenditure for government construction projects, 
reduced the number of government employees, and curbed 
spending on official visits overseas. It also aims to fight 
corruption in the public sector.
Efforts are under way to modernize SOE governance. 
Reforms include separating ownership from management, 
breaking down all forms of administrative monopoly, 
strengthening the accountability of SOE investments 
through better information disclosure, increasing the 
proportion of market-oriented recruitment, strictly 
regulating SOE executives’ wages and benefits, and 
improving the management of state-owned capital. 
SOEs are being encouraged to go global, possibly with a 
view to exposing them to foreign competition that may 
improve their performance and market orientation. 
The government’s overarching goal is to develop 
an economy with mixed ownership and a continuing 
dominant role for the public sector but also support for 
a larger and more significant private sector. The plenum 
discussed ways to support the healthy development of 
the private sector to enable it to play an important role 
in fostering growth, promoting innovation, expanding 
employment, and increasing tax revenues. Reform 
includes adherence to equal rights, opportunity, and rules; 
abolishing all unreasonable regulations on the private 
sector and eliminating hidden barriers to its development; 
encouraging private enterprises to participate in SOE 
reform; and promoting private firms’ adoption of 
modern enterprise systems, or software packages to 
manage complexity. The recent government work report 
emphasized allowing private capital into more state 
projects connected to banking, oil, electricity, railways, 
telecommunications, resource development, and public 
utilities, among other areas. 
Regarding the financial sector, the authorities 
committed to establishing a deposit insurance scheme 
and banking resolution mechanism, as well as to widening 
the exchange rate band this year. They also expect full 
interest rate liberalization during the next few years. 
The government report discussed promoting the healthy 
development of internet finance, taking into account 
its possible risks. Other reforms include reining in 
environmental pollution, improving energy conservation, 
and developing plans for urbanization that address the 
migration of labor and how to develop modern urban 
services and infrastructure.
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double-digit inflation is expected this year followed by some 
moderation in 2015. Inflation in the PRC will remain at 2.6% 
in 2014 but rise to 3.0% next year, following energy price 
reform.
Southeast Asia should see steady growth this year 
before improving in 2015. Growth in the subregion 
decelerated to 5.0% in 2013, mainly because of soft 
export markets and slowdowns in three large economies: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Growth in Indonesia, 
the biggest of these economies, was dampened by 
government policies to subdue inflation after fuel prices 
were raised sharply. Against this trend, GDP in the 
Philippines sped to 7.2%, driven by stronger private 
consumption and fixed investment. In 2014, subregional 
growth looks set to remain flat, as moderating domestic 
demand offsets gains from higher exports. Growth should 
improve in 2015, with Indonesia expanding more quickly 
once inflation ebbs and Thailand rebounding if political 
disruptions recede. Southeast Asia’s inflation rate accelerated to 4.2% 
in 2013, driven by hikes in administered fuel prices in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. It will likely slow to 4.0% in 2015, helped by soft global food 
and fuel prices. 
Unlike in East and Southeast Asia, growth in South Asia is 
forecast to rise in 2014 following 3 limp years of slow growth in 
India. Growth in the subregion inched up to 4.8% from 4.7% in 2012 
but remained well below potential. The recent performance reflects 
mainly a continued slowdown in India marked by stalled infrastructure 
and corporate investment, persistent food and general inflation, and 
fiscal and external imbalances. South Asia’s GDP growth is forecast 
to improve modestly to 5.3% in 2014 and 5.8% in 2015 as growth in 
India reaches 5.5% in 2014 and 6.0% in 2015, assuming long-delayed 
structural reform starts being implemented. Both Bangladesh and 
Pakistan are engaged in wide-ranging adjustment programs to 
strengthen economic fundamentals, and both should see growth 
improve in 2015 after dipping slightly in 2014. In Nepal, successful 
national elections in late 2013 have boosted economic prospects, while 
in Afghanistan presidential elections in April 2014 and an agreement 
on security arrangements after the withdrawal of international troops 
by the end of this year are crucial to a favorable outlook. Inflation 
in South Asia eased to 6.2% in 2013 as global commodity and oil 
prices were broadly stable. Inflation is expected to bump to 6.4% in 
2014 before easing back to 6.2% in 2015 as global commodity prices 
remain soft.
Heightened geopolitical tension clouds Central Asia’s outlook. 
Despite possible repercussions from recent currency depreciations 
(Box 1.1.4), however, Central Asia is forecast to maintain its growth 
rate, as Kazakhstan boosts public spending. GDP growth jumped by 
nearly 1 percentage point to 6.5% in 2013, reflecting unexpectedly 
strong performance in Kazakhstan and sharp gains in Azerbaijan 
and the Kyrgyz Republic. Barring a marked slowdown in the Russian 
Federation, growth in the subregion is forecast to remain at this rate 
1.1.8 Inflation, by subregion
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during 2014 and 2015. In Kazakhstan, a large currency devaluation 
and increased public spending to mitigate its effect on the population 
are projected to maintain growth during 2014 and boost it in 2015, 
while in Turkmenistan additional gas exports should temporarily boost 
growth during 2014. Faster growth in Armenia and Georgia in 2014 and 
2015 will help offset slowdowns in Azerbaijan, where oil production 
is starting to plateau, and the Kyrgyz Republic, where investment is 
1.1.4 Impacts of ruble depreciation on Central Asia’s currencies
Recent political developments in Ukraine are 
compounding pressure on the already weakening ruble, 
such that the currency of the Russian Federation lost 
10.3% of its market value against the US dollar from 
1 January to 15 March 2014 (box figure 1). While most 
countries in Central Asia remain closely linked with the 
Russian Federation economically and politically, their 
responses to this development have differed markedly. 
Their responses to ruble depreciation have also varied, 
depending on how close the trade relationship is, 
whether national exports compete with those of the 
Russian Federation, and the state of the economy’s 
macroeconomic fundamentals.
Among the four petroleum-rich Central Asian countries, 
Kazakhstan reacted quickly to ruble depreciation, while the 
other three—Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—
had still not acted as of late March. Kazakhstan receives 
more than a third of its imports from the Russian 
Federation and exports competing goods, such as oil, 
to Europe, with which the Russian Federation is also a 
major trading partner. To maintain the competitiveness 
of Kazakh exports, Kazakhstan devalued its currency, 
the tenge, by 16.2% on 11 February 2014. This has stoked 
inflation, which will likely rise into double digits this year. 
However, Kazakhstan’s ample foreign reserves, equivalent 
to 6 months of imports at the end of 2013, and strong fiscal 
stimulus should help cushion the impact and support the 
economy’s forecast growth at 6.0% this year. 
The ruble’s depreciation has also put stress on the 
currencies of the other states in Central Asia. The impact 
may be particularly strong in countries with limited 
foreign exchange reserves and tighter links with the 
Russian Federation, namely Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
and Tajikistan. As of 2013, remittances largely from 
the Russian Federation accounted for a substantial 18.0% 
of GDP in Armenia, 26.3% in the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
44.5% in Tajikistan—but only 8.0% in Georgia. Ruble-
denominated remittances will be squeezed in the short run 
when converted into home currencies. These economies 
without commodity exports are therefore highly 
susceptible to economic developments in source countries. 
Among the currencies of the four Central Asian 
states without petroleum exports, the Kyrgyz som 
has been under pressure despite efforts to defend it. 
The central bank there has intervened using foreign 
currency reserves to contain exchange rate fluctuations. 
It also raised the policy interest rate from 4% to 6%, but 
the som nevertheless lost 9.6% of its value against the 
US dollar from 1 January and 15 March. The Armenian 
dram depreciated against the US dollar by 3.2%, as 
Armenia’s reserves were more ample, equivalent to 7.9 
months of imports at the end of 2013. As of late March, 
Tajikistan had managed to maintain the value of its 
currency, the somoni, but may find itself in difficulties as 
its foreign exchange reserves equal less than 2 months 
of imports and global prices are falling for aluminum, 
its main export commodity. Georgia is expected to 
feel little pressure because its trade links with the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan are limited, though 
it exports to Ukraine.
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1.1.9  Exports and imports growth, developing Asia
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slackening. High government outlays and rising private consumption 
should maintain growth in Uzbekistan during 2014 and limit any 
slowdown in 2015. Inflation in Central Asia is projected to accelerate 
sharply to 9.0% in 2014, reflecting currency depreciation in Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan and higher growth in Georgia and 
Turkmenistan. Inflation should slow to 7.4% in 2015 as the impact of 
depreciation wanes in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and as 
growth decelerates in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Growth across the Pacific economies is seen higher in 2014, except 
for the Cook Islands, Fiji, and the Federated States of Micronesia. 
The Pacific will become the fastest-growing subregion in 2015. 
The growth rate in the Pacific fell for the second consecutive year in 
2013 as construction ended on the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project 
in Papua New Guinea, the subregion’s largest economy. Growth in the 
subregion as a whole in 2014 is forecast at 5.4% with the start of LNG 
exports from Papua New Guinea late in the year, rising to 13.3% in 2015, 
the first full year of LNG production. Inflation rose to 4.5% in 2013 
and is projected to rise further to 5.9% in 2014 before ebbing to 5.1% in 
2015. The subregional inflation figure is, like GDP, heavily influenced by 
developments in Papua New Guinea, where government investments and 
currency depreciation in late 2013 are expected to fuel inflation to 6.5% 
in 2014. Inflation in Timor-Leste is forecast to remain at 9.5% in 2014 as 
the government boosts spending. 
Trade resilient and set to rise
On the external front, the recovery in the industrial 
economies has not yet fully lifted exports from developing 
Asia, though export orders placed with the more open, 
trade-oriented economies slowly increased in the second 
half of 2013. Nevertheless, merchandise export growth in 
developing Asia remained fairly resilient, increasing by 4.3% 
in 2013, down a bit from 4.7% the year before. Unlike in 
2012, growth in exports outpaced that of imports in 2013 
in most economies (Figure 1.1.9). PRC exports rose only 
marginally from 2012, supporting the view that stronger 
growth in the US, the euro area, and Japan has not yet 
translated into higher export demand for developing Asia. 
In India, merchandise exports were generally lower during 
the first half of 2013 but improved in the second half 
following a double-digit rise in shipments. Export growth 
was moderate in Hong Kong, China but recovered in the 
Republic of Korea and Taipei,China after weakening in 2012. 
In Southeast Asia, merchandise exports decreased generally 
in line with marked declines in four large economies in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand (Figure 1.1.10). 
Merchandise imports rose by 3.6%, up only slightly from 3.5% 
growth in 2012 because growth was sluggish in some economies 
(Figure 1.1.11). Import growth slowed much more quickly than export 
growth except in Central Asia, where import growth continued to 
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outpace that of exports. Imports declined the furthest in South Asia, 
reflecting weaker imports to India, and shrank in half of Southeast 
Asia’s economies. 
Including services, net exports of goods and services recovered in 
4 of 10 large economies of developing Asia, while the rate of expansion 
in the remaining 6, particularly those with strong trade ties with the 
advanced economies and the PRC, moderated in 2013. In the PRC, net 
exports of goods and services deducted 1.7 percentage points from 
1.1.11  Imports growth, selected Asian economies
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1.1.10  Exports growth, selected Asian economies
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1.1.12 Current account balance, developing Asia
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growth. In Southeast Asia, net exports of goods and services 
declined in Malaysia and the Philippines, subtracting on 
average 1.7 percentage points from growth, while net exports 
recovered in Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand after 
dipping in 2012. Net exports in economies that trade heavily 
with India may have slowed, in view of India’s economic 
slowdown in 2013. 
Growth in exports from developing Asia is expected 
to accelerate to 8.1% in 2014 from 4.3% last year, rising 
further to 9.2% in 2015. Meanwhile, import growth should 
strengthen to 8.4% in 2014 and 9.3% in 2015 on resilient 
domestic consumption and rising investment. Better 
prospects in the major industrial economies, domestic 
rebalancing, and good weather should raise domestic 
demand in many developing Asian economies this year. 
In the last quarter of 2013, consumer confidence began to 
improve in most regional economies, except Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. However, rising incomes, including higher remittances, 
and a hoped-for quick resolution to political problems should boost 
consumption in these economies in 2014.
Despite weak demand from the major industrial economies, 
developing Asia’s current account surplus rose last year to 2.1% from 
1.8% in 2012. Faster growth in imports than in exports, to support 
domestic demand, and the slowdown in the PRC will likely tamp the 
regional current account surplus back down to 1.9% of GDP 
in 2014 and 2015 (Figure 1.1.12). Smaller current account 
surpluses are anticipated in all subregions except Central 
Asia, where the current account surplus is expected to 
widen in 2014 and 2015 in view of higher demand from 
the euro area and local currency depreciation. In 2014, 
Southeast Asia’s current account surplus looks set to 
rise slightly to 2.5% of GDP as global demand improves. 
Meanwhile the 2014 current account surplus for the Pacific 
is forecast to plunge to a fifth of its 2013 amount because of 
continuing decline in petroleum output from Timor-Leste, 
then rocket back up in 2015 on new LNG production in 
Papua New Guinea.
The declining trend in developing Asia’s current account 
surplus is consistent with the narrowing trend in the 
global current account, measured as a share of global GDP 
(Figure 1.1.13). The global current account balance is 
estimated to have declined slightly to 1.1% of world GDP in 
2013 from 1.2% in 2012. Despite its narrowing, developing 
Asia’s surplus grew as a share of world GDP from 0.38% 
in 2012 to 0.47% in 2013, signifying the region’s growing 
economic importance. The PRC holds the bulk of developing 
Asia’s current account surplus, but its surplus as a share of 
world GDP declined slightly from 0.27% in 2012 to 0.26% 
in 2013, while current account surpluses (or narrowing in 
deficits) in some export-oriented East and Southeast Asian 
economies and several natural resource exporters widened.
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Risks to the outlook
The risk of a major global shock upending the regional outlook has 
receded significantly. However, if the assumptions underlying the 
forecasts turn out to be wrong, policy makers in the region will need 
to be ready to act to safeguard the steady growth envisaged. Three 
factors underlying developing Asia’s outlook warrant particularly close 
monitoring: the pace of recovery in the major industrial economies, the 
effect of reform on growth in the PRC, and possible financial turbulence 
from changes in US monetary policy. 
While the gradual strengthening of the recovery in the major 
industrial economies is boosting external demand for regional exports, 
data on their recovery have been mixed, pointing to the possibility that 
demand may be softer than envisaged. Fiscal risks in the US appear to 
have receded, but mixed data on labor markets and producer outlooks 
point to possible weaknesses in the recovery. In the euro area, depressed 
demand, credit contraction, and a strong currency could conspire to 
push the economy into deflation, which would further suppress growth. 
For Japan, weak demand in Asia and VAT hikes scheduled for April 2014 
and October 2015 are the primary concerns. In sum, further recovery in 
the advanced countries cannot be taken for granted.
Regarding the PRC, the outlook envisages some slowing of growth 
there. However, the authorities are pursuing an ambitious reform 
agenda, and financial reform in particular could have an outsized 
impact on PRC output if unforeseen difficulties crop up. If efforts to rein 
in domestic credit expansion are too abrupt, for example, interest rates 
could spike, as they did in June 2013. In such a scenario, the PRC GDP 
could slow much more dramatically, significantly weakening prospects 
for its regional trading partners. 
Finally, the outlook assumes that accommodative monetary policies 
in the major industrial economies will gradually return to normal as 
economies strengthen, beginning with the tapering of US quantitative 
easing. So far, markets have taken in stride the stepped reductions in 
the US Federal Reserve’s monthly asset purchases. However, market 
sentiment is difficult to predict. Monetary policy changes could still 
trigger hasty shifts in capital flows if they are not well communicated. 
If that happens, the economies of developing Asia, particularly the 
vulnerable ones, will need to respond with timely policy responses. 
Despite the continued risks, developing Asia’s policy makers should 
be able to cope with the shocks with the tools and policy space they 
possess. Governments can manage the shocks by adopting appropriate 
policies—whether monetary, macroprudential, or fiscal—to smooth the 
impacts of any unanticipated developments.
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1.2.1  Capital inflows, selected Asian economies 
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Navigating unpredictable 
financial flows
The United States Federal Reserve responded to the global financial 
crisis of 2008–2009 by adopting unconventional monetary stimulus after 
lowering the policy interest rate nearly to zero proved to be insufficient. 
So-called quantitative easing (QE) entailed large asset purchases 
intended to boost the US economy, but the policy appeared to have the 
side effect of accelerating capital flows to emerging markets. When the 
US signaled in mid-2013 that it was contemplating an exit from QE, the 
news shook financial markets in emerging economies as they worried 
about the possible negative impact of such unwinding. As US monetary 
policy has moved from talk of tapering to implementing a phased 
reduction, the question remains whether developing Asia will face 
further shocks.
Quantitative easing and financial flows
The US Federal Reserve initiated three rounds of quantitative 
easing. QE1, from the first quarter of 2009 to the third quarter 
of 2010, occurred after the US Fed had made major purchases 
of mortgage-backed securities and other “toxic assets” in the 
early stages of the crisis in late 2008. In March 2009, the Fed 
announced its intention to purchase $1.7 trillion worth of 
financial assets. QE2, from the fourth quarter of 2010 to the 
second quarter of 2011, saw the Fed purchase $600 billion in 
US Treasury securities. QE3 renewed Fed asset purchases 
from the fourth quarter of 2012, starting with the monthly 
purchase of $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and, 
from December 2012, $45 billion in Treasury securities. QE3 
continues today, albeit following monthly cuts in purchase 
amounts since January 2014. 
Figure 1.2.1 shows quarterly flows of foreign capital since 
2005 into and out of six Asian economies: India, Indonesia, 
the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. The figure also indicates sequential episodes of QE. 
At the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, foreign 
capital flowed quickly out of the six Asian economies. 
Once QE began, inflows largely returned to trend. As Figure 1.2.1 
shows, the first round of US QE coincided closely with the revival of 
capital inflows to Asia. The composition of the flows changed, however, 
as funds previously sent through banks (many of which now having 
to deleverage) flowed during QE directly through capital markets into 
bonds and equities. Capital inflows to the region remained much the 
same during QE2 and the first few quarters of QE3 but then braked 
suddenly in the second quarter of 2013, as talk of a possible end to QE3 
soured investor sentiment and caused some flows to reverse. 
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Exchange rates in the six Asian economies are closely 
related to foreign capital flows. A sharp drop in capital 
inflows during the second half of 2008 coincided with 
sharp currency depreciation, most notably in India, 
Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea (Figure 1.2.2). 
Following QE1 and QE2, the recovery of foreign capital flows 
into these economies coincided with currency appreciation. 
Exchange rates generally remained stable after QE2, except 
in India and Indonesia, which experienced new waves of 
currency depreciation probably at least partly linked to 
their own economic problems. The Indian rupee and the 
Indonesian rupiah began to stabilize when the US Fed 
started its QE3 program and resumed pouring liquidity into 
the US economy. 
In May 2013, the Fed chair began to mention the 
possibility of gradually tapering the $85 billion in monthly 
purchases of securities to a lower amount. This taper talk 
jolted financial markets in emerging economies and caused 
sharp currency depreciation in many of them. The reversal 
of foreign capital flows, now out of Asia, dragged down 
exchange rates across the region, steeply in India and 
Indonesia and less so in Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand (but not in the Republic of Korea). The Fed’s 
announcement at last in mid-September 2013 that it would 
extend its asset purchase program after all stabilized Asian 
exchange rates. 
How much exchange rates moved in different countries 
may have reflected not only specific country characteristics 
but also differences in how central banks intervened to 
defend their currencies. Different countries spent foreign 
reserve holdings to different extents, with the Philippines 
and Thailand apparently intervening less than other 
countries (Figure 1.2.3). Under QE1, all six countries built 
up their foreign reserves despite currency appreciation, 
with the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia showing the 
largest gains. This suggests that rising exchange rates did 
not bear all the impact of capital inflows during that period. 
Reserve accumulation diminished when QE2 ended and 
did not seem to resume under QE3. Since the Fed began 
taper talk in May 2013, affecting the currencies of India 
and Indonesia in particular, these two countries appear to 
be the only ones in Asia to have intervened to defend their 
currencies.
These observations suggest that currency intervention 
since the global financial crisis has not been a key factor 
in explaining differences in exchange rate movements 
across Asia. Other factors, such as countries’ underlying 
economic fundamentals, may have determined capital flows 
and exchange rate movements. 
1.2.2  Exchange rate index, selected Asian economies 
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1.2.3 Foreign reserves index, selected Asian economies
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Impact of quantitative easing tapering
Since QE3 tapering started only in January of this year, assessing its 
impact on capital flows to emerging markets is still difficult. However, 
studies that examined how the talk of QE taper in May 2013 affected 
financial markets in emerging economies suggest that countries with 
weaker macroeconomic fundamentals have experienced more severe 
effects on capital flows and exchange rates. For example, Nechio (2014) 
argues that countries with more external or internal imbalances tend to 
be more vulnerable to capital flow reversals associated with currency 
depreciations. The research showed in a sample of emerging market 
countries a significant negative correlation between rates of currency 
depreciation from May to December 2013 and average fiscal and current 
account positions—indicators for a country’s internal and external 
balance, respectively—during 2010–2012. 
Eichengreen and Gupta (2014) more carefully examined currency 
depreciation from the end of April to the end of August 2013 using 
a broader set of country-specific factors. These included (i) past 
deterioration in the current account deficit and real exchange 
rate appreciation as measures of local market impacts and lost 
competitiveness; (ii) past cumulative private capital inflows or stocks 
of portfolio liabilities as measures of the size of the financial market; 
(iii) past GDP growth, inflation, budget deficits, and foreign reserves as 
measures of economic fundamentals; and (iv) the exchange rate regime, 
capital market openness, public debt, and institutional quality (measured 
by rule of law as rated by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators) as structural variables. The authors used for each variable 
either the value in 2012 or its average during 2010–2012.
Eichengreen and Gupta obtained several striking results. First, 
the economies that allowed the largest rise in real exchange rates 
and widening of current account deficits in the period before QE3 
suffered the largest drop in currency value after the onset of taper talk. 
Second, stronger economic fundamentals—measured by such policy 
and economic performance measures as foreign reserves, GDP growth, 
and budget deficits and public debt as percentages of GDP—did not 
seem to insulate countries from the worst effects of taper talk, but 
countries with larger financial markets did experience more downward 
pressure on currencies. Third, there is little evidence that capital 
controls instituted before taper talk began relieved the exchange rate 
depreciation pressure. 
Park, Ramayandi, and Shin (forthcoming) extended the analysis of 
Eichengreen and Gupta in several ways. The study included additional 
variables, such as rising domestic credit as a measure of financial 
instability. It treated the size of the financial market separately from 
the amount of capital flows during the QE episodes and used a recent 
database constructed by Forbes, Fratzscher, and Straub (2013) to 
incorporate macroprudential measures and capital controls as additional 
explanatory variables. In addition, it introduced a dummy variable for 
Asia to test for other region-specific influences. 
Park, Ramayandi, and Shin (forthcoming) find a country’s past 
current account deficits and real exchange rate rises greatly affected 
how much its currency depreciated after the taper talk. Economic 
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fundamentals other than past inflation rates did not significantly affect 
the depth of depreciation, but capital flows from 2010 to 2012 did, 
with countries that received larger inflows of bank loans and equity 
investments tending to suffer more. Past expansion of domestic credit 
also mattered, as the size of capital inflows was strongly associated 
with subsequent deep depreciation. Pursuing macroprudential policies 
and capital controls in response to intensified market pressures did not 
significantly ease depreciation pressure. Finally, after controlling for 
other factors, no evidence exists that taper talk affected Asia more than 
any other developing region.
In summary, last year’s discussion of QE tapering did not affect 
Asian countries any more than others. Countries with lower and more 
stable inflation, and better fiscal balances, experienced less financial 
instability. Those that had restrained domestic credit growth faced 
less downward pressure on their exchange rates. On the other hand, 
countries that had allowed their real exchange rates to appreciate 
rapidly under large capital inflows generally experienced worse current 
account and exchange rate damage as capital inflows reversed. Thus, 
macroprudential measures implemented during boom times to restrain 
domestic credit expansion and stabilize real exchange rates have a good 
chance of preempting the busts that subsequent capital outflows may 
otherwise cause.
Progress in Asia’s financial indicators 
India and Indonesia were the two Asian countries worst affected by 
taper talk in May 2013. In fact, these two countries were grouped 
among the so called “five vulnerable emerging market economies”, 
along with Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, mentioned as especially 
at risk from tapering. The Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update, 
published in October, noted that India and Indonesia stood out in 
developing Asia as vulnerable as they are experiencing very high 
domestic credit growth, worsening inflation, widening current account 
deficits, and worsening fiscal deficits during the capital-influx stage 
(ADB 2013). How have developing Asian economies fared now that 
tapering is under way?
Tables 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 update the external and financial vulnerability 
indicators for developing Asia previously published in ADB (2013). 
The new data suggest that most countries in the region have made 
progress against vulnerability indicators and toward strengthening 
their macroeconomic fundamentals. The measures taken have varied 
across countries, but most have aimed to narrow fiscal and current 
account deficits and keep domestic financial markets attractive to 
foreign investors.
Although Asian countries have achieved considerable progress 
on many indicators, some vulnerable areas persist. Inflation and 
domestic credit expansion are under control in Thailand and the 
Republic of Korea but less so in Malaysia and the Philippines. Thailand, 
meanwhile, struggles with domestic political problems that could 
hamper its ability to deal with external shocks despite its benign 
vulnerability indicators. 
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1.2.1 Assessment of external vulnerabilities
Current account 
balance/GDP (%) 
(latest available)
Short-term external 
debt/reserves  
(2Q 2013)(%)a
Broad moneyb/
Foreign reserves (%) 
(latest available)
Import cover 
(months) (latest 
available)c
Foreign liabilities/
Foreign assetsd (%)
(latest available)
Cambodia –8.4 (2012) 19.2 1.8 (Dec13) 2.9 (Oct13) 87.1 (Dec13)
China, People’s Rep. of 1.8 (Q32013) 16.7 4.7 (Dec13) 23.6 (Dec13) 62.4 (Dec13)
Hong Kong, China 5.8 (Q32013) 85.2 4.2 (Dec13) 7.1 (Nov13) 74.7 (Nov13)
India –1.3 (Q32013) 53.6 5.4 (Dec13) 7.1 (Dec13) 2.1 (Dec13)
Indonesia –2.0 (Q42013) 59.8 3.2 (Dec13) 6.2 (Dec13) 196.8 (Dec13)
Kazakhstan –3.6 (Q32013) 17.7 3.9 (Dec13) 4.8 (Dec13) 33.3 (Dec13)
Korea, Republic of 6.3 (Q32013) 48.2 5.3 (Nov13) 8.0 (Dec13) 103.7 (Oct13)
Malaysia 6.1 (Q42013) 26.6 3.4 (Dec13) 7.8 (Dec13) 115.9 (Nov13)
Pakistan –0.9 (2012) 79.1 21.1 (Dec13) 1.4 (Dec13) 45.2 (Dec13)
Philippines 5.0 (Q32013) 21.4 2.1 (Dec13) 14.8 (Dec13) 103.2 (Nov13)
Singapore 18.3 (Q42013) 81.8 1.5 (Dec13) 8.8 (Dec13) 117.3 (Dec13)
Sri Lanka –3.7 (Q32013) 51.5 3.8 (Nov13) 4.1 (Oct13) 350.2 (May13)
Taipei,China 13.3 (Q42013) 19.1 2.9 (Dec13) 18.3 (Dec13) 54.6 (Jan14)
Thailand –1.0 (Q32013) 12.9 3.1 (Dec13) 7.6 (Dec13) 142.5 (Dec13)
Viet Nam 3.5 (Q42012) 51.1 6.6 (May13) 2.7 (May13) 73.1 (Jul13)
GDP = gross domestic product, Q = quarter. 
a  Short-term external debt includes loans and credits due and debt securities due within a year as defined in the Joint External Debt Hub. Data start 2004 for all countries. 
Q1 2013 for Viet Nam.
b  Data refers to M3 for Hong Kong, China; India; Kazakhstan; Rep. of Korea; Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; and Singapore. M2 for other countries.
c  Refers to number of months of import that can be covered by official reserves; computed as reserves (excluding gold) divided by 12-month moving average of imports 
(cost of insurance, freight). Latest month when reserves data is available. Import data may be earlier, the same, or later than period indicated.
d  Foreign liabilities and assets of banking institutions, deposit money banks, and other depository corporations.
Note: Green font implies improvement; red means worsening in vulnerability; black means no change in vulnerability status relative to data mostly around the second quarter 
of 2013 as published in ADO 2013 Update.
Sources: ADB calculations using data from CEIC; national sources; Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update, Asian Development Bank; Joint External Debt Hub, BIS-IMF-
OECD-WB; International Financial Statistics online database, Direction of Trade Statistics, World Economic Outlook and Article IV Consultations, International Monetary Fund.
India and Indonesia in particular have made progress in addressing 
high credit growth, inflation, and budget and current account deficits. 
Both countries’ current account deficits have improved, and their 
inflation rates have slowed. India has also significantly improved 
its fiscal balance and has somewhat lowered its domestic credit 
growth. Inflation and domestic credit growth in both India and 
Indonesia, however, remain elevated. In sum, Indonesia and India 
must still do more to strengthen their financial sectors. Interest rates 
in both economies are much higher than elsewhere in the region, 
giving the Indian and Indonesian authorities less room to maneuver 
against any future financial turbulence. Besides strengthening their 
economic fundamentals, both countries may need to tighten their 
macroprudential policies.
On the brighter side, most economies in developing Asia have 
substantial foreign reserves with which to counter any future external 
financial shock. This makes a repeat of the Asian financial crisis of 
1997–1998 unlikely, as developing Asia is now in a much stronger 
position than it was then to weather a crisis.
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1.2.2 Assessment of financial vulnerabilities (%)
Inflation rate
(latest available)
Fiscal balance/GDPa
(2013)
Loans/Deposits of banksb
(latest available)
Bank lending growthc 
(% year on year, 
latest available)
Cambodia 4.6 (Jan14) –5.2 99.5 (Nov13) –
China, People’s Rep. of 2.0 (Feb14) –1.9 78.4 (Dec13) 14.3 (Jan14)
Hong Kong, China 3.9 (Feb14) 3.2 60.9 (Nov13) 17.8 (Jan14)
India 8.1 (Feb14) –6.4 78.7 (Sep13) 14.7 (Dec13)
Indonesia 7.7 (Feb14) –2.3 99.4 (Dec13) 21.6 (Dec13)
Kazakhstan 4.3 (Jan14) –3.0 133.3 (Dec13) –9.5 (Dec13)
Korea, Republic of 1.0 (Feb14) –1.8 120.7 (Oct13) 5.0 (Dec13)
Malaysia 3.4 (Jan14) –3.9 95.9 (Nov13) 11.2 (Jan14)
Pakistan 7.9 (Feb14) –8.5 52.1 (Dec13) 18.9 (Dec13)
Philippines 4.1 (Feb14) –1.4 61.1 (Nov13) 17.1 (Jan14)
Singapore 1.4 (Jan14) 1.1 103.0 (Dec13) 13.7 (Jan14)
Sri Lanka 4.2 (Feb14) –6.2 83.3 (May13) 12.5 (Aug13)
Taipei,China 0.3 (Feb14) –1.6 63.4 (Jan14) 3.1 (Dec13)
Thailand 2.0 (Feb14) –2.0 103.0 (Dec13) 7.3 (Jan14)
Viet Nam 4.7 (Feb14) –7.1 92.9 (Jul13) 13.4 (Jul13)
GDP = gross domestic product, Q = quarter.
a Estimate. 
b  Loans to private sector and nonfinancial institutions; and deposits (demand, time, savings, foreign currency, bond, and money market instruments—
where available) of banking institutions, deposit money banks, and other depository corporations of each economy.
c  Data for the People’s Republic of China refer to financial institution loans; Hong Kong, China to domestic credit; Indonesia to commercial bank loans; 
Kazakhstan to loans of other depository corporations; the Republic of Korea to loans of commercial and specialized banks; Malaysia to commercial bank 
loans and advances; the Philippines to commercial and universal bank loans net of reverse repurchase arrangements; Singapore to loans and advances 
of domestic banking units; Taipei,China to domestic banks’ loans and advances; Thailand to commercial bank loans; and Viet Nam to claims on private 
sector of banking institutions.
Note: Green font implies improvement; red means worsening in vulnerability; black means no change in vulnerability status relative to data mostly around 
the second quarter of 2013 as published in ADO 2013 Update.
Sources: ARIC website http://aric.adb.org/publications/rci-infopack (accessed 19 March 2014); Asian Development Outlook database.
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1.3.1  Price developments of extractable commodity products 
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Coping with volatile  
export prices
Volatile capital flows caused by changes in US monetary 
policy have received a lot of attention recently, but 
economies with underdeveloped capital markets have been 
little affected. For economies that rely heavily on commodity 
exports, financial flows have much less profound effects 
than do gyrations in international prices for food, fuel, or 
metals. Commodity prices remain elevated recently, but 
improved supply conditions have kept them more stable 
than they were in 2007–2008, when they experienced wide 
swings (Figure 1.3.1). Moreover, global commodity prices are 
expected to decline in the next 2 years. 
While most countries in the region welcome lower 
commodity prices, as low prices would help contain 
inflation, commodity exporters naturally have a different 
perspective. Countries that depend on commodity exports 
for foreign exchange and government revenues can 
suffer significant macroeconomic shocks from volatile or 
excessively low prices. This is particularly true for countries 
that rely on extracted natural resources such as petroleum, 
metals, and minerals. Looking more closely at these 
economies can reveal the factors that help some resource-
dependent economies cope with these shocks better than others.
Instability from commodity prices 
Empirical studies have established the link between commodity price 
fluctuations and macroeconomic instability. Broda (2004) and Kose 
(2002) find that price fluctuations account for 10%–30% of real GDP 
variation in resource-dependent economies. Where countries are 
along that considerable range depends on their exchange rate regimes 
and institutional capacity. Historically, income volatility in countries 
dependent on exhaustible resources has been more than twice as 
large as income volatility in other economies. Such volatility has been 
especially large in countries that export commodities other than 
petroleum (Bems and Filho 2011).
Resource windfalls are often outsized factors in otherwise small 
domestic economies. As the government is typically the main recipient 
of resource revenues, fiscal policy is the main medium through which 
windfalls impinge on domestic economic activity. Such countries need 
appropriate mechanisms to smooth out the effects of volatility and 
ensure a sustainable flow of fiscal resources over the long term. 
However, the application of transparent rule-based fiscal policy is 
still limited in regional countries dependent on natural resource exports. 
In theory, a country can ensure against resource revenue volatility 
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1.3.2  Average commodity terms of trade, resource 
dependent versus resource-independent economies 
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Note: Commodity terms of trade refers to the ratio of export prices to import 
prices of commodities that include wheat, rice, maize, oilseed and soybean, 
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The country groupings are as listed in the table in Box 1.3.1.
Sources: ADB estimates using data from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators online database; United Nations COMTRADE database.  
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through either market-based hedging or contracting future deliveries 
of goods at a price set in advance. But such approaches are uncommon 
globally (Borensztein et al. 2009). Instead, precautionary savings in the 
form of foreign exchange reserves or sovereign wealth funds have been 
the usual approach to insulating an economy from price shocks. 
The objectives of sovereign wealth funds vary around the world. 
Some finance public investments to expand productive capacity, and 
others aim to cushion future price declines. This is true of commodity-
based wealth funds in Asia, including those in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kiribati, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Turkmenistan. 
Mongolia’s Fiscal Stability Fund, for example, is designed to promote 
stability in the face of price fluctuations. By contrast, Azerbaijan’s 
State Oil Fund makes medium- to long-term investments. 
Beyond managing windfall revenues, resource-dependent 
countries need to develop diverse economic sectors to 
reduce their vulnerability to external shocks. Countries 
richly endowed with natural resources need to manage them 
well to avoid undue currency appreciation as they export 
natural resources. And they need to invest in the physical 
and human capital necessary to build the manufacturing and 
other industries that will add up to diverse economies that 
are resilient over the long term. 
An analysis covering 45 countries, including 
23 economies in developing Asia, sheds light on the issues 
facing natural resource exporters, particularly those 
with low incomes. A country is considered commodity 
dependent if natural resource exports account for at least 
20% of all exports and if exports were at least 15% of GDP 
in 2006–2011. Among the Asian economies in this analysis, 
Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Malaysia, and Solomon Islands are identified as heavily 
dependent on natural resource exports to finance public 
expenses. 
Commodity terms of trade—defined as the ratio 
of export prices to import prices for 22 agricultural, 
energy, and metal commodities—are computed to capture the pure 
impacts arising from price fluctuations in global commodity prices 
(Figure 1.3.2). For natural resource-dependent economies, these terms 
have been quite volatile on average in recent years. Prices improved 
sharply by 5% in 2007, deteriorated by more than 10% toward the 
end of 2008, and then surged by 7% by the end of 2011. For countries 
with more diversified exports, on the other hand, commodity terms 
of trade have been relatively stable, deteriorating somewhat through 
2008 before picking up in early 2009. Because the fluctuation was 
twice as large for resource-dependent economies, it is crucial for them 
to prepare for the large swings that will almost certainly follow the 
current period of price stability.
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1.3.3  Variance decomposition by absorptive capacity index 
and resource dependency
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Absorptive capacity and resilience to shocks
Empirical evidence shows that how much commodity price fluctuations 
cause output to fluctuate depends on the quality of macroeconomic 
management. A country’s absorptive capacity—the skills of its 
bureaucracy, the state of its infrastructure, and the quality of its 
institutions—affects its ability to effectively use a sudden influx of funds. 
The idea of gauging absorptive capacity has its roots in the literature on 
aid effectiveness and how small economies cope with the large inflows of 
aid, but it can be applied as well to analyze policy makers’ ability to put 
other large inflows to good use without destabilizing the economy. 
Developing Asia’s absorptive capacity is comparable to that 
of other developing regions on average, but some countries lag. 
Feeny and de Silva (2012) rank economies according to an index 
comprised of proxies for human capital (health and education), 
physical infrastructure, governance quality, and the administrative 
burden of international aid. Investment in a low-ranking economy may 
not catalyze higher growth, as weak absorptive capacity hinders capital 
accumulation and its productive use. 
How important absorptive capacity is in this context is an 
empirical question. Using an economic model based on Kose (2002), 
the effect on growth of a commodity terms-of-trade shock is estimated 
for country groups segregated by natural-resource dependence and 
degree of absorptive capacity. The data and approach are described in 
Box 1.3.1. Estimates suggest that these shocks can explain 10%–30% 
of real output fluctuations, which is twice as great as those explained 
by external shocks from other sources such as global interest rates. 
This finding is consistent with existing empirical studies. 
The estimates find that resource dependence combined 
with low absorptive capacity increases a country’s 
vulnerability to commodity terms-of-trade shocks. Looking at 
the full sample of countries in Figure 1.3.3, absorptive capacity 
alone does not make a significant difference, as a commodity 
price shock has similar output effects in countries with high 
and low capacity. But absorptive capacity clearly matters 
when comparing resource-dependent countries, indicated by 
bars C and D. In this case, commodity terms-of-trade shocks 
explain more than 16% of output variation if the country is 
both resource dependent and has limited absorptive capacity—
significantly more than for resource-dependent countries with 
high absorptive capacity. In other words, those that are less 
able to use windfall proceeds productively are also less able to 
shield real output from global commodity price shocks.
Countries with limited absorptive capacity are therefore 
challenged when they face uncertainties surrounding 
commodity price swings and exhaustibility, which complicate 
resource and macroeconomic management. Additional costs 
can arise whenever the speed of investment adversely affects project 
selection, implementation, or management because the country cannot 
use capital productively. In this case, even high public investments 
contribute little to growth. The cases of Papua New Guinea (PNG) and 
Timor-Leste highlight the problem.
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1.3.1 Estimating the role of absorptive capacity
How much does absorptive capacity matter for resource-
dependent economies in developing Asia that face 
commodity price shocks? A variation on the panel vector 
autoregression econometric model used by Kose (2002) is 
estimated to simulate the extent that such capacity helps 
to cushion the blow. 
The model includes quarterly data on the following 
four variables: the cyclical component of real GDP, 
commodity terms of trade, real effective exchange rate, 
and real interest rate. Quarterly GDP was computed 
following Litterman (1983) and commodity terms of trade 
following Spatafora and Tytell (2009) when published data 
is not available. The model used published country data 
on real effective exchange rates augmented with data 
from Terada-Hagiwara and Villaruel (2013) as needed. 
The real interest rate is calculated as the 6-month 
US dollar London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) deflated 
using the US consumer price index. The four variables 
are standardized to have a standard deviation of 1 for 
comparability across countries and, except for the real 
interest rate, are log transformed.
The dataset spans from the first quarter of 2006 to 
the fourth quarter of 2011 for 27 countries, 21 of them in 
developing Asia. The countries are categorized according 
to resource dependence and absorptive capacity, as shown 
in the box table. The four-variable system is estimated 
separately for country groups classified according to their 
degree of resource dependency and absorptive capacity.
The variance decomposition method—which 
determines how much of the forecast error variance of 
each of the variables can be explained by random shocks 
to the other variables—was used to quantify the impact 
of global commodity price shocks. While model estimates 
are generally consistent with Kose (2002) and similar 
studies in that the growth impacts of commodity price 
shocks depend on country institutions and macroeconomic 
frameworks, explicitly modeling absorptive capacity 
differences provides a fresh perspective.
Country classification by resource dependence 
and absorptive capacity
Low absorptive  
capacity
High absorptive 
capacity
Resource 
dependent
Bhutan and 
Solomon Islands 
Azerbaijan, Chile, Croatia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Malaysia
Resource 
independent
Cambodia, Georgia, 
India, Indonesia, 
the Maldives, Pakistan, 
Peru, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Vanuatu, and Viet Nam
Argentina, Armenia, Fiji, 
Mexico, Samoa, Tonga, 
and Turkey
Source: Kose (2012).
The challenge of turning windfalls into 
productive capital
PNG and Timor-Leste continue to be the fastest-growing economies in 
the Pacific, propelled by natural resource exploitation and associated 
foreign direct investment. PNG has now recorded 12 consecutive years 
of economic growth averaging around 6%, while Timor-Leste’s economy 
outside the offshore energy export sector has grown at an average rate of 
11% since 2007. The rapidly expanding fiscal space generated by resource 
extraction has raised expectations in both countries that government can 
play a more active role in overcoming persistent development constraints. 
Since 2009, government expenditure in PNG has grown at an 
annual average of 12%, and in Timor-Leste at 19%, as both countries 
fund ambitious national transport and energy infrastructure projects 
and boost investments in health care, education, and social services. 
Expanded public investment has been broadly aligned with those sectors 
that support inclusive growth, but achievements have been hampered 
in both countries by implementation challenges. Government agencies 
have struggled to stay on top of rapidly rising workloads and effectively 
translate growing budgetary resources into improved service delivery. 
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1.3.5  Quarterly spending as a share of 
total annual expenditure
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Sources: ADB estimate using data from Papua New Guinea Department of 
Treasury; Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Ministry of Finance.  
https://www.mof.gov.tl (accessed 10 March 2014).
1.3.4  Planned and actual capital expenditures: 
PNG versus Timor-Leste
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A number of factors contribute to implementation 
difficulties. First, the number of qualified personnel 
to administer government infrastructure projects is 
insufficient. Spending on public personnel responsible for 
executing budgets has not kept pace with rising project 
expenditure, such that public employee workloads have 
soared, adversely affecting their implementation capacity. 
Government agencies have also struggled to keep skilled 
and experienced technical staff from leaving for the private 
sector, which offers higher salaries. Second, unpredictable 
budgetary processes often delay plan approval and the 
availability of fiscal resources early in each fiscal year. 
In PNG, this has been particularly true as political leaders 
have funded infrastructure projects before detailed 
feasibility and preparatory design studies have been 
completed. This complicates and impedes subsequent 
implementation of budgeted capital projects (Figure 1.3.4). 
In both PNG and Timor-Leste, barely half of the budget 
allocated for public investment projects is actually spent.
The rapid expansion of public expenditure challenges 
both countries to obtain value for money from disbursed 
funds. Figure 1.3.5 shows both countries continue to spend 
a disproportionate amount in the final quarter of the 
fiscal year.
While it is normal for capital project disbursement to 
increase as projects progress, the extreme distribution of 
budget disbursements toward the end of the fiscal year 
signals a tendency in both countries to push money out the 
door before annual fiscal accounts close. This practice risks 
unproductive expenditure and fund leakage.
The tendency to favor investment in new capital 
projects—rather than investing in the underlying 
institutions and agencies tasked with planning, delivering, 
and maintaining new assets and services—has further 
undermined value for money spent. Deficient maintenance 
funding in particular has engendered an expensive build-
neglect-rebuild cycle for many national infrastructure assets. 
The PNG Department of Works received, as a key agency 
executing government infrastructure plans, a 60% funding 
increase in 2014 on top of a 35% increase in 2013. Yet more 
than 97% of this increase in funding is for additional 
capital projects, leaving almost nothing new to allocate for 
operation and maintenance. 
Fiscal policy plays a vital role in translating economic growth into 
improved human development outcomes for the population. Yet fiscal 
policy that truly promotes inclusive growth must do more than just 
expand budget allocations to priority sectors. Time and resources are 
needed to strengthen the underlying systems and institutions charged 
with executing budgetary plans and to build the human-resources 
needed to effectively implement government programs and investments. 
In the cases of PNG and Timor-Leste, translating the windfall from 
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natural resource extraction into inclusive fiscal policy requires a 
broader focus on building the capacity of the civil service, strengthening 
coherence and coordination in the budget process, and ensuring 
adequate funding to maintain and operate assets once they are built.
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Annex: Slow recovery continues
The major industrial economies are slowly regaining their growth 
momentum, and this trend is likely to continue. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth will be stronger in the United States (US) than in the euro 
area or Japan. Combined GDP growth in these economies is expected 
to reach 1.9% in 2014 before strengthening further to 2.2% in 2015. 
Low inflation is envisaged through the forecast period as international 
commodity prices remain weak (Table A1.1).
Recent developments in 
major industrial economies
United States
GDP expanded by 1.9% in 2013 as growth accelerated in the second 
half. Consumption had been growing steadily throughout the year, but 
a pickup in investment in the second and third quarters gave a boost 
to growth momentum (Figure A1.1). The contribution to growth from 
net foreign trade and services improved, but government spending acted 
as a drag following the scaling back of the US fiscal position.
A1.1 Baseline assumptions on the international economy
2012 2013 2014 2015
Actual ADO 2014 
projectionEstimate
GDP growth (%)
Major industrial economiesa 1.3 1.0 1.9 2.2
United States 2.8 1.9 2.8 3.0
Euro area –0.7 –0.4 1.0 1.4
Japan 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3
Prices and inflation
Brent crude spot prices (average, $ per barrel) 112.0 109.0 106.0 102.0
Food index (% change) 1.6 –7.1 –3.5 –1.0
Consumer price index inflation  
(major industrial economies’ average, %)
1.8 1.3 1.6 1.6
Interest rates
United States Federal funds rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
European Central Bank refinancing rate (average, %) 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.3
Bank of Japan overnight call rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
$ Libor b (%) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
a Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method.
b Average interbank quotations on 1-month loans.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp; 
Consensus Forecasts; Bloomberg; International Monetary Fund, Primary Commodity Prices, http://www.
imf.org; World Bank, Global Commodity Markets, http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.6% in the fourth quarter 
of 2013, a sharp reduction from the 4.1% pace in the previous 
quarter. Growth in the last quarter had positive contributions 
from private consumption, exports, and investments but was 
dragged down by lower government spending and increased 
imports. Private consumption, growing at an annualized rate 
of 3.3%, accounted for most of growth in the fourth quarter. 
Tentative recovery in consumer confidence after a drop in 
September 2013 is somewhat consistent with a pickup in 
consumption. Growth in retail sales was weak, however, 
through the last quarter and carrying over into January 2014. 
The figure improved slightly in February, suggesting a 
possible pickup in private consumption. 
After boosting investment growth in the third quarter, 
the contribution of private inventory was significantly smaller 
in the fourth quarter. Fixed investment expanded further, 
however, as real nonresidential fixed investment increased 
by 5.7% in the fourth quarter on the back of high growth 
in equipment, outpacing the 4.8% increase recorded in the 
third quarter. 
Purchasing managers’ index values, compiled by the 
Institute for Supply Management, fell from 57.0 in November 
2013 to 56.5 in December and 51.3 in January, recovering 
somewhat to 53.2 in February (Figure A1.2). The positive 
take is that the values remained above 50 and therefore 
indicate that manufacturing was still expanding. In addition, 
the industrial production index rose consistently in the 
second half of 2013, regaining in September its 2007 average 
(before the global financial crisis) and, despite a small decline 
in January 2014, remaining high. The trend in manufacturing 
and industrial production reaffirms the role of investment 
in promoting growth momentum and the need for more 
private investment.
Positive signs in the labor and housing markets in 2013 
continued to underline progress in the US economic recovery. 
The unemployment rate improved steadily throughout 
2013, dropping from 7.9% in January to 6.7% in December. 
Although this is close to the 6.5% unemployment threshold 
that may trigger upward revisions to the Federal Reserve 
policy rate, the situation does not yet seem to warrant such 
action. The rate of workforce participation has declined 
continuously since 2008 and is not yet showing any strong 
sign of recovery. On a positive side, however, growth in 
nonfarm employment has been supported by the steady 
addition of jobs in industry (Figure A1.3). This suggests that 
further gradual strengthening in the labor market is likely. 
The housing price index increased throughout 2013, but 
affordability, measured by the housing affordability index 
median price, has declined since the second quarter of 2013. 
In terms of housing quantity, the number of housing units 
under construction and of housing starts both rose in 2013. 
A1.2  Business activities and consumer confidence 
indicators, United States
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A1.1 Demand-side contributions to growth, United States
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A1.3  Unemployment rate and growth in nonfarm 
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Inflation, both overall and core, remained under control, 
partly because food and energy prices were low and stable 
throughout the year (Figure A1.4). The risk of inflation 
taking off before the forecast horizon is negligible given 
the weak prospects for higher international commodity 
prices. The Federal Reserve projects that inflation will 
start to bump against its 2% objective no sooner than 2016. 
As the Federal Reserve plans to link policy rate changes to 
the labor market and the inflation rate, an accommodative 
monetary policy is likely to continue. The low interest 
rate environment persisted in 2013, promoting a steady 
increase of credit from commercial banks. Credit growth 
moderated in the last quarter of the year but remained in 
positive territory as commercial banks continued to boost 
their lending. 
Fiscal risks have ebbed as the US administration and 
Congress reached a compromise deal that would mitigate 
the impact of automatic spending cuts in FY2014 (ending 30 September 
2014) and FY2015, and then suspended the debt ceiling until 15 March 
2015. The unemployment rate fell further to 6.6% in January 2014 
but inched back to 6.7% in February as the labor force participation 
rate increased slightly. Noting improvement in the US economic 
performance, the Federal Reserve decided to continue phasing down 
its asset purchase program, through which it pumps money into the 
US economy. This third reduction in so-called quantitative easing in 
April 2014, from $65 billion per month to $55 billion, followed similar 
$10 billion cuts in January and February 2014. Monetary policy will 
remain highly accommodative, however, maintaining the low policy 
interest rate to the forecast horizon.
This tapering of stimulus spending suggests that the Fed is 
confident about the strength of the US recovery. It views the 
January–February soft patch as temporary and linked to cold weather. 
The new chair of the Federal Reserve has said “significant change” 
to the economy’s prospects would be required for the central bank to 
suspend its policy of winding down its bond-buying program. While 
the tapering of monthly asset purchases is likely to bring an end to 
quantitative easing within 2014, the Federal Reserve is expected to 
keep its low interest rate policy through 2015, as inflation is projected 
to remain muted to the forecast horizon. Despite that, long-term 
US interest rates—e.g., yields on 5- and 10-year US government bonds—
have already shown some signs of rising, likely heralding higher global 
interest rates in the short term.
Looking ahead, relatively strong industrial indicators point to 
growth momentum continuing in 2014 and picking up further in 
2015, as the economy further closes the output gap. Lower public 
spending has been more than compensated by growing private 
sector activity. Continued positive signs in investment, consumption, 
housing, employment, and credit suggest that the economy is on track 
for continued gradual strengthening. The US GDP is forecast to grow by 
2.8% in 2014 and accelerate further to 3.0% in 2015.
A1.4 Inflation, United States 
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A1.5 GDP growth, selected euro area countries 
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Euro area
Recovery in the euro area has continued since the second 
quarter of 2013. It is projected to gather strength in the 
next couple of years as consumer confidence and business 
conditions improve, financial markets recover slightly, and 
fiscal pressures ease. However, indicators show that the 
recovery is still fragile, with persistent growth differentials 
between member countries. High unemployment and low 
inflation remain the chief concerns in the region, and both 
have implications for consumption and growth.
GDP growth in the euro area was positive for the third 
consecutive quarter following 6 quarters of shrinkage. An 
estimate released by Eurostat showed seasonally and working 
day adjusted annualized GDP growth at 1.1% quarter on 
quarter in the fourth quarter of 2013, improving on the 0.6% 
increase recorded in the previous quarter. The economy 
expanded by 0.5% year on year in the fourth quarter, 
following 7 quarters of negative numbers by this measure. 
Among the major countries, the Netherlands showed strong 
expansion by 1.3% quarter on quarter in the third quarter and 2.8% in 
the fourth quarter, followed by Belgium (1.1% and 2.0%) and Germany 
(1.3% and 1.5%). Spain entered positive territory with quarter-on-quarter 
growth of 0.3% in the third quarter and 0.7% in the fourth. In the 
fourth quarter, France grew by 1.2% and Italy by 0.3% (Figure A1.5).
As seen in Figure A1.6, in the fourth quarter, the contribution 
of net exports to GDP growth was highest at 1.6 percentage points. 
Net exports have usually added to growth, the exception being 
in the third quarter of 2013, when it dragged down growth by 
1.5 percentage points. Exports increased by 1.2% quarter on quarter 
in the fourth quarter, up from no expansion in the previous quarter, 
and imports increased by 0.4%, slowing from 1.2% in the third quarter. 
Inventory adjustment dragged on growth in the fourth quarter by 
1.3 percentage points, after having contributed 1.2 points 
to growth in the third quarter. Government consumption 
also detracted by 0.2 points in the fourth quarter after 
contributing 0.3 points in the third quarter. A rebound came 
for private consumption and investment in the second quarter 
of 2013, after they dragged on growth in every quarter of 
2012 and the first quarter of 2013. 
Consumption was dampened in the past mostly by low 
wage growth and high unemployment, and private wealth 
was diminished by the weak housing market, which also 
imposed borrowing constraints. Private consumption, the 
largest component of GDP, may be expected to lead the 
recovery in the coming quarters, as shown by the consumer 
confidence indicator improving throughout 2013 and further 
by 1.8% in January 2014 (though it fell back by 1.0% in 
February). In the fourth quarter, consumption contributed 
0.3 percentage points to GDP growth. However, it registered 
only a very small rise in the fourth quarter over the previous 
quarter, signaling continued weakness in demand.
A1.6 Demand-side contributions to growth, euro area
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Gross fixed capital formation showed a healthier increase 
of 1.1% in the fourth quarter, up from 0.2% and 0.6% in the 
two previous quarters. It added 0.8 percentage points to 
GDP growth in the last quarter of 2013. Signaling improving 
business conditions, the euro area composite purchasing 
managers’ index has been above the threshold of 50 since 
July 2013, climbing from 52.9 in December 2013 to 53.3 in 
February 2014, its highest reading since July 2011. Investment 
volume still needs to pick up from its current low as financing 
conditions start to improve, while the European Commission 
projects an increase in gross fixed capital formation overall, 
supported by rebounding investment in equipment.
Other indicators, however, show weaknesses in the 
euro area. Industrial production contracted by a seasonally 
adjusted 0.4% month on month in December 2013, following 
a 1.6% increase in November. Eurostat estimates that 
production fell further by 0.1% in January 2014. By country, 
the biggest declines were in Latvia by 10.7%, the Netherlands 
by 6.4%, and Finland by 3.5%. 
Retail trade volume in the euro area dipped by 1.3% month on month 
in December 2013 after rising by 1.0% in November and before rising 
again by 1.6% in January. The rise came mainly from higher sales of 
nonfood items, followed by automotive fuel.
The unemployment rate stayed at a high 12.0% in January 
2014, stable since October 2013. Data from Eurostat show that 
19.1 million people were unemployed in January 2014, slightly more 
than in December. Labor market conditions are diverse in the 
region, with December’s highest unemployment rates in Greece 
at 28.0%, Spain at 25.8%, Cyprus at 16.8%, and Portugal at 15.3%. 
Also suffering double-digit rates are Italy at 12.9% and France at 
10.9%. Germany’s unemployment rate was a low 5.0% (Figure A1.7). 
Youth unemployment improved slightly to 23.8% in December 2013 
from 24.0% in the previous 3 months.
Inflation slowed throughout 2013, staying from February 
below the European Central Bank target of 2.0%. 
The harmonized index of consumer prices slipped further 
from an annual 0.9% in December 2013 to 0.8% in January 
2014, reflecting falling energy prices (Figure A1.8). The 
month-on-month inflation rate dropped by 1.1 percentage 
points in January 2014, reversing a 0.4 percentage point 
increase in December 2013. Though inflation remains 
subdued, the European Central Bank decided at its March 
meeting to keep the main refinancing interest rate unchanged 
at 0.25%, where it has been since a rate cut in November 2013. 
The central bank expects the recovery indicated in recent 
data to continue, albeit at a slow pace.
Credit conditions remain weak in euro area economies 
because banks’ balance sheet problems are unresolved 
and confidence in the financial sector is low. Loans to 
nonfinancial corporations continued to fall, by 3.1% 
year on year in February 2014, adjusted for sales and 
A1.7 Unemployment rate, selected euro area countries
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securitization. Loans to households increased only slightly, by 0.2%. 
Financial fragmentation remains a problem, with bank rates for lending 
to households and businesses higher in the periphery than in the 
core countries.
For the euro area as a whole, the outlook is for mildly recovering 
growth and subdued inflation. A key concern in most of the euro area 
continues to be unemployment, which can have a detrimental effect on 
consumption and growth. Investment must also pick up to boost real 
GDP growth. In sum, the euro area is expected to see 1.0% growth in 
2014 picking up to 1.4% in 2015. However, depressed demand, credit 
contraction, and a strong currency could conspire to keep inflation low 
for a protracted period, which would further suppress growth.
Japan
Japan posted annual growth at 1.5% last year. Although domestic 
demand held up well throughout 2013 as consumers bought ahead 
of the April 2014 hike in the value-added tax (VAT) from 5% to 8%, 
growth turned sluggish in the second half of 2013, rising at a seasonally 
adjusted annual average rate (saar) of less than 1% as exports to 
developing Asia weakened. Still, actual growth was faster than the 
potential rate estimated by the Cabinet Office. The gap between the 
economy’s current output and its potential output has narrowed from 
the 8.1% of GDP reached during the trough of the global financial crisis 
to 1.5% of GDP in 2013. 
Throughout 2013, private consumption and public demand 
were the main drivers of growth in Japan. Public investment in 
particular grew substantially in the second and third quarters, 
by more than 30% year on year in each quarter. This is because 
public works contracted earlier in 2103 were executed during 
this period. Public demand (public investment combined 
with resilient government consumption, which provided 
20% of GDP) contributed nearly 1 percentage point or more 
to growth in every quarter of 2013. Private investment also 
strengthened in the second half, driven by the new investment 
in construction and services (Figure A1.9).
Imports of goods and services continued to pick up in 
tandem with strong domestic demand, growing by a saar of 
2.1% in the first half of 2013 and 10.5% in the second half. 
In particular, imports of capital equipment surged to 5% 
real growth, and consumer nondurable goods to 3%. These 
results come even after accounting for the strong import price 
increase of 12% in local currency terms caused by the 21% 
depreciation of the yen in the first 9 months of 2013. Given 
continued strong demand for energy imports since nuclear plants shut 
down in the aftermath of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011, 
growth in imports of mineral fuels, such as liquefied natural gas from 
the Russian Federation, became particularly significant. 
While yen depreciation has inflated import bills in the local 
currency, it has not markedly boosted exports. Despite yen depreciation, 
exports dropped sharply in the second half of 2013 to post growth at a 
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saar of only 1.9%, down from 8.5% in the first half. Growth 
in exports to Japan’s major export destination—Asia, which 
receives nearly half of all exports—decelerated significantly. 
Exports to member economies in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations dropped particularly sharply by 8% year on 
year as economies weakened, notably in Thailand, where 
Japanese automobile companies ship intermediate inputs 
from Japan for assembly. Moreover, because Japan has 
shifted its production abroad over recent decades, it has less 
to gain from a competitive currency. As investment income 
declined somewhat toward the end of 2013, Japan’s current 
account fell into a deficit of $13.4 trillion in the fourth quarter 
of 2013. This is Japan’s first quarterly current account deficit 
recorded since the compilation of comparable data began in 
1985, and the $34.3 trillion surplus for the year as a whole is 
the smallest recorded in the same period (Figure A1.10).
Japan’s long-awaited exit from deflation seems to be 
on track, though the main driver so far seems to be the 
depreciated yen pushing up prices for imported products. Headline 
consumer price index (CPI) inflation started to rise in June, driven 
largely by higher prices for energy and imports generally. The CPI 
excluding food and energy also started to post positive inflation by 
October. The rise has been broad-based but most significant in surges 
in fuel prices, electricity and water utility rates, and transportation and 
communications costs. 
Japan’s growth trajectory is uncertain and subject to various 
risks both external and domestic. On the domestic front is concern 
over VAT hikes scheduled for April 2014 and October 2015. As much 
of private consumption for this year has been frontloaded into the 
first quarter, prior to the introduction on 1 April of the higher 8% 
VAT rate, the rest of the year is expected to experience muted private 
consumption (particularly of durable goods) and residential investment. 
The supplementary budget, equal to 1% of GDP and approved in 
February 2014, may mitigate the impact of the VAT hike somewhat, 
but the bulk of domestic demand this year looks set to come from 
nonresidential investment and public works. Although 
nominal wages look set to gradually pick up this year, 
consumption growth may be dented if the rise is slower than 
CPI inflation (Figure A1.11).
Meanwhile, fiscal consolidation is likely to crimp public 
consumption and investment in 2015. Growth in 2015 will 
have to come from private demand, specifically private 
investment and consumption. New investments, new 
hiring, and wage increases are currently concentrated in 
construction, the sector benefitting from public works, but 
recent data show upticks in new investment in agriculture 
and services. The Tankan survey of business conditions 
suggests that firms across sectors see an improving outlook. 
Machinery orders, a leading indicator of private capital 
expenditure, have been growing, and new temporary jobs are 
swelling the workforce. 
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Externally, weak demand in Asia is a concern. Although the global 
economy is expected to recover gradually over the next 2 years, 
sluggishness persists in Japan’s major trading partners in the region. 
On the other hand, import demand, particularly for energy imports, is 
expected to stay robust this year, though it may gradually moderate in 
2015 as some nuclear plants and oil refineries resume operations this 
year. All in all, the trade deficit will likely widen further this year before 
narrowing somewhat next year. 
Japan’s announced fiscal stimulus will mitigate the impact of VAT 
hike, probably allowing private consumption to remain resilient as it 
grows only a bit more slowly at about 1%. Meanwhile, external demand, 
particularly in the US and euro area, will gain strength in the second 
half of 2014. This analysis assumes the VAT to be hiked further, as 
planned, from 8% to 10% on 1 October 2015, and monetary policy to 
remain accommodative. A modest fiscal stimulus equal to about 1% of 
GDP may accompany the 2015 VAT hike to smooth its impact, but the 
government is expected to continue striving for fiscal consolidation. 
Considering all factors, GDP growth in Japan is forecast to be flat at 
1.3% in 2014 and 2015. Short- and long-term interest rates alike are 
assumed to remain low to support economic activity (Box A1.1).
Headline CPI inflation, excluding the impact of VAT hikes, is likely 
to exceed 1.0% this year and 1.5% in 2015. The yen may depreciate 
further, driven down by the widening interest rate gap as the US 
recovers and continues tapering its quantitative easing, but impacts on 
the real exchange rate are expected to be limited as domestic prices 
surge in Japan.
Commodity prices
Average commodity prices declined in 2013. Oil prices, though lower than 
last year as supply conditions improved and demand remained low, have 
stayed elevated because of geopolitical concerns and output disruptions. 
Most agricultural commodity prices continued to be weak, but tight 
stocks will keep prices sensitive to the weather.
Oil prices
The international benchmark Brent crude averaged $108.9 per 
barrel in 2013, 2.8% lower than the average of $112 in 2012 
(Figure A1.12). Brent crude has averaged above $100 every 
year since 2011, having more than tripled in the decade since 
2003, when it was less than $30/barrel. Although the price 
has greatly increased, volatility has calmed. In the 3 years 
that the price has averaged above $100, volatility has faded 
to record lows and the price trend has flattened from its 
historical upward trend.
Despite strengthened supply and still-restrained demand, 
oil prices have remained elevated because of continuing 
supply risks. Unplanned supply disruptions have removed 
oil from the market, and fears of further disruptions make 
the market nervous, adding a risk premium that keeps oil 
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A1.1  Why hasn’t Japan’s massive government debt wreaked havoc (yet)?
The most common answer to the question posed in the 
title above is that Japan has not had to borrow from 
abroad and bear those risks. Japan has been able to 
finance a high proportion of its massive government 
debt domestically because domestic savings are very 
high relative to domestic investment, and the home 
bias of Japanese investors is strong. Household savings 
deposited in bank and postal accounts, insurance policies, 
and pension funds have been funneled into government 
securities through government financial institutions, 
private banks, and insurance companies. As a result, the 
share of Japanese government securities held by foreigners 
was never more than 11% until 2006 (Horioka et al. 2013).
Starting in 2007, however, foreign holdings of short-term 
Japanese government securities skyrocketed to as high as 
30%, though foreign holdings of medium- and long-term 
government securities remained below 7% (box figure). 
This transformation can be largely explained by two 
developments. First, the yields of these securities became 
relatively attractive as yields elsewhere, in the US and 
the euro area in particular, fell sharply in 2008–2009 as 
a result of monetary easing in response to the Lehman 
crisis. Second, the risk gap between Japanese government 
securities and alternative government securities widened 
dramatically from late 2008 to early 2010 as risk spiked 
for the latter with the advent of the debt crisis in the euro 
area. Both factors forced risk-adjusted hedged returns on 
government securities in the US and the euro area down 
toward convergence with Japanese returns in 2008–2009 
and, in some cases, below Japanese returns thereafter. 
Relatively high return and low risk induced foreign 
investors to shift their portfolios into Japanese government 
securities, sharply increasing foreign holdings of short-term 
Japanese government securities (Horioka et al. 2014).
However, the surge in foreign holdings of Japanese 
government securities will not continue indefinitely 
because risks in the rest of the world will eventually 
subside—by early 2010, risk had already declined sharply 
for US and euro area government securities—and investors’ 
appetite for risk will eventually return as the euro area 
crisis recedes. In addition, as bond markets develop in 
emerging Asia, they become increasingly competitive with 
Japanese bonds, especially as they offer higher yields and 
the possibility of currency appreciation as their economies 
grow. In fact, foreign holdings of short-term Japanese 
government securities slipped somewhat to 28% in 
September 2013 after peaking at 30% a year earlier. 
The current situation is even more tenuous than it 
appears at first blush because higher foreign holdings 
and shortening maturities, especially for foreign holdings, 
make rolling over Japanese government securities 
more difficult and heighten the risk of trends suddenly 
reversing, as is now observed. Also, household and 
individual saving rates in Japan can be expected to decline 
even further as the population continues to age, depriving 
domestic banks and insurance companies of sufficient 
bank and postal deposits, insurance policies, and pension 
funds to invest in Japanese government securities. 
The Japanese government has managed to buy time 
by inducing foreign investors to invest temporarily in 
Japanese government securities, but pressure is building 
to rein in Japan’s uniquely high ratio of government debt 
to GDP. One way is to reduce government debt itself 
by raising tax revenues, as the Japanese government is 
doing. Another is to cut government expenditure by, for 
example, reforming the public pension system and other 
social safety nets. The other way is to stimulate economic 
growth, which the current government is trying to do 
using the “three arrows of Abenomics”: massive fiscal 
stimulus, aggressive monetary easing, and structural 
reform to boost competitiveness. 
Japan’s huge government debt has not wreaked havoc 
in the past because it was covered by robust domestic 
savings, especially household savings and, more recently, 
corporate savings, and by a temporary inflow of foreign 
capital provided by the global financial crisis. However, it 
may wreak havoc in the future as these factors fade, unless 
the government debt-to-GDP ratio is quickly brought 
under control.
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prices firm. The Energy Information Agency estimates that 
disruptions in 2013 removed an average of 2.6 million barrels 
per day from global markets (Figure A1.13). 
Thus, after ending 2013 at $110/barrel, oil is currently 
trading in the narrow band of $107–$112. Factors supporting 
the price are cold weather in the US that boosted demand for 
heating fuel and a rebound in demand in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as it 
slowly regains its growth momentum. As noted by the latest 
International Energy Agency (IEA) report, commercial 
inventories in the OECD have been depleted to their 
lowest since 2008 by unexpectedly strong demand, which 
has tightened the market and challenged predictions of 
oversupply. In the short-run, with futures below the current 
price, there is no incentive to build stocks, making the market 
tight and keeping prices firm (Figure A1.14).
Another factor keeping oil prices stubbornly fixed is the 
willingness of swing producers in the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut supply and 
support prices. Saudi Arabia has gone from producing some 10.1 million 
barrels per day (mb/d) in August 2013 to 9.6 mb/d in January 2014. 
In its December 2013 conference, OPEC decided to maintain its notional 
target of 30 mb/d “in the interest of maintaining market equilibrium.” 
According to the organization, the projected increase in world oil 
demand can easily be matched by production increases outside of OPEC, 
but OPEC members will be ready to respond to any developments that 
threaten to adversely affect the oil market.
The IEA forecasts global oil demand to grow in 2014 by 1.4 mb/d 
to reach 92.7 mb/d as the world economy strengthens. Although oil 
demand in the OECD has shown signs of recovery, the IEA observes, the 
main engine for growth in global demand for oil will still be elsewhere. 
So will some downside risks. Recent currency volatility in some large 
emerging market economies—notably Brazil, India, Indonesia, South 
Africa, and Turkey—has raised the local price of imported commodities 
such as crude oil, tempering demand for them. Consequently, central 
banks in some emerging markets have raised interest rates to contain 
inflation, but this can slow economic growth and, like currency 
depreciation, undermine demand for crude oil.
Oil supply from outside OPEC is forecast to increase by 1.7 mb/d 
in 2014, led by production increases in the US and Canada. The supply 
of crude oil from the US grew by 15% in 2013, the fastest growth 
in production to be achieved by any country in the past 2 decades. 
Output from Canada is forecast to remain healthy on continued growth 
in production from oil sands and conventional oilfields. Production 
increases are also forecast from Brazil and Kazakhstan. The recently 
completed pipeline for crude oil exports from Iraq to Turkey is another 
potential source of supply.
Supply disruptions will remain a key feature of the oil market. 
The Energy Information Administration estimates that 3.0 mb/d of 
oil was removed from oil markets in February 2014. As an example, 
concerns about Libyan supply had been calmed after production 
in January more than doubled monthly output at the end of 2013. 
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However, in February 2014, the partial shutdown of a pipeline 
in Libya following protests drove oil production down again 
to below 341,000 barrels per day. The ban on Iran’s crude 
exports remains, though some insurance provisions have 
been relaxed after an interim nuclear accord between Iran 
and the UN. The relaxation of sanctions may lead to small 
increases in crude oil exports, but it will be some time before 
Iran is able to fully rejoin the market. The recent escalation 
of hostilities and conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and South 
Sudan also pose downside supply risks.
On the whole, better supply conditions will continue 
but will likely be countered by an increase in world demand 
as global economic conditions improve, albeit uncertainly. 
The price of crude oil is forecast to soften but remain above 
$100, settling at $106 in 2014 and $103 in 2015. 
Food prices
Prices for food and other agricultural commodities 
continued to be weak in 2013 (Figure A1.15). The agricultural 
commodity index was down by 7% in 2013. Its sub-indexes—
beverages, food, and raw materials—all dropped. Beverages 
led the decline, down by more than 10.0% from the previous 
year, followed by food with a 7.1% decline year on year and 
then raw materials down by 5.9%. Similarly, all sub-indexes 
of food fell in 2013: grains by 9.3%, edible oils by 8.1%, and 
other food by 3.0%. Grain prices have been declining steadily 
since July 2013 on account of continuously improving supply 
conditions. Year-on-year changes to the prices of wheat and 
maize have been negative since July, and of rice since May. 
The food price index averaged 113 points in February 
2014, 3.9% above the January average but still 6.9% lower 
than a year before. February’s rebound, the sharpest 
month-on-month increase since July 2012, resulted from 
strengthening in all its sub-indexes. The commodities that 
exhibited high rises were sugar at 6.3%, wheat at 6.1%, 
maize at 5.7%, and edible oils at 4.2%. Weather-related 
uncertainty triggered upward price movements for sugar, 
soybeans, maize, wheat, and palm oil. Prices for sugar and 
soybeans rose on concern over unfavorable weather in Brazil. 
Wheat and maize prices reacted positively to prolonged cold weather 
in the US, while palm oil prices found support in concern over dry 
weather in some major production areas in Southeast Asia. Political 
uncertainty around the Black Sea, notably in Ukraine, also supported 
wheat and maize prices, while export prices for Thai rice increased as 
irregularities surrounding the government’s paddy pledging scheme 
remained unresolved. Aside from these supply-side risks, buoyant 
demand supported maize and palm oil prices.
The outlook for the supply of food commodities remains favorable. 
The Agriculture Market Information System Market Monitor noted 
uncertainty arising from geopolitical tensions in the Black Sea region 
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but expects bumper crops from multiple producers in 2014 
to run up world stocks of maize, wheat, rice, and—despite 
adverse weather in South America—soybeans. The same 
favorable outlook can be gleaned from the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) March 2014 report, which projects 
slightly higher grain output in the crop year 2013/14. 
The USDA now forecasts 2013/14 grain production to reach 
2.45 billion tons from an estimated 2.26 billion tons the year 
before. It also forecasts the production of wheat to rise by 
8.6% year on year, maize by 12.1%, and rice by 0.7%. 
The drag on rice prices will continue this year, absent 
any major production setback, as millions of tons of Thai rice 
are poised to enter the market following the expiration in 
February 2014 of the rice subsidy scheme. The scheme, which 
was launched in 2011, cost the Thai government billions of 
dollars as it paid rice farmers nearly double market rates. 
Market analysts have been quick to point out that rice prices 
will not go into free fall, as exporters will be unwilling to sell below 
cost. Rice prices are therefore expected to hover within the range of 
$400–$450 per ton. Maize and wheat prices are also expected to stay 
low, as initial yield estimates remain favorable for the current crop and 
the following year. 
The increase in grain production has bolstered stock-to-use ratios. 
Latest estimates for 2013/14 using USDA forecasts yield stock-to-use 
ratios of 16.8% for maize, 26.1% for wheat, and 23.6% for rice. Although 
well within their range in recent years, the ratios are lower than in 
the early 2000s (Figure A1.16). As such, tight stocks will keep prices 
sensitive to the weather. Prices could rise substantially if a major 
production shortfall were to occur. Absent adverse weather, a surge in 
energy prices, or a revival of protectionist trade policies, food prices are 
forecast to decline by 3.5% in 2014 and 1.0% in 2015.
External environment in sum
Demand for imports from the major industrial economies may improve 
gradually as growth there continues to gain traction, and developing 
Asia could see their exports pick up. Despite continuing accommodative 
monetary policy in the US, Europe, and Japan, volatility remains a risk 
for emerging financial markets as the unwinding of the US bond-buying 
program continues to unsettle global investors. Although sensitive to 
potential disruptions, international prices for oil and food are otherwise 
largely immune to inflation to the forecast horizon, which is putting 
downward pressure on inflation globally, including in Asia.
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Fiscal policy for 
inclusive growth
2

As it transforms itself from a low-income region into a middle-income 
region, developing Asia faces the critical strategic challenge of making 
its growth process more inclusive. The sustained and rapid economic 
growth that transformed the region was fueled by globalization, 
technological progress, and market reform. Yet those same market 
forces that enormously benefited the region are now worsening the 
income gulf between the rich and the poor across Asia. 
Widening inequality is not only a matter of equity. If left 
unchecked, it may undermine the social and political stability 
that has underpinned the region’s exceptional growth 
performance in the past few decades. Therefore, governments 
may need to take action to level the playing field and to 
expand access to opportunity so that the broadest swathe of 
society, including the poor, enjoys the fruits of growth.
Government expenditures in developing Asia are small 
by international standards. They are much less than in the 
advanced countries, Latin America (which is comparable 
with developing Asia in terms of income and development), 
or the world at large (Figure 2.0.1). To some extent, this 
generalization reflects the region’s strong tradition of fiscal 
prudence, as Asian governments have, by and large, lived 
within their means and avoided unsustainable expansion. 
The role of fiscal policy in Asia has been to foster economic 
growth by providing macroeconomic stability and 
growth-conducive investments in physical infrastructure 
and education. Growth rather than equity has been the 
ultimate objective of this approach to fiscal policy, even though it may 
incidentally have promoted equity in the process.
Yet, if governments are to play an active role in fostering inclusive 
growth, fiscal policy will have to come to the fore. At the same time, 
Asia’s policy makers are well aware of the value of fiscal prudence that 
creates fiscal space, or spending flexibility, to ensure macroeconomic 
stability. They are also aware that structural changes like aging 
populations may encroach on this fiscal space. Therefore, the central 
dilemma facing Asia is how to use fiscal policy for inclusive growth 
without compromising fiscal sustainability. Is it possible for the region 
to pursue inclusive yet prudent fiscal policy?
Fiscal policy for inclusive growth
This chapter was written by Donghyun Park of the Economics and Research Department. 
It draws on the background papers listed at the end of the chapter. Background materials 
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The emerging case for 
inclusive fiscal policy
Sustained and rapid growth during the past few decades 
sharply lifted general living standards across developing 
Asia and enabled hundreds of millions in the region to lead 
more dignified and productive lives. According to Asian 
Development Outlook 2012, Asia’s GDP grew in purchasing 
power parity terms by an average of 7.0% from 1990 to 2010 
(Figure 2.1.1). This rapid expansion helped more than 700 
million people escape poverty, slashing the percentage of 
people living at or below the $1.25/day poverty line from 52% 
in 1990 to 21% in 2010.
But Asian Development Outlook 2012 warned that 
widening inequality was undermining efforts to eliminate 
poverty. The Gini coefficient, a widely used measure of 
inequality in per capita income or expenditure, rose from 
the early 1990s to the late 2000s in 11 of 28 Asian countries 
that provide comparable data, the higher Gini coefficients 
indicating worsening inequality (Box 2.1.1). The 11 countries—
which include the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, 
and Indonesia—hold 82% of Asia’s population (Figure 2.1.2). 
Widening inequality dampens the poverty-reducing effect 
of economic growth. If inequality had remained constant in 
these 11 countries, the same rate of growth would have lifted 
out of poverty an additional 240 million people, or 6.5% of 
their total population.
In response to worsening inequality, the authorities in 
developing Asia are exploring ways to make growth more 
inclusive. According to one definition (Zhuang and Ali 2010), 
inclusive growth is “growth that is based on equality of 
opportunity.” In other words, growth is inclusive when it 
allows all members of society to participate in it, contribute 
to it, and benefit from it on an equal basis, regardless of 
individual circumstances. This concept of inclusive growth 
is based on creating economic opportunity and making 
opportunity accessible to all. While equality of opportunity is 
perhaps the defining characteristic of inclusive growth, the 
concept encompasses the need to protect the destitute and 
most vulnerable.
As incomes rise, the quality of economic development—
that is, how the public experiences the environmental 
and social consequences of growth—becomes increasingly 
important. In Asia, the demand to make growth more inclusive 
follows on the region’s development success as it becomes 
increasingly middle income. The demand also mirrors growing 
recognition that the same market forces that accelerate 
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growth can exacerbate inequality. For example, technological progress 
will disproportionately benefit richer and better-educated population 
groups, who are more comfortable with new technologies. Likewise, 
the expansion of trade, which served as the springboard for Asia’s rapid 
growth, benefits some firms and households while it hurts others. The 
solution is not to block pro-growth market forces but to create a level 
playing field on which everybody has an opportunity to take advantage 
of those forces. This failure of market forces to ensure equal opportunity 
suggests a need for government intervention to make growth inclusive. 
One important instrument available to the government for bringing 
about a more inclusive society is fiscal policy. Governments can design 
spending programs and tap revenue sources in ways that reduce 
inequality. For example, means-tested government grant programs, 
which provide cash or in-kind assistance to households below a specified 
income threshold, are geared to reduce inequality and poverty directly. 
Public health and education spending can, like government transfers, 
be potent tools to reduce inequality. On the revenue side, progressive 
personal income tax, which imposes a higher tax burden according to 
ability to pay, is a classic example of equality-enhancing revenue policy. 
Historically in Asia, the role of fiscal policy has been to facilitate 
economic growth by providing basic infrastructure while safeguarding 
macroeconomic stability. A tradition of fiscal prudence was instrumental 
in Asia’s past success, along with public investments in growth-
conducive physical and human capital. While some public spending 
such as on public education contributes to both higher growth and 
equality, the primary objective of fiscal policy and broader government 
policy lay in fostering economic growth—an understandable priority 
when Asia’s economies were largely low income. This is not to say that 
Asia refrained altogether from using fiscal policy to share the economic 
pie more equally, but rather that the main focus was to foster rapid 
growth and thus provide a bigger pie. 
As a result, the authorities in Asia possess, by and large, only 
limited experience in using fiscal policy to promote equity, in 
contrast with their counterparts in advanced economies. But 
the difference does not simply come down to lower income. 
Developing Asia also lags Latin America in using fiscal policy 
to promote inclusion. 
While Latin America still suffers stark inequality, the 
region has made some progress toward equality over the 
past 2 decades, even as equality in other regions, notably 
developing Asia, has slipped.
Evidence indicates that Asia falls short relative to the 
advanced economies and Latin America in three equity-
promoting fiscal expenditures: education, health care, and 
social protection. Education and health care directly improve 
the welfare of the poor even as these services augment their 
human capital and productive capacity. Social protection 
helps to protect individuals from the risks and uncertainties 
of life. Public spending on education averages 5.3% of GDP 
in the advanced economies and 5.5% in Latin America but 
only 2.9% in Asia (Figure 2.1.3). The difference is starker 
2.1.3  Share of education, health care, and social protection 
in GDP in 2010, weighted average
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2.2.1 The Gini coefficient defined
The Gini coefficient measures how 
income or consumption expenditures 
are distributed across households. 
In the theoretical situation of perfect 
inequality where only one person has 
all of the income, the Gini coefficient 
will be 1. If, at the other extreme, the 
economy has achieved perfect equality 
with all incomes exactly the same, the 
Gini coefficient will be 0.
Mathematically, consider income 
data on an economy of n households 
that have been sorted according to 
household income, such that the first 
observation is the poorest household 
and nth observation is the richest. 
If the income of observation i is 
denoted as xi and the average income 
of all households as µx, then the Gini 
coefficient is calculated as
The theme chapter follows the 
convention of multiplying the Gini 
coefficient by 100 so that it ranges 
from 0 to 100.
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for public spending on health care, which equals 8.1% of 
GDP on average in the developed world and 3.9% in Latin 
America but a paltry 2.4% in developing Asia. Finally, Asian 
governments devote 6.2% of GDP to social protection, 
essentially half of Latin America’s 12.0% and less than a 
third of the advanced economies’ 20.0%. 
Seen from the perspective of the human economic life 
cycle, Asia uses public transfers for old age support less 
than do other regions (Lee and Mason 2012). During this 
cycle, individuals consume more than they produce when 
they are young and again when they are elderly. They do 
the opposite when they are of working age. A combination 
of private transfers within the family and public transfers 
through government programs finances the gap between 
consumption and production in childhood and old age. 
The relative role of private versus public transfers in 
financing the deficit differs markedly across Asia, Europe, 
and Latin America. For children, private transfers play 
a bigger role in Asia and Latin America than in Europe 
(Figure 2.1.4). The percentage of a child’s total material 
needs covered by the family, such as education and nutrition, 
stands at 70% in Taipei,China, 82% in the Philippines, and 
83% in India. Meanwhile, for the elderly, public transfers 
to cover health care and long-term care are smaller in Asia 
than elsewhere (Figure 2.1.5). 
Nevertheless, governments around the region are rising 
to the challenge of rendering growth more inclusive by 
making it a higher priority on their policy agendas. This 
is evident in countries at all stages of development and 
income. In the Republic of Korea, both of the two main 
political parties promised sharp increases in social welfare 
spending in the 2012 presidential elections. In the PRC, 
the government has since 2006 embraced as a broader development 
objective the concept of a “harmonious society,” which resonates 
with inclusive growth. In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session 
of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of the PRC 
adopted its Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms, which accords a high priority to improving 
income distribution. Since then, several concrete policy measures 
have been announced, including the plan to unify the social security 
schemes for urban and rural populations. The Government of India 
has adopted a development strategy with two goals: lifting economic 
growth and making growth as inclusive as possible. In Southeast Asia, 
many governments have set promoting inclusive growth as the goal 
of their medium-term development plans, some with explicit targets 
(Kanbur et al. 2014). 
If Asia is to use fiscal policy more actively for inclusive growth, it 
must do so without compromising two key strategic priorities: economic 
growth itself and fiscal sustainability. For all its success, Asia still 
needs sustained, rapid growth to raise per capita income. The region 
is still home to two-thirds of the world’s poor, so sustained economic 
2.1.4  Private transfers as a proportion of the life cycle 
deficit for ages 0–19 in selected economies in Asia 
and elsewhere
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growth remains critical to eliminate poverty. Yet inclusive 
growth will ultimately suffer if, for example, burdensome 
taxes distort decisions to invest or hire workers. Moreover, 
the benefits of fiscal prudence should not be discounted. 
Pragmatic fiscal policy in many Asian economies has 
supported macroeconomic stability and opened adequate 
fiscal space, which is a highly valuable resource for fending 
off such severe shocks as the recent global financial crisis 
and for addressing medium-term fiscal demands such as 
those made by aging populations. 
Expanding the role of fiscal policy to fight inequality 
should not undermine fiscal sustainability. Yet tensions are 
surfacing between these competing ends. In the Republic of 
Korea, a new social pension scheme to provide basic income 
support to the elderly, scheduled to be introduced in July 
2014, had to be scaled back in response to fiscal concerns. 
In India, legislation was passed in September 2013 that 
guarantees nearly 70% of the country’s 1.2 billion citizens 
access to subsidized food. The estimated cost of $20 billion 
per year is contributing to concerns about India’s already 
chronic fiscal deficits. Likewise, Thailand’s ongoing rice 
subsidy scheme, under which the government buys rice 
from Thai farmers at 50% above market prices, is estimated 
to have cost the government over $12 billion in 2012. A key 
challenge is how to leverage fiscal policy for more inclusive 
growth while maintaining fiscal sustainability.
2.1.5  Support system for people aged 65 and above, 
selected economies in Asia and elsewhere
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Public spending to foster 
inclusive growth 
Fiscal policy comprises public spending programs and how revenue 
is secured to finance them. Government expenditures cover a broad 
range of activities. Current expenditures pay for such recurring costs 
as salaries for teachers, police, and other civil servants, and capital 
investments finance the construction of new roads or ports. The revenue 
side is similarly diverse, consisting of conventional tax revenues, such 
as value-added taxes and income taxes, and such nontax revenues as 
proceeds from the sale of state assets. 
In principle, governments can calibrate either their spending 
programs or their revenue sources to promote inclusion—or both. Cash 
transfers are expenditures that can directly boost the incomes of poorer 
households, and the poor often benefit more than the rich from free 
or subsidized public education and health-care services because they 
cannot afford private substitutes. On the revenue side, progressive 
personal income tax, under which tax rates increase with income, is a 
classic example of an equity-enhancing policy. Better-off households 
may also pay more property tax than poorer ones because their property 
is worth more. Given the diversity of government programs, it is likely 
that some fiscal tools will have bigger impacts on inequality than 
others. But which spending and revenue levers most effectively promote 
inclusive growth?
Empirical evidence on public spending 
for inclusive growth
Whether fiscal policy can promote inclusive growth—and, 
if so, which fiscal tools are more effective—are ultimately 
empirical questions. The evidence, presented below, suggests 
that while fiscal policy can reduce inequality from either 
the spending or the revenue side, the impact from public 
spending is significantly greater. The evidence also finds 
public spending on health, education, and direct transfers 
to be particularly effective ways to reduce inequality in 
developing Asia.
A review of published findings
In the advanced economies, fiscal policy contributes 
significantly to reducing inequality, according to a 
comprehensive review by Bastagli et al. (2012). The effect 
was more pronounced in economies initially beset by high 
inequality. After factoring in high taxes, subsidies, and 
direct transfers, the Gini coefficient in these economies 
2.2.1  Effect of taxation and transfers on Gini coefficients, 
OECD member countries 
0
20
40
60
80
G
in
i a
fte
r t
ax
at
io
n 
an
d 
tra
ns
fe
rs
0 20 40 60 80
Gini before taxation and transfers
Ine
qu
alit
y w
ide
ns
Ine
qu
alit
y n
arr
ow
s
Ine
qu
alit
y is
 th
e s
am
e b
efo
re a
nd
 aft
er 
tax
es 
and
 su
bsi
die
s
Source: Hur, forthcoming.
Fiscal policy for inclusive growth  49
is lower than the pretax Gini (that is, calculated without 
regard to corrective spending or taxes), as illustrated by the 
observations being clustered below the 45 degree line in 
Figure 2.2.1. For each year between 1985 and 2005, fiscal 
policy reduced the Gini coefficient in 25 member economies 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) by an average of around 15 percentage 
points (OECD 2011). The results were uneven from country 
to country. For 2005, fiscal policy reduced inequality by at 
least 20 points in 7 economies and by less than 10 points 
in 5 economies, with the other 13 economies recording 
Gini coefficient declines in the range of 10–20 points. 
Cash transfers that were not means tested, such as public 
pensions and universal child benefits, accounted for the bulk 
of equity-promoting expenditures in the advanced economies 
(Paulus et al. 2009, Immervoll et al. 2005). 
In contrast to the advanced economies, fiscal policy in 
developing countries has only a limited effect on inequality. 
According to Bastagli et al. (2012), low taxes and transfers 
greatly limit the redistributive impact of fiscal policy in 
developing economies. While average tax ratios in advanced 
economies exceed 30% of GDP, developing economies’ tax 
ratios generally fall much lower, in the range of 15%–20% 
of GDP. Partly as a consequence of this tighter resource 
envelope, public spending—especially on transfers—is 
lower in developing economies, especially in Asia and in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Transfer programs’ meager coverage 
and benefits, along with the widespread use of regressive tax 
instruments, compound the effects of low tax and spending 
levels (Cubero and Hollar 2010). Further, evidence indicates 
that aggregate spending on education and health care has 
been regressive in developing countries, with the lowest 40% 
of the population generally receiving less than 40% of the 
benefits (Figure 2.2.2). This is because some components 
are regressive. While primary education can be progressive, 
for example, the benefit from total education spending is 
dominated by the regressive nature of secondary and tertiary 
education.
One result that emerges consistently from the literature, 
applicable to both advanced and developing economies, is that 
public spending has a bigger impact on reducing inequality 
than does taxation. According to Bastagli et al. (2012), 
expenditures, especially transfers without means tests, 
contributed more to income redistribution than did taxes. On 
average, redistribution via cash transfers is twice as large as 
redistribution via taxes, with the United States as the only 
exception to this pattern. In developing countries, taxes have 
been found to exert at best only a limited effect on income 
inequality, pushing the average Gini for disposable income 
only slightly below the pretax income Gini, to 34 from 38 
(Chu et al. 2004).
2.2.2  Percentage of public spending going to poorest 40% 
of households
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Public spending on education and health in particular seem to offer 
a lot of scope for reducing inequality. Using a data set covering both 
advanced and developing economies, Martinez-Vasquez et al. (2012) find 
that aggregate government expenditures on social welfare, education, 
health, and housing significantly reduce income inequality over time. 
Journard et al. (2012) and Cubero and Hollar (2010) find similar results 
for public spending on education and health. Notwithstanding some 
counterevidence—for example, the Clements (1997) finding in Brazil that 
government social expenditures worsen income inequality—the weight 
of the evidence supports an equity-enhancing effect. Significantly, this 
effect is larger for expenditures such as on primary education and basic 
health care that are heavily used by the poor (Bastagli et al. 2012).
By requiring low-income households to make education or health 
investments to qualify for income support, conditional cash transfers can 
create synergy between direct income transfers and public education and 
health services, compounding their reduction of inequality. Conditional 
cash transfers have become especially well established in Latin America, 
where they have significantly reduced inequality in many countries. 
In Brazil and Mexico, home to the two largest conditional cash transfer 
programs, the programs account for about 20% of the decline in 
inequality from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (Soares et al. 2007).
Significantly, Claus et al. (2014) confirm that the two main 
lessons from the broader literature for developing Asia are that fiscal 
expenditures, not taxation, offer the most effective means of lowering 
inequality and that the public spending best able to reduce inequality is 
on education and health care. Their analysis of data from 150 countries 
spanning 1970–2009 shows that, despite tax systems tending to be 
progressive, government expenditures are more effective at 
redistributing income. Government expenditures on health 
care and education are found to reduce income inequality in 
Asia and the rest of the world, as Table 2.2.1 shows (minus 
signs indicating improved equality). However, the study 
suggests that government expenditures on social protection 
and housing in Asia do not reduce inequality, as they do in 
the rest of the world, but actually worsen it. One possible 
explanation is that social protection and public housing 
in developing countries tend to benefit people living in 
cities, who are generally better off than rural populations. 
The lesson here is the importance of extending social 
protection and public housing benefits to the rural poor.
With respect to government spending policies, Asia has made 
substantial progress toward achieving Millennium Development Goals 
for education and health. However, social protection policies generally 
remain limited in Asia; where they exist at all, benefit coverage 
tends to be narrow and not well-targeted to the poor. Unemployment 
benefits are typically restricted to those who lost formal employment, 
excluding the large proportion of people in informal work. Pensions 
are another example. In Asian countries outside of the OECD, pension 
systems are often quite generous in terms of early retirement eligibility 
and high pension amounts, but they are typically available only to a 
privileged minority.
2.2.1  Estimated marginal impact of government spending 
on income inequality (percentage points)
Spending type Asia Rest of the world
Social protection  0.490 –0.276
Education –0.486 –0.034
Health –0.241 −0.330
Housing  2.162 −0.614
Note: Minus sign indicates improved equality.
Source: Claus et al. 2014.
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Although more effective redistributive policies can be achieved 
with government expenditure than with taxation, some government 
spending has not been well targeted and mainly benefited higher income 
groups. General subsidies on fuel or electricity, for example, tend to be 
regressive because energy use rises with income.
Spending and inequality in Asia—a simulation
Deploying inclusive growth to eliminate poverty depends on maintaining 
growth itself. Policy interventions should broaden the opportunities for 
individuals to benefit from the growth process without derailing growth. 
Emerging empirical literature suggests that income inequality and growth 
may be intimately linked (Berg and Ostry 2011). Gauging the effect of 
fiscal spending on inclusive growth is therefore best done in a framework 
that explicitly models the linkages between the three variables: fiscal 
spending, income inequality, and economic growth (Box 2.2.1).
The empirical analysis yielded the following key results. First, gross 
fixed capital formation, public health spending, and education spending 
have significant positive effects on economic growth. However, the 
positive effects of health care and education spending on growth tend 
to be more persistent than those of gross fixed capital formation. 
Second, public health spending on both health and education seems to 
alleviate income inequality significantly in developing Asia, potentially 
furthering inclusive growth in the region. It is important to emphasize 
that the income-equalizing effect of fiscal expenditures is more evident 
in the long run. All fiscal items—except public gross capital formation 
and military spending—significantly improve the Gini coefficient with 
10-year lags. Examination of contemporaneous relationships also reveals 
a tangible effect of fiscal items on inequality.
The estimation results can be used to simulate the magnitude of the 
income-equalizing effect of an increase in a given fiscal expenditure 
category. Summing the impulse responses over 7 years, based on 
the analysis of developing Asia, can answer the following question: 
If spending on a specific fiscal program is permanently raised by 
1 percentage point of GDP, how much will the Gini coefficient change 
over 7 years? Fiscal spending on education seems to reduce inequality 
the most, lowering the Gini coefficient by a cumulative 1.1 percentage 
points. However, health and transfers also have substantial impacts, 
with Gini coefficient improvements of 0.3 percentage points and 
0.6 percentage points, respectively. The simulation results demonstrate 
that policy makers in developing Asia can deploy their spending 
programs on public education, health, and direct transfers to help 
reverse the rise in income inequality.
Public spending on health, education, transfers, 
and infrastructure
The preceding simulation illustrates the potential macro impact that 
government spending on education, health, and direct transfers can 
have on inclusive growth in developing Asia. However, it is necessary 
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2.2.1  Empirical framework to simulate the effects of public spending on inclusive growth
To simulate the impact of fiscal policy on inclusive 
growth, an empirical framework is used that can allow 
for the feedback effects between growth, inequality, and 
fiscal policy. In a recent study, Hur (forthcoming) uses 
panel vector autoregression to explicitly model these 
interdependencies.
The model includes four variables: real gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth, the Gini coefficient, total 
public spending as a percentage of GDP, and a selected 
component of government spending (such as education) 
as a percentage of GDP. By jointly including both total 
government expenditures and a single expenditure 
component, the model can distinguish between the 
effect of a change in a particular type of expenditure and 
the effect of a change in the scale of spending overall. 
Estimating the model with public education spending, for 
example, allows a more direct assessment of the impact of 
public education on growth and equity while controlling 
for the overall size of government.
The study uses annual data on 63 economies, 30 in 
developing Asia and 33 in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), spanning 
1960–2012. For the purposes of the study, the Republic of 
Korea—the one developing Asian economy that is also an 
OECD member—is classified only as developing Asia. 
Gini coefficients are drawn from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database and are based 
on incomes before taxes and transfers. Real GDP 
growth rates, total public spending, and the individual 
spending items are derived from data drawn from the 
World Development Indicators. The model is estimated 
separately for each individual expenditure item. The six 
categories of government spending analyzed are as follows 
(according to their World Development Indicator series 
names): (i) government final consumption expenditure 
(including for some goods and services it supplies directly 
to the populace), (ii) gross public capital formation, 
(iii) public health expenditure, (iv) military expenditure, 
(v) social transfer and subsidy expenditure, and (vi) public 
spending on education.
The main output of the model, the impulse response 
function, shows how the variable of interest responds over 
time to a shock to another variable over time. Box figure 1 
shows the range of possible impacts on the Gini coefficient 
(within a 90% confidence interval) of a one-time positive 
shock to public spending on education. Box figure 2 shows 
the same for public spending on health care. The impulse 
response functions suggest that both types of expenditures 
show a negative impact on the Gini—that is, they tend to 
reduce income inequality—and that the effect persists for 
several years.
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to delve deeper into the relationship between these public 
expenditures and inequality to derive clearer policy guidance. 
In addition, the foregoing analysis indicates that public 
investment in infrastructure supports growth in the region 
even though it does not appear to budge income inequality. 
This raises the question whether such investments can 
be used to ensure the poor greater economic opportunity. 
A closer look at different kinds of fiscal spending will offer 
a more concrete understanding of how fiscal spending can 
promote equity in Asia.
Public spending on education and health in Asia
Education and health care directly improve human welfare. 
This is why they form part of the broad definition of poverty 
under the Millennium Development Goals. Further, education 
and health are significant determinants of an individual’s 
earning potential. This is especially true for the poor, who 
have limited physical capital or unearned income. Better 
educated and healthier workers are more likely to find a 
job and command higher wages. Educational attainment 
and health status can be major sources of income inequality 
when there is unequal access to the two social services. 
High-income groups can better afford private education and 
health care than can low-income groups. As public spending 
often renders the two services more affordable to the poor, 
free or subsidized education and health care broadens 
access to them. 
Public spending on education
Government spending on education is rising as a percentage 
of GDP in many economies in developing Asia (Figure 2.2.3). 
Even where the share has fallen, sustained rapid growth 
implies a large expansion of outlays. Asia’s rising educational 
investment is part of a broader trend among developing 
countries, which have embarked on huge reforms to expand 
the supply of education, achieve equity in access, and 
significantly raise the quality of education (Tiongson 2005).
However, access to schooling is unequal in a number of 
Asian countries. This holds true especially in South Asia 
(Porta et al. 2011). In Pakistan, over half of the children of 
primary school age from the poorest families were out of 
school in 2006, compared with just 7% of those from the 
richest families (Figure 2.2.4). In India, children in the lowest 
income group were 5 times more likely to be out of school 
in 2005 than those in the highest income group. Similarly, 
there are wide gaps in access to secondary schooling. 
As expected, the percentage of those out of school tends to be 
higher at the secondary level (Figure 2.2.5). The percentage 
of out-of-school youths of secondary school age from families 
2.2.3 Government spending on education
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in the lowest income group in Bangladesh was a staggering 
53% in 2010, compared with only 18% of primary school 
age. These youths were nearly twice as likely as youths 
from the richest group to be out of school.
A number of factors cause these unequal outcomes. 
The poor may be unable to afford out-of-pocket costs, the 
curriculum may seem irrelevant to their circumstances, 
or they may even face discrimination from their better-off 
peers (Porta et al. 2011). As children grow older, the 
opportunity cost of keeping them out of the workforce may 
be greater than the perceived benefits of further education, 
explaining poor children’s falling enrolment rates in 
higher grades. For poor households more than others, the 
monetary and opportunity costs of sending children to 
school are high relative to income, and this accounts for 
much of the difference in enrolment rates between the poor 
and other classes (Roberts 2003). 
Evidence from Asia confirms that how governments 
spend on education affects whether it is progressive or 
regressive. Lanjouw et al. (2002) report from Indonesia 
that an increase in public spending on primary education 
tends to benefit the poorest two income quintiles the 
most. However, spending on secondary schooling mainly 
benefits the richest two quintiles. Warr et al. (2013) finds 
quantitatively similar results in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR). The poor thus benefit the most from 
an increase in public spending on primary education. One 
important caveat is that many jobs, especially in the formal 
economy, require at least a secondary education. Technical 
and vocational education that teaches students the practical 
skills and knowledge that employers demand is therefore 
especially valuable (Adams 2011).
Public spending on health care
Like education, health-care services enhance welfare in 
their own right, and public spending on health care has 
an outsized positive effect on the poor. Gupta et al. (2001) 
find that public spending on health care has a larger impact 
on the health status of the poor than on other classes. 
A 1% increase in public spending on health care reduces 
the child mortality rate in society as a whole but doubles 
the benefit for the poor. The relationship between public 
health spending and the health status of the poor tends 
to be stronger in low-income countries. This effect is 
compounded in terms of the absolute number of lives saved 
when taking into account low-income countries’ higher 
child mortality rates. The data show government spending 
on health care services on the rise across developing Asia 
(Figure 2.2.6). If implemented well, this increase could be 
quite beneficial to the poor.
2.2.6 Government spending on health
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For now, though, the poor in developing Asia suffer 
health conditions that are starkly inferior to those enjoyed by 
people with higher incomes. In Cambodia, Indonesia, Nepal, 
and the Philippines, mortality rates for children under the 
age of 5 in the poorest 20% of the population are more than 
twice those for the wealthiest 20% (Figure 2.2.7). While more 
than 60% of women in the highest income groups in the Lao 
PDR, Nepal, Pakistan, and Timor-Leste give birth attended 
by skilled health personnel, the corresponding share in the 
lowest quintile is less than 20% (Figure 2.2.8). This gap in 
health outcome by income is a strong argument for greater 
public spending on health services.
Public spending on health care also raises the income of 
the poor and protects them from financial risks. As Bidani 
and Ravallion (1997) highlight, public spending on health 
care tends to matter more to the poor for broader reasons. 
Improved health can enable them to lead more productive 
lives in school or work. By the same token, health deficiencies 
can make the poor more vulnerable, generating a vicious cycle 
of poor health and poor incomes. Household spending on a 
member’s health crisis can drive poor households deeper into 
poverty or tip the near poor into poverty. In 1998, medical 
expenses were estimated to have pushed about 3 million 
Vietnamese into poverty. Seldom are the poor enrolled in 
voluntary insurance schemes or compulsory public programs 
that provide protection against health expenditure shocks 
(World Bank 2004). 
Public health expenditures in Asia need to be made more 
inclusive in three ways. 
First, expanded health insurance for the poor and middle 
class would alleviate the stress out-of-pocket expenditures 
for health place on household income and assets. As out-of-
pocket payment for both publicly and privately provided 
health services is the norm in many Asian countries, health 
expenditures can devastate the finances of families below 
or near the poverty line (Brearley et al. 2012). Financial risk 
protection is needed in the form of well-targeted government 
subsidies to render insurance premiums affordable. However, 
such programs must be designed with careful attention to the 
fiscal impacts of more generous health service entitlements, 
as well as to improving the incentives for cost-effective and 
high-quality health care delivery. In the Philippines and 
Thailand, health insurance coverage for the poor has been 
expanded by allocating revenues raised through so-called 
“sin taxes,” or excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol. This 
extends access to health care and financial risk protection 
while discouraging the consumption of substances that pose 
health risks.
Second, Asian countries must further develop primary health care 
with subsidies and incentives to encourage the poor to adopt highly cost-
effective approaches, especially health promotion, disease prevention, 
2.2.7 Under-5 mortality rate per 1,000 live births
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and early diagnosis. The utilization of cost-effective primary health-care 
services reduces long-term health-care costs and improves health and 
productivity. There is evidence that the marginal benefits of increased 
expenditure for primary health care are pro-poor (Warr et al. 2013).
Third, Asian countries need to improve health system governance, 
accountability, and procurement practices to improve health outcomes 
from available budgets. This would enable them to magnify the inclusive 
benefits of public spending on health care without any additional 
spending. The World Health Organization estimates that 20%–40% of 
health expenditure is wasted through inefficiency. This estimate points 
to the very large potential gains to be had from improved efficiency in 
health care expenditure. Options include greater use of generic drugs 
and more rational use of medical equipment and diagnostic tests. 
Fiscal sustainability is a key concern when expanding public 
spending on health care. However, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF 2010) reported that emerging economies have the fiscal ability to 
increase health expenditure if it is done in a fiscally sustainable manner 
and avoids inefficiencies and high costs that even much wealthier 
advanced economies struggle to manage in recent years. Thailand and 
Chile have successfully expanded their basic coverage at relatively low 
fiscal cost, providing models for other countries to emulate.
Direct transfers in developing countries
Across all developing countries, ineffective targeting limits 
the redistributive capacity of direct transfer programs. 
Such programs tend to be smaller in developing Asia than 
elsewhere (Figure 2.2.9). According to Bastagli et al. (2012), 
they are hard to establish effectively in Asia because a large 
portion of the economy is informal. Expenditure on social 
assistance programs for the poor is low and poorly targeted. 
Heavy government spending on regressive general price 
subsidies such as for fuel and electricity constrain the fiscal 
space available for equity-promoting social transfers. Access 
to social insurance programs such as pensions is often 
limited to high-income workers in urban areas who enjoyed 
formal employment and to employees in the public sector. 
In many developing countries, in-kind public spending on 
key services such as education is regressive in aggregate, 
even though individual components, such as primary 
education, are progressive (Davoodi et al. 2010, Lustig et al. 2011).
In recent years, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have emerged as 
a promising option for magnifying the equity impact of public spending 
in developing countries. In essence, such programs provide monetary 
transfers to low-income households in exchange for their investing in 
the education and health of family members. In developing Asia, CCT 
programs are found in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, 
and the Philippines. Through the Pantawid Pamilya CCT program in 
the Philippines, for example, poor households with children receive 
education and health grants in exchange for education and health 
investments. Evidence on the effectiveness of CCT programs in Asia 
is still limited and mixed (Lee and Park, forthcoming). To cite one 
2.2.9  Social protection spending in selected economies, 2010
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shortcoming, many people in Bangladesh fail to participate in CCT 
programs because the benefits are very meager (Fiszbein et al. 2009).
Compared with Asia, Latin America has much larger and better 
established CCT programs. In fact, CCTs have become a distinctive and 
relatively successful form of equity-promoting public spending in Latin 
America, where 17 countries currently operate them. The two largest 
and best-known Latin American programs—Brazil’s Bolsa Familia 
(“family allowance”) and Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly Progresa)—
account for about 20% of the reduction in the Gini coefficient between 
the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s (Soares et al. 2007). Latin American 
CCTs tend to be cost-effective, with budgets typically equal to less than 
1% of GDP—equal to only 0.4% of GDP in the case of Bolsa Familia. In 
general, research has found that CCT is a relatively effective form of 
social assistance for reaching the poor (Fiszbein et al. 2009). 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of CCTs depends on exactly how 
they are put into effect. Program design, implementation, targeting, 
timing, and benefit amount are what matter (Bazzi et al. 2012). CCT 
programs in Bangladesh and Cambodia, for example, have several 
elements in common. Both countries are poor and have only weak 
administrative capacity. For both programs, the only condition for 
receiving cash transfers is education—specifically secondary education 
for girls. Yet their outcomes sharply diverge. Cambodia has deployed 
careful geographic and proxy means targeting, which is a method 
for identifying beneficiaries through various proxies such as the type 
of roof on their home (thatch or corrugated iron) or its floor (dirt or 
concrete). In this way, Cambodia succeeded in concentrating transfers 
among the poor. In Bangladesh, the program operates nationally, except 
in the four largest cities, and is targeted only by gender. That program 
had only a limited effect on equity and has turned out to be regressive, 
as the poor enroll at lower rates than other classes.
CCT programs tend to be most effective when they target the 
poorest households, which otherwise typically lack access to education 
and health care. Well-designed and implemented CCT programs deliver 
a double dividend to their beneficiaries: greater access to education and 
health combined with cash transfers that augment families’ purchasing 
power. The relative effectiveness of CCT further underlines the 
importance of education and health care toward reducing inequality and 
promoting inclusive growth. 
Finally, however, there is no guarantee that programs that worked 
well in Latin America will also work well in Asia. Many Asian countries 
lack a complex administrative structure to monitor a large program. 
On the other hand, social cohesion is often stronger in Asia than in 
Latin America, so a simple pilot program that emphasizes the role of the 
community in implemention could demonstrate an effective approach 
for Asia.
Spending on physical infrastructure in Asia
Governments tend to be smaller in developing countries, including 
those in Asia, than in advanced economies. As with government size, 
most fiscal items’ ratio to GDP is lower in developing economies. 
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An important exception is public gross fixed capital formation, 
which can be viewed as a rough proxy for physical infrastructure: 
communications, electricity supply, water supply and sanitation, and 
transportation. Since 2000, the average ratio to GDP of public gross 
fixed capital formation in ADB member countries has been 7.7%, 
which is much higher than the 4.3% average for OECD members 
(Hur, forthcoming). Developing countries tend to allocate their limited 
fiscal resources to building up infrastructure that supports economic 
activity and growth. 
Good infrastructure supports economic growth for several reasons. 
A good road network and a reliable electricity supply raises productivity 
across industries and firms and, hence, for the economy as a whole. 
In addition, as Winters (forthcoming) points out, infrastructure-
dependent trade offers large potential gains both within an economy 
and across borders. The empirical literature broadly supports the view 
that infrastructure investment boosts growth, especially in developing 
countries with modest infrastructure (e.g., Easterly and Rebelo 1993, 
Arslanalp et al. 2010). On the other hand, the relationship between 
infrastructure and inequality is more ambiguous. Empirically, a 
significant study of the infrastructure–inequality nexus is Calderon 
and Serven (2010). Using data from 1960 to 2005 on more than 100 
countries, the authors find that both the quantity and quality of roads, 
telecommunications, and electricity supply have significant beneficial 
effects on both growth and inequality. For inequality, a highly relevant 
additional finding is a significant relationship between inequality and 
access for the poor to infrastructure.
The analysis in Hur (forthcoming) does not find a significant 
link between public gross capital formation and changes in the Gini 
coefficient, but it does find a strong growth impact. Simulation results 
indicate that a one-time increase by 1 percentage point of GDP in public 
investment spending raises GDP growth by a cumulative 1.3 percentage 
points over 7 years. Growth is needed to successfully reduce poverty. 
For example, Kraay (2006) finds that cross-country differences in the 
growth of average incomes explain 60%–90% of their differing pace of 
poverty reduction during 1970–2005, making per capita income growth 
the single biggest determinant of success in eliminating poverty. 
Winters (forthcoming) provides some possible explanations for 
the failure of studies to find a positive direct effect from physical 
infrastructure on inequality. In particular, he points out that 
infrastructure can exacerbate inequality, partly from its unfair 
2.2.2 Access to infrastructure by income quintile (% of population receiving services)
Country group
Electricity Water Sanitation Telephone
Poorest 
quintile
Richest 
quintile
Poorest 
quintile
Richest 
quintile
Poorest 
quintile
Richest 
quintile
Poorest 
quintile
Richest 
quintile
Low  9.7 68.7 41.1 78.5 27.2 68.8  3.2 24.5
Lower-middle 79.5 99.3 64.5 86.6 48.2 78.7 21.2 66.1
Upper-middle 81.4 99.5 76.7 95.0 73.4 96.4 32.0 73.1
Source: Estache and Fay 2007.
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allocation but also because the better off are better positioned to take 
advantage of the economic opportunity it creates. Similarly, Estache and 
Fay (2007) show that access to infrastructure is highly skewed against 
the poorest, as is evident in Table 2.2.2. This reflects lack of physical 
access as well as limited affordability. Therefore, maximizing the 
inclusive impact of infrastructure requires extending access to the poor 
and making it affordable to them. 
The location of infrastructure development is determined by 
political influence. Even if it is nearby, service charges may be too costly 
for the poor. As a result, as Winters notes, the poor are often unable 
to reap much benefit from infrastructure unless its development is 
accompanied by complementary policies that require policy makers to 
identify why the poor fail to benefit in the first place. Finally, sound 
regulation is key to successful infrastructure programs.
Benefit incidence and the need for 
better targeting
The evidence presented to this point suggests that spending on 
education, health care, and direct transfers can combat income 
inequality in broad terms. Yet the impact for individual poor households 
depends on benefit incidence, or how public expenditure is distributed 
across different demographic groups. How much of the spending 
reaches the poor? Targeting to better channel a larger share of the 
benefits to the poor can amplify the impact that spending has on 
inequality. The evidence from Asia underscores the need for more 
effective targeting. 
Benefit incidence from public spending in the PRC
Public spending programs have the power to level the playing field 
by broadening access to basic services for disadvantaged groups. 
But the extent to which programs succeed depends crucially on the 
distribution of benefits across income groups. A fiscal program can be 
said to be progressive if the benefits accrue disproportionately to poorer 
households; it is regressive if the benefits accrue disproportionately to 
the rich. Shifting the composition of spending can magnify the inclusive 
impact of total spending at no additional cost by simply raising the share 
of benefits enjoyed by the poor.
The national transfer account framework measures consumption 
and labor income for each age group, providing a detailed view of 
who benefits from certain government expenditures (Box 2.2.2). 
Using this data from the PRC in 2012, Shen and Lee (forthcoming) 
analyze the benefit incidence of three fiscal programs: education, 
health care, and pensions. The study looks at the distribution of these 
benefits across income quartiles—from the poorest 25% of households 
in the PRC to the richest. The case of the PRC is particularly insightful 
as the government has made great strides in instituting and improving 
public programs to provide education, health care, and pensions to 
the populace.
2.2.2 National transfer accounts 
National transfer accounts (NTA) are 
rooted in the life-cycle hypothesis, 
wherein individuals plan their 
consumption and savings over their 
lifespans, relying on transfers when 
young, saving money during working 
years, and drawing down savings in 
old age. Using household surveys, 
administrative data from government 
agencies, and data from the United 
Nations System of National Accounts, 
NTAs estimate how much individuals 
earn and consume at each age and 
how they finance the difference. 
Broadly, financing comes from 
transfers within the family or from 
public transfers. Public transfer 
inflows include benefits in-kind such 
as education services and cash benefits 
such as direct income transfers to 
households. Public transfer outflows 
consist of taxes and other public 
revenues. The values of the various 
public transfer flows are calculated for 
each age group and adjusted to match 
actual values of aggregate public 
spending on education, health care, 
and direct income transfers available 
in a reference year (2010 or, in some 
instances, earlier). 
For the PRC, the NTA data combine 
micro-level household data from the 
2010 wave of [People’s Republic of ] 
China Family Panel Studies, an annual 
survey of nationally representative 
households, and macrolevel data from 
the System of National Accounts. 
The 2010 survey covered 25 of 31 
provinces and recorded information 
on adults and children in 16,000 
households. The questions covered the 
detailed data on household structure, 
income, and expenditures needed to 
construct the NTA.
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With regard to the benefit incidence of education, a 
number of patterns emerge (Figure 2.2.10). First of all, the top 
quartile gains more public education resources for children 
under age 5. This indicates that children from better-off 
families are more likely to be enrolled in kindergarten. 
Pre-primary education is not yet compulsory in the PRC, so 
tuition fees are relatively high. Second, children from families 
in the top quartile are much more likely than others to go 
to college. Under earlier central planning, higher education 
was heavily subsidized (Li et al. 2013). With the scaling up 
of higher education, the government gradually lowered its 
subsidies. From 1995 to 2004, college tuition fees increased 
sharply from an average of CNY800 per student per year to 
CNY5,000 (Yang 2006). Third, the richest quartile receives 
the most public education funding for students aged over 25, 
indicating that this is the group most likely to pursue post-
graduate and adult education.
Publicly funded health care is consumed fairly equally 
across income groups until the age of 60 (Figure 2.2.11). 
Though higher-income groups may be covered by generous 
public health insurance, they may also be healthier and thus 
use less publicly funded health care than the poor. In any 
case, public health spending per capita is highly skewed in 
favor of the top quartile for recipients who are age 60 and 
older. This is largely because the elderly poor are held back 
from availing themselves of these benefits by three principal 
factors: health insurance, income, and access. First, an elderly 
person’s health insurance is linked to previous employment 
in urban China. Those in the top quartile typically serve 
in the formal sector prior to retirement and are covered by 
generous health insurance, making them more inclined to 
seek public health care. Second, health care is a normal good, 
so the use of public health services will likely increase with 
income. For instance, in rural areas of the PRC, enrollment 
in New Rural Cooperative Medical Insurance is found to 
significantly increase inpatient service utilization only among 
high-income groups. Third, poor households often live far 
from high-quality public health institutions, so obtaining 
health care entails long journeys and high opportunity cost 
(Castro-Leal et al. 1999).
In contrast to public spending on education and health 
care, public pensions are strongly regressive, with older 
people at the top of the income distribution enjoying much higher 
pension benefits (Figure 2.2.12). On average, those aged 75 and in the 
top quartile receive a pension of CNY11,793, those in the second quartile 
CNY4,000, and those in the bottom quartile less than CNY250. This is 
partly because the PRC pension system combines public funding with 
personal contributions; as employees in the richest group paid higher 
contributions during their working life, they are entitled as retirees 
to higher pensions. Another factor is that the vast majority of pension 
benefits go to urban residents, whose average per capita income was 
2.2.11  Per capita public health care consumption by 
income quartile, 2010
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2.2.10  Per capita public education spending by 
income quartile, 2010
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3 times that of rural residents in 2009: CNY17,174.7 versus 
CNY5,153.2. The top income quartile lives predominately in 
urban areas and therefore enjoys higher pension benefits. 
Public spending on these social services varies markedly 
by age across income groups (Figure 2.2.13). Public spending 
per child accounts for 45.5% of public social spending on the 
bottom quartile, almost twice the share of the elderly. By 
contrast, for the top quartile, the share of public spending 
going to the elderly is more than twice the share going to 
children. This suggests that, among higher-income groups, the 
public sector is responsible for the sustenance of the elderly, 
and that families remain largely responsible for childrearing. 
Equitable incidence can be examined not only by income 
group but also by gender and place of residence, urban or 
rural. For example, if fiscal spending favors men and urban 
areas, it exacerbates the male–female and urban–rural income 
gap. Shen and Lee (forthcoming) find that public spending 
on primary and secondary education are equally distributed 
by residence, gender, and income group, but that spending on 
tertiary education favors city dwellers, women, and the rich. 
Public health-care programs tend to target the young and 
middle aged equally in different socioeconomic groups but tilt 
toward urban residents, men, and higher-income groups for 
senior recipients. Public pensions show similar bias, with rural 
residents, women, and lower-income groups benefiting less. 
Benefit incidence analysis uncovers significant disparities 
in the distribution of public transfers across different 
population groups in the PRC. In particular, the elderly poor 
and elderly rural residents rely heavily on transfers from their 
children to cover their living and medical expenses. With 
declining fertility and burgeoning migration, the erstwhile 
strong family network is ebbing, along with the private 
transfer system it supported. If the disadvantaged elderly 
are not well targeted by government programs, inequality 
worsens. More generally, analysis suggests that benefit 
incidence is a central determinant of a government program’s 
equity-promoting effect. Benefit incidence must therefore be a 
major consideration in the design and implementation of any 
government program that aims to tackle inequality.
Reforming energy subsidies in Asia
Fuel and electricity subsidies provide further evidence of the centrality 
of benefit incidence in determining how inclusive fiscal spending is. 
The governments of many developing countries, including those in Asia, 
provide significant energy subsidies for consumers. The underlying 
rationale is that fuel and electricity are basic necessities to which 
everybody is entitled. Despite such benign intentions, the subsidies often 
end up offering very little if any positive effect on equity, as a large 
share of the benefits accrue to the better off. Further, such subsidies are 
often costly and undermine fiscal health and sustainability.
2.2.12  Per capita public pension spending by income 
quartile, 2010
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
9080706050403020100
Age
CNY
Quartile 4
Quartile 3
Quartile 2
Quartile 1
Source: Shen and Lee, forthcoming.
2.2.13  Age distribution of public social spending by 
income quartile, 2010
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A number of studies indicate that fuel subsidies primarily 
benefit upper-income groups. In Indonesia, more than 
90% of fuel subsidies benefit the richest urban households 
(Agustina et al. 2008). In India, the richest 10% of households 
receive 7 times more benefit than the poorest 10% (Anand 
et al. 2013). This is because fuel consumption tends to rise 
substantially in tandem with income, so general subsidies 
will benefit poor households the least (Hope and Singh 1995). 
In low- and middle-income countries, the richest 20% of 
households capture, on average, 6 times more in fuel product 
subsidies than the poorest 20% (IMF 2013). In short, there is 
significant evidence that fuel subsidies fail to promote equity. 
In addition, providing energy subsidies imposes 
significant fiscal costs on Asian governments. In 2008, 
subsidies for coal, refined petroleum products, natural gas, 
and electricity were equivalent to about 3%–8% of GDP in 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, and Viet 
Nam (Burniaux and Chateau 2011). Many countries have 
since embarked on fuel and electricity subsidy reform—
notably Indonesia and Malaysia last year—or are seriously 
considering doing so. However, such reform will be politically 
challenging in light of its large immediate welfare costs (Table 2.2.3). 
The impact of fossil fuel subsidy reform depends on a country’s 
circumstances regarding the extent and type of subsidies being 
reformed, the size of the economy, and the proportion of income spent 
by different income groups on subsidized energy. Yet governments 
generally do not estimate subsidies systematically, nor do they make the 
data available. To get a clear view of the impact, a bottom-up approach 
is needed, methodically identifying and quantifying many subsidies that 
are often hidden (Box 2.2.3). 
 The findings underline how reallocating subsidy expenditure to 
shield the poor from higher energy prices can use public resources more 
efficiently and have significantly more progressive social and economic 
outcomes. Even greater benefits can be achieved by targeting subsidy 
spending on areas that best safeguard household welfare and stimulate 
business, economic growth, and job creation. On the other hand, fully 
compensating the bottom 40% is easier modeled than done. Problems 
with targeting and program administration mean that many existing 
safety nets may not be able to protect the poor. It is thus important 
to examine safety net policies in each country and international best 
practices to protect the poor during subsidy reform.
Overall, the results show that policy makers can use public spending 
to reverse widening inequality. Yet inclusive spending is not just about 
spending more, but spending wisely. Eliminating costly general subsidies 
in favor of targeted subsidies can make current spending levels more 
inclusive. Prioritizing programs that benefit the poor, such as primary 
education and basic health care, can maximize the equity-promoting 
impact of additional spending. But spending is only half of the fiscal 
story. How can governments use their revenue policies to promote 
inclusive growth?
2.2.3  Direct and indirect welfare losses from fuel price 
increases (% of household consumption)
Region/Country
Direct  
impact
Indirect 
impact
Africa 2.0 3.8
South & Central America 1.4 2.4
South & Southeast Asia 3.9 2.1
  Bangladesh 1.7 1.5
  Sri Lanka 2.7 2.6
  Cambodia 2.2 na
  India 3.6 na
  Indonesia 8.8 na
Middle East & Central Asia 5.8 4.2
All regions 2.8 3.3
na = not available.
Note: Examples of direct impact are higher prices for fuels used for 
cooking or lighting. Indirect impact occurs as prices for other goods and 
services rise because of higher production costs associated with more 
costly fuel.
Source: del Granado et al. 2010.
Fiscal policy for inclusive growth  63
2.2.3 The costs of energy subsidies and their reform 
ADB (forthcoming) inventoried fossil fuel and electricity 
studies in India, Indonesia, and Thailand. These three 
economies have quite different underlying circumstances, 
and each has taken a unique approach to subsidies and 
attempts to reform them. These full inventories provide the 
most comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date estimates 
of fossil fuel subsidies in the three countries (Box table). 
While the estimates are higher than official government 
estimates, total subsidy values are likely to be even higher, 
as some subsidies could not be quantified, and producer 
subsidies were calculated for only one energy type.
The subsidy estimates were used to analyze the 
economic impacts of hypothetical subsidy reform using 
economic models. For each country, a social accounting 
matrix—a representation of all transactions and transfers 
in an economy—was first used to analyze the direct 
impacts of increased prices for fossil fuels and electricity 
on macroeconomic indicators, economic sectors, and 
households. Changes made in one part of the model, 
such as higher energy prices, flow through to other parts 
of the model, affecting sectors according to how they are 
assumed to be interrelated. 
The analysis showed that a 20% reduction in subsidies 
with no other changes to government spending or revenue 
would cause GDP contraction, compared with a baseline 
business-as-usual scenario, ranging from 0.4% in Thailand 
to 1.5% for Indonesia. Sectoral price impacts, such as on 
transport, had the biggest effect on households that spent 
the most on those sectors. 
However, the impact of subsidy reform on the economy 
is muted if some of the savings are used to fully reimburse 
households in the bottom 40% for the higher energy 
prices. These scenarios projected that the reallocation 
of subsidy savings would be enough to offset losses and 
create significant social and economic benefits. Despite 
only the bottom 40% being compensated, all households 
are projected to benefit from stimulated demand and more 
efficient allocation of resources.
References
ADB. Policy Report: Forthcoming. Fossil Fuel Fubsidies in Asia–
Trends, Impacts and Reforms. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
Summary of consumer and producer subsidies identified for each country (latest year)
Subsidy type  Energy type
India Indonesia Thailand
2011a 
($ million)
% of total 
subsidies
2012 
($ million)
% of total 
subsidies
2012 
($ million)
% of total 
subsidies
Consumer Petroleum 27,923 57 24,595 68 6,077 87
Natural gas 85 0.2 374 1 714 10
Coal 7,288 15 0 0 0 0
Electricity 13,486 27 11,034 30 184 2.6
Consumer subsidy total 48,782 99 36,002 99 6,975 99
Producer Natural Gas for Vehicles nq nq 46 0.70
Coal 208 0.4 nq nq 21.2 66.1
Electricity nq 208 0.6% nq 32.0 73.1
Total fossil fuel subsidies ($ million) 48,990 36,210 7,021
% of GDP 2.66 4.12 1.92
a Fiscal year ending 31 March 2013.
0 = no subsidies identified, nq = not quantified.
Notes: All policies that favor fossil fuels were captured, including direct transfers of funds, foregone revenue, the provision of goods or services, and income or price 
support. Externalities and optimal taxation rates were not assessed. Subsidy data were drawn from government budgets and financial statements or, where necessary, 
estimated. Producer subsidies were calculated for only one fuel in one area of the upstream energy supply chain in each country, for lack of resources to identify and 
quantify more such subsidies.
Source: ADB, forthcoming.
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Public revenues to safeguard 
fiscal sustainability
While the evidence presented above shows that public 
spending can promote more inclusive growth, increased 
spending could jeopardize fisc al sustainability and 
macroeconomic stability if not balanced by increased 
revenues. A history of fiscal prudence has endowed much 
of the region with seemingly adequate fiscal space at 
present. However, the current availability of fiscal space 
does not guarantee its availability in the years ahead. 
Aging populations in many Asian countries are likely to have 
greater needs for public health services, to cite probably the 
biggest challenge. 
Meeting such future challenges will entail fiscal demands 
that compete for the same public resources needed to reduce 
inequality. Unfortunately, fiscal revenue intake has been more 
limited in Asia than in other parts of the world. The region 
needs to explore the full array of revenue options to secure 
the robust resource base needed to fund equity-promoting 
spending, meet future challenges like population aging, and 
maintain the prudent fiscal policy that has helped promote 
macroeconomic stability.
Developing Asia’s current and 
future fiscal space 
Fiscal space refers to the government’s capacity to deploy 
fiscal resources for short-term purposes (such as to 
counteract macroeconomic shocks) and to satisfy long-term 
needs (such as maintaining public infrastructure) without 
jeopardizing fiscal sustainability. A country’s current 
fiscal position is a consequence of past patterns of public 
expenditures and revenues. 
With some exceptions, the examination of developing 
Asia’s past fiscal behavior confirms a generally conservative 
stance. As in other parts of the world, the region’s fiscal 
position has weakened since the global crisis forced 
governments to implement fiscal stimulus to prop up 
demand and encourage growth during the crisis (ADB 2010). 
There is considerable diversity in countries’ fiscal balance 
in the region, with some countries running sizable deficits. 
The deficit countries include some large economies such 
as India and Pakistan. Generally speaking, though, the 
fiscal position of many countries in the region, and of the 
region as a whole, is healthier than elsewhere in the world. 
2.3.1   Average fiscal balance of selected economies  
(% of GDP)
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Interestingly, the fiscal health gap between the region and 
the rest of the world seems to have widened since the global 
crisis (Figure 2.3.1).
Prudent fiscal behavior in the past means that 
government debt is low in much of developing Asia relative 
to the rest of the world (Ferrarini et al. 2012). This is a 
predictable and natural consequence of the fiscal prudence 
that characterized many Asian countries in the past. 
The region’s ratio of debt to GDP compares favorably with 
that of other regions and the world as a whole (Figure 2.3.2). 
Even taking into account that a debt ratio considered 
sustainable for a developing country is lower than for an 
advanced economy, developing Asia’s low ratio bodes well 
for its fiscal sustainability and fiscal space. However, the 
large economies of India and Pakistan are among those that 
stand out as exceptions, needing to make concerted efforts to 
improve their fiscal health and secure the finances required 
to invest in inclusive growth. 
While it may seem that many countries in developing Asia 
have sufficient fiscal space to expand government 
expenditure for inclusive growth, current fiscal space is no 
guarantee of future fiscal space. The size and mix of fiscal 
expenditures reflects income levels and economic structures 
that necessarily evolve over time. Developing Asia faces 
potentially significant fiscal demands from a wide range of structural 
challenges. For one, as income rises, public spending and government 
size tend to rise too. This helps to explain why governments are larger 
in advanced economies than in developing countries: demand for many 
public goods rises with income. Demand for a cleaner environment, for 
example, tends to intensify with higher average incomes, so a better-off 
populace may expect its government to invest more public resources to 
protect the environment. 
But perhaps the single biggest social and economic shift facing 
developing Asia is population aging. Despite considerable demographic 
diversity, the region as a whole is in the midst of a shift toward 
older populations. Demographic structures affect public spending 
because the beneficiaries are often children and the elderly, as shown 
in Benefit incidence and the need for better targeting. National transfer 
account data (described in Box 2.2.2 above) lends itself to studying the 
effect aging has on the fiscal position as it estimates flows between 
households and the government by age group. Using this data for seven 
low- to middle-income Asian economies (Cambodia, the PRC, India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam) and four higher-
income regional economies (Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
and Taipei,China), UN population projections by age group (United 
Nations Population Division 2013), and GDP forecasts, Lee and Mason 
(forthcoming) project government spending for education, health care, 
and social protection in developing Asia until 2050. The projections 
use the recent spending in higher income countries as a guide to 
how spending is likely to change in the lower-income group as their 
incomes rise. 
2.3.2  Gross government debt in selected economies, 2012 
(% of GDP)
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As Asian populations age from 2010 to 2050, public 
spending on education is expected to decline (Figure 2.3.3). 
In 2010, public education spending averaged 3.5% of 
GDP, ranging from 1.6% to 6.7%. By 2050, the average is 
projected to fall to 2.7% of GDP, ranging from 0.6% to 
5.0%. This is calculated using a simple average of country 
values. A regional calculation weighted by GDP shows the 
share of education falling from 2.9% of GDP to 2.8%. The 
projected decline in education spending is driven by fertility 
decline and the consequent decline in the school-age share 
of population. The rate of spending decline varies across 
subregions, with the greatest declines projected for South 
Asia and Southeast Asia. Note that this is public spending 
only; in some Asian economies—such as the PRC, the 
Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China—private spending on 
education is quite substantial.
Projected health spending contrasts dramatically with 
projected education spending (Figure 2.3.4). Unlike for 
education, demographic change and economic growth both 
push health-care spending higher. As populations age, the 
share of older age groups increases, and they require higher 
health-care spending. At the same time, higher per capita 
income should push per capita spending on health care 
higher, particularly for older age groups. In no country is the 
share of GDP devoted to health care projected to decline. 
The simple average increases from 2.9% of GDP in 2010 
to 4.7% in 2050. The GDP-weighted share rises even more 
sharply, from 2.4% of GDP in 2010 to 7.3% in 2050. 
The rise in publicly funded health-care spending in 
East Asian economies is particularly dramatic, with the 
average share of GDP rising from 3.0% in 2010 to 9.7% 
in 2050. In the PRC, the projected rise is from 2.7% to 
9.8%. These increases reflect the particularly rapid aging 
anticipated in East Asia, combined with high rates of 
economic growth anticipated for the PRC. And, outside of 
East Asia, a number of other countries in the larger region—
Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, and the Maldives—are expected to more than 
double the percentage of GDP devoted to health care.
Among the public expenditure items studied, aging wields the 
biggest fiscal impact on social security and welfare (Figure 2.3.5). 
For developing Asia as a whole, using simple averages, the percentage 
of GDP devoted to social security and welfare is projected to rise from 
2.8% in 2010 to 4.9% in 2050. The GDP-weighted figure rises from 
2.5% to 6.7%. However, the importance of social security and welfare 
spending varies considerably from country to country, currently and 
in the future. Spending is relatively high in the region’s higher-income 
developing economies. Spending in the Republic of Korea is expected to 
reach 12.0% by 2050, and in Taipei,China 10.5%. These values represent 
significant growth in spending in these countries, but they still fall 
well short of values for Japan: 17.0% in 2010 and 21.0% in 2050. These 
2.3.3  Current and projected public spending on education, 
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2.3.4  Current and projected public spending on health, 
developing Asia
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2.3.5  Current and projected public spending on 
social security and welfare, developing Asia
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projections may be conservative, as many countries have relatively 
underdeveloped public pension systems. Should they choose to introduce 
these schemes in the future, public spending could rise much more 
rapidly than projected here. 
The demands that rising age structures and incomes alone will place 
on public spending programs will encroach considerably on Asia’s fiscal 
space. Yet the analysis in Lee and Mason (forthcoming) is only part of 
the story and may understate future demands. The estimates use Asia as 
a benchmark, but as discussed in The emerging case for inclusive fiscal 
policy, the region underspends on public education, health care, and 
direct transfers when compared with the rest of the world. This is yet 
another reason why Asian countries should not take for granted that 
fiscal space will be available tomorrow just as it is today. Governments 
need to find ways to make their revenue systems more productive if they 
are to take a more active role in combating widening inequality.
Overview of Asia’s revenue systems
To maintain fiscal space as spending needs expand, 
developing Asia needs to raise more public revenues. As 
with spending, Asia lags other world regions on the revenue 
front (Figure 2.3.6). Revenue from taxes in developing Asia 
remains, despite improvement, at barely half the average in 
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). The tendency of government to 
expand in tandem with per capita income explains some of 
the gap with the OECD, but fiscal revenue mobilization in 
Asia also lags Latin America. This gap with peers in Latin 
America suggests considerable scope for developing Asia to 
improve revenue mobilization. Understanding key features 
of the region’s current revenue systems will help clarify 
policy direction. 
Growth and the equity effects of fiscal revenues
Government revenues can help reduce inequality through 
four channels. First is the indirect effect that fiscal revenues have by 
funding expenditures that promote equity. The main issue related to 
this role is the economic cost associated with raising different types 
of resources. Second is the direct effect on inequality when a revenue 
source is itself an instrument of redistribution. Progressive income tax, 
under which tax rates rise with income, is the prime example, but such 
taxes can entail a trade-off sacrificing growth for equity. Third, some 
revenue instruments are deployed to curb activities with harmful social 
consequences. Taxes such as environmental levies have a double dividend 
in that they raise revenue while curtailing socially undesirable activities.
The fourth channel pertains to revenue administration. Whatever 
the intrinsic potential of a particular revenue instrument to promote 
equity, how efficiently it is administered will have its own effect. 
For example, tax administration that demands onerous bookkeeping 
or filing procedures imposes burdens on firms that are particularly 
2.3.6  Tax revenues in developing Asia, Latin America, 
and the OECD
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2.3.7  Average resource positions in developing Asia, 
2005–2011 
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heavy for small businesses. Such ill-conceived administration raises the 
tax agency’s collection cost as well as the taxpayer’s compliance cost. 
Complex tax laws subject to frequent, arbitrary changes similarly add to 
taxpayer costs and may incite tax disputes and litigation, which generate 
additional legal costs. By contrast, streamlining procedures and making 
them more transparent, such as through the greater use of information 
and communication technology, can reduce costs for tax authorities and 
taxpayers alike.
The two main fiscal resources are tax and nontax revenues. As 
Das-Gupta (forthcoming) points out, governments have other resource-
generating options—such as issuing debt or receiving foreign aid—but 
the analysis presented here will focus on these two sources. In general, 
taxes on domestic and international goods and services are the most 
widespread, followed by individual and corporate income taxes, though 
there is some variance from this norm. The governments of some 
countries rich in publicly owned resources, for example, rely mainly on 
income from the sale of resources or their use rights. Nontax revenues 
arise mainly from the sale of government goods or resources and income 
from publicly owned assets.
Growth and distribution effects vary across tax types, as detailed in 
the Annex at the end of the chapter. Among broad-based taxes, property 
tax is the least harmful to economic growth, followed by consumption 
tax and personal income tax, with corporate income tax dampening 
growth the most (McBride 2012). Since property tax is also likely to be 
progressive, because the rich tend to have greater property holdings 
than the poor, raising revenue through this source can reduce inequality 
without undermining growth. 
Empirical analysis of Asian countries confirms that the 
composition of tax structure matters for growth. Abdon et al. 
(forthcoming) simulate the impact of tax composition 
changes on growth in developing Asia and find that reducing 
reliance on income tax while raising reliance on consumption 
and other taxes can raise GDP growth over the long run. 
The IMF (2014) points out that different taxes have different 
effects on equity, so how the tax structure mixes resources 
matters for equity. For example, as taxes on wealth, especially 
property, are progressive, expanding them can make the tax 
system more progressive.
Developing Asia’s fiscal revenues
For developing Asia as a whole and across all of its subregions, 
taxes are the primary sources of fiscal revenues (Figure 2.3.7). 
Current revenues provide the vast majority of the region’s 
fiscal revenues, and taxes dominate them. The share of taxes 
is higher in some subregions than others, but in no subregion 
of Asia and the Pacific does the share of taxes fall below 75%. 
Within this broader region-wide picture of the 
primacy of current revenues and taxes, some interesting 
differences distinguish subregions and countries, as detailed 
by Das-Gupta (forthcoming). For example, grants contribute 
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2.3.8  Contribution of major tax groups to revenue, 
2005–2011
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2.3.1  Revenue sources in developing Asia, Latin America, and the world, 2005–2011 (% of GDP)
Type of revenue Developing Asia Latin America & Caribbean World
Revenue, excluding grants 14.5 23.9 19.5
Tax revenue 11.3 15.6 12.7
   Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains 4.5 6.4 7.1
  Taxes on goods and services 5.6 7.2 4.4
  Taxes on international trade 0.7 0.7 0.7
  Other taxes 0.6 1.3 0.5
Nontax revenue 2.5 5.4 4.5
Grants and other revenue 3.1 4.5 3.0
Note: Some nontax revenue sources such as fines and penalties are included as “other revenue” in the World Development Indicators classification system.
Source: ADB estimates based on data from World Bank. World Development Indicators online database (accessed 27 February 2014).
relatively strongly to fiscal revenue in the Pacific and 
Central Asia (Figure 2.3.7). Countries that use grants as a 
major revenue source include Afghanistan, Bhutan, Papua 
New Guinea, and many Pacific island states. The share of 
grants in revenue is 14.9% in Papua New Guinea, 38.5% in 
Bhutan, 53.2% in Afghanistan, and even higher in some 
Pacific island economies. While tax revenues are the primary 
current revenues, nontax revenues are a significant revenue 
source across the whole region—but for different reasons. 
Resource dependence is clearly the reason for the high nontax 
revenue share in oil-rich Brunei Darussalam (providing 
54.2% of total revenue) and some Pacific economies. On the 
other hand, corrective and other deliberate policy is likely 
the reason for the relatively high nontax revenue share in 
Singapore.
Taxes on goods and services and tax on income are 
the two main sources of tax revenue in developing Asia. 
Figure 2.3.8 shows the composition of tax revenue for the 
region as a whole and its subregions in 2005–2011. 
The relative contribution of the major tax groups follows 
the expected pattern in developing countries. Taxes on goods and 
services contribute the largest share region-wide, closely followed by tax 
on income. Taxes on goods and services are especially preponderant in 
the large and heavily weighted East Asia subregion but, in Central Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and South Asia, somewhat less important than tax 
on income. International trade taxes have declined in importance 
in developing countries following trade liberalization and tariff 
reduction through the World Trade Organization (Bahl and Bird 2008). 
Among country-specific differences, India and Indonesia stand out 
for their high dependence on income tax (Das-Gupta, forthcoming). 
Taken together, taxes on goods and services and tax on income 
dominate developing Asia’s tax revenue landscape.
Comparing developing Asia’s fiscal revenue base with that of Latin 
America and the world, three noteworthy patterns emerge (Table 2.3.1). 
First, as noted above, developing Asia’s fiscal resource base is relatively 
limited. Second, in developing Asia the share of taxes in total fiscal 
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revenues is higher, and the share of nontax revenues lower, 
than in Latin America and the world as a whole. Finally, 
the share of income taxes in total tax revenues is lower in 
developing Asia than in other parts of the world, and the share 
of taxes on goods and services is correspondingly higher. 
The highly aggregated presentation of fiscal resource 
categories presented so far has precluded a look at the 
relative importance of tax subcategories such as on property, 
corporate income, and personal income. This matters 
because different taxes affect growth and equity differently, 
as detailed in the Annex. Although narrower in country 
coverage—covering only 8 developing Asian economies among 
the 41 countries included in the analysis above—the IMF’s 
Government Financial Statistics database contains data with 
finer disaggregation of tax revenue categories. 
Figure 2.3.9 shows the GDP share of corporate income 
tax, personal income tax, indirect tax, property tax, and 
social security contributions in the OECD, developing Asia, 
and Latin America and the Caribbean. Predictably, the sum 
of the five taxes is lower for Asia than for the OECD or 
Latin America. The regional figures are weighted by GDP 
of member economies. The share of property tax in Asia is 
only a shade below the share in Latin America but barely 
half the share in the OECD. Asia’s corporate income tax rate 
stands at a tad below the share in Latin America but above 
the OECD’s share. Social security contributions are lower in 
Asia than in the other two groups. Personal income tax in 
Asia is somewhat lower than in Latin America and much less than in the 
OECD. Finally, indirect taxes are lower in Asia than in Latin America 
but higher than in the OECD. All in all, the figure confirms that indirect 
taxes are more important than income taxes in developing countries, but 
the opposite holds for the OECD. It also confirms that social security 
systems are most developed in the OECD and least developed in Asia.
The four major developing Asian economies in the IMF data display 
common elements and differences. Indirect tax is the single most 
important fiscal revenue instrument in the PRC, India, the Republic of 
Korea, and Thailand. Corporate income tax is also a major instrument 
in all four countries. Property tax is less important, to the point of 
being negligible in India and Thailand, but significant in the Republic 
of Korea, which is consistent with property tax requiring strong tax 
administration. Personal income tax is much less important than 
corporate income tax in the PRC, India, and Thailand, but in the high-
income Republic of Korea it brings in slightly more than corporate 
income tax. Social security contributions are notably larger in the PRC 
and the Republic of Korea than in India and Thailand, reflecting more 
developed social security systems in the two East Asian countries. 
The overview of developing Asia’s fiscal revenue systems suggests 
some broad policy directions for achieving a more secure fiscal revenue 
base. The dominant role of taxes in the region’s fiscal revenues suggests 
that the key to revenue mobilization lies in strengthening and reforming 
the region’s tax systems. However, the composition of revenue sources 
2.3.9  Tax composition in developing Asia, Latin America, 
and the OECD, 2010
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affects growth and income inequality. Given the current revenue 
structure in the region, how can policy makers generate the additional 
resources needed to maintain prudent fiscal policy while also fostering 
inclusive growth?
Options to expand developing Asia’s 
fiscal revenues
In light of the region’s huge economic and fiscal diversity, there can be 
no one-size-fits-all sustainable path to resource expansion, so policy 
priorities will necessarily differ across countries. However, policy 
makers will choose from the same menu of options to find a mix of 
revenue sources that generates sufficient resources, does not unduly 
hamper growth, and promotes equity or is at least equity-neutral. 
Greater mobilization of fiscal revenues requires exploring all possible 
sources. Options include broadening the base for personal income tax 
(PIT) and value-added tax (VAT), enlarging corrective taxes and nontax 
revenues, and introducing naturally progressive taxes on property, 
capital gains, and inheritance. 
Broadening income and value-added tax collection
The evidence in Overview of Asia’s revenue systems indicates that 
income taxes and taxes on goods and services provide the bulk of 
tax revenues in developing Asia. This makes doing a better job of 
collecting these two types of taxes the best point of departure for 
improving revenue mobilization in the region. Among income taxes, 
PIT is found preferable to corporate income tax because it is more 
efficient. Also, PIT offers more room for development because its 
share in the regional tax mix lags that of corporate income tax. Among 
goods and services taxes, VAT, which is a form of consumption tax, is 
especially appealing for development in Asia because it is already fairly 
widespread in the region (Martinez-Vasquez and Bird 2011). Further, 
VAT entails relatively low economic costs (Banks and Diamond 2010). 
There is substantial evidence, though, that VAT is regressive 
(IMF 2014). This suggests that its design should be improved to make it 
more progressive. 
PIT is often said to discourage work and thus have a negative 
growth effect. On the other hand, the tax is generally progressive and 
thus promotes equity. As noted above, in terms of growth effects, PIT 
compares favorably with corporate income tax but unfavorably with 
VAT and other consumption taxes. 
Claus et al. (2014) estimate how progressive income tax is in Asia 
and its impact on inequality. They find that a 1 percentage point increase 
in PIT reduces income inequality by 0.573 percentage points in Asia, 
more than the 0.041 percentage points estimated for the rest of the 
world (Table 2.3.2). The greater redistributive effect of PIT may reflect 
a larger percentage of people not paying income tax in Asia because 
their income is below the tax-free threshold. Indeed the ratio of tax-free 
threshold income to gross national income per capita is generally 
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higher in most Asian countries than in OECD members 
(Claus et al. 2014). Further, the top income tax rate applies 
to few taxpayers, as the ratio of the top PIT threshold to 
per capita income is relatively high in Asia (Figure 2.3.10). 
Narrow PIT bases keep PIT revenues low in some Asian 
countries that exempt certain types of income or tax them 
at lower rates. For example, in the PRC, only 11 types of 
personal income are subject to tax. The direction of reform is 
to broaden PIT, including at the top tax rates.
Of particular importance in Asia is VAT, which is a 
major revenue source in many countries. VAT is among 
the least-distortionary taxes (Banks and Diamond 2010). 
The distortionary economic costs of taxation rise along 
with tax rates and as tax bases narrow, but VAT is typically 
charged at a uniform, relatively low rate applied to a broad 
base. Table 2.3.2 indicates, on the other hand, that general 
taxes on goods and services, which may be viewed as a proxy 
for VAT, worsen inequality in Asia and rest of the world. 
The IMF (2014) agrees that VAT itself is regressive but points 
out that it can be made progressive if its proceeds are used 
to fund inclusive spending. The discussion in Overview of 
Asia’s revenue systems found goods and services taxes to be 
the single biggest revenue source for the region. The primary 
policy implication is not to reduce the share of such taxes but to make 
them more progressive through better design. 
One way to improve VAT is to raise the threshold for payment. In 
Asia, few VATs are levied at a single rate above a threshold that excludes 
small business (Figure 2.3.11). Das-Gupta (forthcoming) points out that 
the relatively low VAT threshold in some Asian countries reduces VAT 
efficiency because the administrative cost of taxing small taxpayers 
is much higher per unit of revenue. There is also evidence that tax 
compliance costs are regressively distributed, adversely affecting 
small businesses more than larger firms (Barbone et al. 2012). Another 
option for making VAT less regressive is to use the proceeds for equity-
promoting expenditures such as education and health care (Munoz 
and Cho 2004). Finally, while the number of Asian countries levying 
VAT has been rising rapidly (Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2011), several 
2.3.2  Estimated marginal impact of taxation on income inequality (percentage points)
Asia Rest of the world
Personal income tax −0.573 −0.041
Personal income tax-progressivity interaction −0.002 −0.005
Corporate income tax  0.598 −0.338
Corporate income tax-globalization interaction −0.017  0.005
Social security and payroll taxes   1.324  0.165
General taxes on goods and services  0.666  0.768
Excises  0.609 −0.059
Customs duties  0.174  0.651
Source: Claus et al. 2014.
2.3.10  Ratio of top personal income tax threshold to 
gross national income per capita, 2012
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Pakistan
Viet Nam
Lao PDR
Bangladesh
PRC
Thailand
Indonesia
India
Bhutan
Sri Lanka
Nepal
Singapore
Philippines
Japan
Republic of Korea
Cambodia
OECD
Malaysia
Hong Kong, China
Ratio
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, OECD = Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Note: Data for OECD are unweighted average for 2011.
Source: Claus et al. 2014
74  Asian Development Outlook 2014
2.3.12  State-owned enterprise share of GDP, 2010
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exceptions remain. They include Bhutan; Hong Kong, China; 
Macau, China; Malaysia; and Myanmar. These countries 
should also explore adopting a well-designed VAT in light 
of its relatively low economic cost. There is also scope for 
further improving the efficiency of the VAT in the region 
by, for example, broadening its coverage to as many goods 
as possible (Das-Gupta, forthcoming). Exemptions cause 
distortions and inefficiencies. 
Enlarging corrective taxes and nontax revenues
The evidence indicates that countries in developing Asia 
rely more heavily on broad-based taxes than on other taxes. 
There is thus plenty of scope for the region to expand the 
fiscal resource base by moving beyond broad-based taxes to 
alternative revenue sources. Individually, these alternative 
sources may be small, but collectively they can make a 
significant contribution to a larger, more sustainable fiscal 
resource base. One promising option is corrective taxes 
because they can promote efficiency while raising revenues. 
Another option is nontax revenues, an area in which the 
region lags other parts of the world. 
Corrective taxes, or “sin taxes,” are levied on goods and services 
deemed to be bad for the individual or society at large. Classical 
examples are taxes on alcohol and cigarettes, more recently extended 
to products and activities with adverse environmental consequences, 
such as driving a personal car. If well-designed, such taxes can 
curtail economically or socially undesirable activity while raising 
fiscal resources, thus providing a double dividend (Annex Table). 
Interestingly, experience in the Philippines shows that alcohol and 
cigarette taxes can yield a triple dividend by promoting efficiency and 
equity while raising fiscal revenues (Box 2.3.1).
Nontax revenues are payments made to the government for a range 
of goods, services, special rights, and recompense. The most important 
sources of nontax revenue are asset exploitation fees, charges, royalties, 
dividends, tolls, interest, and auction proceeds; fees and user charges 
for goods and services; and license, permit, and registration 
fees for regulated activities. Among other widely used 
sources of nontax revenue are fines and penalties. The 
effects of nontax revenue instruments on growth and 
equity are not uniform. However, broadly speaking, they 
are either neutral or positive for growth and can have 
positive distribution impacts if properly designed (Das-
Gupta, forthcoming). Sources of nontax revenues vary 
widely across Asian countries. In Singapore, land leases and 
certificates of entitlement to own a car are important; in 
Kiribati, the sale of tuna fishing licenses is a major source.
Another source of nontax revenues is profit from state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), which occupy a major part of 
the economy in a number of countries in developing Asia 
(Figure 2.3.12). SOEs are often less efficient than their 
2.3.11  Value-added tax registration threshold, 2012
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counterparts in the private sector for a number of reasons, and 
some enjoy monopoly power in industries where government 
restrictions keep out competitors (OECD 2010). There is often plenty 
of scope for reforming SOEs to improve their productivity, after which 
they can deliver larger dividends to the governments that own them 
and help lift productivity across the economy. In the case of the PRC, 
increasing the share of SOE profits delivered to the government to 50%, 
which is the percentage prevailing in the advanced economies, would 
increase PRC fiscal revenues by as much as 3 percentage points of GDP 
(World Bank 2012). Countering such large potential gains, SOE reform 
can cause job losses and regional dislocation in the short term, so 
policy makers should act to mitigate such costs when embarking 
on reform.
2.3.1 Tobacco and alcohol excise taxes: a win-win solution for inclusion, public finance, and health
Increasing the price of tobacco and alcohol products by 
raising the excise taxes levied on them reduces smoking 
and drunkenness and so improves public health as it raises 
tax revenues. A comprehensive review of evidence from 
over 100 studies, including some in middle- and low-
income countries, clearly shows that tobacco taxes reduce 
tobacco use while providing a reliable source of fiscal 
revenues (Chaloupka et al. 2012). The review suggests 
that taxes are the single most cost-effective intervention 
to keep young people from starting to smoke and to 
encourage current smokers to quit. When the tax revenues 
thus raised are allocated to health care or other social 
services for the poor, they further promote positive health 
and equity outcomes.
The Philippines increased excise taxes specifically for 
cigarettes and alcohol in 2013. The tax increase greatly 
hiked cigarette prices and more than doubled the tobacco 
tax revenue collected in 2013 over 2012. Higher taxes on 
tobacco and alcohol together netted revenue estimated 
at $1.4 billion. Tobacco and alcohol tax revenues are 
allocated to tobacco-growing provinces and tobacco 
farmers (who receive 15%), health infrastructure (5%), 
and health services and health promotion (80%), largely 
through subsidies for poor families under the Philippine 
Health Insurance Corporation. As a result, the Department 
of Health budget for 2014 has been expanded by 58%. 
Resources will be used largely to extend insurance 
coverage to an additional 9.5 million families that are poor 
and near poor.
While the example of the Philippines reflects good 
revenue results, it will take some time to measure the 
impact on smoking rates, health, and poverty. One model 
found in 2012 that, while the poor would likely shoulder 
a disproportionate burden from the new taxes, they 
would also receive a larger share of the health benefits 
(Jha et al. 2012). This is because the poor may be more 
price sensitive in light of the opportunity costs that 
buying cigarettes imposes on them, making them more 
likely to quit, and because they are more vulnerable to 
tobacco-related diseases. The box figure shows that the 
low socioeconomic group pays 18.4% of the tax increase 
and receives 33.7% of the health benefits, for a favorable 
health/tax ratio of 183%.
References
Jha, P., R. Joseph, D. Li, C. Gauvreau, I. Anderson, P. Moser, 
S. Bonu, I. Bhushan, and F.J. Chaloupka. 2012. Tobacco Taxes: 
A Win-Win Measure for Fiscal Space and Health. Manila: 
Asian Development Bank.
Chaloupka, F.J, A. Yurekli, and G.T. Fong. 2012. Tobacco Taxes as a 
Tobacco Control Strategy. Tobacco Control. 21. pp. 172–180.
 Distribution of marginal taxes and health benefits by 
socioeconomic group, Philippines
Marginal taxes paid by
socioeconomic status
Deaths averted by
socioeconomic status
16.6%
65.0%
18.4%
6.8%
33.7%
59.5%
High 
Middle
Low
Source: Jha et al. 2012.
76  Asian Development Outlook 2014
2.3.3 Inheritance tax in major Asian economies
Economy Name of tax
Taxation on property left 
or acquired Lowest–highest rate (%) Percentage of national tax revenues
Japan Inheritance Property acquired 10–50 1.6 (FY2013 budget)
Republic of Korea Inheritance Property acquired 10–50 2.0% (inheritance and gift taxes in 2012)
Philippines Estate Property left 5–20 0.1% (2010)
Taipei,China Estate Property left 10 1.1% (2012)
Source: Araki 2014. 
Introducing naturally progressive taxes
There are a number of inherently progressive fiscal revenue options 
that can enhance the progressive orientation of fiscal revenue systems 
across Asia. Most of them promise more equitable resource mobilization 
at relatively low economic cost. These include property tax, inheritance 
tax, and capital gains tax.
Taxes levied on immoveable property are widely viewed as a fiscal 
source tailored for local government. Because they are underused in 
most parts of the world, including developing Asia, they offer scope 
for strengthening fiscal resources, particularly for local governments. 
For example, the PRC is currently exploring property tax options 
toward solving the high indebtedness of local governments (Box 2.3.2). 
Taxes on property include annual taxes on land and property, stamp 
duties or property transfer taxes, development fees, betterment levies, 
estate duties or inheritance taxes, and capital gains taxes on property 
transfers. As noted above, one attractive feature of property tax is that, 
among broad-based taxes, it has the least adverse effect on growth 
effects. In addition, property tax is progressive because it is proportional 
to property value.
Another inherently progressive tax is inheritance tax, which 
currently exists in only four countries in Asia and the Pacific 
(Table 2.3.3). This levy taxes the transmission of wealth (and hence 
inequality) across generations but has little effect on work incentive. 
The capital gains tax similarly targets the rich, who tend to own more 
capital, and does not adversely affect incentives, as the tax is usually 
levied on gains realized from investments. Finally, tax expenditures—
also known as tax relief, tax subsidies, or tax aid—reduce or postpone 
the tax liabilities of a narrow selection of taxpayers. Tax expenditures 
are often costly, unproductive, and regressive. One example is 
preferential tax rates on capital gains and qualified dividends. 
Reducing tax expenditures thus benefits both efficiency and equity.
Developing Asia as a whole lags other parts of the world in the 
relative size of its fiscal revenues, pointing to the need to improve 
revenue mobilization across all categories. PIT and VAT, corrective 
taxes and nontax revenues, and inherently progressive taxes can all 
contribute. Innovative policies, such as using ICT in tax administration, 
can help, if accompanied by institutional reforms that enhance 
governance, enforcement, and incentives (Das-Gupta, forthcoming).
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2.3.2 Property tax in the People’s Republic of China 
Property tax generates only modest revenue in the 
PRC, despite its long history and rising yield in recent 
years. In 2012, the five types of property tax combined 
contributed 21.4% of local tax revenue (box table). 
This compared very unfavorably with 73% in the 
United States and almost 100% in Australia, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom (Norregaard 2013). As a result, local 
governments in the PRC must rely on other sources for 
income, such as land-lease fees. 
The low yield of property tax in the PRC is explained 
by diverse factors. First, the tax structure levies taxes 
on property transactions rather than on possession. 
Second, owner-occupied residential properties are 
excluded. Third, the tax base is narrow and has widened 
only insignificantly over the years, with tax rates based 
on the purchase price instead of current market value. 
Fourth, there are no standards established nationally for 
assessment and assessors. 
Pilot schemes have taxed home ownership in Chongqing 
and Shanghai since 2011 toward introducing residential 
property tax more widely. They have had only limited 
impact so far. Both cities opted for low rates and many 
exemptions, taxing luxury units in Chongqing and new 
purchases in Shanghai. In Chongqing, property tax was 
levied on 8,800 housing units in 2011 and 11,000 units in 
2012. Despite this slight increase, property tax continued to 
provide less than 1% of local government revenue because 
it still covered less than 1% of all properties. Results are 
similar in Shanghai, where property tax revenue is larger, 
at CNY9.3 billion, but still amounted to less than 1% of 
local government revenue in 2012 because of similarly low 
coverage. Nonetheless, the pilots were extremely important 
for introducing residential property taxation in the PRC 
and paving the way for the nationwide rollout, which was 
announced in November 2013 after the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the PRC.
Other issues deserve attention: the poor quality of 
property and land registration data; separate authorities 
for land and building registration; the difficulty of 
assessing the market value of land, rural housing, and 
subsidized housing for government and state-owned 
enterprise employees; the lack of independent property 
appraisal firms, which remain dominated by subsidiary 
companies of local governments; and resistance from 
vested interests to the adoption of residential property tax.
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Property tax and local government revenue in the PRC
Year
Total 
revenue
Total tax 
revenue
Real-estate 
tax
Urban  
land-use tax
Land value-
added tax
Cultivated land 
occupancy tax
Deed title 
tax
Direct 
Subtotal
in CNY billion
1999 559.49 493.49 18.34 5.91 0.68 3.30 9.60 37.83
2006 1,830.36 1,522.82 51.48 17.68 23.15 17.11 86.77 196.19
2012 6,107.83 4731.91 137.25 154.17 271.91 162.07 287.40 1,012.80
As % of total local revenue:
1999 100.0 88.2 3.3 1.1 0.1 0.6 1.7  6.8
2006 100.0 83.2 2.8 1.0 1.3 0.9 4.7 10.7
2012 100.0 77.5 2.2 2.5 4.5 2.7 4.7 16.6
Source: National Bureau of Statistics yearbooks, various years.
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Planning and innovation for a 
more inclusive Asia 
The preceding analysis demonstrates considerable scope for leveraging 
fiscal policy to combat rising inequality in developing Asia. The evidence 
points to a role for increased public spending—especially on education, 
health care, and targeted direct transfers—to make growth more 
inclusive. Moreover, augmenting public spending on infrastructure can 
boost growth and magnify the inclusive impact of public spending on 
education, health care, and direct transfers. 
Critically, inclusive fiscal policy requires not just more fiscal 
spending, but better spending. Simply spending more without careful 
planning—such as on costly general fuel subsidies that disproportionately 
benefit the rich—erodes valuable fiscal space without generating any 
equity benefits in return. Further, some programs such as primary 
education and basic health care are especially beneficial for the poor. 
Therefore, an urgent priority throughout the region should be to improve 
the design and implementation of public programs so that they reach 
those who need them most.
Revenue policy is critical to easing inequality in developing Asia, 
partly through a direct effect on equity but primarily by raising 
resources to fund inclusive public spending. Past fiscal prudence has 
earned many countries in the region sufficient fiscal space to invest 
more in inclusive growth. However, sizable future fiscal demands loom 
on the horizon as consequences of major structural shifts, such as 
population aging. Asia lags other parts of the world in the relative 
size of its fiscal revenues, pointing to scope for better fiscal resource 
mobilization. All possible sources need to be explored. Options include 
broadening the base for personal income tax and VAT, enlarging 
corrective taxes and nontax revenues, and introducing naturally 
progressive taxes on property, capital gains, and inheritance. 
The use of fiscal policy for inclusive growth will benefit from a more 
conducive fiscal environment. Such an environment would include, 
among other things, an inclusive medium-term fiscal policy framework, 
more and better fiscal data, and innovative policies.
Fiscal framework for inclusive growth
Governments need to look beyond annual budgeting cycles to balance 
competing demands on public resources while guarding fiscal 
sustainability. Effectively using fiscal policy to reverse widening 
inequality requires a planning tool with explicit equity objectives—call it 
the medium-term fiscal framework for inclusive growth. 
The framework begins with a careful review of existing and planned 
public spending and revenue programs to identify the share of spending 
benefits and revenue burdens that are expected to accrue to low-income 
households (those below the national poverty line, for example, or 
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a certain income decile) over the coming 5–10 years. An initial step 
in the planning process is to diagnose the equity impacts of current 
fiscal policy. Box 2.4.1 illustrates a possible diagnostic toolkit for this 
purpose, which can set the baseline to operationalize the framework. 
The framework includes a plan to increase the share of public spending 
benefiting target households while explicitly detailing revenue increases 
and accompanying cuts in other spending that allow the plan to be 
achieved within the envelope defined by fiscal sustainability (e.g., the 
targeted ratio of government debt to GDP).
The medium-term fiscal framework for inclusive growth provides 
a procedure to help direct more government activity to benefit 
low-income households over time, and to review progress toward 
this end. The framework involves careful annual reviews of inclusive 
government programs and sets concrete medium-term targets and the 
means for financing them. As Bangladesh, for example, has explicit 
poverty-reduction goals, the framework could show the government’s 
plans to boost services and assistance for low-income households 
over a multiyear period. However, the framework also shows how 
changes to spending fit within the government’s fiscal targets, thereby 
demonstrating their feasibility. 
Commitment to evidence-based planning
Effective fiscal policy for inclusive growth requires more and better 
fiscal data to inform evidence-based policy. It also requires strong 
political commitment. Improved fiscal data will enable Asian policy 
makers to better track public programs and assess their effectiveness. 
Such data, which should ideally include at least some micro-level data 
on individual projects, will help policy makers improve the design 
and implementation of inclusive public spending. The medium-
term fiscal framework for inclusive growth would benefit from, for 
example, data on expenditures on primary, secondary, and vocational 
education flowing to low-income regions and neighborhoods, and on 
the percentage of low-income students in such schools and programs. 
Another example is data on spending within the health budget for 
basic health care, nutrition, and public health services, ideally limited 
to expenditures for low-income households or regions. Political 
commitment protects public spending from pressure for populist 
overspending, thus safeguarding fiscal sustainability. It also keeps 
politically powerful groups from capturing the benefits for themselves, 
thus ensuring a more equitable allocation of scarce fiscal resources.
Innovations for inclusive fiscal policy
A number of innovative policies can support and amplify the role 
of fiscal policy in inclusive growth. For example, it may be possible 
to expand social infrastructure such as education and health care 
by harnessing public–private partnership (PPP), which has been a 
valuable tool for building physical infrastructure such as roads and 
power plants. While social PPP is still in its infancy in developing Asia, 
there are some promising developments. The Republic of Korea has 
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2.4.1 Commitment to equity: a diagnostic framework for fiscal policy
The Commitment to Equity Assessment (CEQ) is a 
diagnostic framework used to measure and evaluate 
how well government expenditures and taxes align with 
supporting a minimum living standard and reducing 
inequality in ways that are broadly consistent with 
macroeconomic stability, microeconomic efficiency, 
and growth. 
The CEQ evaluates government efforts in terms of the 
following criteria: Do governments collect and allocate 
enough resources to support a minimum living standard 
and human capital accumulation for all? Is the collection 
and distribution of fiscal resources consistent with 
eradicating extreme poverty gaps in income and human 
capital? Do governments collect and distribute resources 
equitably? To understand the diagnostic framework, it is 
best to visualize it as a diagnostic tree as in box figure 1.
The CEQ uses a standard analysis of tax and 
benefit incidence and a specially designed diagnostic 
questionnaire. Each criterion has quantitative and 
qualitative indicators derived from poverty and inequality 
analysis; tax and benefit incidence analysis; and best 
practices in macroeconomic management, program and 
policy design and evaluation, and accountability indicators. 
Applying the CEQ framework to Brazil as an 
illustration, using data for 2009, yields the following 
policy-relevant findings: Revenue collection and 
redistributive spending are sufficient to close the poverty 
gaps and are consistent with Brazil’s GDP per capita 
when compared with international benchmarks. However, 
poverty is not eradicated. 
The diagnostic framework helps determine the reasons. 
First, transfers to the nonpoor are too large, as the 
share of direct transfers the poor receive is approximately 
equal to their population share. For direct transfers 
to reduce poverty and inequality, the poor should 
receive proportionally more. Benefits are directed—
or misdirected—to the nonpoor both by design and 
through errors of inclusion. Second, the poor are not 
universally covered, as 15% of them are not covered by 
any direct transfer program. In fact, some families that are 
moderately poor by Latin American and national standards 
are not eligible for any targeted antipoverty program, 
even if the family has children or elderly members, 
because programs have low eligibility cutoffs. Third, the 
average transfer per poor beneficiary is less than the 
average poverty gap. This means that many poor families 
receive direct transfers but remain in poverty nevertheless 
because the transfers are too low to lift them out. Even if 
all poor were thus covered, poverty would still not be 
eradicated.
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2.4.2 Social public–private partnership for inclusive growth
Social PPP extends a development modality usually 
associated with physical infrastructure such as roads and 
power plants to such social infrastructure as education 
and health care. There are many types of PPP, but the 
PPP arrangements for social infrastructure can be broadly 
classified into two types. In one, the private sector is 
responsible only for providing physical facilities such as 
schools or hospitals. In the other, private participation 
extends to providing core services in addition to facilities.
Education is the one social sector that has seen private 
participation increase rapidly over the past 2 decades 
across the world. India, for example, introduced various 
forms of PPP that provide school services by contracting 
out school management functions: finance and staff 
management, professional services such as teacher 
training and curriculum design, or support services such 
as providing school meals. The private education providers 
include a wide range of entities: faith-based organizations, 
local communities, nongovernment organizations, and 
private for-profit and nonprofit organizations. 
The Republic of Korea introduced PPP to increase the 
funding available for constructing and upgrading school 
buildings. With rapid economic growth in the 1990s, 
there was rising demand for improved school facilities. 
The government estimated that it would take 20 years or 
more to rehabilitate all inadequate schools. It turned to 
PPP as the solution in 2005. The existing PPP Act was 
revised to add schools and other social infrastructure 
such as hospitals and public housing. As of December 2012, 
PPPs had constructed 191 elementary, middle, and high 
schools at an aggregate cost of $7.6 billion. 
PPP can better tailor the delivery of social services to 
the needs of end users than can traditional government 
arrangements, which favor uniform delivery. The Urban 
Primary Health Care Project in Bangladesh is an example of 
how PPP can improve the delivery of primary health care to 
the urban poor by engaging NGOs to provide services. The 
project aims to improve the health of the urban population, 
especially the poor. It focuses in particular on women 
and children, providing essential health and reproductive 
health services. The government entered into 16 PPPs with 
competitively selected NGOs to deliver health care services 
tailored to local community needs at 180 health care 
centers. A performance evaluation found that partnership 
arrangements with NGOs outperformed government-run 
services in facility management, service quality, and cost per 
health care recipient. 
Despite the dearth of rigorous empirical evidence, PPP 
clearly offers potential advantages for social infrastructure. 
Besides expanding governments’ fiscal space, PPP provides 
better-quality services more efficiently. By generating 
competition in the market, PPP allows the government 
to choose private providers through open bidding. 
In addition, PPP allows contract flexibility that enables 
service providers to respond to the expressed demands of 
end users. 
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successfully leveraged PPP to fund the construction and upgrading of 
school buildings. In Bangladesh, the government has partnered with 
nongovernment organizations to effectively deliver primary health care 
to poor urban children and women (Box 2.4.2).
Another option is to leverage information and communication 
technology (ICT) to make tax administration more efficient. ICT can 
improve and strengthen every aspect of tax administration, which tends 
to be weak in many developing Asian countries. Tax administration 
bodies in developing Asia generally have the basic infrastructure they 
need to apply ICT to tax administration. The potential benefits are 
enormous. A shift to ICT spares many taxpayers the time and trouble 
of traveling to the tax office to pay their taxes in person by offering 
electronic payment through internet banking or electronic direct 
debit from bank accounts. Further, this shift reduces operating costs 
for tax offices and opportunities for corruption. Tax administration 
bodies should extend their ICT systems to streamline their own 
internal operations, including enforcement, as well as promote taxpayer 
convenience (Box 2.4.3).
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2.4.3 Leveraging tech to enhance tax administration in Asia
Information and communication technology (ICT) 
improves every aspect of tax administration: taxpayer 
services, tax audit, tax collection, and other internal 
management processes. ICT benefits tax administration 
by improving the performance of tax administration 
bodies, reducing tax administration costs, reducing 
taxpayers’ compliance costs, and enhancing interaction 
between taxpayers and tax administration bodies. These 
four benefits are interrelated. From the perspective 
of tax administration bodies, a well-established ICT 
system supported by good ICT-based media expedites 
the collection of information from taxpayers and 
other government institutions. Once within the tax 
administration body, the collected information can 
be used efficiently for the various tax administration 
functions such as taxpayer management, audit, and 
arrears collection. 
Electronic tax-filing systems are the most visible of 
ICT-based taxpayer services. For most taxpayers, contact 
with the tax office consists of submitting annual income 
tax returns, nothing more or less. A system enabling 
taxpayers to submit tax returns electronically benefits 
them as well as the tax administration bodies because 
it can greatly reduce the time and effort required of a 
taxpayer compared with visiting a tax office or even 
sending a tax return by post. At the same time, it saves 
time and labor for tax officials compared with receiving 
and processing stacks of paper tax returns. Further, 
inputting data electronically improves the quality of 
tax returns. Automatic calculation functions prevent 
miscalculation, and the help functions available onscreen 
enhance taxpayers’ understanding of tax regulations 
and requirements. As a benefit for tax administration 
bodies, data filed electronically can be inputted directly 
into a tax information management system. This is vastly 
more efficient and error-free than having tax officers 
input the data manually or through an optical character 
recognition system. 
The box table shows the penetration rates of electronic 
tax filing for personal income tax, corporate income tax, 
and value-added tax (or goods and services tax). Australia, 
India, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, and Taipei,China 
record more than 90% use for some of the tax items. 
In Singapore, electronic filing for goods and services 
tax is mandatory. In India, electronic filing has been 
mandatory since FY2009 for corporations and individuals 
whose income exceeds a certain amount. In Indonesia, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Philippines, electronic tax 
filing is available to at least some filers, but its use is still 
limited. Possible reasons include patchy internet access, 
particularly for individuals, and the high cost of obtaining 
a digital signature, which is necessary to authenticate a 
taxpayer’s identity. 
Tax administration bodies in Asia and the Pacific, 
including those in developing economies, are generally 
equipped with basic foundations for ICT-based tax 
administration. Most economies have an inhouse ICT 
system for tax administration, and all economies surveyed 
now provide at least some tax information to taxpayers 
through their websites. With respect to electronic tax-
filing systems, the picture varies from one economy 
to another. While penetration rates are quite high in 
developed economies, they are still low in some developing 
economies, even where electronic tax filing is available. 
On the other hand, the trend in tax payment appears to 
have shifted from in-person payment at tax offices to 
electronic tax payment such as through internet banking 
or direct debit from bank accounts, reducing operating 
costs and opportunities for corruption. Despite their 
current unfamiliarity to most tax administration bodies, 
Other policies can strengthen the role of fiscal policy in promoting 
inclusive growth. For example, the reform of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) can expand fiscal space and foster productivity growth (Options 
to expand developing Asia’s fiscal revenues). Although SOE reform can 
cause labor retrenchment and regional dislocation in the short run, it is 
likely to promote efficiency and growth over the longer term. Further, 
if reform paves the way for higher SOE profits, the government can use 
the resulting larger dividends to fund investments in inclusive growth. 
Reducing subsidies to inefficient SOEs can similarly expand fiscal space. 
Fiscal decentralization can render fiscal policy more responsive, as 
local governments understand much better than the faraway central 
government the most pressing needs of their poor communities. 
An essential feature of fiscal decentralization is that is enables local 
governments to secure enough resources—by, for example, levying 
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property taxes (Options to expand developing Asia’s fiscal revenues)—to 
deliver more and better public services. In addition, introducing greater 
competition into public services can improve their efficiency. 
Fiscal policy can and should play a bigger role in promoting inclusive 
growth in Asia. In light of the wide range of development stages and 
income levels across developing Asia, solutions need to be tailored 
to the individual country’s circumstances. Nevertheless, the broad 
contours of an inclusive fiscal policy emerge from the analysis: higher 
public spending on better-quality education, health care, and direct 
transfer programs; the expansion of underused revenues sources such 
as property taxes; and the improvement of existing sources such as VAT 
and personal income tax. To put the region on a growth path of broadly 
shared benefits, Asian governments need to actively target inclusion in 
their fiscal plans. Achieving inclusive growth is necessarily a long-term 
challenge, so policy makers must plan and act now.
the various social media offer tremendous potential for 
effective communication, making their deployment only 
a matter of time. 
The implications for tax administration bodies in 
developing economies are as follows. First, an ICT tax 
administration system should be developed to serve a 
dual purpose: expediting tax administration including 
enforcement, and serving the convenience of taxpayers. 
Second, electronic taxpayer services should be combined 
with good policies that enhance taxpayers’ use of these 
services. Japan offers a tax deduction for electronic 
filers. Third, where most taxpayers have only limited 
access to ICT and financial services, measures such as 
tax payment by mobile phone can facilitate access to tax 
administration services.
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Use of electronic tax filing in 2011 by tax item
Economy Personal income tax Corporate income tax Value-added tax
Australia 92  92  54
Hong Kong, China 14 <1 NA
India 26 100 NA
Japan 44  58 53 (corporations)
Korea, Republic of 87  97  79
Kyrgyz Republic 0.6   3  37
Malaysia 69  49 NA
Mongolia …  76  96
New Zealand 71  80  28
Philippines 0.3   6   7
Singapore 96  63 100
Taipei,China 82  98  94
Thailand 45  10  14
… = data not available, NA = not applicable because the economy has no value-added tax.
Note: The table includes only those countries whose tax authorities responded to the survey. 
Sources: OECD 2013; Asian Development Bank tax administration survey.
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Fiscal resource Growth impact Distribution impact
Advantages & 
disadvantages Key risk areas Other observations
Taxes Negative, but the 
negative impact of 
corrective taxes may 
be outweighed by 
corrective benefits
No uniform impact Promote accountable 
government, but 
economic cost tends 
to be higher than 
for other revenue 
sources
Tax evasion, 
corruption, informal 
and underground 
economic activity
Groups that are 
hard to tax pay 
proportionately less 
tax than do other 
groups.
Taxes on income Negative No uniform impact Compliance costs 
regressive for 
business, as they 
weigh more heavily 
on small businesses
Correlation The quality of state 
bureaucracies is 
positively associated 
with GDP growth.
Individual 
income tax
Negative, especially 
if economic activity 
is driven into the 
informal sector, for 
which economies of 
scale are limited
Generally progressive 
but not uniformly so
Usually imposes 
high and possibly 
regressive 
compliance costs 
on business and  
self-employment 
income
Most prone to tax 
evasion and official 
corruption except 
possibly where 
tax is withheld by 
employers
Evidence suggests that 
individual income 
tax has less impact 
on growth than does 
corporate tax but 
more impact than 
does commodity tax 
(McBride 2012).
Social security tax Negative Generally regressive, 
especially if tax 
on individuals is 
deductible
Reduces private 
savings and 
investment in pay-
as-you-go systems if 
workers covered by 
social security save 
less of their income
Corporate tax Negative Possibly progressive, 
as the poor own few 
corporate shares, 
but international 
competition to lower 
corporate taxes and 
companies’ efforts 
to shift tax liability to 
labor and other less 
mobile factors may 
reduce progressivity
As taxpayers are few, 
low cost of collection 
and compliance 
relative to the 
revenue collected, 
and the cost of 
collection lower 
still if administered 
through large, 
efficient taxpayer 
units
Can push economic 
activity into the 
informal sector and 
leave a country 
vulnerable to others 
that attract foreign 
investment with tax 
breaks
Evidence suggests 
that corporate tax 
has a larger impact 
on growth than do 
income, property, 
or commodity taxes 
(McBride 2012). 
How much it induces 
corporate migration 
to low-tax venues is 
disputed, as is the 
impact on domestic 
and foreign labor 
(Clausing 2011).
Capital gains tax Negative but limited 
if levied when gains 
are realized
Similar to corporate 
tax except that 
capital gains tax on 
immobile capital 
such as real estate 
may be more 
progressive
Easily avoided 
or evaded but 
can discourage 
investment 
Subject to competitive 
pressure from 
countries seeking 
foreign investment
Annex:  Properties of major tax and nontax 
fiscal revenues
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Fiscal resource Growth impact Distribution impact
Advantages & 
disadvantages Key risk areas Other observations
Taxes on goods 
and services
Negative No uniform impact Usually the most 
important revenue 
source in developing 
countries
Value-added tax 
(VAT) 
Possibly negative Generally regressive 
but, depending on 
the VAT threshold, 
possibly neutral 
(Keen 2012, Bird and 
Zolt 2012)
Costly to administer 
and comply with, 
and compliance 
costs tending toward 
regressive, depending 
on how high the 
tax threshold is; 
if properly 
administered, can 
reduce avenues of 
evasion and the 
informal sector
Administration in 
developing countries 
tending to be weak, 
which can allow 
revenue leakage but 
usually less leakage 
than from the taxes 
it typically replaces
VAT usually has less 
impact on growth 
than the commodity 
taxes or international 
trade taxes it 
replaces. 
Evidence suggests that 
it has less impact on 
growth than income 
or corporate taxes 
(McBride 2012).
Selective excises Negative Regressive if passed on 
to final consumers 
Can control 
economically and 
socially undesirable 
activity, yielding a 
double dividend
Fuel taxes can have 
large costs to growth 
in the short run. 
In the long run, if they 
stem the overuse 
of nonrenewable 
resources, the growth 
impact may be 
positive. Their impact 
on distribution is 
unclear.
Domestic 
commodity taxes 
other than VAT 
and selective 
excises including 
sales taxes
Negative Regressive Relative prices 
distorted through tax 
cascading
More prone to evasion 
than VAT
Taxes on 
international trade
Negative No uniform impact Harmful to 
international trade, 
but a revenue 
source that is easy 
to administer for 
countries with 
easily controlled 
boundaries such as 
island states 
(Keen 2012)
Such taxes are 
subject to World 
Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreements. 
They are of limited 
value for raising 
revenue except for 
poorer countries 
with controllable 
boundaries.
Import duty Negative No uniform impact If protectionist, can 
induce excessive 
import substitution
Prone to evasion and 
can give rise to 
smuggling
Such taxes are 
subject to WTO 
agreements. They 
may help growth 
by improving the 
current account and 
preventing adverse 
macroeconomic 
impacts from 
currency 
depreciation. 
86  Asian Development Outlook 2014
Fiscal resource Growth impact Distribution impact
Advantages & 
disadvantages Key risk areas Other observations
Export duty Negative No uniform impact Allows countries to 
exploit international 
monopoly power
Such taxes are subject 
to WTO agreements.
Asset taxes
Individual 
wealth tax
Limited but negative Generally progressive Limited source of 
revenue 
Possible hardship for 
individuals with 
little income but 
rich assets
.
Land tax Limited but negative Generally progressive Limited source of 
revenue 
Possible hardship for 
individuals with 
little income but 
rich assets
Taxes on assets 
other than 
property and 
including 
resource taxes
Negative unless taxing 
pure rents
Generally progressive Maybe encouraging 
illegal resource 
extraction 
and incurring 
environmental costs
Stamp duty and 
transaction tax
Negative No uniform impact Price distortion 
hindering market 
efficiency and 
perhaps transaction 
volume if levied on, 
for example, financial 
transactions
May encourage 
property sale prices 
to be under-declared
Other taxes
Property Taxes Negative Progressive if rates 
are proportional to 
property values
Prone to evasion 
unless levied 
using presumptive 
valuation norms
Evidence suggests 
that property taxes 
have less impact 
on growth than do 
income, corporate, or 
commodity taxes. 
Betting and 
gambling taxes
Not clear No uniform impact
Corrective taxes Gross effect negative 
but may be positive 
with corrective 
impact
No uniform impact Maybe yielding a 
double dividend
Nontax revenue Positive or neutral 
if rates are not 
excessive 
No uniform impact Generally more volatile 
than tax revenue
Nontax revenue may 
be underexploited in 
most countries.
Resource rents Positive if not 
overexploited but 
can be negative if 
overexploited
No direct impact Permit the allocation 
of resources in line 
with development 
objectives; foster 
growth and inclusion
So-called “natural 
resource curse” if 
governance is poor, 
as funds may be 
misused
User charges Positive if set at 
economically 
efficient rates, 
typically at marginal 
cost
May be positive 
(Balestrino 1999)
Can help reduce 
undesirable 
consumption or 
production and give 
rise to a double 
dividend
May be costly to 
administer and so 
impractical for goods 
and services for the 
poor
User charges 
are generally 
underexploited in 
most countries.
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Fiscal resource Growth impact Distribution impact
Advantages & 
disadvantages Key risk areas Other observations
Fines and penalties Positive if they reduce 
economically 
undesirable activity
No uniform impact If well designed, can 
help reduce activities 
causing harm and 
give rise to a double 
dividend, but proper 
penalty design 
not very common; 
their importance 
to revenue limited 
if very effective in 
deterring harmful 
activity
May be costly to 
administer.
Fines and penalties 
are generally 
underexploited in 
most countries.
Nontax revenue other 
than resource rents, 
user charges, and 
penalties
No direct impact No direct impact By using prices to 
ration the availability 
of goods, can 
improve resource 
allocation; some 
sources open to 
tailoring to have a 
positive distribution 
impact through price 
discrimination
Corruption in the 
supply of priced 
goods or allocation 
of resources; 
revenue leakage in 
the decentralized 
administration of 
payment for some 
goods such as public 
school fees and 
hospital charges
Sources such as 
spectrum auction 
fees can exploit 
public monopoly 
power. 
Note: Refer to Das-Gupta (forthcoming) for a discussion of fiscal resources other than taxes and nontax revenues.
Source: Das-Gupta, forthcoming.
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Armenia
Economic performance was mixed in 2013, as slower growth and higher inflation accompanied the 
marked narrowing of fiscal and current account deficits. The outlook is for higher growth, lower 
inflation, and further improvements in fiscal and external positions. Despite progress in structural 
reforms and an improved business environment, high unemployment remains a challenge. 
Economic performance 
Economic growth slowed to 3.5% in 2013 from 7.2% in 2012. On the 
supply side, industrial growth decelerated to 4.9% in 2013 from 7.0% 
in 2012, reflecting the adverse effects of steep price increases for 
electricity and imported gas in July 2013, partly offset by government 
efforts to stimulate export-oriented industries. Industrial growth came 
mainly from higher output in mining, quarrying, and the production of 
pharmaceuticals, food, and beverages (Figure 3.1.1). 
Growth in agriculture moderated to 8.1% in 2013 from 9.5% in 2012, 
mainly because a severe hailstorm hit several regions of the country in 
May–June 2013 and slowed growth over the rest of the year. Agricultural 
growth was driven by state assistance programs, including free seed 
distribution and subsidies to farmers for fuel and fertilizer. Construction 
fell by 11.2%, reversing 3.3% growth in 2012. The decline came from 
lower demand and investment in construction and delays in large public 
infrastructure projects. Despite some moderation in the second and third 
quarters, services (accounting for about 45% of GDP) expanded by 5.9% 
as compared with 7.0% in 2012. Growth was driven mainly by increases 
in trade, information and communication, finance, insurance, food 
service, and recreation.
On the demand side, consumption was the main driver of economic 
growth in 2013, as in the previous year. Growth in private consumption 
slowed to an estimated 2.8% in 2013 from 9.1% in 2012, as higher 
inflation reduced real income, despite continuing increases in workers’ 
remittances and bank credit. But public consumption jumped by an 
estimated 12.7%, versus a 0.2% decline in 2012, reflecting higher 
government spending. Gross fixed capital formation dropped by 4.9%, 
compounding the 1.8% decline in 2012 and reflecting sluggish public 
and private investment. The negative impact of net foreign trade and 
services eased somewhat in 2013, as a relatively favorable external 
environment helped exports grow more quickly than imports.
Average annual inflation more than doubled to 5.8% in 2013 from 
2.6% in 2012, largely reflecting rising energy prices and lagged effects 
from severe storms in the second quarter (Figure 3.1.2). However, the 
12-month inflation rate, which peaked at 9.2% in August, declined 
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gradually to 5.6% in December, slightly above the Central Bank of 
Armenia (CBA) target band of 4% ±1.5 percentage points.
Rising inflation prompted the CBA to raise its refinancing rate to 
8.5% in August 2013 from the 8.0% set in September 2011. With inflation 
slowed, the CBA then bolstered economic activity by lowering the rate 
to 7.5% in three steps from November 2013 to February 2014. Broad 
money supply rose by 14.8% during 2013, reflecting a significant buildup 
in CBA net foreign assets and continued credit growth. Credit to the 
private sector rose by 11.9% in 2013, versus 26.5% in 2012, mainly for 
personal loans and lending to retailers and wholesalers.
The government continued its policy of fiscal consolidation, aiming 
to stabilize the ratio of public debt to GDP. The fiscal deficit declined to 
0.4% of GDP in 2013, well below the target of 2.6% (Figure 3.1.3). 
Higher tax collection and some improvement in revenue 
administration lifted government revenues including grants by 
nearly 13% in 2013, to 25.0% of GDP from 23.7% in 2012. Government 
expenditure, while rising by 7.6%, remained 6% below the budget (equal 
to 25.4% of GDP), mainly because of delays in public investment projects. 
Total public debt declined to 43.6% of GDP at the end of 2013 from 
44.1% a year earlier (Figure 3.1.4). External public debt dropped to 37.1% 
of GDP in 2013 from 37.7% in 2012, while domestic public debt increased 
by 0.1 percentage points to 6.5% of GDP.
The successful placement in September 2013 of Armenia’s first 
eurobonds ($700 million in 7-year bonds with a yield of 6.25%) enabled 
the government to repay early a $500 million loan to support its 2009 
anti-crisis program, which the Russian Federation had granted with 
15-year maturity and an interest rate 3% above the London interbank 
offered rate (LIBOR). 
Continuing large inflows of transfers and income from abroad helped 
narrow the current account deficit to an estimated 9.5% of GDP in 2013 
(Figure 3.1.5). In volume terms, the trade deficit narrowed in 2013, as 
exports expanded more quickly than imports. Export growth accelerated 
to an estimated 8.5% in 2013 from 2.5% in 2012, largely driven by higher 
mineral and processed food exports. Merchandise imports grew by 2.5% 
in 2013, versus 2.2% in 2012, mainly reflecting slack domestic demand. 
Remittance inflows from workers abroad, primarily in the Russian 
Federation, rose by 10.8% to $1.5 billion in 2013 (Figure 3.1.6). 
Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), concentrated in mining 
and energy, fell by 9.2% to an estimated $430 million during 2013. 
Gross international reserves jumped by 25.2% in the year to the end of 
2013, to $2.3 billion, reflecting the eurobond issue and CBA purchases of 
US dollars (Figure 3.1.7). During 2013, the Armenian dram depreciated 
by 0.7% in nominal effective terms and appreciated by 5.7% in real 
effective terms, as inflation exceeded that of its main trading partners.
Economic prospects 
Growth is expected to accelerate to 4.6% in 2014 and 5.0% in 2015, with 
both projections subject to upside and downside risks (Figure 3.1.8).
The pace of growth depends on Armenia’s accession to the 
customs union and common economic space of the Russian Federation, 
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Kazakhstan, and Belarus in 2015; accession was announced in September 
2013, but the full implications will depend on the final agreements to 
be signed in mid-2014. While Armenia may benefit in the long run from 
higher trade in the enlarged market, lower nontariff trade barriers, more 
efficient flows of labor and capital, and potentially greater FDI, it remains 
to be seen how terms-of-trade changes will affect trade with countries 
outside the union. 
Also likely to promote growth are domestic factors such as 
continued reforms in taxation, customs duties, and the business 
environment, along with air space liberalization introduced in 2013.
Agriculture is expected to continue expanding, reflecting the 
implementation of state assistance programs designed to improve 
productivity and efficiency. Industrial expansion is expected to 
accelerate, benefitting from the government’s export-led industrial 
development strategy approved in 2012, which targets 11 subsectors with 
export potential. Intergovernmental agreements between Armenia and 
the Russian Federation signed in December 2013 to exempt imported 
gas, raw oil, and diamonds from customs fees could provide additional 
support to industrial growth. Services should also expand, driven 
largely by increases in civil service salaries in January and July 2014 
and remittance-based consumption spending. Construction is expected 
to rise, primarily on investments associated with the North–South Road 
Corridor project.
On the demand side, the main contributor to growth will be 
consumption, fueled by rising salaries, remittances, and public spending. 
Significant increases in public sector salaries and pensions in 2014, 
and continuing impacts from energy price increases in July 2013, will 
likely keep average annual inflation high at 4.5% in 2014 before it eases 
to 4.0% in 2015. However, the 12-month inflation rate (December over 
December) is expected to remain within the CBA’s target band of 4% ±1.5 
percentage points. Slower demand growth and lower food inflation, from 
better harvests, are seen as offsetting other price increases. Monetary 
policy is expected to be broadly accommodative to support growth. 
Fiscal policy is likely to remain relatively tight during 2014 and 2015, 
given the vulnerability of public debt to shocks. The 2014 budget aims 
for a deficit that is just over 2.3% of GDP, with higher capital spending 
and wage and pension increases. The government’s medium-term fiscal 
objective is to narrow this deficit to 2.3% of GDP in 2015 and 2.0% in 2016.
The current account deficit is projected to narrow slightly to 8.7% 
in 2014 and 8.0% in 2015, reflecting further shrinkage in the trade 
deficit and increases in workers’ remittances (Figure 3.1.9). Exports are 
projected to grow by 6.2% in 2014 and 6.5% in 2015, benefitting from 
the government’s export-led industrial strategy, assuming no downward 
pressure on prices for nonferrous metals. Imports are projected to rise 
by 3.5% in 2014 and 4.3% in 2015 as domestic demand expands. 
The policy of air space liberalization may well become important for 
expanding service exports. Further declines in the current account deficit 
will also require follow-through on reforms to the business environment, 
which would improve competitiveness and attract more FDI. 
The stock of public debt will continue rising, albeit at a slower 
pace and in line with the government’s strategy to reduce the external 
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share of public debt. While Armenia’s graduation from eligibility 
for concessional financing from the International Monetary Fund 
in April 2013 and the World Bank in July 2014 will raise the cost of 
external borrowing, the eurobond issuance in September 2013 helped 
the government lengthen its debt profile and lower the average rate on 
government securities. Higher economic growth should put the ratio of 
public debt to GDP on a steady downward path, at least through 2015.
Policy challenge—high unemployment 
Economic growth has had limited impact thus far on Armenia’s high 
unemployment. Despite some reduction during the past 4 years, the 
persistently high unemployment rate, estimated at 16.8% in 2013, 
hinders poverty reduction. A shrinking workforce (caused by outward 
migration), outmoded worker skills, and market distortions created by a 
large informal sector continue to undermine Armenia’s growth potential. 
Addressing these weaknesses would reduce unemployment, narrow 
income disparities, reduce poverty, and promote more inclusive growth.
The government recognizes the need to foster private sector 
development in order to create more jobs. Expanding employment 
by creating high-quality and highly productive jobs is an objective 
of the government’s Armenia Development Strategy 2025. Achieving 
this is seen to depend mainly on employment growth, human capital 
development, an improved social protection system, and better public 
administration and governance.
Employment is still concentrated in sectors with low productivity, 
as measured by the value added per employee. As a few export-oriented 
industries—such as mining, diamond processing, and sectors with some 
foreign ownership, notably financial intermediation and information 
technology—generate higher GDP per worker, the government’s export-
oriented industrial development strategy is seen as a way to boost 
employment and productivity over the medium term. 
Improving the business climate to attract more FDI is also critical 
for boosting employment. Weak foreign investment has hindered the 
economy’s structural transformation. The government has begun 
extensive reforms to improve the efficiency of public services, streamline 
operating procedures, and reform tax and customs administration.
Because much unemployment is rooted in outmoded skills and 
therefore structural in nature, more active labor market policies and 
better-targeted education and training would complement these programs. 
Wide-ranging reforms have been implemented throughout the 
education system since the 2000s. Advancing these reforms and 
ensuring that academic and training courses match labor market 
needs would help alleviate unemployment, create better-paying jobs, 
and promote further economic growth. The government has adopted 
a new approach for 2014 that aims to reform labor market policies by 
eliminating unemployment benefits and less effective programs and 
focusing resources on better services for job seekers. These policies will 
receive support from new social programs to be introduced in 2014, 
such as educational support for the young from vulnerable families and 
mortgage assistance for civil servants. 
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Azerbaijan 
Growth accelerated to 5.8% in 2013 from 2.2% a year earlier, reflecting recovery in the oil sector 
and continued growth in the rest of the economy. Declining oil prices squeezed export earnings 
and narrowed the current account surplus to 16.7% of GDP. Growth is projected to moderate to 
4%–5% in 2014 and 2015 as industry grows more slowly. 
Economic performance
Growth accelerated to 5.8% from 2.2% in 2012, driven mainly by a 10% 
expansion in the 52% of the economy not directly connected with oil. 
On the supply side, rapid growth in non-oil activity and a resumption 
of growth in petroleum enabled industry (excluding construction)
to expand by 1.2% after the 3.3% decline in 2012 (Figure 3.2.1). Food 
processing, construction materials, and machinery all expanded, 
benefitting from significant public investment, bank lending, and support 
from the Entrepreneurship Support Fund. Petroleum output rose by 1.0%. 
Construction expanded by 23.0%, supported by large public 
infrastructure projects and private investment. Agriculture grew by 
4.9%, largely by tapping concessional government lending and improved 
access to finance in rural areas. To stimulate local entrepreneurship 
in agriculture, the government continued to provide exemptions from 
taxation and customs duties. Services, representing about 30% of GDP, 
grew by 7.2%, reflecting gains particularly in trade, tourism, and catering. 
Retail trade grew by 9.6%, reflecting higher consumption demand.
On the demand side, private consumption, public investment, and net 
exports all expanded. Rising incomes attributable to higher salaries and 
pensions and increased consumer lending fueled private consumption. 
Gross fixed capital formation rose by 11%, mainly reflecting higher 
investment in the non-oil economy, much of which was supported by 
government development programs. 
Average annual inflation rose to 2.4% in 2013 from 1.1% in 2012 
as prices for services increased, reflecting higher civil service wages 
and expanding credit (Figure 3.2.2). Markets for agricultural goods 
organized by the government and moderating global food prices 
helped contain inflation. An unexpected increase in fuel tariffs during 
December raised inflationary pressure at year-end. 
Fiscal policy in Azerbaijan is driven largely by oil income, which 
accumulates in the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), from 
which transfers are made to finance budget expenditures. Transfers 
from SOFAZ provide about 58% of total revenues. Improved tax 
administration contributed to tax revenues exceeding expectations. 
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Total revenues increased by 12.8% from 2012 and constituted 33.8% of 
GDP, up from 31.6% in 2012. 
Expenditure rose by 9.7%, which was 3.7% less than projected. Large 
salary increases, greater support to social services including health and 
education, and aggressive regional development activities raised total 
outlays to an estimated 33.1% of GDP from 31.8% in 2012. The budget 
surplus was estimated at 0.7% of GDP, reversing a deficit of 0.2% in 2012.
The objective of Central Bank of Azerbaijan monetary policy has 
been to limit inflation to 5% while stabilizing the exchange rate. In 
February 2013, the central bank further relaxed monetary policy by 
reducing its policy rate from 5.00% to 4.75%, to strengthen activity and 
support firms in the non-oil economy. Average interest rates declined in 
response. Broad money grew by almost 15.4%, reflecting a 20.0% rise in 
credit to the economy. 
Exchange rate policy targets the US dollar/Azerbaijan manat 
rate. During 2013, the central bank intervened in the market and 
sterilized $2.5 billion to maintain exchange rate stability. This helped 
limit the appreciation of the manat to less than 0.1% (Figure 3.2.3). 
The authorities accepted the recommendation from the International 
Monetary Fund to move over time to a more flexible exchange rate 
regime, which should provide additional tools to weather potential 
shocks as the economy diversifies. 
After the bankruptcy of a local bank, the central bank acted to 
protect the country’s banking sector from risks and raised capital 
requirements fivefold, from AZN10 million to AZN50 million. This 
measure envisaged banking sector consolidation and recapitalization. 
However, most of the banks managed to meet the new requirement, and 
the deadline for compliance was extended a year, until the end of 2014. 
Hydrocarbons contribute 94.4% of export revenues. Exports 
declined by 1.8% in 2013, as lower global prices reduced oil export 
earnings, while imports, mainly of food and other consumption goods, 
rose by 9.4%. Accordingly, the trade surplus narrowed to $20.6 billion in 
2013 from $22.2 billion in 2012. The smaller trade surplus contributed 
to a 17.4% contraction, to $12.3 billion, in the current account surplus, 
which fell to 16.7% of GDP in 2013, from 21.4% in 2012.
Foreign direct investment amounted to $6.3 billion, 82.4% of which 
went to the oil and gas sector. Gross international reserves grew to an 
estimated $14.4 billion at the end of 2013, equivalent to 15.5 months 
of imports, from $12.0 billion a year earlier (Figure 3.2.4). Strategic 
reserves—the sum of gross reserves in the central bank and SOFAZ 
assets—amounted to nearly $50 billion at the end of 2013. External public 
debt at the end of 2013 was estimated at $6.1 billion, or 8.2% of GDP.
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to slow to 5.0% in 2014 and decelerate further to 
4.8% in 2015, mainly because of an anticipated moderation in public 
expenditure and slowing expansion in the oil industry (Figure 3.2.5). 
Large public sector programs, including public investments in 
infrastructure, will continue to propel growth, though declining oil 
prices and limited increases in production will constrain how much 
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petroleum income can finance the promotion of other activities. 
Recently approved state programs for the development of Baku, the 
capital, and of the regions will identify new opportunities for public 
investments to diversify the economy. Attempts to make the budget less 
dependent on oil revenues may further cut public investments in coming 
years, possibly slowing growth more than currently projected. 
On the supply side, industry is forecast to expand by 0.9% in 2014 
and then slow to 0.5% growth in 2015. Oil and gas will contribute 
modestly to growth, while construction, benefiting from public 
investment, will remain an important driver, though less so than 
in 2013 because of an expected plateauing of budget expenditure. 
The government will continue its support to agriculture and will 
extend subsidies and concessional lending to farmers through its 
company Agroleasing. The authorities are expected to prepare a plan to 
reclaim unused land for agriculture as two big irrigation projects reach 
completion. Hence, agriculture is expected to grow by 5.5% in 2014 and 
5.7% in 2015, reflecting higher crop production. Services are projected to 
grow by 8.0% in 2014 and 8.5% in 2015 because of tourism and trade.
Inflation is projected to accelerate to 4.0% in 2014, reflecting 
higher incomes and a rise in fuel tariffs, then moderate to 3.5% in 2015 
(Figure 3.2.6). Higher transportation costs may impose additional 
inflationary pressure on food prices, which will nevertheless remain low. 
Strict processing rules introduced in 2013 for consumer loans should 
reduce overheating in consumer markets, helping contain inflation and 
widen the trade surplus. 
The government budget is expected to return to deficit in 2014 
and 2015, with the deficit reaching 2.6% of GDP in 2014 before 
diminishing to 2.0% in 2015 (Figure 3.2.7). Despite improved tax 
administration, revenues are expected to decline by 6% in 2014, 
mainly because of smaller transfers from the SOFAZ sovereign wealth 
fund, as oil earnings approach a peak and the authorities work to 
reduce the budget’s dependence on oil revenues. Total expenditure is 
forecast to decline to 32.1% of GDP in 2014 and possibly less in 2015, 
notwithstanding continued investment in infrastructure and spending 
for social projects that support education, health, and social protection. 
The decline in the ratio of expenditure to GDP will limit domestic 
demand and retard growth. 
Monetary policy during 2014–2015 is expected to target inflation 
even more narrowly than before. With stronger controls over consumer 
loans, banks are expected to promote lending to micro, small, and 
medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, the central bank announced 
in February 2014 a significant relaxation of provisioning requirements. 
Both developments may accelerate growth in private sector credit. 
The current account balance is forecast to record a surplus of 16.0% 
of GDP in 2014 and 15.0% in 2015, reflecting continued sizable oil and 
gas exports (Figure 3.2.8). Imports are expected to grow by 3.4% in 2014 
and 4.0% in 2015. New rules on consumer lending will reduce imports of 
electric appliances and other household goods, though imports required 
to build the Shah Deniz gas pipeline will keep total imports rising. Service 
earnings should expand in 2014 and 2015, buoyed by the transportation of 
goods and two big international events Azerbaijan will host. 
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Policy challenge—fiscal consolidation 
and reducing dependence on oil 
Much of Azerbaijan’s recent growth has come from using oil earnings to 
finance public investment, as transfers from SOFAZ have provided nearly 
60% of budget revenues. Oil revenues are unlikely to rise much over the 
medium term, however, as production levels off and global prices decline. 
Thus, the budget may fall under pressure, requiring the government to 
consolidate its budget and spend its money more productively. 
The resulting cuts in public spending will likely reduce public 
investment in various sectors of the economy. Unless managed carefully, 
these cuts could undermine growth in the broader economy, especially 
in construction, and slow its necessary diversification.
The government needs to make its budget planning and 
implementation more effective by introducing best practices, including the 
use of effective public–private partnerships, while also creating deeper 
and more efficient financial markets. Effective public–private partnerships 
can help the authorities to address infrastructure needs at lower cost 
to the budget, though such arrangements must be well organized and 
managed to attain good results. The careful use of such partnerships 
would allow the budget to devote more spending to programs in health, 
education, and training, which offer the best hope of addressing the needs 
of the most vulnerable populations. Developing more effective financial 
markets would promote private sector development.
The central bank’s decision to curb consumer lending in favor of 
loans to small and medium-sized enterprises should promote growth. 
Additional lending to small and medium-sized enterprises should assist 
a wide variety of firms, particularly those in the broader economy apart 
from oil, and narrow disparities between the capital and the regions. 
However, more is needed to promote lending in rural areas. 
Around 40% of the population of Azerbaijan lives in rural areas, where 
agriculture is the main pursuit and firms are usually small. At present, 
agriculture is heavily subsidized by the government, which shields activities 
in the sector from taxes and exempts several agricultural inputs, such as 
seeds, livestock, and fertilizer, from customs duties. These exemptions 
reduce revenues and help keep the budget dependent on oil income. 
Agriculture has the potential to employ around 30% of total labor 
force, and generate additional income to reduce poverty and promote 
growth in rural areas. Making finance available in these areas, and using 
microfinance to reach underserved farmers and other poor households, 
is important for boosting rural income. Promoting microfinance will 
require that a sound regulatory framework be established. A new 
strategic approach for financial inclusion that includes new services, such 
as micro insurance and micro leasing, would support this effort.
Besides improving microfinance, the authorities need to promote a 
wider regional network of bank branches, enforce financial consumer 
protection, and create conditions that will enable financial institutions 
to reduce real lending rates for rural enterprises. These steps should 
boost rural income and, eventually, revenue from rural areas, thereby 
reducing the budget’s current dependence on oil earnings. 
This chapter was written by George Luarsabishvili of the Georgia Resident Mission, 
Asian Development Bank, Tbilisi.
Georgia
A reduction in budget spending, and low private investment attributable to political uncertainty, 
slowed growth to an estimated 3.2% in 2013, while the current account deficit narrowed 
substantially to about 6% of GDP. Greater political stability, better trade links, reforms to boost 
competitiveness, and improved investor sentiment are expected to raise growth to 5.5% in 2014 
and 6.0% in 2015, though the current account deficit will likely widen.
Economic developments 
Growth slowed to an estimated 3.2% in 2013 from 6.2% in 2012. On the 
demand side, a 16.7% decline in public investment offset improvement 
in net foreign trade and services. Public investment declined because 
of audits of ongoing projects, while private investment fell because of 
political uncertainty. The drop in investment reduced construction by 
10.6% (versus 13.6% growth in 2012), slowed manufacturing growth to 
8.4% from 13.6% in 2012, and cut growth in industry overall to 1.9% 
from 9.5% (Figure 3.3.1). Partly offsetting these steep slowdowns were 
9.8% growth in agriculture, reversing a 3.7% decline in 2012, and 3.1% 
growth in services, down from 6.2% in 2012, as domestic trade, financial 
intermediation, and tourism all expanded by less than in the previous 
year. Growth accelerated toward the end of 2013, reflecting greater 
political certainty and increased public investment. 
Deflation persisted in 2013. Consumer prices fell by 0.5%, about half 
the 0.9% decline in 2012, reflecting both supply and demand factors 
(Figure 3.3.2). Lower international food and fuel prices, together with 
cuts in electric and gas utility charges, contributed to deflation from the 
supply side, while slower growth helped lower prices from the demand 
side. Inflation accelerated to 2.9% in January 2014 with higher food and 
utility prices. 
The fiscal deficit narrowed slightly to 2.7% of GDP in 2013 from 2.8% 
in 2012 (Figure 3.3.3). With slower growth, revenues fell by 2.1% to the 
equivalent of 27.6% of GDP, from 28.9% in 2012. Tax revenues declined 
slightly (against a 4.3% projected increase), and nontax revenues fell by 
13.3%. Total expenditure decreased by 3.1% to the equivalent of 30.3% of 
GDP from 31.7% in 2012. Increases of 23.5% in social spending and 16.0% 
in salaries were offset by two large declines: 20.8% in capital expenditure 
and 22.1% in spending on goods and services. At the end of 2013, total 
government debt rose to 32.9% of GDP from 32.3% a year earlier. 
In response to the slowdown, the National Bank of Georgia, the 
central bank, progressively cut the policy rate from 5.25% to 3.75% 
during 2013 before restoring it to 4.00% in February 2014 (Figure 3.3.4). 
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Growth in broad money (M3) rose to 24.5% in 2013 from 11.4% in 2012. 
Bank credit to the economy grew by 18.7% during 2013 (compared with 
20.6% in 2011 and 13.3% in 2012), reflecting revived economic activity, 
increasing demand for bank loans, and less risk aversion among banks 
(Figure 3.3.5). 
The average lending rate dropped to 15.6% from 18.6% in 2012, and 
the average deposit rate to 6.2% from 8.5%, as constrained credit growth 
and excess liquidity persisted in the banking sector. Dollarization 
remained high, although the share of foreign exchange deposits in total 
deposits declined to 55.7% from 60.4% in 2012. Nonperforming loans 
eased to 7.5% of total loans at the end of 2013 from 9.3% a year earlier, as 
overdue loans and provisions for loan losses decreased. 
The current account deficit nearly halved to 6.0% of GDP in 
2013 from 11.4% in 2012 (Figure 3.3.6). The trade balance improved 
substantially with a strong, 27.6% recovery in exports and a 0.5% 
decrease in imports. Improved trade relations prompted a fourfold rise 
in exports to the Russian Federation. Exports to other markets in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States rose by 19.2%, and those to the 
European Union by 72.2%. The reduction in imports largely reflected 
the economic slowdown and lower imports of investment items. 
Gains in tourism generated a surplus in the services account, as 
the number of tourists including those in transit rose by 21.1% in 2013 
and earnings related to tourism increased by 6.0%. Total remittances 
rose by 7.8% to $1.3 billion (8.0% of GDP), including a 5.0% increase in 
remittances from the Russian Federation. 
The current account deficit was largely financed by inflows of 
foreign direct investment, which slightly increased to $914 million from 
$912 million in 2012. The Georgian lari weakened by about 5% vis-à-vis 
the US dollar in 2013, reflecting rising imports and faster economic 
growth at year-end, along with market sentiment that the lari was 
overvalued. Over the year, it depreciated by 1.5% in real effective terms. 
In response to outflows of short-term capital, the central bank sold 
$240 million in foreign exchange near the end of 2013 to stabilize the 
exchange rate, following purchases of $575 million during the first three 
quarters. Official reserves decreased by $50 million to $2.8 billion in 
2013, equivalent to 4.4 months of merchandise imports. Gross external 
debt declined to 62.8% of GDP at the end of 2013 from 63.5% a year 
earlier, in part reflecting Georgia’s repayment of $377 million in loans 
from the International Monetary Fund.
Economic prospects 
Growth is expected to accelerate to 5.5% in 2014 and 6.0% in 2015, 
reflecting higher public investment and improved investor sentiment 
(Figure 3.3.7). Anticipated improvements in the external environment, 
coupled with rising consumer confidence, should also support growth. 
Reduced political uncertainty will help revitalize the banking sector and 
credit activity, aiding growth. 
Industry is projected to expand by 5.8% in 2014 and 6.5% in 2015, 
reflecting improved investor sentiment, while rising income is forecast 
to boost services by 5.1% in 2014 and 5.5% in 2015. Barring adverse 
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weather, agriculture is expected to expand further by at least 7.0% 
in 2014 and in 2015 as the government continues to promote higher 
productivity and technological advancement. 
Inflation is projected to remain below the central bank’s 6.0% target 
but rise to 4.0% in 2014 and 5.0% in 2015, reflecting accommodative 
monetary policy, the pass-through effect of a weakening lari, and 
the diminishing impact of earlier utility price cuts. Demand-side 
inflationary pressures should intensify as economic activity picks up. 
However, delayed recovery in business activity and investment may keep 
inflation below current projections. 
Higher expenditures are expected to widen the fiscal deficit 
to 3.6% of GDP in 2014, but increased revenues and a leveling off 
of spending should narrow it again to 3.0% in 2015. Revenues are 
expected to decrease to 27.2% of GDP in 2014 before rising to 27.5% in 
2015. Expenditures are expected to reach 30.8% of GDP in 2014 and 
then decline to 30.5% in 2015. The ratio of government debt to GDP is 
forecast to rise to 33.6% of GDP in 2014 before declining to 33.0% in 
2015, with the share of external debt expected to fall (Figure 3.3.8).
Monetary policy will pursue the twin objectives of low and stable 
inflation and higher employment as it remains accommodative to support 
growth. Broad money is projected to expand by 26% annually during 
2014–2015 as credit growth accelerates, reflecting the central bank’s 
efforts to expand borrowers’ access to long-term loans in local currency. 
Faster growth in consumption should, along with higher investment, 
boost imports and widen the current account deficit in 2014. The deficit 
is forecast to reach 8.0% of GDP in 2014, with exports projected to 
grow by 19.0% and imports by 21.5%. The deficit should narrow slightly 
in 2015 to 7.5%, as export growth accelerates to 22.0% and import 
growth eases to 17.4%. Exports will expand as additional productive 
public investment boosts output and productivity generally, while 
higher growth will further attract imports. The services balance should 
improve as service earnings expand with increased tourism. However, 
the income account deficit should widen, with higher profit transfers 
and lower portfolio investment income. Foreign direct investment is 
expected to remain strong at just under $1 billion in 2014 and 2015, 
as increased integration with the European market and improved 
infrastructure boost investor sentiment and project opportunities. Gross 
international reserves are forecast to dip to $2.7 billion in 2014 before 
increasing to $2.8 billion in 2015 (Figure 3.3.9). Total external debt 
is expected to decline to 60.4% of GDP in 2014 and further to 60.0% 
in 2015. In 2013, Georgia initialed an association agreement with the 
European Union that is expected to lead to a deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement.
Downside risks to economic growth relate to fiscal and financial 
challenges and unexpectedly slow growth in major trading partners 
from such possible causes as regional tensions that diminish trade and 
investor confidence. Inflation could also be higher. A protracted recovery 
in the euro area and continued economic weakness in the Russian 
Federation may undermine growth prospects if exports, remittances, 
and capital inflows disappoint expectations.
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Policy challenge—fiscal policy for inclusive growth
The government is pursuing fiscal policies that support inclusive 
growth while maintaining a sustainable fiscal position. Measures aim to 
improve the tax system, the business environment, and the quality and 
composition of public spending. 
The tax environment is to be made more conducive for business 
through policy reform and better tax administration. Reform and easier 
tax compliance should encourage business activity, generating higher 
revenues that could fund additional benefits to the poor, particularly 
in health care, education, and social security. On the expenditure 
side, health care and social protection are rising priorities, reflecting 
a strong commitment to improving the health status of the most 
vulnerable. Plans are under way to reshuffle spending to focus on the 
poor, expanding jobs to replace aid provision and offering reserve social 
assistance for the poorest groups, while cutting other expenditure to 
provide sufficient fiscal space to ensure sustainability. 
To facilitate inclusion and social cohesion, the government has 
expanded social expenditure and upgraded the country’s social 
protection system with targeted social assistance and a basic pension. 
Spending on targeted social assistance has doubled, at a cost of 0.5% 
of GDP, while the basic pension was raised almost to the subsistence 
minimum, costing an additional 0.8% of GDP. Universal medical 
insurance, which extends coverage for basic care to every citizen, has 
also been introduced at a cost of about 1% of GDP, nearly doubling 
health care spending in 2013 to 2.7% of GDP. The new insurance system 
is expected to stay cost-effective and sustainable by using a common 
procurement mechanism for basic medical services. Further social 
reforms yet to be elaborated are expected to add about 1% of GDP 
annually to existing costs.
The government intends to index the basic pension to inflation, to 
protect the purchasing power of pension benefits and offer recipients an 
acceptable percentage of prior earnings. To lessen financial pressures 
arising from future pension increases for an aging population, the 
government is planning to supplement the current basic pension, funded 
solely from payroll taxes, with a private pension savings scheme under 
a defined contribution plan. This reform will support retirement needs 
while extending basic income security to those working outside the 
formal sector.
Better targeting of social benefits should promote social inclusion 
while making social spending more sustainable. Coverage of the poorest 
decile under the Targeted Social Assistance program is expected to 
increase to 60% by 2017 up from a baseline of 40% in 2013. At the same 
time, as the elderly use their pensions to supplement income for their 
extended families, higher pensions should benefit children living in such 
families and reduce the number of children living below the poverty line.
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This chapter was written by Manshuk Nurseitova of the Kazakhstan Resident Mission, 
Asian Development Bank, Astana.
Kazakhstan 
Growth rose to 6.0% from 5.0% in 2012, reflecting accelerated private consumption and 
investment, though the current account surplus shrank further to 0.1% of GDP from 0.3% a 
year earlier. The pace is projected to remain at 6.0% in 2014 and improve to 6.4% in 2015, as 
the February 2014 devaluation of the Kazakh tenge and new flows from the Kashagan oilfield 
should boost exports and the current account surplus.
Economic developments 
GDP growth accelerated to 6.0% from 5.0% in 2012, driven mainly 
by robust private consumption and investment. On the supply side, 
industry expanded by 2.3%, up from 0.4% in 2012, as mining output rose 
by 3.1% from 0.4% in 2012. Agriculture rebounded strongly, rising by 
10.8% after the 18.5% decline in 2012, as harvests expanded by nearly 
20%. Preliminary data for 2013 show growth in services slowing to an 
estimated 7.4% from the 10.4% recorded in 2012, despite large gains of 
12.7% in trade and 14.0% in communications (Figure 3.4.1). 
On the demand side, based on 9 months’ data, consumption is estimated 
to have expanded by over 12.0%, up from 11.4% in 2012. Private consumption 
rose by 16.1%, versus 11.0% in 2012, fueled by rapid growth in consumer 
credit, though fiscal tightening slowed growth in public consumption to 
1.6% from 13.2% in 2012. Net exports fell by about 30% during the same 
period, on top of an estimated 40% decline in 2012, as export volumes 
declined by 7.2% while import volumes rose by 23%. Investment in 2013 
expanded by 6.5%, up from 3.8% in 2012, as public investment fell by more 
than 10% but private investment rose by about 12% (Figure 3.4.2). 
The average inflation rate rose to 5.8% from 5.1% in 2012 as service 
tariffs jumped by 10.6%, up from 6.8% in 2012. Food prices increased 
by 4.3%, slightly less than the 4.5% recorded in 2012, and other prices 
by 3.1%, down from 4.3% a year earlier. However, the December-to-
December inflation rate fell to 4.8% from 6.0% in 2012 (Figure 3.4.3). 
Fiscal policy tightened slightly during 2013, as the republican budget 
deficit narrowed to 2.1% of GDP from 3.0% in 2012. Revenues contracted 
slightly to 15.5% of GDP from 15.8%, but expenditure fell to 17.6% of 
GDP from 18.8% as the government consolidated spending. Total public 
and publicly guaranteed debt rose to 13.4% of GDP from 13.0% at the 
end of 2012, while external debt declined to 2.7% of GDP from 2.9% a 
year earlier. The foreign debt of state-owned enterprises declined to 
10.9% of GDP from 12.9% at the end of 2012. However, the International 
Monetary Fund has warned against the risk of contingent liability from 
foreign debt incurred by the Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund 
equivalent to 30% of GDP. 
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Monetary policy aimed in 2013 to contain inflation while supporting 
growth. Broad money (M3) grew by 10.2% (versus 7.9% in 2012), 
reflecting 13.4% growth in credit to the economy (as in 2012) and 12.2% 
growth in deposits (versus 7.3% in 2012) (Figure 3.4.4). Credit to legal 
entities rose by 8.0%, and to individuals by 27.0%, though credit to small 
and medium-sized enterprises fell by 9.1%, despite subsidized interest 
rates and guarantees. Restrictions on consumer lending introduced in 
October responded to concerns over a possible bubble. 
In September 2013, the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) 
moved from pegging the exchange rate solely to the US dollar to a 
multicurrency basket peg comprising the ruble at 10%, euro at 20%, 
and the US dollar at 70%. The NBK was a net seller of currency during 
the year. While the real effective exchange rate against a basket of 33 
currencies did not change, the Kazakh tenge depreciated against the 
US dollar, as the nominal average exchange rate fell from T149.1 per US 
dollar to T152.1 and, in January 2014, further to T155.0. On February 11, 
shortly after the Russian Federation announced its move to a floating 
exchange rate and the ruble depreciated, the NBK reset the exchange 
rate band at T185 ±T3 per US dollar, a devaluation of 16.2% against the 
US dollar, or a 19.4% rise in tenge per dollar (Figure 3.4.5).
 The current account surplus fell to 0.1% of GDP from 0.3% at the 
end of 2012 and 5.4% a year earlier. Export earnings declined by 4.0%, 
reversing a 2.3% rise in 2012 and reflecting weaker demand and lower 
prices, with ferrous metals and grain suffering the most. Growth in 
imports dropped sharply to 1.0% after a 21.6% rise in 2012, as prices for 
most goods declined but volumes increased. Deficits in the services and 
income accounts narrowed as the Kashagan oilfield neared completion. 
Net inflows of foreign direct investment fell by 31.1% to $8.1 billion, 
while gross reserves fell to $24.7 billion from $28.3 billion at the end of 
2012. Assets in the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan rose to 
$70.5 billion from $57.9 billion a year earlier. 
External debt rose from $137.0 billion at the end of 2012 to 
$148.0 billion by the end of September 2013 (Figure 3.4.6). This was 
unchanged as a share of GDP at 67.4%, but the ratio of debt service 
to exports of goods and services rose from 33.7% to 39.5%. Almost 
half of the external debt, or $72.5 billion, is intra-company debt of 
multinational corporate subsidiaries operating in Kazakhstan. 
Economic prospects
Following the tenge devaluation in February 2014, growth is forecast 
to remain unchanged at 6.0% in 2014 and accelerate to 6.4% in 2015, 
mainly supported by higher investment and net exports (Figure 3.4.7). 
On the supply side, industry is forecast to expand by 2.9% in 2014 and 
a further 4.0% in 2015, as mining revives and the first results of the 
industrialization program materialize. Production at the Kashagan 
oilfield, originally forecast to begin in 2014, may be delayed until 2015. 
Infrastructure development and preparation for the global Expo 2017 
(themed “future energy”) will boost construction and related services. 
Agriculture growth is expected at about 4.0% in 2014, accelerating to 
4.4% in 2015 thanks to ongoing support and huge investments under 
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the state program Agribusiness 2020 to modernize and diversify output 
beyond grain production. Services should grow by about 8% each year, 
driven by fast expansion of trade, transport, communications, and 
business services. 
On the demand side, consumption is forecast to grow by 6.2% 
in 2014 and 6.8% in 2015. The expansion in private consumption 
is expected to slow to 6.8% in 2014 because of new restrictions on 
consumer credit, higher taxes on property and transport, and the impact 
of tenge devaluation on prices, recovering to 7.5% in 2015. Meanwhile, 
growth in public consumption is projected to accelerate to 4.0% in 2014 
and then subside to 3.8% in 2015. An anticipated rise in total investment 
(equipment plus structures) of 6.8% in both 2014 and 2015 should boost 
construction by 3%–4%. Net exports are forecast to rise by 4.0% in 
2014 and 4.5% in 2015, as devaluation boosts mineral exports and slows 
import growth. 
Inflation is projected to rise to 11.5% in 2014 and then slow to 
8.8% in 2015 as the effect of the devaluation ebbs over time. Prices are 
projected to rise in 2014 by 8.1% for food and 18.6% for other items, 
which are mainly imported, and by an estimated 6.6% for food and 11.8% 
for other items in 2015. Prices for services should rise by 8.4% each year. 
The augmented republican budget deficit is expected to expand 
to 2.8% of GDP in 2014. Revenues are projected to reach 15.7% of 
GDP, reflecting mainly higher revenues from corporations, including 
a 33.0% increase in the crude oil excise from $60 to $80 per ton. 
Expenditure is forecast to expand to 18.5% of GDP on increases in 
social benefits, pensions, and public wages granted to mitigate hardship 
caused by devaluation. For 2015, revenues are forecast at 13.8% of GDP, 
expenditures at 16.2%, and the deficit at 2.4% (Figure 3.4.8). 
A unified state pension fund with assets estimated at $22 billion is 
to emerge by the middle of 2014 from the merger of 10 private pension 
funds. The government is considering another sovereign eurobond issue 
to provide a benchmark for the corporate sector and refinance debt due 
in 2014 and 2015. 
The government remains committed to limiting its debt to 13.7% 
of GDP, public and publicly guaranteed debt to 13.9% of GDP (22% 
if state-owned enterprise debt is included), and debt service to 15% 
of republican budget revenue. Projections show public and publicly 
guaranteed debt remaining below its limit in 2014 and 2015. 
Monetary policy over the next 2 years will face the challenge 
of limiting inflation while supporting growth and maintaining the 
exchange rate. Broad money is projected to rise by about 10% in 
2014 and 12% in 2014, as the resolution of the nonperforming loan 
(NPL) problem helps expand credit to the private sector. Exchange 
rate policy will focus on the competitiveness of Kazakh exports and 
depend on the policy of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan’s major 
trade and economic partner. However, given the intention to move 
to a floating exchange rate, the rate’s long-term trend will depend on 
macroeconomic developments, with the recent tensions in Ukraine 
introducing downside risk.
Loan quality will remain a concern of bank regulators. A range of 
tools will be used to remove NPLs from the books of commercial banks, 
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in some cases by writing off assets; the bankruptcy law was amended 
to facilitate the process. The goal is to reduce NPLs to less than 20% 
of loan portfolios by the end of 2014 and below 10% by the end of 2015, 
though new NPLs arising from currency devaluation may complicate 
achieving these objectives.
The current account balance is forecast to improve to a surplus of 
0.6% of GDP in 2014, because of tenge devaluation, and to 2.3% in 2015 
if production begins in the new oilfield (Figure 3.4.9). Import growth 
is expected to stabilize at 2%–4% in 2014 and 2015, as the devaluation 
and industrialization slow demand for imported investment goods. 
The services deficit should remain at about $7 billion in 2014 and 2015 as 
the development of the Kashagan oilfield winds down but preparations 
for Expo 2017 begin—though production at Kashagan may widen the 
deficit in the income account. Reverse remittances are forecast to fall 
to about $1.5  billion in 2014 and 2015. Gross reserves are projected 
to reach $28.0 billion in 2014 and $31.0 billion in 2015, reflecting the 
improved current account. Assets in the National Fund of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan are projected to reach $73.2 billion at the end of 2014 
and $77.7 billion a year later (Figure 3.4.10), with accumulation limited 
by the use of funds for budget support and mitigating the impact of the 
devaluation (see Box 3.4.1). 
3.4.1 Spotlight on tenge devaluation and its consequences
On 11 February 2014, shortly after the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation announced a transition to a floating 
exchange rate, and the consequent depreciation of the 
ruble, the National Bank of Kazakhstan reset its exchange 
rate band for the tenge at T185 ±T3 per US dollar, from 
about T155 the previous day. This was equivalent to a 
16.2% devaluation, or a 19.4% rise in tenge per dollar. 
To contain volatility, the bank announced it would 
intervene in the exchange market, though it eventually 
planned to establish a floating exchange regime consistent 
with targeting inflation. On 14 February 2014, T1 trillion 
was allocated from the assets of the National Fund of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan to use in 2014 and 2015 to support 
economic growth and provide credit to small and medium-
sized enterprises. The government and the national central 
bank were tasked to propose policies and ensure the 
efficient and transparent distribution of these funds.
The devaluation is expected to have significant 
repercussions on the economies of Kazakhstan and its 
neighbors. It should boost the competitiveness of Kazakh 
exporters and encourage import substitution. Import prices 
will rise, adding to inflation, while the expected higher 
exports should boost growth and budget revenues. Budget 
outlays may rise as social programs for the vulnerable are 
expanded, but revenues are expected to rise by more than 
expenditures. Devaluation will hit banks’ profitability and 
capital adequacy and weaken the finances of the many other 
firms with foreign debt. 
The devaluation has affected Kazakhstan’s macroeconomic 
outlook. Growth is forecast to be about 0.3% higher in 2014 
than originally expected, thanks in part to the additional 
spending financed by the National Fund of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, and about 0.2% higher in 2015, as the impact 
of the devaluation weakens. Inflation is projected to exceed 
earlier forecasts by at least 5% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. 
The devaluation is projected to improve the current account 
balance by nearly 5% of GDP in 2014 and more than 7% 
in 2015.
Following the devaluation, the government announced 
measures to mitigate its impact on the populace. Prices 
will be regulated for socially important goods and tariffs, 
as catch-up wage increases are instituted. By 1 April 2014, 
employee salaries in the public sector and state-owned 
companies were to be raised by 10%, pensions and social 
allowances by 9%–14% (versus previously scheduled increases 
of 7%–9%), and student stipends by 10%. Major industrial 
companies have been advised to do the same, and many 
leading employers have agreed. Kazakhmys, a large copper 
producer with over 55,000 employees, announced a 10% pay 
increase for its operational staff. Tengizchevroil, the country’s 
largest oil producer, announced an additional 9% increase for 
employees from 1 April. 
3.4.9 Current account
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Policy challenge—strengthening the financial sector
The health of the banking industry reflects Kazakhstan’s economic 
situation. Massive loan losses have made banks averse to risk despite 
having considerable liquidity. Lending has lagged, hindering investment. 
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2009, more than a third 
of all bank loans have fallen seriously into arrears despite efforts by the 
government and the NBK to clean bank balance sheets and improve 
access to finance for priority economic sectors. Unlike in some other 
countries, banks have to set aside very large provisions against NPLs. 
In January 2014, provisions equaled 32.5% of all loans outstanding, 
while 31.4% of loans were 90 days or more past due.
From 2010 to 2013, the authorities introduced a variety of measures 
to reduce the share of NPLs. These included tax waivers, creating 
special purpose vehicles as subsidiaries of commercial banks, and 
establishing collection agencies. In addition, two vehicles to handle 
distressed assets were established nationally: dynamic provisions to 
anticipate losses and new restrictions on NPLs were intended to be 
introduced from 2013 but were poorly designed, inconsistent, and 
ultimately unsuccessful. 
Further regulatory tightening was originally scheduled to take effect 
in 2014. However, new NBK management, installed in October 2013, 
agreed with the government to ease regulatory pressures by extending 
the favorable tax treatment of loan write-offs and by postponing by 6–12 
months various steps to tighten the regulatory regime—a move highly 
praised by the financial community. Changes to bankruptcy procedures 
are also being considered. At the same time, the NBK has reached 
agreements with major banks holding sizable NPLs on how to reduce 
the number of such loans. The NBK expects to see NPLs declining 
to about 10% of all loans by the end of 2015. Regulatory response to 
noncompliant banks may go as far as withdrawing bank licenses. 
Compliant banks, on the other hand, will be eligible to participate in the 
distribution of T1 trillion mobilized from assets of the National Fund of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan to mitigate the effect of devaluation, support 
economic growth, and provide credit to small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Some of the funds may be used to enable NPL purchases by 
a fund for problem loans that is a subsidiary of the NBK.
Toward the end of 2013, negotiations intensified with private 
investors on the most troubled banks nationalized in 2009, and 
agreements were reached with three—BTA (the largest lender before the 
financial crisis), Alliance, and Temir—albeit causing substantial loss to 
the Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund. 
The new, more relaxed regulatory policies may expand 
lending, thereby supporting the government’s efforts to accelerate 
industrialization. However, the currency devaluation in February 
could undermine these efforts to the extent that higher inflation and 
the revaluation of foreign liabilities raise costs and impair borrowers’ 
capacity to service their debt. The weaker tenge is already hampering 
borrowers’ repayment of foreign currency loans and causing NPLs to 
proliferate. Avoiding further deterioration of bank profitability and 
capital adequacy may require additional support, including capital 
injections. 
3.4.10  Foreign exchange reserves and fund 
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Kyrgyz Republic
Economic growth jumped to 10.5% in 2013, and the current account deficit narrowed to 10.4% of 
GDP, reflecting a rebound in gold production. Meanwhile, inflation accelerated to 6.6%. Growth is 
expected to return to 6.5% in 2014 and 5.5% in 2015, while inflation should average 6.0%–7.0%. 
The major challenge remains enacting governance reforms to improve the investment climate and 
boost investor confidence. 
Economic performance
GDP rebounded by 10.5% during 2013, driven mostly by a recovery in 
gold production that outpaced expectations (Figure 3.5.1). All sectors 
except agriculture showed robust growth as the private sector expanded. 
On the supply side, industrial output grew by 28.0%, reflecting 45.4% 
growth in manufacturing driven by a near doubling of gold output from 
the low base in 2012. Growth in other manufacturing subsectors slowed 
to 3.5% from 6.1% in 2012, dragged down by declines in textiles, utilities, 
and the production of minerals other than gold, as well as by somewhat 
slower growth in construction. 
Services, which provide about half of GDP, grew strongly for 
the third consecutive year, at 5.1%. The strongest gains were in 
transportation (5.8%), trade (7.0%), and hotels and restaurants (11.1%), 
in view of higher consumer demand and improved cross-border trade. 
Agriculture outperformed the meager 1.2% rise in 2012, expanding by 
2.9% as gains in grain and vegetable output outweighed a small decline 
in livestock production. 
On the demand side, private consumption is estimated to have 
grown by 9.9%, as higher employment, wage increases, and a rise in 
remittances boosted retail sales by 7.5%. Investment growth plummeted 
to 2.3% from the 42.1% recorded in 2012, as higher private investment 
was offset by a 14% decline in government investment due to cuts in 
lower-priority spending.
Annual average inflation rose to 6.6% from 2.8% in 2012, mainly 
because nonfood prices climbed by 6.3%, and utility charges by 6.8%, 
while food prices rose by only 1.8%. Inflation decelerated during the 
second half of the year, led by lower prices for wheat, which reduced the 
12-month (December over December) inflation rate to 4.0% from 7.5% 
during 2012 (Figure 3.5.2).
The fiscal deficit narrowed to 4.0% of GDP in 2013 from 5.4% in 
2012, reflecting expenditure cuts. Total revenue fell to 29.0% of GDP 
from 34.5% in 2012, despite better tax administration. Expenditure 
declined to 32.8% of GDP from 39.8% in 2012, as current and capital 
spending both shrank (Figure 3.5.3).
3.5.1 GDP growth by sector
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Despite the large government deficit, public debt (almost all 
external) declined to 43.7% of GDP from 46.9% at the end of 2012, 
reflecting a debt write-off agreement reached with the Russian 
Federation and higher economic growth (Figure 3.5.4).
Extensive dollarization limits the impact of monetary policy in 
the Kyrgyz Republic. The central bank raised the policy interest rate 
from 2.64% at the beginning of the year to 4.17% at year-end, in line 
with inflationary pressures during the year. The average deposit rate 
rose slightly, to 4.26% from 4.11% in 2012, while the lending rate fell to 
18.40%, from 19.90% in 2012.
Confidence in banks has strengthened. During January–December 
2013, the deposit base grew by 32.9% and credit to the economy by 
34.5%. The nonperforming loan ratio improved further, falling to 
5.5% in December 2013 from 7.2% a year earlier. The local currency 
depreciated by 4% against the US dollar, with $1 equaling Som47.4 in 
January and Som49.3 in December. The central bank intervened in the 
foreign exchange market only to smooth excess volatility (Figure 3.5.5). 
The current account deficit is estimated to have narrowed 
considerably, to 10.4% of GDP from 15.3% in 2012, helped by the recovery 
in gold output and lower prices for imported food and fuel. Remittances 
rose by 7.4% to $1.9 billion, reflecting positive developments in the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan (Figure 3.5.6). Gross international 
reserves remained stable at $2.2 billion. 
Economic prospects
GDP is expected to grow by 6.5% in 2014 and 5.5% in 2015 (Figure 3.5.7). 
This estimate assumes that gold production remains stable and that 
investments in energy and transport infrastructure projects, mainly 
from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, 
materialize as expected. The projected growth slowdown in 2015 
anticipates some slackening in the pace of investment projects during 
2015. Government expenditures will remain a driver of economic 
activity amid gradual recovery in the private sector. Higher domestic 
demand, encouraged by greater political stability and an improved 
investment climate, should spur growth in the private sector 
unconnected to gold. Growth is expected to stabilize at about 5% in the 
medium term, supported by infrastructure investments and continued 
increases in credit.
On the supply side, services will remain the major source of 
growth, expanding by more than 5% annually. Transportation and 
communications should perform well as major road networks and 
energy infrastructure are rehabilitated and communication networks 
are expanded. Industry is expected to grow by about 10% annually, with 
metals and metallurgy being the main drivers and gold remaining the 
principal output. 
The ongoing dispute with the Centerra Gold company over the 
government’s share of the Kumtor gold mine may cause risks to the 
outlook. In September 2013, the government signed a memorandum of 
understanding whereby it would exchange 33% of its shares in Centerra 
Gold for a 50% stake in the Kumtor goldmine. Parliament initially 
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opposed the deal but, in February 2014, approved the memorandum 
with the proviso that the details of the new agreement be negotiated 
within 3 months. 
Average annual inflation is expected to stay within 6%–7% 
during 2014–2015. Substantial price hikes are not expected for food, 
which accounts for around half of the consumer price index, given 
current forecasts for declining global food and fuel prices. The recent 
depreciation of the Kyrgyz som by about 10% and its fluctuations, 
following the decline in the Russian ruble and Kazakh tenge, may cause 
higher inflation in 2014, as well as higher dollarization.
The fiscal deficit is forecast at 4.0% of GDP in 2014 and 3.0% 
in 2015. This is despite the closure of the military transit center at 
Manas Airport in July 2014, as operations wind down in Afghanistan, 
and the consequent loss of rental revenue worth $60 million in 2014 
and an annual $120 million thereafter. The government is committed 
to fiscal consolidation in the medium term and will be guided 
by conservative revenue forecasts as it restrains expenditure on 
low-priority items and weighs social needs. The loss of nontax revenues 
in 2014 is expected to be offset partly by grants and expenditure 
restraint. Revenue is expected to reach 30% of GDP in 2014 and 31% in 
2015, as improving tax administration remains high on the government’s 
agenda. Expenditure is projected at 35% of GDP in 2014 and 34% in 
2015, reflecting higher capital spending and somewhat lower current 
outlays. 
Monetary policy is expected to remain restrictive, as the central 
bank aims to restrain inflation by absorbing excess liquidity arising from 
government spending. The central bank will likely increase the policy 
interest rate if inflation rises, as expected in 2014. Nominal interest rates 
are expected to stay in the 13.0%–15.0% range if the Kyrgyz Som does 
not depreciate further. 
The current account deficit is forecast to widen to 15.7% in 2014 
because of substantial import-intensive foreign direct investment and 
new infrastructure projects, and then decline gradually in subsequent 
years (Figure 3.5.8). Exports are forecast to grow by about 8% in 2014 
and 2015, mainly from higher gold exports by volume. However, falling 
gold prices and expected weaker demand, mainly for textiles, food, 
and machinery in the Russian Federation and other markets in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, may worsen the trade outlook. 
Imports are expected to grow steadily, by about 10% in both 2014 and 
2015, because of new infrastructure projects. Inflows of foreign direct 
investment will depend largely on the government implementing its 
proposed structural reforms and improvements to the investment 
climate. External reserves are forecast to climb to $2.3 billion in 
2014 and $2.4 billion in 2015. Currency depreciation in the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan, where most Kyrgyz migrants work, may 
reduce remittances. Accession into the customs union with Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation—expected within the next 
few years—adds uncertainty, as trade may initially falter with countries 
outside the union, including the People’s Republic of China. 
3.5.6 Remittances
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Policy challenge—promoting inclusive growth 
The rising poverty rate in the Kyrgyz Republic, which climbed from 
31.7% in 2009 to 38.0% in 2012, has shown how easily the poverty 
reduction achieved from 2005 to 2008 can be reversed. Moreover, 
poverty rates vary significantly across the regions. They are relatively 
low in Bishkek city (at 21.4%), the surrounding oblast of Chui (16.6%), 
and Issyk-Kul oblast (28.1%), but the other five oblasts have always been 
poorer, with poverty rates in some exceeding 50%. Poverty rates are 
also volatile, and studies are examining why. The National Statistics 
Committee’s report on poverty for 2012 found that inflation strongly 
affects the poverty rate because it drives incomes of many near-poor 
people below the national poverty line. Inclusive growth, benefitting all 
regions and people, is thus an urgent priority and necessary for political 
and social stability and security.
In January 2013, the Kyrgyz President approved the National 
Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) for 2013–2017, which aims 
to achieve political stability and stable growth in GDP and household 
incomes. The NSDS recognizes persistent poverty and regional 
disparities as key challenges. 
A 2012 diagnostic study identified political instability, weak rule 
of law, and corruption as binding constraints on inclusive economic 
growth. Other constraints include the failure of low-quality education 
and training programs to meet the demand for skilled labor, the 
high cost of finance, and unreliable electricity supply. The first two 
constraints are especially acute in remote oblasts. 
Addressing these constraints and supporting private sector 
development will likely accelerate growth, but making growth inclusive 
requires giving people more equitable access to economic opportunities. 
Young people in remote oblasts and the poor and vulnerable in 
particular need greater access to the high-quality training and education 
that can make them employable. Improving access to affordable 
finance will help distribute economic opportunity more evenly across 
geographic areas.
The main economic priority of the NSDS is to create an enabling 
environment for the private sector, thereby attracting investment 
and promoting growth. The strategy aims to reduce poverty mainly 
by creating new jobs, upgrading education and training to promote 
employability, and improving social assistance to pensioners and 
low-income groups. The government intends to address regional 
disparity by attracting investment to areas outside of the traditional 
growth centers of Bishkek, Issyk-Kul, and Chui oblasts, largely by 
improving the business climate. The government program for 2013–2017 
intends to facilitate inclusive regional development by decentralizing 
administration, strengthening local self-governance, and developing 
road maps for economic and social development in each region. 
3.5.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
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Tajikistan
Growth remained robust at 7.4% in 2013, supported mainly by remittances. It is expected to 
slow to 6.0% in 2014 and 5.8% in 2015 because of anticipated declines in the production of 
aluminum and cotton, Tajikistan’s primary exports. The main policy challenge is to boost private 
investment by improving governance and the investment climate.
Economic performance 
Growth remained robust at 7.4%, though slightly lower than the 7.5% 
recorded in 2012. It was driven by strong domestic demand attributable 
to higher remittances, booming construction, and increased public 
investment. Private investment expanded but remained barely half the 
size of public investment. 
On the supply side, growth in industry slowed to 3.9% from 10.4% 
in 2012, reflecting an 18.9% contraction in aluminum production caused 
by aging technology, disruptions in the supply of raw materials, and the 
lowest global prices since 2009. Industry nevertheless expanded because 
of higher output from mining, food processing, and electricity generation 
and distribution. Growth in agriculture also slowed, to 7.6% from 
10.4% in 2012, as a 6.0% decline in cotton production linked to lower 
international prices offset major gains in newer crops. Growth in services 
accelerated to 19.3% from 14.5% in 2012, fueled by high remittances, 
while a recovery in public investment helped boost construction by 
18.2%, sharply reversing an 18.9% contraction in 2012 (Figure 3.6.1). 
On the demand side, consumption remained the main driver 
of growth, supported by strong remittances and increased public 
consumption as spending on social services rose. Public investment 
expanded by 2.2%, reversing the 3.5% contraction in 2012 with renewed 
government spending in infrastructure projects, mainly for transport 
and energy. Private investment expanded by 1.2%, up from 1.0% in 2012. 
Recent reforms to improve the investment climate, particularly in tax 
policy and administration, are gradually paying off. However, excessive 
regulation, problems with governance, and limited property rights 
hinder the expansion of private investment and wages. 
Average annual inflation slowed to 5.1% from 5.8% in 2012, although 
food prices rose slightly faster based on monthly data (Figure 3.6.2). 
Prices for services increased by only 6.1%, less than half the 12.9% 
recorded in 2012 as the price of imported liquefied gas used in transport 
fell by 5.5% and the Russian Federation eliminated its export duty on oil 
and oil products. 
Monetary policy remained largely accommodative as inflation 
moderated. The refinancing rate was reduced to 5.5% in October from the 
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6.5% set in September 2012. Broad money grew by 20.1%, the same rate as 
in 2012. Credit to the private sector grew by 53.6%, following the 17.2% rise 
in 2012. Total credit to the economy soared by 38.9%, on top of the 13.0% 
rise in 2012. Depositors’ confidence in banks is gradually strengthening, 
as indicated by growth in the share of individual deposits to 8.7% of 
GDP at the end of 2013 from 7.9% a year earlier. However, the banking 
system remains prone to risks from low profitability, and the percentage 
of nonperforming loans rose to 22.0% from 18.2% in 2012. The average 
exchange rate for the Tajik somoni remained stable at TJS4.77 = $1, which 
helped moderate import prices and inflationary expectations (Figure 3.6.3). 
Fiscal policy became more expansionary during 2013. The budget 
recorded a deficit equal to 0.8% of GDP, following the surplus of 0.4% 
in 2012. Excluding investment outlays, the budget surplus narrowed 
to 0.2% of GDP from 1.7% in 2012 (Figure 3.6.4). Revenues rose to 
26.9% of GDP from 25.1% in 2012, reflecting continued improvements 
in tax administration attributable to a comprehensive reform program. 
Expenditure grew to 27.7% of GDP from 24.7% in 2012, as social 
spending expanded further and public spending on infrastructure 
recovered after a decline in 2012. However, rapid economic growth 
meant that total public and publicly guaranteed debt decreased as a 
percentage of GDP to 29.2%, from 32.3% in 2012.
Despite a worsening trade balance, higher remittances narrowed the 
current account deficit to 1.9% of GDP from the 2.0% recorded in 2012. 
Exports fell by 0.8%, following 41.0% expansion in 2012, as aluminum 
and cotton exports fell sharply. At the same time, imports grew by 9.8%, 
following the 16.8% rise in 2012, as increased remittances helped finance 
imports of consumer goods. Remittances grew by 8.3% to an estimated 
$3.9 billion, from $3.6 billion in 2012, with 95% of inward remittances 
coming from the Russian Federation. Foreign direct investment fell 
sharply, from $198 million in 2012 to an annualized $81 million based on 
data for the first 9 months of 2013. Gross reserves rose from $650 million 
in 2012 to $694 million, equivalent to about 1.4 months of import cover. 
Total public and publicly guaranteed external debt fell to 25.3% of GDP 
at end-year from 28.3% at the end of 2012 (Figure 3.6.5). 
Economic prospects
Growth is forecast to slow to 6.0% in 2014 and 5.8% in 2015, as aluminum 
and cotton output both decline (Figure 3.6.6). Nevertheless, the overall 
outlook remains cautiously optimistic. Barring a sharp slowdown in the 
Russian Federation, remittance inflows should remain sufficiently healthy 
for growth to continue in 2014 and 2015, stimulating private consumption, 
imports, and budget revenues. On the supply side, greater diversification 
into the production of new industrial products and agricultural crops will 
contribute to more sustainable growth. However, the economy remains 
vulnerable because income, consumption, and the balance of payments 
depend heavily on remittances, and because the outlook is weak for the 
economy’s two main exports: aluminum and cotton.
Aluminum output is expected to decline substantially in response to 
low international prices for the metal and consequent financial problems 
facing the Tajikistan Aluminum Company. The continued depreciation 
3.6.4 Fiscal balance
–6
–3
0
3
20132012201120102009
Excluding public investment program 
Including public investment program 
% of GDP
Source: Tajikistan State Statistics Agency. 
3.6.3 Nominal exchange rate
4.78
4.76
4.76
4.75
DecOctJulAprJan
2013
TJS/$
Source: National Bank of Tajikistan.
3.6.5  External public and publicly 
guaranteed debt
10
20
30
40
20132012201120102009
% of GDP
Source: Tajikistan State Statistics Agency. 
3.6.6 GDP growth
%
0
3
6
9
2015201420132012201120102009
Forecast
5-year moving average
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2013. World Economic 
Outlook. October; Tajikistan State Statistics Agency. http://
www.stat.tj (accessed 15 March 2014); ADB estimates.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Central Asia Tajikistan  119
of production facilities, ongoing problems with power supply, and 
limited supplies of other inputs will exacerbate the situation. Cotton 
production is also projected to decrease, reflecting lower international 
prices, the poor investment climate, and a weak financial sector. Despite 
recent marginal improvements, Tajikistan’s standing in the comparative 
rating on ease of doing business published in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2014 report remains the second lowest in Europe and Central 
Asia and very low globally, at 143rd of 185 countries. Thus, structural 
reform will be essential to boost private investment. 
Inflation is projected to accelerate slightly, to 5.5% in 2014 and 
6.0% in 2015, mainly because of higher utility prices, particularly for 
electricity (Figure 3.6.7). Stable global and regional food prices are 
foreseen, as is only modest depreciation of the somoni, which should 
help keep inflation moderate, although sharper depreciation, perhaps 
triggered by the depreciation of the Russian ruble and the Kazakh tenge 
early in 2014, would accelerate inflation in 2014. 
Fiscal policy is expected to tighten somewhat. The budget deficit 
will likely narrow to 0.7% of GDP in 2014 and further to 0.5% in 2015, 
while the budget balance excluding investment is projected to record 
surpluses of 0.5% of GDP in 2014 and 0.7% in 2015. While public 
debt should decline as a percentage of GDP, external borrowing for 
large infrastructure projects, mainly in energy and transport, should 
continue. Higher imports, fueled by remittances, and the effects of 
the tax code approved in January 2013 and the implementation of tax 
administration reforms are expected to raise revenues to 19.0% of GDP 
in 2014 and 19.5% in 2015. Expenditures are projected to moderate to 
27.3% of GDP in 2014 but rebound to 27.7% in 2015. The announced 
public debt management strategy aims to keep public plus publicly 
guaranteed debt below 40% of GDP, ensure that new loans have a grant 
element of at least 35%, and undertake cost–benefit analyses of large 
investments. The strategy is expected to further reduce public plus 
publicly guaranteed debt to 28.2% of GDP in 2014 and 28.0% in 2015.
Over the next 2 years, monetary policy will need to balance 
support for growth with ensuring price stability. The refinancing 
rate is expected to remain between 4.5% and 5.5% in 2014 and 2015. 
Broad money growth is projected to fall to 18.3% in 2014 and further 
to 17.8% in 2015, envisaging slower growth in credit to the private 
sector. Some depreciation of the somoni is expected in 2014, in view 
of the depreciation of the ruble, though remittances should limit the 
downward pressure on the somoni exerted by weak export performance. 
Continued exchange rate flexibility and closely coordinated monetary 
and fiscal policies will be important to maintain competitiveness and 
avoid shocks. 
The current account deficit is forecast to widen to 2.1% in 2014 and 
2.3% in 2015 (Figure 3.6.8). Exports are projected to expand moderately, 
reflecting growth in nontraditional goods. On the other hand, shipments 
of traditional goods such as aluminum and cotton will shrink in line 
with declining international commodity prices. Imports are projected to 
expand by 7.9% in 2014 and 9.3% in 2015 because of higher remittances 
(Figure 3.6.9). Foreign direct investment should continue to rise 
gradually, to 2.1% of GDP in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015, in line with ongoing 
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reform initiatives and major infrastructure projects. External debt is 
forecast to stabilize at around 27.5% of GDP in 2014 and 2015. Reserves 
are expected to rise to $930 million at the end of 2014 and $1.1 billion a 
year later, equivalent to less than 3 months of imports. 
Policy challenge—promoting good governance 
and investment climate reform 
One of the most serious challenges in Tajikistan is to sustain a high 
rate of economic growth and generate employment through higher 
private investment. The government undertook a number of broad 
legal and regulatory measures to improve the business environment, 
such as signing the New York Arbitration Convention and joining 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2013. These moves were 
matched by some progress in lightening the burden of regulation on 
businesses and curtailing government intervention in several sectors of 
the economy. Nonetheless, private sector participation in the economy 
remains limited. Private investment stands at only about 5% of GDP, 
and the private sector still runs less than half of the formal economy. 
These statistics reflect an unfavorable business environment and lack 
of investor confidence. More is needed to boost investor confidence 
and promote private investment. This will require improvements in 
governance, property rights, and the rule of law. 
While some progress has been achieved in preparing and issuing 
laws, regulations, and general policies, their enforcement and 
implementation remain problematic. The legal system does not support 
effective enforcement, and systemically poor governance continues to 
undermine the impact of reform, imposing risk on any potential private 
investment. There is limited momentum toward serious structural 
reform that would cut red tape and improve governance and public 
management. The quality of governance suffers a lack of capacity within 
the government and of accountability and transparency in service 
delivery. The consequences are visible problems with the regulatory 
and investment climate: subsidies for large state-owned enterprises, 
patchy rule of law and enforcement, and a high perception of corruption. 
Bank loans to related parties are also problematic. Good governance 
requires more decisive action to enforce laws that protect property 
rights and counter corruption. Mechanisms and structures to impose 
accountability are urgently needed. 
Tajikistan has several sectors that can compete domestically, 
regionally, and even globally, but developing them depends upon 
attracting greater private investment. Immediate action is therefore 
needed to eliminate constraints on private investment and accelerate 
structural reform. Continued improvements to the business and 
investment climate are important, especially to make policy more 
predictable, reduce excessive regulation, secure property rights, and 
further improve tax policy and administration. More broadly, improving 
security and maintaining political and economic stability are key to 
encouraging private investment inflows and improving the business 
environment.
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Growth remained strong at 10.2% in 2013, reflecting high public investment and strong performance 
in all production sectors, and the current account surplus widened to about 0.5% of GDP. Growth 
is projected to accelerate to 11.0% in 2014, as gas exports increase, and register 10.0% in 2015, 
while the current account surplus should average 2.0% of GDP during 2014–2015.
Economic performance
GDP growth in 2013 remained high at 10.2%, based on government 
reports, slightly below the 11.1% attained in 2012. Expansion was 
supported by strong performances in both the hydrocarbon economy 
and its non-hydrocarbon counterpart (Figure 3.7.1). 
On the supply side, the government reported that all sectors 
expanded, with industry—accounting for about half of GDP—growing by 
7.3% in 2013, versus 8.6% in 2012. Services rose by 13.9%, versus 14.7% in 
2012, and agriculture expanded by 10%, versus 8%. Growth in industry 
reflected moderate expansion in hydrocarbons, electrical power, and 
chemicals, paired with a strong pickup in construction materials, 
textiles, food, and agro-industrial products. Growth in services reflected 
government construction projects that fueled the domestic production 
of construction materials, which expanded by 17.3%; a 7.8% rise in 
transportation and telecommunications; and growth in wholesale and 
retail trade, catering, and other services. Rapid agricultural growth 
reflected the production of wheat, cotton, and rice above targets. 
On the demand side, economic growth was boosted by public 
investment and consumption. Capital investment in industrial and 
social infrastructure under the state-led Program of Socio-Economic 
Development, 2012–2016 grew by 7.1%, compared with 38% in 2012, and 
comprised 46.7% of GDP. Higher public outlays and rising real incomes 
spurred consumption growth. 
Rising domestic demand helped fuel inflation, especially for nonfood 
items and services. The consumer price index is estimated to have risen 
by 6.0% on an annual average basis, versus 5.3% in 2012 (Figure 3.7.2). 
Nevertheless, price controls, extensive subsidies, a fixed exchange rate, 
and government import-substitution policies helped keep inflation 
within the implicit target of the Central Bank of Turkmenistan (CBT).
Monetary policy strove to maintain macroeconomic stability and 
limit inflation. Tighter monetary policy helped slow broad money 
growth to an estimated 29.5% from 35.6% in 2012, as growth in private 
sector credit was estimated to have declined to 40% from 47% in 2012. 
The CBT maintained its exchange rate peg, bolstered by comfortable 
foreign exchange reserves. 
3.7.2 GDP growth and inflation
%
Growth
Inflation
–4
0
4
8
12
16
2013201220112010200920082007
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2013. World Economic 
Outlook. October; ADB estimates.
122  Asian Development Outlook 2014
Fiscal policy continued to support growth in 2013. Revenue 
exceeded the budget forecast by 31%, estimated at 17.9% of GDP. Budget 
expenditure was slightly below the planned amount, equaling 16.4% of 
GDP. The budget surplus is estimated to have fallen to 1.5% of GDP from 
6.4% in 2012 as spending on social programs rose. Public sector wages, 
pensions, and students’ stipends were raised by 10% in January 2013, 
and teachers’ salaries were raised by another 10% in September 2013. 
Spending from extra-budgetary funds for large-scale public investment 
is believed to remain significant. Total government debt, all of it 
external, is estimated to have risen to 20.6% of GDP in 2013 from 18.1% 
at the end of 2012, as foreign loans financed substantial hydrocarbon 
infrastructure investments. 
The current account surplus, estimated at 0.5% of GDP in 2013, was 
smaller than earlier projected because technical delays in completing gas 
processing facilities at the large Galkynysh gas field kept gas exports below 
expectations. In addition, heavy imports of industrial and technological 
goods for investment projects and large service imports for hydrocarbons 
and construction caused imports to grow more quickly than exports. 
Turkmenistan continues to receive sizable foreign direct investment, 
mainly in oil and gas (Figure 3.7.3). Turkmenistan’s foreign exchange 
reserves are estimated by the International Monetary Fund to total 
$29.3 billion, equivalent to 19 months of imports. 
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to reach 11.0% in 2014 and register 10.0% in 2015, 
further buoying GDP per capita (Figure 3.7.4). This reflects continued 
public investment and growing hydrocarbon exports, particularly exports 
of gas to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which receives over half 
of Turkmenistan’s gas exports. Recent agreements with the PRC call for 
doubling Turkmen gas exports by 2020, using an expanded pipeline. 
On the supply side, continued double-digit growth in services, along 
with acceleration in industry growth to 10.0%, is projected to raise GDP 
growth to 11.0% in 2014, while in 2015 a return to 7%–8% growth in 
industry will likely limit GDP growth to 10.0%.
Higher earnings from hydrocarbon exports are expected to spur 
growth in the non-hydrocarbon economy. 
Growing domestic demand is expected to raise inflation to 6.7% in 
2014 and 6.2% in 2015. The government will continue to subsidize public 
utility, food, and fuel prices, though some utility charges will rise in 2014. 
The CBT will likely further tighten monetary policy to keep inflation 
under control. Money growth is expected to slow further to 20.6% in 2014.
Fiscal policy will remain expansionary in 2014 and 2015 to meet 
government plans under the Program of Socio-Economic Development, 
2012–2016. The state budget for 2014 calls for spending to rise by 15%, 
and revenues by 17%. Government debt is projected to decline to about 
15% of GDP at the end of 2014 and below 14% at the end of 2015.
Exports are estimated to rise by 12.6% in 2014 and 7.0% in 2015, taking 
into account the expected rise in gas exports to the PRC. Import growth is 
expected to be slower at 7.0% in 2014 and 6.0% in 2015, enabling the current 
account surplus to widen to 2.0% in 2014 and 2015. The improved current 
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account position should further strengthen international reserves, which are 
estimated to reach the equivalent of 20 months of imports in 2014. 
Policy challenge—strengthening public 
financial management 
Since independence Turkmenistan’s oil and gas exports have provided a 
large revenue base to support the country’s socioeconomic development 
(Box 3.7.1). 
Rapid growth in the non-hydrocarbon economy is driven by public 
spending financed by hydrocarbons (Figure 3.7.5). To reduce overreliance 
on earnings from exhaustible hydrocarbon resources and develop 
alternative sources of revenue, the government plans to diversify the 
economy beyond hydrocarbons and increase the private sector’s share 
of the non-hydrocarbon economy to 70% by 2020. Public investment can 
help develop the human capital and infrastructure needed to support 
growth in the non-hydrocarbon sector. 
As the government is the main beneficiary of hydrocarbon receipts, 
strengthening public financial management is crucial to ensure efficient 
fiscal policies. Such strengthening currently faces two major challenges. 
A significant amount of government revenue and expenditure 
remains outside the main state budget, moving through extra-budgetary 
funds, which leaves the total fiscal position opaque. A strong fiscal 
framework to ensure spending through the budget rather than through 
extra-budgetary or quasi-fiscal channels would improve budget 
transparency, accountability, and effective resource use. 
The current magnitude of public investment spending accentuates 
the need for better control over the efficiency of spending. In addition, 
the large outlays risk spurring inflation and real appreciation of the 
Turkmen manat, which may weaken prospects for creating a more 
broadly competitive and diverse economy. A strong fiscal framework 
could help rationalize spending decisions in line with the country’s 
absorption capacity. Further, fiscal management would improve with 
better selection and monitoring of public investment projects, giving 
priority to more productive projects while allocating sufficient resources 
to social infrastructure. 
The government’s recent move to introduce a new budget code is 
a welcome step toward a stronger fiscal framework. The new budget 
code, expected to be finalized in 2014 with assistance from the 
European Union, aims to improve budget coverage by consolidating 
extra-budgetary funds under the budget and streamlining the budget 
process. Concurrent with introducing the new budget code, the 
government plans to modernize its treasury and introduce a new budget 
classification system. 
Introducing a medium-term budgetary framework and measures 
to improve the quality and transparency of public sector statistics 
would support government reforms. Moreover, establishing stronger 
fiscal rules consistent with international best practices would facilitate 
countercyclical fiscal policy and ensure that government fiscal targets 
promote intergenerational equity. 
3.7.1  Oil and gas translated 
into growth
Turkmenistan’s resource endowments 
make it the 4th largest holder of gas 
reserves in the world. The country 
also ranks among the top 10 oil 
producers in Asia and the Pacific. 
Oil and gas revenues have 
boosted prosperity and allowed 
Turkmenistan to accumulate 
substantial savings while raising 
incomes. GDP growth averaged 
13.4% annually from 2000 to 2013, 
while income per capita has 
increased more than tenfold 
since independence, to $7,300 
in 2013 (Figure 3.7.4). In 2012 
Turkmenistan graduated to upper-
middle-income status.
The country’s financial 
position has strengthened thanks 
to favorable oil and gas prices, 
technological advances and 
foreign expertise in the oil and 
gas sector, the development of 
new transportation routes for 
energy exports, and improved 
regional energy cooperation. 
The country accumulated gross 
reserves equivalent to 19 months of 
imports at end 2013. Over the years 
Turkmenistan has run substantial 
fiscal surpluses that averaged 5.2% 
of GDP during 2008–2013 and 
helped build up large fiscal reserves. 
Public debt, all of it external, 
remains close to 20% of GDP, while 
inflation has remained in single 
digits since 2009. 
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Growth remained robust at 8.0% in 2013, led by wage and pension increases, high public 
investment spending, and large remittances. Recovery in external demand raised the current 
account surplus to 3.7% of GDP. Continued high public spending, strong private consumption, 
and an improving external environment are projected to keep growth near 8.0% in 2014 
and  2015.
Economic performance
GDP grew by 8.0%, down slightly from 8.2% in 2012 but making 
2013 the seventh consecutive year of growth at 8.0% or better. On 
the supply side, the main contributors to growth were industry 
including construction, which expanded by 9.0% (up from 8.0% in 
2012) and services at 8.8% (down from 10.4%). In industry, the ongoing 
modernization program, backed by substantial public investment and 
recovering external demand, boosted the production of machinery, 
textiles, construction materials, and foodstuffs. Services posted healthy 
growth as retail trade, telecommunications, finance, and catering all 
recorded double-digit increases. The continuing housing boom raised 
construction growth to 16.6% from 11.5% in 2012. Agriculture grew by 
6.8% (versus 7.0% in 2012), supported by favorable weather and record 
harvests of the key cereal and vegetable crops (Figure 3.8.1). 
On the demand side, wage and pension increases and substantial 
remittance inflows boosted private consumption, while net exports also 
increased. The government raised public sector wages and pensions by 
21% in 2013 and maintained large-scale public investment in industry 
and housing. State investment spending grew by 11.0% to $11.3 billion, 
enabling gross fixed capital formation to rise by 19.8%, following 11.1% 
growth in 2012. An increasing share of investment is financed by the 
Fund for Reconstruction and Development (FRD), a sovereign wealth 
fund with assets exceeding $15 billion. 
The government reported that inflation in 2013 was 6.8% (Figure 3.8.2), 
below the 7%–9% target range set by the Central Bank of Uzbekistan. 
(The International Monetary Fund, using the same data but different 
methods, estimated inflation to be unchanged from 2012 at 12.1%.) Despite 
public wage and pension increases, tariff hikes, and greater exchange rate 
depreciation, inflation was held in check by ongoing global food price 
deflation, lower import costs, and the central bank’s sterilization of excess 
liquidity. On 1 January 2014, the central bank reduced its main policy rate 
from 12% to 10%, signaling lower inflation expectations for 2014. 
3.8.2 Inflation and broad money
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The continuing if slower accumulation of net foreign assets put 
upward pressure on reserve money. In response, the central bank 
increased its issuance of certificates of deposits, mainly to commercial 
banks; the volume of sterilization operations, including sales of 
certificates of deposits on the open market, rose by 20% in 2013. 
These activities helped slow broad money growth to around 26% from 
27% in 2012. 
Uzbekistan’s state-dominated banking sector has promoted 
industrial development by channeling public investment to strategic 
industries and increasing total bank lending, while keeping banks sound. 
At the end of 2013, the sector’s capital adequacy ratio reached 24.3%. 
Aggregate capital in the banking sector rose by 25%, helping expand 
total credit by 31%. In August 2013, Moody’s Investors Service issued 
a stable outlook for the country’s banking sector, citing healthy bank 
profits, improvements in asset quality, stable liquidity, limited reliance 
on wholesale funding, and few problem loans, averaging less than 10% of 
total lending. 
The government reported a budget surplus of 0.3% of GDP in 2013, 
though the surplus in the augmented budget, which includes the FRD, 
is estimated to have narrowed to 1.8% of GDP from the 4.7% recorded 
in 2012 (Figure 3.8.3). Budget revenues (including the FRD’s estimated 
revenues) are estimated to have declined slightly, from 38.6% of GDP 
in 2012 to 35.8% in 2013, in line with declining international prices 
for key export commodities. Rising government spending, particularly 
for health and education, helped slightly raise budget expenditures 
(including the FRD’s estimated expenditures) from 33.9% of GDP in 
2012 to 34.0% in 2013. The government adopted a new budget code 
in 2013, streamlining legislation on public finance management and 
strengthening the enforcement framework.
The current account surplus rose to 3.7% of GDP, reflecting a larger 
trade surplus, as external demand started to recover and destinations 
for key exports diversified (Figure 3.8.4). Despite lower international 
prices, export earnings grew by 14.7%, mainly on higher gas exports. 
Declining prices for natural gas exports to the Russian Federation 
led Uzbekistan to begin shifting exports to other markets, starting 
in April 2013 to export gas to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Data through September 2013 showed a substantial 80% jump year on 
year in energy exports, likely reflecting natural gas exports to the PRC. 
Imports of goods and services rose by 9%, as continued 
infrastructure development and industrial modernization required more 
imports of capital goods and services. Remittances and compensation 
from abroad grew sharply. Remittances and income from the Russian 
Federation are estimated to have risen by 20.7% in the first 9 months of 
2013 to $4.9 billion (Figure 3.8.5). 
The government reported foreign investment inflows of $3.0 billion, 
up from $2.5 billion in 2012, mainly into oil and gas, petrochemicals, and 
automobile manufacturing. External debt is estimated at 13% of GDP. 
Gross official reserves are believed to have increased to $19.4 billion 
from $18.4 billion at the end of 2012. 
3.8.3  Fiscal indicators and 
augmented budget
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Economic prospects 
Higher government spending and private consumption are projected 
to support growth at 8.0% in 2014 and 7.8% in 2015 (Figure 3.8.6). 
Improvement in the external environment should raise demand 
for exports. On the supply side, investment-led industry and 
consumption-led services will remain the key drivers of growth. 
Planned wage and pension increases exceeding the inflation rate should, 
combined with remittances, boost private consumption and promote 
services. Agriculture is projected to grow by 6.5% each year, reflecting 
stable production in cotton and wheat. 
The government will continue its large-scale investment program, 
which is set to conclude by 2015. Its aim is to increase industry’s share 
of GDP to 28% in 2015 from 24% in 2013. The state investment program 
for 2014 envisages an investment package of $14.3 billion (equal to 23% 
of GDP), of which $3.9 billion is to be financed externally. A growing 
share of investment is coming from the Russian Federation and the PRC, 
Uzbekistan’s main trading partners. Gross fixed capital formation is 
forecast to rise by 10% in 2014 and 13% in 2015.
As in 2012 and 2013, the government will stimulate domestic 
consumption in 2014 and 2015, most likely by raising public sector 
wages, welfare payments, and pensions. If external risks materialize, 
the government is expected to implement additional measures, 
including consumer lending, to sustain household spending. These 
developments are forecast to raise private consumption by 4.5% in 2014 
and 6.0% in 2015. 
Inflation is forecast at 11.0% in 2014 and 10.0% in 2015, reflecting 
higher government spending, greater accumulation of net foreign 
assets, and continued depreciation of the local currency (Figure 3.8.7). 
Anticipated declines in global food prices and lower import costs could 
partly offset these pressures. Nevertheless, inflation will remain a key 
challenge, requiring close coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. 
The government projects a consolidated budget deficit of 1.0% of 
GDP in 2014, to support economic expansion. Including expected FRD 
surpluses, the augmented budget is projected to post surpluses of 2.9% 
of GDP in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. Augmented budget expenditures 
are forecast to dip slightly, to 33.5% of GDP in 2014 and 33.7% of GDP 
in 2015, as the government offsets wage and pension increases by 
trimming less critical spending. Despite the announced cuts in the 
profits tax from 9.0% to 8.0% and the personal income tax from 8.0% to 
7.5% for the lowest taxable income bracket, higher revenue collection, 
reflecting the external environment and continued tax reforms, is 
forecast to yield augmented budget revenues equal to 36.4% of GDP in 
2014 and 36.2% in 2015. 
The current account surplus is forecast at 4.7% of GDP in 2014 and 
3.6% in 2015, as recovering global trade should boost the trade surplus 
and transfers. Merchandise exports are projected to rise by 11.9% in 
2014 and 6.0% in 2015, while imports are forecast to increase by 10.3% 
in 2014 and 10.9% in 2015, reflecting continued public spending for 
infrastructure and industrial modernization. Remittances are likely to 
reflect the economic situation in the Russian Federation. Gross official 
reserves are expected to reach $21 billion by the end of 2014, covering 
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about 20 months of imports, and $22 billion by the end of 2015 (covering 
19 months) (Figure 3.8.8). 
The key downside risks are continuing economic slowdown in the 
European Union and uncertainties regarding the Russian Federation; 
how US tapering of quantitative easing may affect the Russian 
Federation through lower oil prices, tighter access to international 
capital markets, and higher capital outflows; and decelerating import 
demand from the PRC as its economy slows. 
Policy challenge—improving financial services
Uzbekistan’s banking sector—which represents 95% of the finance 
system—is stable but remains at an early stage of development and 
faces many challenges. Financial intermediation is underdeveloped and 
unable to meet growing need in the private sector. Independent business 
surveys identify lack of access to finance (including credit, cash, and 
foreign exchange) as a major challenge facing Uzbekistan’s private 
sector. Underlying this problem are three key factors: 
•	 At 25% of GDP, financial intermediation is barely half the average in 
developing countries in Europe and Asia. 
•	 The banking sector accounts for only 37% of the GDP in terms of 
assets, while total loans at 21% and total deposits at 24% are among 
the lowest in the region.
•	 A third of private sector demand for external financing remains unmet.
The sector is highly concentrated, with state-controlled banks 
holding 76% of total assets in 2012. While supporting the government’s 
industrial modernization policies, banks have not done much to 
promote private sector development, and credit to the private sector is 
substantially lower than in other transitional economies (Table 3.8.2). 
The need to maintain noncore functions, such as monitoring and 
registering import contracts, hinders banks’ ability to meet private 
sector demand. 
The government recognizes the importance of financial sector 
reform and supports financial activities through a variety of legal 
and regulatory frameworks, the most important being Presidential 
Resolution No. 1438 of November 2010: On Priority Areas for Further 
Reforms and Sustainability Improvement of Country’s Finance and 
Banking System in 2011–2015 and Achieving High International Ratings. 
This resolution elaborates priorities for further reform, including 
comprehensive programs for banks, nonbank institutions, and 
microfinance, and covering the extension of nonbank credit networks 
and their range of services.
The government’s reform agenda is to maintain the sector using state 
support, credit infrastructure, risk management, and banking supervision. 
Additional reforms are needed to prioritize private sector access to 
finance through competition, diversification, and market-driven allocation 
and distribution of resources. These additional reforms would strengthen 
the ability of banks to provide efficient intermediation, thereby supporting 
government targets for growth and improved well-being. 
3.8.2  Monetization and credit to the 
private sector (%)
Country/region
M2 money 
supply to 
GDP  
(%)
Domestic 
credit to 
the private 
sector  
(% of GDP)
Uzbekistan 25.0 19.6
Lower-middle-
income country 
average
61.3 42.3
Developing Europe 
and Central Asia 
average
49.9 49.8
Sources: International Monetary Fund. 2012. 
Article IV Staff Report No. 13/278; World Bank. World 
Development Indicators (accessed 24 February 2014).
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People’s Republic of China
Last year saw high and stable economic growth, subdued inflation, and a smaller current account 
surplus. Slightly lower growth, higher inflation, and a still smaller current account surplus are 
forecast for 2014 and 2015. Containing credit growth while maintaining growth momentum is 
one policy challenge, and another to improve income distribution.
Economic performance
After decelerating to 7.6% year on year in the first half of 2013 as 
domestic demand weakened, GDP growth in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) rose to 7.8% in the third quarter following a limited fiscal 
and monetary stimulus, then moderated slightly to 7.7% in the fourth 
quarter (Figure 3.9.1). Over the full year, GDP grew by 7.7%, the same 
rate as in 2012 and above the government target of 7.5%.
On the supply side, the service sector expanded by 8.3%, 
contributing 3.6 percentage points to GDP growth. Providing the 
impetus to growth in the sector were urbanization, rising household 
incomes, and the rollout since August 2013 of reforms to taxes 
on services, which effectively lowered them. Industry (including 
manufacturing, mining, and construction) grew by 7.8%, driven mainly 
by infrastructure projects and real estate development. The share of 
services in GDP rose to 46.1% in 2013 current prices, while that of 
industry fell to 43.9% (Figure 3.9.2). Domestic rebalancing from industry 
to services has thus continued to gain traction, as planned by the 
government. As in previous years, the private sector registered higher 
growth than the public sector. Similarly, growth in the western and 
central regions, the main beneficiaries of development programs, was 
higher than in eastern provinces. Monthly data indicate that the growth 
momentum has weakened in both industry and services since December 
2013, most likely owing to monetary tightening and stronger controls on 
local governments’ off-budget spending.
A good harvest brought agricultural growth up to 4.0% in 2013, after 
a weaker performance in the first 9 months. The grain harvest reached 
a new peak above 600 million tons, or 442 kilograms of raw grain per 
capita. This is well above the 400-kilogram benchmark considered 
sufficient to meet the aspirations of an increasingly affluent population 
for a more protein-rich diet. However, agricultural growth remained 
below its 5-year average of 4.5%, and the share of agriculture in GDP 
slipped to 10.0%. 
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3.9.1 Income inequality now and in the future
One outcome of rapid economic growth in the PRC over 
the past 30 years is high income growth. In 2013, urban 
households’ average disposable income per capita grew 
by 9.7% to CNY26,955. Rural households’ average net 
income per capita grew by 12.4% to CNY8,896. The main 
long-term driver of income growth is exceptionally robust 
growth in real wages for urban and rural households 
alike. As rural households work more off the farm, 
their wage income growth has outstripped that of their 
urban counterparts every year since 2005. In 2013, rural 
households’ wage income grew by 16.8%, almost double 
the 9.6% recorded by urban households. However, because 
rural incomes started much lower, the gap between urban 
and rural incomes is still wide, with urban households’ 
earning and consuming 3 times as much. The gap between 
coastal and western regions also persists. 
High income growth, particularly for migrants, suggests 
that labor demand is still generally healthy, especially for 
blue collar jobs, and that income distribution is improving 
as growth in the rural migrant worker population slows. 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, 6.3 million 
new migrants entered the workforce in 2013, fewer than 
the average of 8.2 million per year from 2000 to 2010. In 
contrast, university graduates face an increasingly crowded 
labor market because their numbers rise considerably each 
year. More than 6 million undergraduate degrees were 
awarded in 2011 and again in 2012, compared with fewer 
than 1 million in 2000. The tightening supply of new blue-
collar workers, mostly rural migrants, is combining with 
the rapidly expanding supply of new white-collar workers 
to narrow the rural–urban income gap.
Current trends in urban and rural income and wage 
growth present a hopeful contrast to the rapidly rising 
income inequality that the PRC experienced until recently. 
In 1990, income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient was 0.320, comparable to Western Europe 
but low for Asia. The coefficient has risen by more than 
50% since then, tracking one of the most rapid increases 
in inequality in history. Despite moderating to 0.473 in 
2013 from 0.491 in 2008 (box figure), the coefficient still 
exceeds figures for the developed world and the average 
for Asia. 
Three important developments mark recent trends in 
income inequality. First, the ratio of urban incomes over 
rural has stopped rising as rural households record strong 
wage income growth. Second, education-related income 
inequality has increased along with returns on education. 
Third, the privatization of housing and the emergence of 
an entrepreneurial private sector have sharply spurred 
wealth inequality. Thus, despite recently higher rural 
income growth, the rise in wealth and education inequality 
could undermine the moderation of the urban–rural 
income gap.
The government issued guidelines in 2013 to narrow 
the range of primary income distribution, mainly by 
mandating wage caps and thresholds. Measures include 
promoting equal employment opportunity, increasing 
investments in vocational training, improving the 
management of revenue from public natural resources, 
and establishing regulations to narrow the distribution of 
labor incomes. Minimum wage targets aim to ensure low-
income workers about 40% of average urban wages by 
2015. Executive compensation will be capped, especially at 
state-owned enterprises. Financial reform is expected to 
increase unearned income by liberalizing deposit rates.
The guidelines call for improving secondary 
redistribution through taxes, social insurance, and 
transfers. Taxation will be made more progressive by 
reforming individual income and property taxes and 
cutting taxes on small enterprise. Social safety nets, 
including health care and pensions, would be extended 
to rural residents. Education will be improved, especially 
On the demand side, investment contributed 4.2 percentage points to 
GDP growth in 2013, up from 3.8 in 2012, and consumption contributed 
3.8 percentage points, down from 4.1 (Figure 3.9.3). Thus no further 
progress was made toward replacing investment-driven growth with 
growth driven by consumption. Investment growth was strongest in 
agriculture, underlining the government’s perception of agriculture as 
the “foundation” of the economy, followed by services and industry. 
Within industry, investment growth was strongest in infrastructure, 
followed by manufacturing, utilities, and mining. Real estate investment 
continued to grow at a very high rate on the back of strong demand. 
The floor space sold in residential buildings increased by 17.5% year on 
year, and in commercial buildings by 17.3%. Weaker net exports dragged 
GDP growth down by 0.3 percentage points. 
3.9.3  Demand-side contributions to growth
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Monthly figures suggest that investment growth has decelerated 
sharply since October 2013 while that of retail sales, a proxy for 
consumption, has been robust. This is good news for domestic rebalancing. 
Within investment, the picture was mixed, with infrastructure 
plummeting while manufacturing and real estate performed better. 
Housing starts posted a rebound in November 2013, as did housing sales.
Consumption was supported by strong income growth in 2013. 
For the sixth successive year, real per capita income growth for rural 
households, at 9.3% year on year, exceeded that for urban households, at 
7.0% (Figure 3.9.4). The income of migrant workers increased even more 
quickly as demand for their services rose in labor-intensive services and 
construction. Income distribution improved marginally as the official 
Gini-coefficient edged down to 0.473 from 0.474 in 2012 (Box 3.9.1). 
in rural and poverty-stricken areas, and more affordable 
housing and need-based subsidies provided. These reforms 
will be financed by an increase from 35% to 37% in the 
social security and employment share of fiscal expenditure 
by 2015. The PRC will still lag the 52% average in other 
middle-income countries, limiting how much social safety 
net improvement can reduce precautionary savings and 
unleashes rural consumption.
The PRC also needs to improve education and 
strengthen skills and labor productivity. As unskilled 
wages rise in urban areas, so does the incentive to drop 
out of high school. Yet rising returns on education worsen 
wage inequality. Means-tested schooling subsidies, higher 
than those set in 2006, and conditional cash transfers for 
upper secondary education may be necessary to increase 
enrollment and graduation rates. 
Improved health care boosts labor productivity and 
thus narrows wage inequality. In developing economies, 
health-related financial shocks are the major cause of 
households sliding into poverty. Despite recent reforms to 
extend health care into rural areas, the urban–rural health 
care gap remains worse even than labor income inequality. 
Fiscal spending on health should be raised gradually from 
the current 1.4% of GDP closer to the 6.5% average in the 
advanced economies. 
Also important is to improve mobility, lending urgency 
to the announced reform of the household registration 
system, as graduates need to be able to move to where 
the jobs are. In 2011, the PRC’s urban population finally 
surpassed its rural population. The 12th Five-Year Plan 
calls for accelerating urbanization, and the urban share of 
the population is expected to reach 60% by 2020 and 70% 
by 2030.
Can inequality be reversed? International experience 
suggests that large fiscal transfers for health, education, 
and pensions effectively reduce inequality. So do 
reforms that broaden the tax base and make taxes more 
progressive. In the advanced countries, progressive fiscal 
policies helped lower the average Gini coefficient by 
about a third from 1985 to 2005. Brazil and Argentina 
are among the emerging economies that have narrowed 
inequality by improving social protection, health care, 
and education.
The PRC currently spends less than 9% of GDP on 
these services, significantly less than the 20% average in 
advanced countries or the 15% spent by Brazil and the 
Russian Federation. It can afford to spend more.
Source: ADB. 2013. Reducing Inequality in the People’s Republic of China through Fiscal Reform. Observations and Suggestions No. 2013-3. Beijing.
3.9.1 (continued) 
Recent inequality trends
Sources: CEIC Data Company (assessed 10 February 2014); National Bureau of 
Statistics; ADB estimates.
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Annual consumer price inflation averaged 2.6% in 2013, the same 
as in 2012, with fluctuations over the year caused mainly by food price 
volatility. Nonfood inflation and core inflation (which omits energy 
as well as food) remained relatively low and stable within a range of 
1.6%–1.7%. Average producer price deflation accelerated to 1.9% in 2013 
from 1.7% in 2012, reflecting lower commodity prices and overcapacity 
in domestic industries. This suggests that inflationary pressures 
within the economy remain modest. Although producer price deflation 
moderated to 1.4% year on year in December 2013, it reverted to 2.0% 
in February 2014, casting doubt on the possibility that demand is 
strengthening or capacity utilization improving (Figure 3.9.5).
The official budget deficit for 2013 stood at 1.9% of GDP, slightly 
higher than in 2012 but within the government target of 2.0%. Revenue 
growth slowed to 10.1% in 2013, the lowest annual rate since 1991 
and only marginally above nominal GDP growth, while expenditure 
growth moderated to 10.9% in 2013 from 15.3% in 2012 (Figure 3.9.6). 
The decline in revenue reflected mainly overdependence on indirect 
taxes. Value-added, business, and consumption taxes currently bring in 
over 60% of total tax revenues. Reflecting the higher sensitivity of these 
taxes to economic up- and downswings compared with direct taxes, 
falling import growth suppressed import-related duties and taxes.
A recent audit suggests that the augmented budget deficit, which 
includes off-budget spending, was higher than officially reported, 
and the fiscal stance more expansionary. The audit showed local 
government debt increasing from 26.7% of GDP in 2010 to about 
36.0% at the end of June 2013. Most of this debt was borrowed off 
budget through special financing vehicles because local governments 
are prohibited from borrowing on budget, despite their expenditure 
needs substantially exceeding their revenues. The augmented local 
government debt was partly invested in nonearning infrastructure 
assets, making it difficult for these governments to meet their debt 
service burden, which is high for some, particularly in light of maturity 
mismatches. Deeply indebted governments are now allowed to borrow 
only to refinance existing liabilities with longer-term loans. As central 
government debt is still low at 13.6% of GDP, however, consolidated 
central and local government debt does not appear excessive from an 
international perspective. 
The M2 money supply was growing at 13.6% year on year at the 
end of 2013 (Figure 3.9.7). This exceeded the 13.0% target set by 
the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank, for 2013, as 
in the previous years. The ratio of M2 to GDP rose to nearly 200%, 
which is high for a developing country. Despite efforts to pursue a 
firmer monetary stance to rein in credit growth and financial risks, 
which have driven up interbank interest rates since May 2013, credit 
growth outpaced nominal GDP growth. The root cause of high credit 
growth in 2013 was an increase in the PBOC’s net foreign assets 
resulting from strong capital inflows, which put upward pressure on 
the currency. The PBOC had to purchase foreign currency to stem 
renminbi appreciation, thereby inflating the monetary base and the 
money supply. The government and banks increased their deposits at 
the central bank, but this sterilized only about a third of the expansion. 
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Another factor behind strong money supply growth in 2013 was the 
difficulty of controling lending, particularly lending associated with 
shadow banking. However, some progress was made in the second 
half of 2013, when tighter interbank market conditions and stricter 
regulations forced a sharp decline in the issuance of trust loans and 
bankers’ acceptances (Figure 3.9.8). This trend continued into 2014, 
helping to further reduce broad money growth to 13.2% year on year in 
January 2014.
The trend appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the US dollar 
continued as capital inflows remained strong except for short 
interruptions in mid-2013 and early 2014. By December 2013, the 
renminbi had appreciated by 3.1% year on year against the US dollar 
(Figure 3.9.9). In nominal effective terms, the appreciation was higher 
at 7.2% because the Japanese yen depreciated early in 2013. In real 
effective terms, the renminbi appreciated by 7.9% year on year. Real 
effective appreciation peaked in September 2013 at 9.3% year on year—a 
magnitude that, if sustained, might be difficult to compensate for 
through productivity gains. The downward trend since then, resulting 
mainly from yen stabilization and higher inflation in Japan, is thus good 
news for the PRC’s external competitiveness.
As its foreign trade continued to grow, the PRC replaced the 
United States in 2013 as the largest goods-trading nation. Merchandise 
export growth was volatile throughout the year but reached 7.8% year 
on year based on customs statistics, only marginally below the export 
growth rate in 2012 (Figure 3.9.10). Export figures since late 2013 do 
not yet clearly support the view that stronger growth in developed 
economies translates into higher export demand for the PRC, as 
export growth was strong in November 2013 and January 2014 but 
weak in October and December 2013, and even negative in February 
2014. Import growth was lower than export growth but more stable. 
It reached 7.3% for the year as a whole. Therefore, the trade surplus rose 
to $261 billion, 12.3% higher than in 2012, but remained unchanged as a 
percentage of GDP at 2.8%. 
The improved trade balance and lower deficit in the income account 
were offset by an expanding deficit in the service account and a small 
deficit in net transfers. The current account surplus thus narrowed 
to $188.7 billion or 2.1% of GDP from $193.1 billion or 2.3% of GDP in 
2012. In contrast, the financial and capital accounts closed with a large 
surplus of $262.7 billion in 2013, following a deficit of $16.8 billion 
in 2012. This impressive turnaround came mainly from strong net 
inflows of portfolio investment in 2013, particularly in the first and 
fourth quarters, following strong net outflows in 2012. Gross inflows 
of foreign direct investment also increased in 2013, by 5.3% to 
$117.6 billion according to the Ministry of Commerce, but the PRC’s 
direct investment abroad rose more quickly, recording 17.3% expansion 
to reach $87.8 billion. This means that net foreign direct investment 
inflows may well have declined, but the balance of payment figures to 
confirm this have yet to be disclosed. The overall balance of payments 
surplus increased fourfold over 2012, boosting official reserves by 
$510 billion to nearly $4 trillion.
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Economic prospects
GDP growth is projected to decelerate somewhat to 7.5% in 2014, which 
is the official target, and 7.4% in 2015 (Figure 3.9.11). Slightly weaker 
growth momentum from the fourth quarter of 2013 is carrying over into 
2014. Support for growth over the forecast period should come from 
more equitable income growth and higher social spending in line with 
government objectives, which will sustain growth in consumption. GDP 
growth should also benefit from the upturn in developed countries, 
which should sooner or later generate stronger demand for PRC exports 
despite continuing real renminbi appreciation and higher unit labor costs. 
Investment growth, on the other hand, will likely decelerate as 
the government tries to rein in high credit growth, reduce industrial 
overcapacity, and bring local government debt under control. These efforts 
are already forcing many local governments to adjust their investment 
targets for 2014. Other structural reforms outlined at the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
PRC in November 2013 might also weigh on headline growth: state-owned 
enterprise reform, higher prices and/or taxes for primary resources, 
and a change in how senior local government officials are evaluated 
that depends less on economic growth. However, such reforms have 
the potential to improve the quality of growth and ensure its long-term 
sustainability. The government has announced that it will try to prevent 
a sharp downturn to avoid social problems, implying that reforms will 
be rolled out over longer periods. Therefore, GDP growth is forecast to 
decelerate slowly over several years before it stabilizes or rises again.
Inflation is forecast to remain subdued at 2.6% on average in 2014, 
below the government target of 3.5%, as moderating GDP and credit 
growth keeps price pressure in check (Figure 3.9.12). Low capacity 
utilization in manufacturing should help contain domestic price pressures 
for some time to come. However, increases in administered prices, in line 
with government’s plans to reform the pricing of energy, water, and other 
commodities, may push annual average inflation to around 3.0% in 2015. 
Volatile food prices harbor risks to this inflation forecast.
As the government has announced that fiscal policies will stay broadly 
unchanged, the consolidated budget deficit is forecast to remain at about 
2.1% of GDP in 2014 and 2015. The government will likely try to broaden 
its fiscal space and options by gradually increasing budget revenues 
through tax system reforms. Efforts to reduce local governments’ 
off-budget spending may, however, have the effect of fiscal tightening. 
Government current expenditure should rise more than in 2013 as 
fiscal spending related to social security, public housing, education, and 
health care will continue to increase in line with announced government 
policies. In contrast, administrative spending will be cut further.
Monetary policy needs to strike a balance between mitigating risks 
in the financial and property sectors that stem from high past credit 
growth and supporting sustainable economic growth. As current growth 
momentum seems sufficiently high to provide enough jobs, monetary 
policy is expected to lean further toward tightening over the forecast 
period. This should bring the growth rate of money supply closer to 
that of nominal GDP and possibly even below the official target of 13% 
(Figure 3.9.13). 
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As global commodity prices are forecast to fall, the PRC’s foreign 
trade will likely benefit from improved terms of trade. The merchandise 
trade surplus should thus widen further in 2014 and 2015. As the 
deficit in the service account will also likely widen, the current account 
surpluses are forecast to narrow marginally to 2% of GDP. 
If strong net capital inflows continue, which seems likely, the PBOC 
will find it difficult to widen the exchange rate band for the renminbi, 
which was already extended from ±1 percent to ±2 percent in mid-March 
this year as an intermediate step toward the declared policy objective of 
full exchange rate liberalization. It will also be more difficult to rein in 
money supply growth. The authorities are therefore likely to facilitate 
capital outflows to ease upward pressure on the renminbi, followed 
in later years by steps toward further exchange rate liberalization. 
A more balanced capital and financial account would help slow the 
accumulation of reserves, which boosted money supply in 2013, given 
the limited scope for sterilization owing to the shallow financial market. 
Unexpectedly high trade surpluses and net capital inflows harbor risks 
for these exchange rate and monetary forecasts.
Among the international risks to the forecast is unexpectedly severe 
financial volatility in developing economies as the US Federal Reserve 
gradually tapers quantitative easing. If some countries suffer excessive 
capital outflows, the PRC may be affected indirectly through weaker 
demand for its exports. Another global risk is recovery in developed 
economies remaining sluggish. While there seems to be evidence of 
improved performance in these markets, a setback to recovery in the 
PRC’s main trading partners would translate into lackluster demand 
for its exports, which would slow growth during the forecast period. 
On the other hand, an unexpectedly strong external environment would 
improve the upside potential for the PRC economy and create room for 
bolder structural reforms.
The principal domestic risks to the forecast stem from uncertainties 
regarding the effectiveness of monetary management and the concern 
over credit quality. A number of trust funds are already facing difficulties, 
and a few have reportedly defaulted on bonds in recent months for lack 
of repayment from their own borrowers. Many of these borrowers, which 
include real estate developers and companies in industries with excess 
capacity, are subprime and struggle in an environment of decelerating 
economic growth. The factors mitigating these risks are that debts 
are mainly domestic and, at least in the case of local government debt, 
largely backed by long-term assets. Further, given relatively low central 
government debt and a well-capitalized banking system, the PRC is in a 
strong position to forestall domestic risks. 
Policy challenge—maintaining GDP growth 
while taming credit expansion
The key challenge for policy makers during the forecast period is to 
implement policies that help to decelerate investment growth in a 
controlled manner, thereby ensuring orderly debt accumulation by local 
governments and state-owned enterprises and the safety and soundness 
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of the banking system, without derailing the growth momentum of the 
economy. After launching the key structural reforms outlined at the 
November 2013 party plenum, the government will pursue, as in the 
past, a gradual reform strategy and regularly fine-tune the speed of 
reform and which specific measures to apply. 
While this strategy will help to contain instability, achieving results 
will take time. In the short term, the PBOC needs to find the right 
balance between subduing credit growth and supporting economic 
growth. Attempts to slow credit growth too rapidly may impose 
additional stress on enterprises and financial institutions, eroding 
investor confidence. However, if continued, the current pace of credit 
growth and the associated increase in debt, including the debt of local 
governments and state-owned enterprises, may aggravate existing asset 
quality problems, which also risks undermining investor confidence. 
Responding to this bind requires strengthening monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange rate policies in a coordinated way. To this end, the PBOC 
can be expected to target a monetary growth rate in 2014 that exceeds 
nominal GDP growth but by less than in 2013, invigorate competition 
in the financial sector to help allocate credit more efficiently, and 
strengthen sector oversight to prevent excessive risk taking. Other needs 
are further interest rate liberalization, financial market deepening, and 
more flexibility in exchange rate policy to reduce the need to sterilize 
eventual large capital inflows. 
In the fiscal area, the government intends to further improve tax 
collection and cut preferencial tax treatments, introduce property 
taxes, and start adjusting the distribution of fiscal responsibilities and 
resources between the central and local governments by recentralizing 
social expenditure responsibilities and enlarging the block transfers that 
the central government pays to local governments. Both measures will, 
over time, ease the need for local governments to accumulate more debt. 
Reform of personal income tax may also be launched during 
the forecast period, as a broader income tax base would go a long 
way toward mobilizing the resources needed to better provision 
social and infrastructure services without accumulating more debt. 
Equally important, progressive income taxes would help to shift the tax 
burden from low-income to high-income households. This would improve 
income distribution and equity, which are declared policy objectives. 
This chapter was written by Arief Ramayandi and Aleli Rosario of the Economics and 
Research Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Hong Kong, China
Spurred by domestic demand and tourism, GDP grew steadily. Growth is expected to accelerate 
moderately to 3.5% in 2014 and 3.6% in 2015 as inflation hovers just below 4%. Being an 
international financial center poses risks from volatility, but a healthy financial sector and substantial 
financial resources can cushion the economy. A policy challenge is to address long-term fiscal 
sustainability in view of an ageing population and the government’s financial commitments. 
Economic performance 
The economy grew by 2.9% in 2013, more quickly than in 2012. 
Domestic demand and healthy tourism supported economic expansion. 
Consumption was the backbone of growth, contributing about 3 
percentage points, with private consumption accounting for 92% of 
that contribution (Figure 3.10.1). Investment also picked up in 2013 
with increased purchases of machinery and equipment, contributing 
1 percentage point to growth. Sluggish external demand reduced net 
exports, subtracting nearly 1 percentage point from growth.
Private consumption was buoyed by rising real incomes. Reflecting 
a low unemployment rate of 3.3% and an upward adjustment to 
the statutory minimum wage in May 2013, real wages have risen. 
The continuing influx of tourists also played a major role in boosting 
private incomes. In 2013, Hong Kong, China attracted 54.3 million 
tourists, 75% of them from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
While tourists arrivals from other markets have remained stable, those 
from the PRC have increased by 80% since 2010 (Figure 3.10.2).
Gaining from high tourist arrivals in 2013, the service sector, which 
accounts for more than 90% of GDP, grew by 3%. Most services grew at 
a robust pace, with the exception of real estate, which contracted by 4%. 
The contribution of industry and construction was small, and that of 
agriculture negligible.
Export and import growth both accelerated slightly in 2013, 
reflecting economic recovery in the advance economies in the latter 
half of 2013. Net services exports grew by 33%. The combined goods 
and services balance produced a modest surplus of $2.9 billion, and the 
current account surplus widened to 2.1% of GDP from 1.6% in 2012. 
This outcome, together with a net capital inflow of $2.2 billion, generated 
a balance of payments surplus of 2.7% of GDP. Official foreign reserves 
increased to $311.2 billion by the end of 2013 from $305.8 billion a year 
earlier. Tracking movements of the US dollar to which it is pegged, 
the local currency appreciated in nominal effective terms by 3.7% 
against the currencies of the economy’s major trading partners in 2013 
(Figure 3.10.3). 
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Under the currency board system, interest rates generally align with 
the policies of the US Federal Reserve. The low interest rate environment 
pushed domestic credit to 170% of GDP in 2013, for a growth rate of 
8.2%, and the total loan-to-deposit ratio to 72.9% in January 2014 
(Figure 3.10.4). The total loan portfolio of authorized institutions, 
including their lending abroad, expanded by 16%, up from 10% in 
2012. Tighter macroprudential policies and fiscal measures imposed in 
February 2013 to contain soaring property prices lowered the ratio of 
property loans to total loans to 30% from about 33% in 2012. The money 
supply grew by 12.3% in 2013, substantially outpacing nominal GDP 
growth and somewhat more quickly than the 11.1% rate posted in 2012.
Consumer price index inflation increased to 4.3% year on year in 
2013 from 4.1% in 2012 as costs rose for rent and food, which together 
accounted for 79% of the index rise. Despite the sharp cooling of the 
property market, residential rents increased by 6.7%, albeit stabilizing 
in the fourth quarter (Figure 3.10.5). The number of new rental leases 
edged down in line with cooling in the property market, which will take 
time to feed through to other rental indicators. Food prices rose by 4.4%, 
but prices for durable goods declined on weak import prices. Headline 
inflation was calculated with no corrections for one-off relief measures 
such as tax concessions, an electricity subsidy, and 2 months’ free rent 
for public housing tenants.
Since 2004, the budget has recorded surpluses cumulatively 
amounting to $60.3 billion, providing substantial fiscal reserves at a time 
when higher social expenditure seems inevitable. The budget for FY2013 
(ended 31 March 2014) was no exception, recording a surplus of 0.6% 
of GDP. Revenues rose to HK$447.8 billion, 3% more than projected, as 
additional land was sold for housing. Expenditure of HK$435.8 billion 
was lower than budgeted by HK$4.2 billion, though recurrent 
expenditure growth has averaged 8.5% in the past 3 years, with a huge 
chunk of that allotted to education, health care, and social welfare.
Economic prospects
The economy is forecast to grow by 3.5% in 2014 and 3.6% in 2015 
(Figure 3.10.6). This is within the range of 3.0%–4.0% that the 
government forecast for 2014. In the next 2 years, as the economies of 
the US and the euro area strengthen, the external trade of Hong Kong, 
China is expected to pick up. Exports are expected to grow over the 
next 2 years by an average of 8.2%, and imports by 7.0%. Close links to 
the PRC economy are expected to open up more business opportunities 
in that market, and facilitate access to more provinces, for service 
companies based in Hong Kong, China. This should mitigate any 
adverse impact from slower growth in the PRC. Inflation is expected 
to moderate to 3.8% in 2014, as the slower pace of rent hikes in the 
last quarter of 2013 feeds through and as international food and oil 
prices decline with expected better supply. As these developments feed 
through in turn to 2015, inflation is envisaged declining slightly to 3.7%. 
Domestic demand is expected to be robust in the forecast period. 
Private consumption will continue to be an important source of growth 
in 2014 and 2015. Private investment is expected to pick up from its low 
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base in 2013. Public spending will likely continue growing from its high 
base, as projects initiated over recent years keep public construction 
buoyant. More generally, low and stable interest rates in 2014, reflecting 
US monetary policy, will fuel domestic demand in 2014, but this effect 
may wane in 2015 if US monetary policy tightens. 
Both imports and exports will grow, with the trade balance 
remaining in deficit. However, the current account surplus is expected 
to widen to 3.5% of GDP in both 2014 and 2015 on growing net service 
receipts and income from PRC tourists. This is despite the Government 
of the PRC agreeing to temporarily tighten restrictions on travel to 
Hong Kong, China in response to mounting concerns about the burden 
tourist numbers place on public infrastructure. The position of Hong 
Kong, China as an international financial center could strengthen as the 
PRC continues to open its capital account and to foster the renminbi’s 
expanded use internationally.
A surplus of about 0.4% of GDP is planned under the FY2014 
budget, with revenue and expenditure both amounting to about 19% of 
GDP. This represents a 4% reduction in revenue and a 6% reduction in 
expenditure from the FY2013 budgetary outturn. Lower expenditure 
reflects reduced relief measures and transfers to various funds. 
The FY2014 budget cuts the amount budgeted to finance relief to 
HK$20 billion. The budget is in line with the recommendations of the 
Working Group on Long-Term Fiscal Planning, which was set up in June 
2013 to contain public expenditure to 20% of GDP, close to the ratio in 
the past year. 
Growth prospects hinge on continued expansion in the PRC, 
economic recovery in the advanced economies, and accommodative 
monetary policy in the US. As an international financial center, 
Hong Kong, China would feel the impact of global financial shocks, 
particularly those emanating from the US or the PRC. If the US tightens 
monetary policy in 2014, capital outflows, higher interest rates, and 
financial market volatility will likely ensue, curtailing domestic demand 
and economic growth. However, a strong fiscal position, robust and 
proactive oversight of the financial system, and a flexible labor market 
would allow the timely adjustment of the real exchange rate, if needed. 
Another domestic risk is a sharp rise in property prices followed by an 
abrupt correction, which would undercut the value of collateral securing 
loans and leave some mortgaged homeowners owing more than their 
homes are worth. This would stifle economic activity. 
Policy challenge—fiscal sustainability
Fiscal prudence has been the hallmark of government policy in 
Hong Kong, China. The budget has not been in deficit since the global 
financial crisis, and the government has amassed reserves sufficient 
to finance more than 20 months of government expenditure. In the 
past 5 years, actual budget surpluses have substantially exceeded the 
budgeted amounts. This small, open economy is particularly susceptible 
to fluctuations in the global economy and other external factors. 
Its major sources of revenue, such as profit tax, land premiums, and 
stamp duty, have been highly volatile and susceptible to fluctuation. 
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Realized revenues are thus not always the same as budgeted, and have 
often exceeded the budget, with unanticipated surpluses coming largely 
from land sale receipts. Unlike revenues, actual spending has rarely been 
allowed to exceed budgeted amounts (Figure 3.10.7). 
The share of education, health care, and social welfare in recurrent 
spending in the FY2014 budgeted is similar to actual expenditure 
in FY2013. These expenditures have been on the rise since 1997 and 
account for about 60% of the recurrent government expenditure. 
The aging population has heightened the need for substantial increases 
in health care and welfare spending. Managing this inevitable increase 
while preserving fiscal sustainability presents a fiscal challenge in 
the years ahead. The Working Group on Long-Term Fiscal Planning 
has noted that, while the government’s fiscal position will remain 
healthy in the medium term, the prospects of an aging population and 
a shrinking workforce pose a future fiscal challenge. With revenues 
assumed to grow by 4.5% annually, the fiscal position is projected to 
begin deteriorating in about 15 years under no service enhancement 
for social services—that is, with spending adjusted only to take into 
account demographic and price factors. With service enhancement 
requiring government expenditure to grow at an average of 7.5% per 
year, a structural deficit would result in 7 years. The working group 
recommended that the government implement coordinated measures 
to contain expenditure growth, preserve the revenue base, and save for 
future generations to cope with the fiscal challenges ahead.
The government of Hong Kong, China cites the continued increase 
in recurrent expenditure on education, health care, and social welfare 
as reflecting its long-term commitment to providing public services. 
This policy aligns with the working group’s recommendations and 
its analysis, which points to the need to enhance both social services 
and the availability of resources to fund them over the medium term. 
A further need, as also highlighted by the working group, is to ensure 
the sustainability of public finances by aligning government expenditure 
growth with the growth in the economy and government revenue.
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Republic of Korea
Growth picked up moderately in 2013 as inflation slowed and the current account surplus 
expanded. Growth will accelerate this year and the next, unaffected by moderation in the 
People’s Republic of China, with inflation higher but still low and with shrinking current account 
surpluses. Inducing more women to join the workforce remains a high-priority policy challenge.
Economic performance
Growth accelerated gently from 2.0% in 2012 to an estimated 2.8% in 
2013, somewhat less than expected at the beginning of the year because 
exports remained soft. Budding recovery in the advanced economies, 
especially the US, did not translate into an increase in exports. 
Nevertheless, exports made a tangible contribution to growth, reflecting 
the improving global outlook. Mirroring the world economy, GDP 
growth accelerated from below 2.0% in the first half to above 3.5% in 
the second half, exhibiting a clear strengthening trend since the fourth 
quarter of 2012 (Figure 3.11.1). 
The main driver of growth in 2013 was healthy domestic demand, 
spurred by a solid employment gain of 386,000 jobs and accommodative 
government policies. Private consumption was the most dynamic 
component of demand, expanding by 1.7% on a consistently rising 
trend throughout the year (Figure 3.11.2) and adding 1.0 percentage 
point to GDP growth. Government consumption also remained robust, 
contributing another 0.5 percentage points (Figure 3.11.3). Investment 
registered a large turnaround, adding 0.7 percentage points to growth 
after subtracting 0.5 percentage points in 2012. Net exports made a 
similar contribution of 0.6 percentage points.
The pickup in investment was spurred by a big improvement in 
construction, which more than offset falling investment in plant and 
equipment. Construction investment grew by 6.9% after 3 straight 
years of contraction and remained buoyant throughout the year. 
An unexpectedly weak export performance took its toll on plant and 
equipment investment, which fell by 1.5% following a 1.9% contraction 
in 2012. The high-tech manufacturing sector, geared toward exports 
to the advanced economies, was especially hard hit, and investment in 
machinery continued to shrink. 
On the supply side, robust construction did not translate into faster 
growth of value added in the service sector, which expanded by 2.4% 
in 2013, slightly down from 2.5% in 2012. Manufacturing growth 
accelerated to 3.0% from 2.2%, while exceptionally favorable weather 
fostered robust 5.6% growth of agriculture in 2013, on the heels of a 
0.6% slide in 2012. 
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The inflationary impact of rising domestic demand was more than 
compensated by the improved agricultural outcome and soft global 
commodity prices, which brought lower inflation. The consumer price 
index averaged 1.3%, down from 2.2% of 2012, its lowest level since 2000 
and well below the Bank of Korea’s inflation target band of 3.0% ±0.5% 
(Figure 3.11.4).
Monetary and fiscal policies were both expansionary during 2013. 
Low inflation did not raise the specter of deflation but enabled the Bank 
of Korea to cut its benchmark policy rate from 2.75% to 2.50% in May, 
facilitating an expansion of domestic liquidity. Fiscal policy provided by 
far the bigger impetus to growth. Including the $16 billion supplementary 
budget, the fiscal deficit rose to 1.8% of GDP from 1.4% in 2012, and the 
ratio of sovereign debt to GDP climbed to 36.2% from 34.8%. 
Trends in external trade and services balances brought the current 
account surplus to a record $71 billion, or 5.8% of GDP, up from 
$48 billion in 2012. Merchandise exports grew by 3.0%, up from 0.4% 
in 2012, while merchandise imports shrank by 0.8%, following a 1.1% 
contraction in 2012 (Figure 3.11.5). Lower global commodity prices 
underlay the softness of imports, while export growth strengthened 
in tandem with the global outlook. Notably, exports to the People’s 
Republic of China remained resilient in the face of that country’s growth 
moderation. The services trade surplus soared from $270 million in 
2012 to $6 billion as business service imports fell sharply. The surplus 
in the overall balance boosted official foreign exchange reserves to 
$335.6 billion at the end of 2013.
The won averaged 1,094 to the dollar in 2013, somewhat stronger 
than the 1,126 of 2012, and the real exchange rate also strengthened 
during the second half of the year (Figure 3.11.6). These developments 
did not appear to have tamped down export demand or raised import 
demand. 
The economic outcome in 2013 marks a moderate improvement from 
the disappointing performance of 2012. Growth still underperformed 
market expectations because exports were lackluster, but the stronger 
second half bodes well for 2014.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast to accelerate to 3.7% in 2014, fueled by strong 
exports and private consumption (Figure 3.11.7). The improvement of 
the global outlook, which became evident in the second half of 2013, is 
expected to strengthen in 2014, benefiting this highly export-oriented 
economy. The expected robust recovery of consumption in the US and 
other advanced economies will especially boost durable and information 
technology exports, while exports to the People’s Republic of China 
and other developing countries will continue to grow at a healthy pace. 
Merchandise export growth is therefore forecast to rise above 6.0% in 
2014, as the trend in the second half of 2013 is expected to persist. 
Private consumption will supplement exports as a driver of growth in 
2014 and 2015, as a higher export volume combines with improving terms 
of trade to boost household disposable income. Consumer confidence is 
on the mend, as uncertainties associated with restrictions on chaebols 
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(large conglomerates) and the tapering of US quantitative easing are 
expected to recede (Figure 3.11.8).
Growth in private consumption is projected to strengthen to 3.0% 
in 2014 as it closely tracks gross national disposable income, which 
is expected to grow at a solid pace. The job market will be another 
bright spot, with an employment gain of over 400,000 jobs expected. 
The combination of robust employment, the reversal of the recent 
downward slide in asset prices, and a stronger currency also augurs well 
for household spending. These factors will likely dampen the impact 
of any increase in interest rates, which could restrict consumption by 
raising the debt service burden.
After 2 years of contraction, investment in plant and equipment 
is expected to increase by over 5% on the back of rising exports, 
substantially outpacing projected GDP growth. The rebound will not 
extend, however, to sectors plagued by excess capacity, such as steel and 
petrochemicals. Construction investment growth will remain positive 
but slow to below 2%, well short of the 2013 outcome, which was a 
one-off driven by temporary public works, rather than the beginning 
of a trend. Investment in residential construction will remain subdued 
despite some pickup in private sector activity (Figure 3.11.9).
Imports will outpace exports as they grow by more than 8% on 
the back of stronger domestic demand. As a result, the current account 
surplus will shrink to $42 billion, or 4.1% of GDP. In short, 2014 will 
mark the consolidation and firming of recovery in the Republic of Korea, 
which will persist into 2015.
Consumer price index inflation will pick up to 2.1% in 2014, as 
growth momentum firms and the rise in agricultural output diminishes. 
Stable global commodity prices and the strong won will persist, holding 
down import prices, but demand-side pressures will gain strength. 
In light of the energy sector’s growing debt, electricity charges may 
escalate significantly. 
Despite the improving outlook, fiscal and monetary policy will 
remain mildly expansionary in 2014. The relatively tame recovery rules 
out a quick and decisive change of policy direction. The Bank of Korea is 
thus expected to keep its policy interest rate unchanged in the absence 
of any big shock. The projected fiscal deficit for 2014 is 1.8%, identical 
to that of 2013, such that the ratio of public debt to GDP will likely 
rise to 36.5% from 36.2%. The Republic of Korea has run fiscal deficits 
every year since 2008, and the public debt ratio has grown consistently. 
Keeping fiscal deficits from becoming entrenched will require medium-
term fiscal consolidation achieved by strengthening the tax base, 
including exemption reduction, and expenditure prioritization. 
The brightening global outlook will continue to exert a positive effect 
in 2015. Growth is forecast to pick up marginally to 3.8% from 3.7% 
in 2014. Consumer inflation will likely rise to 2.5% from 2.1%, and the 
current account surplus is projected to continue shrinking marginally, 
from 4.1% to 4.0%.
Overall, risk and uncertainty in the economy are likely to recede 
in 2014, as the global recovery gains traction and global financial 
markets become accustomed to the tapering of US quantitative easing. 
Upside risks to this assessment outweigh downside risks, so growth 
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may pleasantly surprise. The Republic of Korea’s financial stability is 
evident from its low and declining credit default spread (Figure 3.11.10) 
and will be shielded by its strong fundamentals such as a solid current 
account surplus and formidable foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, 
US tapering can exert a sizable indirect impact if it rekindles significant 
financial stress in the euro area and emerging markets, which collectively 
form a substantial export market for the Republic of Korea. Domestically, 
the growth of household debt is slowing, but the structure of mortgages, 
which account for half of household debt, remains a source of concern. 
A large part of mortgage debt is short term, variable interest, and single 
repayment, rendering it vulnerable to interest rate shocks and housing 
price decline. 
The single biggest risk affecting the generally benign economic 
outlook for 2014 is the steady appreciation of the won relative to the 
yen (Figure 3.11.11). This will adversely affect export competitiveness 
vis-à-vis Japan, as exporters in the two countries compete in many 
markets. According to 2013 estimates by Hyundai Research Institute, 
yen depreciation to 100 per US dollar would reduce the Republic of 
Korea’s exports by 2.6% and shave up to 0.2% off its GDP growth; further 
yen depreciation to 120 per US dollar would almost triple this export 
reduction to 7.3%. Won appreciation against the yen would also reduce net 
tourism and corporate market value as external competitiveness suffers. 
While growth momentum is expected to firm up in 2014 and 2015, 
widespread concerns about the visible loss of dynamism since the global 
crisis are likely to linger. To some extent, the growth slowdown reflects 
the maturing of the Republic of Korea as a high-income economy. 
Nevertheless, its policy makers are exploring policy options to lift 
long-term growth. On 25 February 2014, the government announced 
a three-pronged growth strategy: fostering the creative economy, 
reforming state-owned enterprises, and strengthening domestic demand. 
Another emphasis is deregulation, especially in the service sector, toward 
revitalizing private investment. Yet another option is to increase the 
workforce participation of women, which remains below the average 
for member economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) despite recent gains (see below). However, the 
impact of these policies is unlikely to be felt during the forecast period. 
Policy challenge—lifting the employment of women
The Republic of Korea may soon face labor shortages as its population 
rapidly ages. One obvious solution is to encourage more women to 
work. The country’s female workforce participation rate stood at 55.2% 
in 2012, the lowest figure among the 34 OECD member countries, 
which averaged 62.3%. The gap is most pronounced among university 
graduates. By contrast, the Republic of Korea’s high school graduation 
rate is the highest in the OECD. As 74.3% of Korean female high school 
graduates continue to university—a rate even higher than the 68.6% for 
males—the underutilization of female labor masks the underutilization 
of a highly educated portion of the potential workforce. 
The fundamental reason behind the underemployment of Korean 
women is that many of them drop out of the workforce in their 30s 
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(Figure 3.11.12). Pregnancy, childbirth, and child-raising are the 
immediate causes for leaving the workplace. Only 56.0% of all women in 
their 30s are economically active. The female employment rate fails to 
recover strongly in later years, peaking at 64.6% in the 40s. By contrast, 
the male employment rate surges to 90.3% in the 30s and rises further 
to 91.7% in the 40s, creating a large gender gap.
According to a 2013 Hyundai Research Institute report, the 
experiences of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom can 
provide good benchmarks for the Republic of Korea. Those countries 
have higher female workforce participation, which in the case of female 
university graduates exceeds 80.0%, far above the Republic of Korea’s 
62.4%. The three benchmark countries are also seen as leaders in 
providing employment compensated by the hour, which allows for more 
flexible work arrangements (Figure 3.11.13). Women in those countries 
are able to work during their childbearing years mainly because many 
shift from full time to hourly. Another noticeable difference is the 
widespread availability of other flexible work arrangements, including 
work from home. Korean women are shifting to hourly work in 
their 30s, but less than in peer countries, and they have less access to 
other flexible work arrangements. 
The experiences of these countries point to the importance of 
developing a labor market model that caters to the needs of highly 
educated women whose careers are interrupted by motherhood. 
Hourly work may be a flexible arrangement that enables women to 
work while raising children, but it offers only limited career prospects. 
The model should therefore allow women to transition back to full 
time. The number and quality of hourly jobs, especially for highly 
educated women, should be augmented. In the Republic of Korea, hourly 
employment is dominated by temporary or daily work, and pay per hour 
is only 45.4% that of full-time workers. A broader prerequisite is to 
establish woman-friendly work environments with flexible hours, other 
arrangements such as work from home, and more and better childcare 
facilities. Such arrangements would encourage highly educated Korean 
women to combine office work with homemaking. 
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Resident Mission, Asian Development Bank, Ulaanbaatar.
Mongolia
Mongolia is challenged by significant external imbalances because foreign direct investment has 
declined rapidly and some mineral exports remain weak. Growth is forecast to moderate in 
2014 and remain broadly stable in 2015, inflation to decline, and the current account balance 
to improve over the next 2 years, assuming appropriate policies. The major policy priority is to 
address pressures on the balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves. 
Economic performance
The Mongolian economy grew by 11.7% in 2013, down from 12.4% in 
2012. Growth was boosted by highly expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies to compensate for the marked slowdown in coal exports and 
mine development financed through foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which have been the drivers of growth in recent years. Strong economic 
growth has helped reduce the poverty rate by more than 11 percentage 
points in the past 2 years, to 27% in 2012.
Industrial production increased by 20.1% in 2013, contributing 
5.1 percentage points to economic growth, driven by construction, which 
expanded by 66%, boosted by monetary and fiscal stimulus. Mining 
output expanded by 20.7%, thanks to the ramp-up of copper production 
at the vast Oyu Tolgoi mine, which started in June 2013. Services 
expanded by 10.0%, contributing 4.3 percentage points to economic 
growth. Favorable weather allowed agriculture to expand by 13.5%, 
contributing 2.0 percentage points (Figure 3.12.1).
Domestic consumption was the main driver of economic growth 
from the expenditure side, increasing by 16.3% in constant prices and 
contributing 13.7 percentage points to growth. Gross capital formation 
increased by 2.1%, contributing 1.5 percentage points, while net foreign 
trade and services subtracted 3.6 percentage points (Figure 3.12.2). 
The completion of the first phase of Oyu Tolgoi and a dramatic fall 
in FDI reduced imports of capital goods, which led a 5.7% drop in 
imports of goods. Exports of goods declined by 2.6% as coal exports 
to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) plummeted by 40.7% owing to 
abundant coal supplies in the PRC and growing competition from other 
major coal-exporting countries. 
The consumer price index rose by 10.4% in 2013. It had fallen in 
the first half with the phase-out of the cash handout scheme and the 
temporary impact of the price stabilization program of the Bank of 
Mongolia (BOM), the central bank. Inflation rose subsequently, driven 
by currency depreciation and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies 
(Figure 3.12.3). 
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Fiscal policy became more expansionary in 2013 as the consolidated, 
on- and off-budget fiscal deficit widened to 11.1% of GDP from 10.9% in 
2012. Excluding off budget spending, the cash deficit amounted to 1.4% 
of GDP, lower than the 7.4% recorded in 2012, and the structural deficit 
reached 1.7%, within the 2% ceiling of the Fiscal Stability Law (FSL). 
Actual government revenue increased by 19.6%, less than the budgeted 
(and highly optimistic) amount. Revenue shortages and implementation 
challenges reduced public investment expenditure by 5.1%, holding the 
increase in government expenditure to a mere 3.1% (Figure 3.12.4). 
The Development Bank of Mongolia (DBM) has become the main 
source of financing for off-budget spending, providing an amount 
equal to 9.6% of GDP in 2013 mainly for projects such as roads that do 
not generate revenue. The main source of DBM financing is proceeds 
from the Chinggis bond and a 5-year, $580 million euro bond issued 
in 2012, and the $290 million Samurai bond issued in December 2013. 
DBM debt is guaranteed by the government and so a contingent liability 
for the budget. 
The ratio of public debt to GDP rose from 35.9% in 2010 to 63.0% in 
2012, and likely remained broadly unchanged in 2013, though no official 
data are yet available. The external debt component equaled 48.3% of 
GDP in 2012. A debt sustainability analysis conducted in 2013 by the 
International Monetary Fund found Mongolia at moderate risk of debt 
distress, assuming a strong policy scenario—no longer at low risk, as 
found by previous analyses. Public debt sustainability has been impaired 
by the rising share of borrowing at commercial rates since 2012.
To cushion the impact of declining FDI and boost credit growth, 
the BOM cut the policy rate three times in 2013 by a total of 275 basis 
points to 10.5%. It injected liquidity equal to 17.1% of GDP, including 
for onlending to selected sectors through price stabilization and 
mortgage programs at subsidized interest rates. Bank credit increased 
as a result by 41.0% year on year in 2013 and by 54.3% year on year to 
January 2014. Broad money (M2) increased by 19.3% and 36.6% year on 
year during the same periods (Figure 3.12.5). These policies are widely 
seen as important factors behind balance-of-payment (BOP) pressures 
starting last year.
Capitalization and liquidity in the banking system have improved, 
but vulnerabilities remain. Weakness in bank supervision, inadequate 
provisioning, high loan concentration (especially in construction), 
dollarization, and a high and rising ratio of credit to deposits (at 103% 
in February 2014) have heightened the risk of bank distress. Corporate 
governance needs to be strengthened in the banking sector.
The current account deficit narrowed in 2013 to $3.2 billion, or 27.4% 
of GDP, from 32.6% in 2012 (Figure 3.12.6). The trade deficit improved 
to 18.1% of GDP from 22.8% in 2012 as the decline in imports outpaced 
that of exports, but the services and transfers balance worsened. Since 
mid-2013, the trade and current account deficits have both narrowed 
as currency depreciation strengthened export competitiveness and 
constrained imports—and as exports were boosted by the start of 
production at the Oyu Tolgoi mine. FDI plunged by about 55% in 2013 
because of uncertainties arising from changes in the investment law, 
slower growth in the PRC, the completion of the first phase of Oyu 
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Tolgoi, and delays in the expected commencement of the mine’s second 
phase. Foreign exchange reserves almost halved in 2013, falling by 
$1.9 billion to $2.2 billion, or 4 months of imports. They increased to 
$2.4 billion in January after the DBM issued a $290 million samurai 
bond 90% guaranteed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. 
The Mongolian togrog has depreciated by 27% against the US dollar 
since early 2013 as capital inflows ebbed and market sentiment 
weakened over prolonged debate surrounding Oyu Tolgoi issues and 
over uncertainty regarding the regulatory framework for foreign 
investment. The nominal effective exchange rate of the togrog fell by 
15.5%, but the real effective exchange rate fell by only 7.2% as inflation 
in Mongolia exceeded that of its trading partners (Figure 3.12.7).
In October 2013, the parliament enacted a new comprehensive 
investment law, which aims to encourage FDI over the medium-term 
by leveling the playing field for foreign and domestic investors and 
ensuring a stable legal environment for investment. Under the law, the 
category of “strategic investor” no longer applies, and private foreign 
investors need only register with a state agency, rather than seek 
government approval. 
Economic prospects
Medium-term prospects remain promising, with growth expected 
in the double digits after a dip in 2014, given Mongolia’s potential to 
develop its natural resources. Economic growth is forecast at 9.5% in 
2014, driven in particular by the start of copper production at the Oyu 
Tolgoi open pit in June of last year. Growth in non-mineral output is 
expected to be held back by the tighter economic policy, which will be 
needed to reduce high domestic demand and so relieve BOP pressures. 
In particular, the overall budgetary deficit including off-budget outlays 
is expected to be lower than in 2013, as the DBM curtails investment 
expenditure and as BOM liquidity injections are expected to begin their 
phaseout this year. 
Economic growth is expected to pick up slightly to 10% in 2015, 
spurred by further development in mining, including the possible 
development of the Oyu Tolgoi underground mine and an expansion 
of coal production from the Tavan Tolgoi mine (Figure 3.12.8). 
Non-mining growth is expected to accelerate as restrictive economic 
policies are eased and FDI flows are assumed to partly recover. 
Inflation in 2014 is expected to increase to 11%, driven by the lagged 
effect of expansionary monetary policy in 2013 and the recent 
depreciation of the togrog. Inflationary pressure in 2015 is expected 
to ease, assuming a tightening of economic policy in 2014 and a more 
stable exchange rate, with inflation falling to 8% consistent with BOM 
monetary policy (Figure 3.12.9).
The current account deficit is forecast to fall to 20% of GDP in 2014 
and 15% in 2015 as the trade balance improves. Exports are expected to 
grow following the start of Oyu Tolgoi production last year, and as new 
mining projects come onstream. The recent exchange rate depreciation 
and the expected tightening of economic policy will further constrain 
domestic absorption and dampen imports. The new investment law and 
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the planned second phase of Oyu Tolgoi development are expected to 
support a recovery in FDI inflows, further stabilizing the BOP.
Mongolia’s economic prospects are subject to downside risks from an 
uncertain external environment and the continuation of expansionary 
economic policies at a time when the BOP is under pressure. The PRC 
is the main destination for Mongolia’s exports, accepting about 87% of 
them in 2013. Mongolia is thus highly vulnerable as the PRC rebalances 
from investment-led growth toward greater reliance of consumption, 
which may initially dampen demand for Mongolia’s exports. 
Environmental concerns in the PRC may also reduce coal consumption. 
Further, substantial increase in global supplies and growing competition 
are putting Mongolia’s mineral exports on an uncertain growth 
trajectory. Future trends in Mongolia’s major export prices are also 
uncertain (Figure 3.12.10). On the domestic front, the continuation of 
current monetary and fiscal policies will inevitably perpetuate BOP and 
inflationary pressures, requiring significant real economic adjustments 
that may curtail growth.
Policy challenge—safeguarding macroeconomic 
and financial stability 
The main policy challenge is to adjust unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies to relieve BOP pressure, contain inflation, and reduce the risk of 
severe distress in the financial sector. Negative shocks to FDI and coal 
exports have intensified BOP pressures since mid-2012. These pressures 
have been compounded by highly expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies that have spurred substantial credit expansion and debt 
accumulation, as well as boosted demand for imports. 
While current foreign exchange reserves are broadly adequate, the 
declining trend is not sustainable. The resumption of significant foreign 
capital inflows may take some time despite the adoption of the new 
investment law. Current policy offers little room to strengthen financial 
buffers to cope with possible external shocks. Mongolia needs to change 
course to mitigate its vulnerability to external shocks. 
Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive package of 
economic policy reforms, but improvements to monetary management 
and fiscal policy are the most urgent. Monetary policy should focus 
on macroeconomic and financial stability. The priority should be to 
gradually phase out the BOM’s quasi-fiscal lending programs—or, if they 
are considered high priority, include them in the budget. Procyclical 
fiscal policy is a major concern, although the discipline of the FSL, if 
adhered to in practice and in spirit, would reduce the scope for such a 
policy. Needed fiscal reforms include reprioritizing and reducing public 
expenditure, incorporating DBM off-budget expenditure into the budget 
(thereby subjecting it to the FSL), and developing a medium-term fiscal 
framework to reduce the consolidated, on- and off-budget deficit to 
the law’s 2% ceiling. Expenditure reform should include improving the 
quality of public investment expenditure, which has come under strain 
in view of the rapid increase in public investment.
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Taipei,China
Higher growth is forecast for 2014 and 2015, but inflation will remain low. The current account 
surplus will expand. As export competition stiffens, this export-dependent economy needs a new 
engine of growth and strengthened cross-strait relations. Also crucial is to further deregulate the 
economy and shift resources toward more productive sectors.
Economic performance
GDP expanded by 2.1% in 2013. This outpaced the 1.5% growth recorded 
in 2012 but was less than expected as exports and private investment 
both grew more slowly than projected. Exports of goods and services, 
which account for nearly 75% of the economy’s GDP, were the main 
engine of growth in 2013, expanding by 3.8% and adding 2.8 percentage 
points to growth, up from essentially nil in the previous year. Imports 
of goods and services also rose on higher demand for capital goods and 
consumer goods alike, climbing by 4.0% and reversing a 2.2% decline in 
2012. Net exports expanded by 3.2%, lifting economic growth in 2013 by 
0.6 percentage points.
Private investment grew by 7.4% in anticipation of stronger external 
demand, especially for machinery, but budgetary consolidation reduced 
government investment (Figure 3.13.1). As a result, total investment 
rose by 3.5%, reversing the slump of the past 2 years and contributing 
0.6 percentage points to growth.
The same trend was apparent with consumption expenditure. 
Private consumption grew by 1.8%, aided mainly by lower 
unemployment, healthy increases in earnings across sectors, and 
rising consumer confidence. This more than offset a 0.3% decline in 
government consumption to lift total consumption by 1.4%, contributing 
0.9 percentage points to growth (Figure 3.13.2).
On the supply side, growth was driven by the service sector, which 
expanded by 1.5% and contributed 0.9 percentage points to GDP growth. 
Expansion in all services remained strong, boosted by the doubling of 
tourist arrivals from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which have 
cumulatively exceeded 8 million since Taipei,China opened to PRC 
tourists in 2009 (Figure 3.13.3). Industrial output rose by 1.8% on a 
modest rise of 2.0% in manufacturing and contributed 0.6 percentage 
points to growth. Construction expanded by 0.8% in line with the rise 
in investment, but mining and quarrying weakened by 5.7%. Growth in 
agriculture was almost flat at 0.2% as typhoons hit crop production.
Average inflation slowed to 0.8% from 1.9% in 2012 in line with 
lower global energy prices, education fees, and clothing prices, which 
offset the lifting of electricity subsidies and a series of fuel price hikes. 
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Excluding fruits, vegetables, and energy prices, core inflation slowed to 
an average of 0.7% from 1.0% a year earlier (Figure 3.13.4).
The budget deficit stood at 1.0% of GDP in 2013, down from 1.6% in 
2012 and 1.8% in 2011. Continued fiscal consolidation limited the increase 
in expenditure to 1.3%. Revenues increased by 3.9% as the government 
issued new licenses to telecommunications companies, and as receipts 
from customs duties and business and commodity taxes grew. Meanwhile, 
income taxes, which comprise 54.9% of total tax revenues, declined by 
2.3%, as receipts from both corporate and individual income taxes were 
lower. They were dragged down by the uncertain global environment, 
which affected the profitability of firms operating locally and in the PRC.
In view of inflation being tamed, the central bank kept the 
rediscount rate unchanged at 1.875%. The accommodative monetary 
policy, positive business sentiment, and steadily improving consumer 
confidence pushed up credit to the private sector by 4.1%. The rise in 
credit last year, especially to the real estate sector, led the central bank 
to tighten rules on issuing collateralized loans, despite the ratio of 
nonperforming loans remaining very low. Real estate lending by banks 
rose by 4.1% to account for 44.0% of all loans at the end of 2013, up from 
43.5% a year earlier. The rise in domestic credit and a sizeable increase 
in net foreign assets lifted the money supply (M2) by 5.8% in 2013, 
which outpaced the 3.5% recorded in 2012 but remained well within the 
central bank’s target range of 2.5%–6.5% (Figure 3.13.5). 
The current account improved in 2013 to $57.4 billion, or 11.7% of 
nominal GDP, as the increase in both the trade surplus and net service 
receipts more than compensated for a narrower income account surplus. 
The balance of trade recorded a surplus of $37.0 billion, up 17.1% from 
$31.6 billion a year earlier. The services surplus widened to $9.3 billion 
(equal to 1.9% of GDP) from $6.3 billion in 2012 (1.3%), buoyed by higher 
travel receipts and lower royalty and license fee payments.
The improved trade balance reflected a 1.4% rebound in exports, 
which reversed a 2.3% slump in 2012, as well as a decline in imports. 
Exports to all destinations improved, especially to the US and Japan, two 
of the economy’s biggest markets. Exports to the PRC and to Hong Kong, 
China also remained high, but their combined share of the export total 
slipped to 39.7% from 41.1% in 2009 as a growing share of exports went 
to the five largest economies in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
Reflecting these developments, the overall balance of payments 
recorded a surplus of 2.3% of GDP, despite net capital outflows of 
$41.2 billion (Figure 3.13.6). Foreign exchange reserves increased by 
3.4% and amounted to $416.81 billion at the end of December 2013. 
The NT dollar depreciated against the US dollar by 0.5% in nominal 
terms in 2013 but appreciated by 1.4% in real effective terms. 
Economic prospects
Economic prospects for the next 2 years are positive, with GDP growth 
accelerating to 2.7% in 2014 and 3.2% in 2015, inflation accelerating 
slightly but remaining low, and the current account balance improving. 
Domestic demand will likely grow as consumer confidence is trending up, 
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supported by government efforts to boost the service sector and the 
continued rise in tourist arrivals from the PRC. Investment is expected to 
rise in line with the improving outlook for exports. The economy should 
also benefit from free economic pilot zones and new infrastructure for 
tourism including hotels.
As global economic recovery gains momentum in 2014, external 
demand is expected firm. Exports are expected to be the key driver 
of economic growth in the next 2 years. Recent data on export orders 
show an increase of 5.7% year on year in February 2014 (Figure 3.13.7), 
suggesting a likely pickup in exports, especially for electronics. Imports 
are also expected to climb during the forecast period in line with the 
expected rise in private consumption and strengthening trade ties with 
the PRC. The trends in external trade and services, together with a large 
surplus in the income account as earnings from overseas investments 
are repatriated, will likely lift the current account balance to 12.3% 
of GDP in 2014 and 12.5% in 2015. The balance of payments surplus is 
expected to increase to around 3% as capital inflows expand.
Inflation is expected to remain low but trend marginally higher to 
1.1%–1.3% in 2014–2015 as production costs rise with higher wages and 
stronger demand for inputs, and as electricity rates and transportation 
fares increase. The likely rises in global commodity prices are expected 
to be too modest to significantly affect domestic prices.
Monetary policy is expected to remain accommodating in 2014, but 
perhaps less so in 2015. The central bank is likely to keep the policy 
rate unchanged, given expectations for low inflation. Fiscal policy 
is expected to remain prudent, but a slightly bigger fiscal deficit is 
expected for 2014 as budgetary revenue is forecast to be lower than in 
2013, when a one-time issuance of wireless communications licenses 
boosted nontax receipts. 
The economic outlook for Taipei,China depends largely on 
developments in its major trading partners. A highly open economy, 
it is vulnerable to fluctuations in external demand because of its 
heavy reliance on electronics exports. While the major industrialized 
economies have shown signs of improvement, the slowdown in the 
PRC would have significant downside risks for the economy. The likely 
appreciation of the NT dollar could also tamp down export growth 
(Figure 3.13.8), while delays in establishing the free economic zones 
could curb business expansion.
Policy challenge—boosting investments 
and exports
The growing localization of productive capacity in the PRC, under 
which local manufacturers move to produce or source some inputs 
domestically, is putting pressure on the Taipei,China economic model. 
For the past 3 decades, Taipei,China has occupied a central position 
in Asian supply chains, manufacturing semiconductors and other 
electronic parts and components to be incorporated into products 
that are assembled in the PRC for export to the major industrialized 
economies. Taipei,China has invested heavily in the PRC for this 
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purpose and transferred some of its manufacturing plants there. 
This economic model is now strained by growing localization and from 
rising PRC production costs, especially for wages and property. 
These factors helped depress Taipei,China’s investments in the 
PRC since 2010 (Figure 3.13.9). Although these investments remain 
large, their downward trend indicates eroding profit margins and 
stiffening competition from domestic PRC production facilities, which 
have gradually shifted parts orders away from Taipei,China suppliers 
(Figure 3.13.10). Recent data confirm this trend. Some leading technology 
companies, particularly those involved in manufacturing notebook 
computers (in which Taipei,China is a leader), report shrinking profit 
margins and market shares in 2013. PRC imports of intermediate goods 
from Taipei,China have steadily declined, though the decline can be 
attributed to competition from the US, the Republic of Korea, and other 
Asian countries as well as to production localization in the PRC. Recent 
data indicate that Taipei,China’s production base for tech products has 
started to shift to other countries such as Viet Nam, reflecting both PRC 
localization and manufacturers’ search for cheaper production venues.
These trends indicate that Taipei,China may not be able to benefit to 
the same extent as before from investing in and exporting to the PRC. 
However, as the PRC grows, the scale effect easily compensates for the 
declining share of the PRC import market occupied by Taipei,China. 
Meanwhile, an analysis of spillover effects shows that, taking into account 
income elasticity and scale effects, changes in PRC economic activity have 
the largest impact on Taipei,China exports and GDP growth. Changes 
in other neighboring Asian economies have somewhat less effect, and 
changes in the major industrialized economies have much less effect 
(Figure 3.13.11). Moreover, the analysis indicates that the spillover effect 
from the PRC relative to that of other trade partners of Taipei,China has 
been on a rising trend, with a pronounced increase in 2012. 
Against this background, the strategies by which Taipei,China can 
minimize its vulnerability to developments in the PRC are twofold. 
It can diversify its industrial base, and it can continue its efforts to tap 
neighboring markets for more export and investment opportunities. 
To improve competitiveness, the government has established free 
economic pilot zones where customs, investment regulations, and 
tax incentives are more competitive. It has signed two free-trade 
agreements, with New Zealand and Singapore. It aims to expand the 
service sector with a focus on tourism, medical services, and cultural 
and creative industries by further easing restrictions on tourists from the 
PRC, upgrading tourism infrastructure, opening new service-oriented 
manufacturing industries, and bolstering research and development 
investments and innovations. 
While these initiatives are expected to boost competitiveness, other 
factors such as widespread restrictions on foreign direct investment and 
excessive regulation should also be addressed. Success depends on when 
and how quickly the much-needed reforms are implemented, and on 
reform overcoming such obstacles as the medium-term priority on fiscal 
consolidation and domestic lobbies for protectionism. Spillover effects 
mean economic conditions in major trading partners and developments 
in the PRC will also play major roles. 
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This chapter was written by Rehman Gul of the Afghanistan Resident Mission, 
Asian Development Bank, Kabul.
Afghanistan
Growth decelerated to 3.3% following stellar agriculture and growth performances in 2012. Afghan 
forces have assumed responsibility for security, and the withdrawal of international troops will be 
complete by the end of 2014. The decision on retaining a small number of international troops, 
largely for mentoring and logistical support, has been delayed until after the April presidential 
election. The outlook is for modest growth until uncertainties are resolved. 
Economic performance
Evolving political and security uncertainties substantially affected 
nonagricultural economic activity in 2013. Growth in GDP excluding 
opium production is estimated to have declined to 3.3% in 2013, 
consistent with ADO 2013 projections, and was much lower than the 
11.9% gain in 2012 (Figure 3.14.1). The weaker performance reflects slow 
expansions in agriculture, industry and services on the supply side, and 
in private consumption and investment on the demand side.
On the supply side, agriculture production was slightly higher than 
the record output achieved in 2012, as the country enjoyed favorable 
weather for another excellent harvest. However, because 31.5% growth 
in 2012 established a high base, agriculture growth recorded in 2013 
was only 1.6%. The retrenchment in spending by international security 
forces, the winding down of a large number of projects funded and 
implemented by development partners, and Afghans’ heightened caution 
greatly curtailed activity in industry and services. Growth in industry 
decelerated to 2.5% from 7.2% in 2012, while that in services slipped to 
4.3% from 7.3%. 
On the demand side, private consumption continued to drive 
growth but at a slower pace, reflecting increased domestic savings 
but also the impact of slowing growth in incomes reflecting the 
drawdown of military and civilian personnel and declining aid since 
2010. The deadlock over signing the Bilateral Security Agreement, 
which is necessary to retain a small number of international troops in 
Afghanistan for training and logistical support, added to uncertainties 
created by the exit of international forces by the end of 2014 and the 
prospect of further reductions in assistance. With consumer and 
investor confidence down, private investment is estimated to have 
dropped to 3.6% of GDP in 2013 from 4.9% in 2012.
Headline inflation accelerated to 7.3% in the year to December 
2013 from 5.8% a year earlier, mainly because of food price hikes 
(Figure 3.14.2). Food inflation reached 9.7% in December on account 
of sharp rises in the prices of vegetables, fresh fruit, and dried nuts. 
3.14.1 GDP growth
%
Agriculture
Industry
Services
GDP
–10
0
10
20
30
40
201520142013201220112010
Forecast
8.4
4.53.53.3
11.97.3
Note: Years are fiscal years, ending on 21 December of the 
same calendar year. 
Sources: Ministry of Finance; ADB estimates
3.14.2 Inflation
%
0
3
6
9
12
Jan
2014
JulJan
2013
JulJan
2012
Headline
Food 
Nonfood
Sources: Central Statistical Office; ADB estimates.
156  Asian Development Outlook 2014
Nonfood inflation notably slowed to 4.8% in December from 7.4% in 
December 2012, reflecting a sharp drop in prices for real estate and 
rental houses and in restaurant and hotel services as demand softened 
from foreigners and Afghans alike. Inflation averaged 7.4% in 2013.
The budget came under enormous pressure in 2013 as revenues fell 
short of their targets and public expenditures rose, especially those related 
to security and the election. Customs revenues notably disappointed 
because of the economic slowdown and the weak administration of 
customs and tax collections. The government managed to collect AF109.0 
billion ($2.0 billion) toward its AF114.0 billion ($2.1 billion) target. This 
deepened the shortfall in domestic financing of the recurrent budget 
to a deficit of 7.7% of GDP from 6.8% in 2012 (Figure 3.14.3). In 2013, 
international development partners financed 60% of the national budget, 
45% of recurrent expenditure, and 77% of the development budget. 
Including support from development partners, the budget surplus 
increased to 2.1% of GDP, from 1.1% in 2012. 
Monetary policy aims for price stability and was relatively tight in 
2013. Broad money (M2) growth edged up to 9.3% from 8.9% in 2012. 
However, it remained well below the 20%–30% rate of expansion in the 
fast-growth era before 2012. The slow growth in money supply since 
2012 is attributed to significantly slowing demand for local currency 
in anticipation of the transition, as dollarization further increased. 
The value of the afghani has trended downward since 2011, and the 
currency depreciated by 9.1% against the dollar in 2013 to AF57.2 
(Figure 3.14.4). The nascent financial sector has yet to shake negative 
spillover from the Kabul Bank crisis in 2010, and subsequent growth in 
banks’ net credit to the private sector has been slight.
The current account deficit excluding grants narrowed slightly 
to 41.6% of GDP in 2013 from 41.9% a year earlier (Figure 3.14.5). 
Import growth slowed in 2013, and deficits in the income and services 
accounts increased modestly. The current account surplus including 
grants declined to 2.5% of GDP from 3.9% in FY2012 on lower net 
foreign earnings.
Economic prospects
GDP is forecast to grow by 3.5% in 2014. This assumes subsiding 
political and security uncertainties, a smooth transfer of power 
to a new government following broadly accepted presidential and 
provincial council elections on 5 April 2014, and a signed Bilateral 
Security Agreement. Growth in agriculture is expected to be modest 
because current production is close to capacity. Expansion in industry 
and services should edge higher in the second half of the year as the 
policy direction of the new government becomes apparent and public 
confidence strengthens. 
For 2015, GDP growth is estimated to accelerate to 4.5%, driven by 
higher consumer spending, private investment, and trend performance 
in agriculture. This post-transition outlook for growth rests on stable 
political and security conditions and high investor and consumer 
confidence.
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A large 27.6% increase in national budget spending is planned for 
2014, mostly for security—the item that will consume 65% of budgeted 
recurrent expenditures and 44% of the total budget. Rising security 
expenditure will create huge pressure to find new funding resources 
in 2014 and 2015. The new government will need to boost domestic 
revenues credibly to ensure strong support from development partners. 
Inflation is projected at 7.0%, assuming good harvests, stable 
international commodity prices, and the pursuance of tight monetary 
policy. The government will keep the existing managed float regime for 
the exchange rate. 
Including grants, the current account balance is forecast to ease to 
1.7% of GDP in 2014 and 1.2% in 2015 as foreign aid inflows diminish. 
Excluding grants, the current account deficit is expected to narrow to 
35.5% of GDP in 2015, reflecting reduced expenditures owing to the 
departure of international security forces in 2014. 
Policy challenge—domestic revenue mobilization 
A major policy challenge for the government is to improve its domestic 
revenue performance. Domestic revenue as a share of GDP is lower 
in Afghanistan that almost anywhere else in the world. Moreover, 
it dropped to 9.6% of GDP in 2013 from 11.0% in 2010, falling short 
of an important reform benchmark in the current International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) economic program. The government has been 
struggling to improve revenue performance for the past 2 years. 
The revenue shortfalls partly reflect the slowdown in economic 
activity, in particular the shortfall in foreign trade that weakened 
customs revenues. However, the bulk of revenue is lost to leakage under 
weak tax administration that allows corruption. The gap between 
domestic revenues and the government’s recurrent expenditures has 
consequently widened, with revenue coverage down to 55.0% in 2013 
from 72.8% in 2010. 
In the forecast period, fiscal policy will be under huge pressure 
from rising security expenditures, the cost of operating and maintaining 
assets built by development partners, and the expense of expanding 
civil service reform, including reform to pensions. As a result, public 
expenditures will reach 34.5% of GDP in 2014 as domestic revenues are 
estimated to languish at 10.8%, leaving a financing gap of 23.7% that will 
need to be filled by development partners.
The weak revenue outlook necessitates concerted efforts on the part 
of government to improve revenue collection through reform to tax 
policy, tax administration, and governance, as well as through other 
structural reforms in customs taxation under the program. The bills on 
tax administration and value-added tax pending in the parliament must 
be approved quickly to ensure that the value-added tax is implemented 
toward the end of 2014. Governance has to be strengthened and 
leakage significantly reduced through policy and structural reform 
to the revenue and customs departments. The approval of the mining 
bill now before the parliament has to be expedited to secure in the 
medium term new contributions to revenue from the development of 
mineral resources. 
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Bangladesh 
Growth moderated last year, inflation declined, and the current account returned a larger 
surplus. This year, growth will slip again, reflecting slower expansion in exports, falling worker 
remittances, and political unrest before parliamentary elections. Higher inflation and a modest 
current account deficit are expected. The garment industry faces challenges in adopting tough 
compliance and safety standards. Growth should improve in the following year, but a major 
boost will come only with ramped up investment in infrastructure. 
Economic performance
As officially estimated, GDP in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013) grew by 
6.0%, less than the 6.2% recorded in FY2012 (Figure 3.15.1). Agriculture 
growth slipped to 2.2% from 3.1% in FY2012 as crop output was held 
down by higher input costs, lower output prices, and unfavorable 
weather. Services growth slowed to 5.7% from the previous year’s 6.0% 
owing to stagnant imports and frequent hartals (political demonstrations) 
that disrupted supply chains and affected retail and wholesale trade. 
Industry growth rose slightly to 9.0% from 8.9% in FY2012, with 
contributions from construction and small-scale manufacturing.
On the demand side, net foreign trade and services added to 
growth as garment sales grew briskly. Growth in private consumption 
accelerated, fueled by healthy remittance inflows, though expansion in 
private credit slowed. Investment rose only slightly to 26.8% of GDP 
from the previous year’s 26.5%. Private investment declined to 19.0% 
of GDP from 20.0% in FY2012, while public investment rose to 7.9% 
of GDP from 6.5% in FY2012. Private investment was constrained by 
electricity and gas shortages and a weaker investment climate. Foreign 
direct investment inflows rose only slightly.
Year-on-year inflation rose to 8.1% in June 2013, reflecting escalating 
food prices as the demonstrations disrupted supplies. The rise in 
government-administered power and fuel prices also contributed 
(Figure 3.15.2). Nonfood prices fell, responding to slower credit growth 
and the appreciation of the Bangladesh taka. Average inflation slowed to 
6.8% from 8.7% in FY2012.
In September 2012 the government raised power tariffs for bulk 
consumers by 17.0% and for retail consumers by 8.0%. It also raised diesel, 
kerosene, and gasoline prices by 5.3%–11.5% in January 2013, but the price 
of furnace oil, used mostly to generate electricity, was not increased.
Although the central bank’s monetary policy was accommodative, 
money and credit growth slowed in FY2013. Broad money growth 
eased to 16.7% in June 2013 from 17.4% a year earlier (Figure 3.15.3). 
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Private credit growth slowed markedly to 10.9% from 19.7% in June 
2012, as net credit to the government grew by 20.1% in June 2013, down 
from 24.9% a year earlier and well below its peak expansion in the 
middle of FY2012. As imports remained unchanged, net foreign assets 
shot up, accounting for nearly half of monetary expansion.
In easing monetary policy, the central bank in March 2013, cut repo 
and reverse repo rates by 50 basis points. The weighted average yield 
on the 91-day Treasury bill fell to 8.3% by June 2013 from 11.4% a year 
earlier. Banks’ weighted average lending rate, however, declined only 
marginally to 13.7% from 13.9% in June 2012, but the weighted average 
deposit rate rose to 8.5% from 8.1%, narrowing banks’ interest rate 
spread by 0.6 percentage points to 5.2%.
Revenue growth was less than the FY2013 budget target of 21.6% 
as import-based taxes yielded less than expected. Growth in domestic 
indirect taxes also slowed, although income taxes were buoyant. 
At 12.4% of GDP, revenue collection in FY2013 remained essentially at 
the previous year’s level, but public spending rose to 16.9% from 16.6% 
in FY2012 (Figure 3.15.4). The fiscal deficit widened to 4.5% of GDP 
from 4.1% in FY2012 but remained within the budgeted 5.0% of GDP. 
Domestic sources financed about two-thirds of the deficit. 
Exports expanded by 10.7% in FY2013, up from the previous year’s 
6.2%, with higher demand from both traditional and newly developed 
markets for the country’s low-end garments. Earnings from readymade 
garments rose by 12.7%, doubling the figure a year earlier. Growth 
in import payments fell to 0.8% from 2.4% in FY2012, as imports of 
rice, sugar, edible oil, fertilizer, petroleum products, and capital goods 
declined. Remittance inflows rose to 12.6%, up from 10.2% in FY2012 
because of improved banking services and the lagged impact of large 
placements of Bangladeshi workers a year earlier.
With higher remittances and a narrower trade deficit, the current 
account sharply improved to a surplus of $2.5 billion (1.9% of GDP) 
in FY2013 from a deficit of $447.0 million in FY2012 (Figure 3.15.5). 
The combined capital and financial accounts showed a surplus 
of $3.4 billion, strengthening from $1.9 billion in FY2012, as net 
disbursements of medium- and long-term loans were higher, as were net 
inflows on account of trade credit. The overall balance grew tenfold to 
a surplus of $5.1 billion in FY2013 from $494.0 million in FY2012. Gross 
foreign exchange reserves, adjusted for valuation changes, rose sharply 
to $15.3 billion at the end of June 2013 from $10.4 billion a year earlier, 
providing cover for 4.6 months of imports.
The taka appreciated by 5.2% against the dollar in FY2013, 
reflecting weak import demand and strong growth in both exports and 
remittances (Figure 3.15.6). The taka had appreciated in real effective 
terms by 11.1% year on year by the end of June 2013 because of its 
nominal appreciation and higher domestic inflation relative to trading 
partners, indicating some loss of export competitiveness.
The stock market continued to be volatile in FY2013, with 
abrupt price movements. The Dhaka Stock Exchange general index 
fell by 4.1%, though market capitalization grew marginally by 1.6% 
(Figure 3.15.7). The price–earnings ratio rose from 12.5 in June 2012 
to 14.6 in June 2013. Net foreign portfolio investment in FY2013 rose 
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to $287 million from $240 million in FY2012. Parliament passed the 
Demutualization Act in April 2013 with a view to separating ownership 
from management and converting both of the country’s stock exchanges 
into shareholder-owned corporate entities, as the authorities sought to 
boost investor confidence in stock dealing and to stabilize the market. 
Economic prospects
The forecasts for FY2014 and FY2015 rest on several assumptions: 
Political stability will be restored following the January 2014 national 
elections, improving consumer and investor confidence. The central 
bank will be watchful, in line with the January 2014 monetary policy 
statement, to keep inflation in check while helping direct steady credit 
flows to the private sector. Electricity and fuel prices will be raised 
to lower subsidy costs. It will be possible to mobilize more foreign 
financing, thus limiting government bank borrowing. Food grain and oil 
prices will remain stable on the international market. And the weather 
is normal.
GDP growth is expected to slow to 5.6% in FY2014, owing to a decline 
in remittances (which have been equivalent to about 15% of private 
consumption spending) and as export growth tapers off in the coming 
months (Figure 3.15.8). Domestic demand was depressed in the first half 
of the year because the prolonged political unrest ahead of parliamentary 
elections in January 2014 dented consumer and investor confidence. 
This is reflected in lower private credit growth, a decline in imports of 
consumer goods and capital machinery, and modest growth in imports of 
raw materials. Growth is expected to rebound to 6.2% in FY2015, aided 
by higher remittance and export growth, as well as by prospects for 
continued economic recovery in the US and the euro area. A likely rise in 
consumer and investor confidence as the political situation stabilizes is 
also expected to stimulate demand and strengthen growth momentum.
Industry growth is expected to slow to 8.0% in FY2014 because 
of the output lost to political unrest in the first half of the year, and 
as weaker domestic demand depresses production. Production by the 
readymade garment industry may also be affected if foreign buyers 
postpone orders in response to delays in implementing agreed fire 
and building safety standards to prevent further industrial accidents. 
Industry growth is expected to increase to 9.0% in FY2015 with a 
pickup in domestic and external demand, better safety standards and 
compliance in garment factories, and gains in power generation.
Agriculture growth is projected to rebound to 3.0% in FY2014, aided 
by favorable weather conditions in the early months of the year and 
reflecting the previous year’s low base. Growth in FY2015 is expected to 
strengthen to 3.5%, about on trend.
Services growth in FY2014 is projected to slip to 5.4% due to lost 
sales during the pre-election unrest and slower industry activity. Sluggish 
demand in retail and wholesale trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, 
and tourism—and the fall in commercial banks’ operating profits on weak 
credit flows—evidence a slow expansion. With the expected rebound in 
industry and agriculture, services growth is expected to recover to 5.7% 
in FY2015.
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Inflation is expected to rise to average 7.5% in FY2014 because of 
the effects of supply disruptions, rising wages in both the public and the 
private sector, and expected increases in electricity and fuel prices. With 
the easing of supply constraints, continued prudent monetary policy, and 
better crop outlook, inflation is expected to moderate to 6.5% in FY2015. 
Exports grew by 21.2% in the first quarter of FY2014 and then 
slowed to 14.0% in the first 8 months of the year (Figure 3.15.9). 
Garment exports grew by 16.7%. Other exports (about 20% of total) 
were up by only 3.4%, with performance little improved from a year 
earlier. Earnings from frozen food and leather rose strongly, but 
exports of jute goods, petroleum products, raw jute, and engineering 
products declined. In the first 7 months, earnings on exports to the 
European Union grew by 19.6%, to the US by 9.1%, and to newly 
developed markets by 14.2%. With momentum declining during the 
middle months, growth in exports is expected to moderate to 9.0% 
in FY2014. Then, with stronger external demand in FY2015, export 
growth is projected to recover to 12.0%.
Import payments grew by 13.9% in the first half of FY2014, mainly to 
pay for higher imports of rice and wheat, while imports of sugar, edible oil, 
machinery, fertilizer, and petroleum products declined. With moderation 
in the second half, imports are expected to increase by 10.0% in FY2014 
and pickup to 14.0% in FY2015 on projected higher demand.
Worker remittance inflows declined by 6.9% in the first 8 months of 
FY2014, reflecting reduced employment overseas, especially in the Middle 
East. Action against illegal workers in Saudi Arabia and taka appreciation 
contributed to the lower remittance inflows. Overseas jobs for Bangladeshi 
workers fell by 13.1% in the first 8 months of FY2014 (Figure 3.15.10). 
Remittances are expected to decline by 3.0% for all of FY2014 but then 
grow by 7.0% in FY2015, as more jobs are created by the government’s 
efforts to engage with recruiting countries.
With a somewhat larger trade deficit and falling remittances, the 
current account is expected to reverse to a small deficit of 0.5% of GDP 
in FY2014. The current account is projected to slide further to a deficit 
of 1.5% of GDP in FY2015, as remittance growth is inadequate to offset 
the projected wider trade gap.
Growth in revenue collection slowed to 10.0% during the first 
7 months of FY2014, underperforming the 19.9% budget target because 
economic activity was disrupted and growth in dutiable imports was 
low. Income tax collection, boosted by automation in tax administration, 
grew strongly by 18.2%, but the gains were offset by lower growth in 
import duties, and value-added tax at both the import and the domestic 
production stage. The ratio of revenue to GDP is expected to rise slightly 
to 12.6% in FY2014. 
Budget spending is expected to remain unchanged at 16.9% of GDP. 
Current spending will be contained by cuts to low-priority items and 
expected adjustments to electricity and fuel prices to lower subsidy 
costs to 2.2% of GDP from 3.1% in FY2013. Annual development 
program spending will increase as the government steps up project 
implementation to fulfill election pledges. The expected fiscal deficit 
of 4.3% of GDP in FY2014 will be within the budget target. Domestic 
sources, mostly banks, are expected to cover two-thirds of financing.
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Policy challenge—reviving and upgrading 
economic growth
Bangladesh needs to boost investment in infrastructure and skills 
development to raise the economy’s productive capacity if it hopes 
to upgrade economic growth to a 7%–8% trajectory. Investment has 
remained virtually stagnant at around 25%–26% of GDP over the past 
several years and needs to be raised to the 32%–33% range, as envisaged 
in the Sixth Five-Year Plan, FY2011–FY2015 (Figure 3.15.11). Actual 
output closely follows the track of potential output (Figure 3.15.12). This 
suggests that little scope exists for raising GDP growth without stoking 
inflation, unless potential GDP is bolstered through higher investment. 
Clearly, more public resources should be mobilized to finance large 
infrastructure investment requirements in electric power, gas, ports, 
railways, roads, and urban services, and to enhance the skills base to 
strengthen the garment industry (Box 3.15.1), help diversify the economy 
and raise global competitiveness and growth. Bangladesh’s tax effort is, 
at 10.4% of GDP in FY2013, low compared with other South Asian 
countries. It needs to be raised through tax measures that include axing 
exemptions and exclusions, and through improved tax administration 
achieved by simplifying laws and procedures, improving logistics and 
automation, and reducing scope for evasion with the introduction of 
advanced auditing and enforcement techniques. Moreover, fiscal space 
needs to be expanded by cutting subsidies, which requires raising 
electricity prices to reflect the cost of production vis-à-vis other options, 
and by aligning fuel prices with international oil prices. Gas prices need 
to be set keeping in view gas prices on the international market and the 
cost of alternative fuels. The resources freed up could be allocated for 
infrastructure and human resource development.
Public sector capacity for project design and administration, 
procurement, audit, and financial management must be enhanced to 
make project implementation more efficient. In addition, projects under 
public–private partnerships need to be advanced by developing the 
capacity in line agencies to design, bid, and award such contracts.
Banks are the main financing source for private investment. 
However, weak governance in state-owned commercial banks has 
undermined their strength and efficiency. In line with the latest 
memorandum of understanding between these banks and the central 
bank, performance is to be improved by adopting stronger risk 
management and controls, and by placing ceilings on credit growth for 
each bank based on its performance and financial soundness. Ongoing 
capital market reforms to enhance market stability and governance need 
to be deepened, including through the development of a liquid bond 
market, to expand sources for private sector financing.
To improve the business climate, the trade regime needs to be 
liberalized through tariff and nontariff reform. Import duties need 
to be cut, and the dispersion in rates and average level of protection 
lowered to boost competitiveness and reduce biases against exports. 
Trade infrastructure and logistics, including port services and 
automation, need to be improved to lower transaction costs and facilitate 
faster clearance of goods. 
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3.15.1 Toward a better garment industry in Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s garment industry is in transition. With 
5,400 factories employing 4.0 million workers, mostly 
women, and with export earnings at $20 billion, or 16.6% 
of GDP in FY2013, the industry is the backbone of the 
economy and a major force for inclusive growth. However, 
it has a mixed safety history. Following major industrial 
accidents in 2012 and 2013, the industry in collaboration 
with the government, foreign buyers, and development 
partners have agreed to and is in the process of adopting 
internationally accepted safety and compliance standards. 
Success in this endeavor will be difficult, as it will require 
major changes and substantial financing. To comply with 
international standards, about half of the country’s garment 
factories, mostly small and medium-sized ones that depend 
on subcontracting from large factories, will be hard pressed 
to adapt. Operating on small profit margins and lacking 
financial resources, many of these factories will likely need 
to close or be absorbed by larger companies.
An operating manual was developed with the assistance 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) for 
assessing structural integrity and fire and electrical safety. 
Factory inspections have begun under the Accord on 
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, the signatories 
of which are European buyers and trade unions, and the 
Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, an initiative of US 
buyers. In March, the first batch of detailed inspection 
results under the accord was made public. The two groups 
have pledged to provide loans to qualifying companies 
for safety upgrades. In January 2014, the Rana Plaza 
Donors Trust Fund was established and began to receive 
contributions from buyers and private donors to assist 
victims of that 2013 building collapse and their families. 
Under the National Action Plan, development 
partners—Canada, the European Union, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the US—have started providing 
funds as part of their long-term initiatives to ensure labor 
safety and factory standards while involving local and 
international nongovernment organizations and trade 
unions in their efforts. Low-cost loans are made available 
through support from the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency and the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC). In addition, the government has decided to cover 
3 percentage points of commercial bank lending rates 
for export loans, to enable garment factories affected by 
political unrest to cut their losses. 
The ILO and the IFC have announced, in partnership 
with the government, the Better Work Program as a 
component of the program Improving Working Conditions 
in the Ready-Made Garment Sector. In addition to 
providing financial support to the victims and their 
families, and to ensuring treatment for injured workers, the 
government took initiatives to reemploy affected workers 
and implement suggestions for ensuring workplace safety.
The minimum wage was raised to Tk5,300 per month 
from Tk3,000 in November 2013. Even with this increase, 
Bangladesh will continue to be the most wage-competitive 
of major garment producers in Asia, having maintained 
the least-cost pattern from 2001 to 2011, according to 
recent research (box figure 1). Moreover, estimates place 
Bangladesh labor productivity at 80% of that in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). This suggests that unit 
labor costs are about half that of India and Cambodia, two 
main Asian competitors for production moving from the 
PRC to lower-cost venues. 
The continued dynamism of Bangladesh’s garment 
industry will depend on its ability to raise productivity, 
boost value addition, and move upmarket. Major 
challenges include upgrading safety standards to maintain 
strong buyer market access, improving inadequate 
electricity and transport-related infrastructure and 
logistics (box figure 2), and developing skilled candidates 
for middle and senior management needed both to 
improve labor relations and to raise production efficiency 
through better quality control, labeling, and shipment.
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Bhutan
Growth slowed for a second year as the authorities continued administrative measures to rein 
in consumption spending that was creating pressures on the balance of payments and Indian 
rupee reserves. These measures are giving way to adaption in fiscal and monetary mechanisms 
to strengthen demand management. Growth is expected to pick up on construction of a series 
of large hydropower projects that will substantially expand this mainstay industry and exports 
of power to India.
Economic performance
Economic growth continued to moderate from 6.5% to an estimated 
5.2% in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013), rates well below the average 
growth of 8.4% over the past decade (Figure 3.16.1). The slowdown 
largely reflects policy measures adopted in 2012 to alleviate growing 
shortages of Indian rupee reserves. The measures entailed credit and 
import restrictions, particularly in import-heavy activities such as 
construction and transport that required large rupee payments.
The brunt of the downdraft in FY2013 was felt in services. 
Expansion in transport and communications halved to 5.2% from 10.3%, 
while growth in retail trade, hotels and restaurants and other services 
moderated mainly owing to slower domestic spending, especially 
on vehicles. In addition, finance output fell as lending plummeted. 
Growth in industry provided a partial offset; the 6.4% expansion in 
manufacturing and 7.7% in construction remained relatively high, the 
latter related to hydropower projects rather than to house building. 
Inflation decelerated to 5.5% in the fourth quarter of FY2013 
from its peak at 13.6% a year earlier as food prices significantly eased 
(Figure 3.16.2). Local food prices had gone up in the last quarter of 
FY2012 as supplies tightened and demand rose for consumption goods 
not subject to the restrictions. Inflation after this slowed as the high 
base effect dissipated and inflation moderated in India, Bhutan’s major 
trading partner that supplies over 90% of food imports. Since June 2013, 
inflation has rebounded, tracking currency depreciation and price 
developments in India. Over all of FY2013, inflation averaged 8.6%, 
down from 10.1% a year earlier. 
Monetary tightening rolled out in March 2012 to fight the rupee 
liquidity shortage included credit constraints for various imported 
goods. As the measures took hold, growth in credit to the private sector 
plunged from high rates averaging about 35% over the past 5 years, to 
6.8% in FY2013 (Figure 3.16.3). Credit for transport and construction 
was hardest hit. While growth in the broad money supply recovered to 
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18.6%, the expansion reflected marked improvement in banking system 
net foreign assets as the balance of payments turned around. 
Following on earlier measures to implement use of policy rates 
for more effective monetary management and a base-rate system for 
financial institutions to strengthen competition, the Royal Monetary 
Authority in 2013 reviewed in depth its reserve management operations 
and issued revised policy and operational guidelines.
On the fiscal front, the budget deficit narrowed to 0.9% of GDP 
in FY2013 from 1.1% the year earlier, and was below the target of 
1.6% (Figure 3.16.4). Substantial grants alongside some increase in 
tax revenue largely funded spending and helped to rein in the deficit. 
Preliminary estimates indicate that total expenditure and net lending 
grew by 14.6%, slightly more quickly than in the previous year. 
The trade balance improved as the country’s large import bill fell by 
6.5%, reflecting the administrative restrictions that curtailed imports of 
vehicles and construction materials. Hydropower exports continued to 
be a major source of earnings, accounting for nearly one-third of exports 
in FY2013, though earnings, which vary with river flow, slipped slightly. 
Accordingly, the trade deficit narrowed to an estimated $354 million, or 
18% of GDP, even as the current account deficit widened from 21.3% to 
23.6% of GDP on sharply lower current transfers and increased interest 
payments (Figure 3.16.5).
The deficit was funded by ample capital and financial flows, 
more than three-quarters of which were earmarked for hydropower 
construction. The overall balance of payments moved to a surplus of 
$167.9 million, or 8.7% of GDP, which marked a sharp turnaround from 
a deficit of 9.8% of GDP a year earlier. Reserves increased sharply to 
$916.9 million, equivalent to 12.6 months of imports (Figure 3.16.6). 
The $200 million purchase of Indian rupees in June 2013 substantially 
boosted rupee reserves to about 3 months of imports from India, which 
should provide a more comfortable cushion for managing cross-border 
payments. 
Economic prospects
GDP growth is expected to rebound to 6.0% in FY2014 as hydropower 
construction projects under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan get underway 
and improving economic conditions in major tourist source countries 
boost tourism. Growth is forecast to strengthen further to 6.8% in FY2015 
as hydropower construction expands and exports increase with the start 
of operations at the Dagachhu power plant. Notably, the sale of carbon 
credits is potential source revenue for the project, as it was approved 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Total budget spending is planned to moderate in FY2014 in line 
with the government’s policy to rationalize expenditure, but the deficit 
is nevertheless expected to widen to 3.6% of GDP on lower projected 
grants. The reduction in spending reflects spending cuts on vehicle 
purchases, staff quarters construction, and other nonessential operating 
expenses, as part of austerity measures to address the rupee liquidity 
problem. Moreover, medium-term macro-fiscal projections envisage 
annual expenditure ceilings to maintain a sustainable fiscal path.
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The current account deficit is projected to widen to 28.6% of GDP in 
FY2014, mainly owing to large imports for power projects, but to narrow 
again to 26.4% in FY2015 with the mobilization of more development 
grants. 
Inflation is anticipated to rise to average 10.2% in FY2014 as the 
economy expands and currency depreciation keeps import prices high. 
Inflation will ease slightly in FY2015 as global price pressures subside 
and inflation moderates in India.
Policy challenge—credit availability for 
inclusive growth
Bhutan’s economy has grown remarkably in recent years, with GDP 
tripling over the past decade mostly on the back of capital-intensive 
hydropower development, which has contributed 20.9% to GDP growth 
on average over the past 14 years. While government has harnessed 
hydropower proceeds to substantially raise the standard of living for 
many Bhutanese, economic expansion in other sectors has been limited. 
Productivity gains have been largely confined to industry, which has 
improved productivity by over threefold in the past 13 years but uses 
little labor. Productivity increases in the key employment generating 
sectors have, by contrast, been negligible. As 62% of the Bhutanese 
work in agriculture, mainly for subsistence, encouraging private-sector 
development to create more jobs outside of agriculture remains an 
important macroeconomic priority toward achieving self-sufficient and 
inclusive growth.
In terms of business development, the greatest constraint identified 
by small and medium-sized firms is their lack of access to finance, 
cited by over 30% of all firms (Figure 3.16.7). Accordingly, constraints 
on domestic credit to the private sector need to be addressed. While 
deficiency in domestic savings for investment restrains the overall 
availability of credit, the distribution of existing credit is hampered 
by risk-averse selection of clients in response to limited loan-recovery 
capacity, little variety in loan products, financial infrastructure 
shortfalls, and client dispersion across difficultly accessed rugged 
terrain. Further, external borrowing by the private sector remains 
severely restricted by law in terms of the borrower type as well as 
regarding the use of funds, effectively eliminating this as a source 
of funds for potential borrowers who face credit constraints in the 
domestic market. 
Enhancing access to finance should thus be a pillar of government 
policy to foster private sector development, employment growth, and 
diversification. The stimulus package that the government will soon 
start to disburse aims to ease access to credit in priority development 
sectors such as cottage industries and the informal sector. It is an 
important measure to address issues of credit distribution. Further 
development of a credit information system and a better variety of 
financial products may also help bolster the provision of credit to 
entrepreneurs.
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India
The economic slowdown bottomed out last year. A spell of global financial turbulence caused 
capital outflows and pressure on the exchange rate, but strong policy measures stabilized the 
currency, rebuilt reserves, and narrowed the excessive current account deficit. Weaknesses 
remain, however, and include persistent inflation, fiscal imbalances, bottlenecks to investment, 
and inefficiencies that require structural reforms. Without a systemic resolution to these, growth 
is forecast to pick up modestly.
Economic performance
The government’s initial estimates peg GDP growth at 4.9% in FY2013 
(ended 31 March 2014), slightly higher than the ADO Update 2013 
forecast of 4.7%. The estimate could be a tad optimistic, as achieving 
it would require growth to be boosted to 5.5% in the fourth quarter of 
FY2013 (Figure 3.17.1). The marginal pickup in headline GDP growth 
masks underlying weakness in the economy as it was due to stronger 
agriculture. Excluding agriculture, GDP growth slipped from 5.0% in 
FY2012 to 4.9% in FY2013.
The recovery of the monsoon in the season’s second half in 2012 and 
a good monsoon in 2013 helped agriculture to grow by 4.6% in FY2013, 
though growth moderated somewhat in the second half of the year. 
Food grain production is estimated to have increased by 2.4% in FY2013, 
reaching a record of 263.2 million tons.
After growing by a tepid 1.0% in FY2012, industry decelerated 
further to 0.7% in FY2013. While mining has been in the red for nearly 
2 years because policy bottlenecks plaguing coal and natural gas have 
seen little resolution, the contraction in manufacturing output was a 
new low. Continuing contraction in the output of capital goods and 
consumer durables reflects very weak investment and consumer demand 
(Figure 3.17.2). Bottlenecks restricting fuel supplies have hampered 
electricity generation. 
The industrial slowdown and weak recovery in advanced economies 
caused growth in services to drop below 7%. Trade, hotels, transport, 
and communication services, which together account for more than 
a quarter of GDP, saw growth slump to 3.5% in FY2013 as industry 
weakened and consumption dried up. Growth in the large financial 
services industry is estimated at a healthy 11.2%. However, much of this 
expansion is attributed to strong deposit mobilization as large inflows 
came from Indian nonresidents under a temporary foreign exchange 
swap window. This appears to be largely a one-off event.
Growth in private consumption slowed sharply to 4.1% in FY2013. 
A weak currency, persistent food inflation, rising fuel prices, and dim 
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employment prospects severely dented consumer confidence. Rural 
consumption is likely to have been affected by some moderation in rural 
wage growth since January 2013. Growth in government consumption, 
which sharply picked up in the first quarter, remained subdued for the 
rest of the year as fiscal pressures intensified. Investment flattened during 
the year, registering no growth. While structural and procedural delays 
continued to hamper investment, new headwinds appeared in the form of 
monetary tightening and the heightened challenge of repayment in foreign 
currency as the currency weakened. Domestic demand contributed less 
than half of growth.
Consumer price inflation averaged 9.8% in FY2013, while wholesale 
price inflation averaged 5.9%. Inflation picked up for both from 
May with higher food prices and periodic increments in fuel prices 
(Figure 3.17.3). However, from December 2013, inflation decelerated 
sharply due to a drop in food prices, especially for vegetables. Marked 
currency depreciation during the year affected import prices, though the 
pass-through to final prices has been limited by weak demand, which 
has curtailed firms’ pricing power and forced them to tighten margins. 
The Reserve Bank of India, the central bank, had to calibrate 
monetary policy to balance weak growth with concerns over external 
and price pressures. After reducing the policy repurchase rate by 
25 basis points to 7.25% in the first quarter of FY2013 to foster growth, 
it had to force market rates much higher in July, using its marginal 
standing facility rate, which it increased to 10.25% (Figure 3.17.4). This 
was to counter intense pressures on the exchange rate and reserves 
from turmoil in global capital markets stemming from fears that the 
US Federal Reserve was about to abruptly end quantitative easing. This 
action and others in September to buttress capital flows effectively dealt 
with external pressures. Subsequently, the central bank underlined its 
firm commitment to bring down inflation (while mindful of slack in the 
economy) by pushing up the repurchase rate to 8.0%. 
A committee that the central bank set up in December 2013 
proposed using the consumer price index as the nominal anchor for 
monetary policy and the adoption of an inflation target of 4%±2%, to be 
achieved over 2 years. While the advantage of having a clear nominal 
anchor to influence expectations is widely acknowledged, a debate 
continues on inflation targeting, as it would depend critically on better 
coordinated monetary and fiscal policy, more accurate forecasting, and 
an improved transmission mechanism. 
The quality of commercial bank assets continues to be a major 
concern. The ratio of nonperforming loans to all loans worsened to 4.2% 
in September 2013 from 3.4% in March 2013. Over the same period, 
the ratio of restructured loans to all loans also increased, to 6.0% from 
5.8%, taking the ratio of stressed loans to over 10% (Figure 3.17.5). 
The publicly owned banks that dominate the banking system hold a 
disproportionate share of stressed loans. 
The federal budget deficit in FY2013 is estimated at 4.6% of GDP, 
slightly less than the 4.8% recorded in FY2012. However, the quality 
of fiscal consolidation is a concern. Revenue growth was, at 15.9%, well 
below the target. Collections of corporate tax and customs and excise 
duties were weakened by tepid economic activity, and receipts from 
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asset sales were less than half of the target despite the government 
benefitting from a strong response to the auction of the telecom 
spectrum. To meet the deficit target, expenditure was compressed, 
with the burden falling disproportionately on growth-enhancing 
capital expenditure, which came in at 15% below target, while current 
expenditure was maintained as planned. Subsidy payments, though 
capped at 2% of GDP, were 10.6% higher than targeted, as a weak 
currency pushed the cost of fertilizer and petroleum higher than 
originally budgeted. In a bid to narrow the fiscal deficit, petroleum 
subsidies equal to about 0.3% of GDP have been deferred to FY2014.
The current account deficit is estimated to have narrowed sharply 
to 2.2% of GDP in FY2013 from 4.7% a year earlier. The improvement 
reflected a large compression of the trade deficit from 10.4% of GDP 
in FY2012 to 7.9%, mainly owing to a 7.0% drop in imports. Imports 
of oil, the largest item, were stagnant, while those of gold, the second 
largest, fell by 45.2% from a year earlier as higher taxes and quantitative 
restrictions took hold. However, the decline in imports was broad based, 
with the economic slowdown hitting imports of capital goods such as 
machinery and transport equipment. Competitiveness gains from a 
weaker currency and the pickup in demand in some of the advanced 
economies helped exports to grow by 4.7% in FY2013 (Figure 3.17.6). 
Exports of petroleum products, fabrics, garments, and plastics grew 
at a robust pace. Improved services receipts and a modest advance in 
transfers narrowed the current account deficit by an amount equal to 
0.1% of GDP. 
A favorable swap scheme for domestic banks initiated by the central 
bank as one of the September 2013 stabilization measures garnered 
$46 billion before its expiration in November, mainly from 3-year 
deposits from nonresident Indians. This facility was a major contributor 
to rebuilding international reserves after they dipped to $275 billion in 
early September, helping to restore them to $297 billion in mid-March, 
a couple weeks before the end of the FY2013 (Figure 3.17.7). While 
there were substantial net outflows of portfolio investment from June 
through August during the global market turmoil, subsequently there 
have been sizeable net inflows, especially to purchase local currency 
bonds (Figure 3.17.8). With the strengthening and stabilizing of the 
rupee and marked narrowing of the current account deficit in the 
second half of the year, global investors moved back into bonds, which 
allowed them to lock in profit in a covered transaction. However, net 
foreign direct investment, estimated at $20 billion, improved little on 
the FY2012 figure. 
Policies that have improved reserves and substantially strengthened 
the external position are reflected in exchange rate developments. 
The Indian rupee depreciated by about 20% against the US dollar from 
May to its low at the end of August but has subsequently appreciated 
to trade in March 2014 at about 10% below its rate a year earlier 
(Figure 3.17.9). The average real effective rate has depreciated about 
6%, aiding competiveness. Stock prices declined by 7% from March to 
August 2013 but recovered sharply for a gain of around 19% in FY2013 
(Figure 3.17.10). Despite difficulties, markets in India were more positive 
over the year than emerging markets averages either in Asia or globally.
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Economic prospects
Economic recovery would have to be led by improved investment and 
consumption, but the prospects do not appear promising at this stage. 
Elevated inflation, a tight monetary stance, and a weak currency will 
continue to constrain spending. Further, fiscal austerity is likely to be an 
additional drag on growth.
 While the quarter ending in December 2013 witnessed a healthy 
increase in the number of new projects announced, most were 
government projects (Figure 3.17.11). At the same time, the number of 
stalled projects continued to increase with the withdrawal of coal block 
allocations placed earlier with private sector operators and problems 
related to acquiring land.
The Cabinet Committee on Investment has cleared projects with a 
combined worth of $89 billion or 4.8% of GDP. This is likely to provide 
some traction toward resolving issues with some of the stalled projects. 
The government is likely to initiate actions that would bolster capital 
expenditure, as companies are looking for macroeconomic stability 
and forward movement on some structural issues before commencing 
operations. Better growth prospects in the US and the euro area will 
likely bolster external demand, as will competitiveness gains from 
currency depreciation. 
A favorable monsoon is assumed to help agriculture grow at close 
to its trend rate of 3%. However, some global weather agencies have 
reported the increased chance of a weak El Niño in 2014, which could 
reduce rainfall in India and suppress agriculture growth. 
Industry is likely to achieve a marginal uptick in growth with 
mining clearances and improved electricity generation. The HSBC 
India Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index rose in February 
2014 to its highest level in a year (Figure 3.17.12). The increase was 
driven by improvement in current indicators such as output and in 
forward indicators such as new orders and export orders. Improved 
global prospects are likely to boost tradeable services such as finance, 
communication, and information technology and business services, but 
the HSBC Services Sector Activity Index for February remained below 
par despite some improvement. The central bank’s Business Expectation 
Index continued to strengthen in the fourth quarter of FY2013 on 
improved sentiment regarding production, order books, capacity 
utilization, and exports (Figure 3.17.13).
The economic downdraft of recent years appears to have calmed, 
and GDP growth in FY2014 is expected to inch upward by 5.5% on 
improved performance in industry and services. In FY2015, economic 
growth is expected to pick up to 6.0%, as a speeding up in advanced 
economies bolsters external demand and government action opens some 
structural bottlenecks that have impeded industry and investment. 
Consumer price inflation is expected to ease below the double digit 
rates witnessed in recent years but will continue to be high. Record 
production of food grains in FY2013 will help to soften food prices. 
Government policies on support prices for procuring food grains under 
the National Food Security Act will bear heavily on food inflation. 
A monsoon disrupted by El Niño could fuel food inflation. Improvements 
in agricultural productivity and the marketing and distribution of 
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perishables are needed. Monthly diesel price hikes will need to continue 
for more than a year if the government is to eliminate this subsidy. 
On balance, consumer inflation will likely average 8.1% in FY2014 and 
moderate further to 7.8%, assuming no adverse shocks to agriculture. 
Wholesale price inflation, which has a smaller food component and 
excludes services, is expected to average 6.0% in FY2014 and 5.8% in 
FY2015. These projections assume that monetary policy will remain 
tight, as consumer price inflation, which has persistently trended higher 
than wholesale price inflation, is increasingly viewed as the nominal 
anchor, making the inflation target of 4% ±2% within the next 2 years a 
bigger reach. 
This being an election year, an interim budget was presented in 
February 2014. The fiscal deficit is seen dropping to 4.1% of GDP in 
FY2014, which appears optimistic. With no major increase in tax 
rates, tax revenue collection is expected to increase by 19% in FY2014 
on account of higher projected tax buoyancy. Meanwhile, excise duty 
for capital and consumer goods has been reduced from 12% to 10% to 
stimulate growth. Personal income tax and excise and customs duties 
are projected to grow at rates higher than the average over the past 
decade, indicating assumptions of a manufacturing rebound, expanded 
tax coverage, and a dynamic global environment in FY2014. At 0.4% 
of GDP, projected revenue earnings from asset sales are also on the 
ambitious side, up from an average of less than 0.3% over the past 
5 years.
While current expenditure is estimated to grow by 10.8%, capital 
expenditure growth is pegged at 11.7%. With nominal GDP growth at 
13.4%, this implies a further reduction in the ratio of capital expenditure 
to GDP. Subsidies have been maintained in FY2014 at FY2013 levels in 
absolute terms, as lower fuel subsidies offset a higher food subsidy with 
the introduction of the National Food Security Act, 2013. Fuel subsidies 
are likely to overshoot their budgets in FY2014 as arrears of around 
0.3% of GDP from FY2013 were rolled into FY2014. Further, the cap on 
the number of cooking gas cylinders eligible for subsidies was recently 
raised, and the losses incurred by oil marketing companies rose because 
of the weaker rupee. 
Improved global growth momentum in 2014 and the recent 
weakening of the rupee should spur exports, which are expected to 
increase by 8.0% in FY2014. Imports are also likely to grow, at 9.0%, as 
imports of items other than oil and gold respond to a modest upturn in 
growth. Softer international oil prices are likely to keep oil imports in 
check. Gold imports will likely witness an uptick as some of restrictions 
are gradually eased to accommodate the large jewelry and gem-setting 
industry. Better growth prospects in the advanced economies and high 
domestic interest rates should bolster remittance inflows. The FY2014 
current account deficit is expected to be 2.5% of GDP, slightly higher 
than FY2013.
In FY2015, the current account deficit is expected to widen further 
to 2.8% of GDP as import demand grows by 12% with improvements in 
investment and industry. Export growth is also expected to pick up to 
10.5% as the advanced economies consolidate their growth momentum. 
While the current account deficit is expected to be comfortable in 
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FY2014 and FY2015, and financed by capital inflows, the economy 
remains susceptible to external shocks. A large part of the moderation 
in the current account deficit has been achieved through discretionary 
curbs on gold, which cannot be sustained over the long run. Similarly, 
export competitiveness, restored by a sharp depreciation in mid-2013, 
will slowly erode under high inflation and stagnant productivity. 
Moreover, the economy continues to import large volumes of essential 
commodities such as crude oil, coal, and fertilizer because domestic 
production is constrained. As demand for them is inelastic, a hike in 
international prices or a marked weakening of the rupee would damage 
external stability.
Policy challenge—expanding manufacturing 
to create jobs
One of India’s most pressing policy challenges is to create significantly 
more productive and well-paying jobs. Such jobs are vital to sustain 
high growth and ensure that it is inclusive. As the proportion of the 
workforce that depends on agriculture declines, and given the 12 million 
people enter the workforce each year, manufacturing will have to play a 
key role in generating productive and well-paying jobs. 
In many ways, manufacturing is well placed to play this role. First, 
India’s factor endowments provide an abundance of semiskilled labor, 
which is essential for a comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
manufacturing. Second, India has developed the capabilities required 
for a diversified and dynamic manufacturing industry in terms of the 
range of manufactured products produced and of India’s manufactured 
export basket, which includes relatively sophisticated chemical and 
pharmaceutical products, as well as auto components. Moreover, India’s 
information technology and engineering services have increasingly been 
deployed by multinational corporations for designing industrial products 
for global markets, including sophisticated memory chips used in a 
range of electronic devices.
Unfortunately, manufacturers in India do not perform close 
to their tremendous potential. For many years now, the sector has 
contributed around 15% of GDP and 12% of employment. By comparison, 
manufacturing in the People’s Republic of China, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam accounts for close to 25% or more of GDP. 
While employment shares in some of these countries are similar 
to India’s—for example, a little above 15% in Thailand—the large 
majority of Indian manufacturing employment is concentrated in 
small, informal enterprises. As Figure 3.17.14 shows, the largest share 
of manufacturing employment in India is in the informal sector “own 
account manufacturing enterprises,” which employ no wage-workers. 
Though the most recent data suggest a welcome decline in this segment 
of manufacturing employment from 2005 to 2010, Indian manufacturers 
by and large continue to be small and informal, which translates into 
low productivity and wages. Figure 3.17.15 shows low average wages 
generated by the informal sector and low average wages paid by small 
firms in the formal sector relative to their larger counterparts. 
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Infrastructure deficiencies, especially for power and transport, 
and a difficult regulatory environment for manufacturing loom 
large in discussions and analyses of the factors holding back 
manufacturing. Rigorous empirical work has begun documenting 
how insufficient and irregular power supply affects firms’ product 
choices, output, and scale of operations. Also, for products such as 
apparel that have geographically dispersed domestic supply chains, 
poor connectivity and logistics raise transaction costs and damage 
global competitiveness. Similarly, the World Bank’s 2014 Doing Business 
study on regulations ranks India 134th of 189 countries for ease of 
doing business. Particularly problematic are regulations on starting a 
business, obtaining permits, and closing unprofitable units. Further, 
elements of India’s labor laws, especially those pertaining to layoffs 
in manufacturing plants, seem to have discouraged larger and more 
productive firms from entering labor-intensive product lines. 
Recognizing the importance of a more dynamic manufacturing 
industry, the government unveiled in 2011 its new National 
Manufacturing Policy, which calls for boosting the share of 
manufacturing to 25% of GDP and adding 100 million workers by 2022. 
To achieve these targets, the policy proposes rationalizing and 
simplifying business regulations, including the use of single-window 
clearance mechanisms; an exit policy that aims to balance firms’ need to 
adjust employment in response to market conditions with labor’s need 
for income security; financial and institutional mechanisms to develop 
technology, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises; large-
scale infrastructure development; and clustering manufacturers in new 
national investment and manufacturing zones. 
These zones will be developed as industrial townships, benchmarked 
with the best manufacturing hubs in the world. They will also help meet 
growing demand in India for world-class urban centers. Further, they 
will address infrastructure bottlenecks. These zones will be equipped 
with necessary infrastructure, particularly power, either through 
grid connection or by power plants in the zone. They will also seek to 
minimize supply chain fragmentation and its associated costs.
The government is transforming major transport corridors into 
economic corridors and promoting greater industrial activity along 
them. In addition, the Cabinet Committee on Investment has been 
set up to speed clearance for stalled infrastructure projects throughout 
the country.
The successful implementation of these recent initiatives will be 
necessary to ensure that India’s manufacturers perform at or close to 
potential.
This chapter was written by Sarah Carrington and Huiping Huang of the South Asia 
Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila; and Elbe Aguba, consultant, South Asia 
Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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Maldives
Growth picked up in 2013 owing to a strong recovery in tourism, mainly a further large influx 
of visitors from Asia. The country still has to grapple with hefty fiscal and external imbalances 
despite some improvement. With strengthening in global economic conditions, the outlook is 
for higher growth. Policy nevertheless needs to focus on durable reductions to the fiscal deficit.
Economic performance
After a deep downdraft in 2012, GDP growth picked up to an estimated 
3.7% in 2013, buoyed by a strong rebound in tourism and associated 
sectors such as transport and communication (Figure 3.18.1). Tourism, 
the mainstay of this island economy, expanded by an estimated 5.5% 
and accounted for about 40% of growth. Transport performed robustly, 
expanding by 5.1%, as did communication at 7.6%. Together, the three 
sectors provided three-quarters of GDP growth. Industry, which is 
dominated by construction, has stalled in the past 2 years on weak 
investment, as hotel occupancy has not recovered to rates enjoyed before 
the financial crisis. 
Tourist arrivals grew by 17.4%, nearly reaching the government’s 
target of 1.2 million, led by a strong influx of visitors from Asia, 
particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which now provides 
nearly 30% of total arrivals (Figure 3.18.2). Asia has been a rapidly 
growing source of visitors, increasing its share to 45.0% of arrivals from 
barely a third only 4 years ago. Visitors from Europe, which made up 
just less than half of total arrivals, grew by a mere 1.8%, reflecting the 
prolonged economic slump in Europe. 
Other sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, social services, and 
real estate posted good growth. Agriculture and fisheries also grew but 
contributed barely 2% to GDP growth. Agriculture remains constrained 
by the lack of cultivable land, while fisheries, the main employer in the 
atolls, struggles with depleted fish stocks. That said, after 6 years of 
steady decline, the catch rebounded substantially by 16.8%.
Inflation in Malé, the capital, eased markedly from averaging 10.9% 
in 2012 to 4.0% in 2013, the lowest since 2006 (Figure 3.18.3). Price 
increases for fish were much lower in 2013 as the catch improved. 
Prices for furnishings, household equipment, miscellaneous goods and 
communications services, fell sharply after double-digit growth in 2012. 
Controlled prices of certain food items, electricity and fuel were largely 
unchanged.
The government estimates the budget deficit to have narrowed 
to 4.7% of GDP in 2013 on higher revenues and lower spending 
(Figure 3.18.4). Revenue grew by 15.8% on large increases in tax 
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revenue from the goods and services tax on tourism and the business 
profit tax. Total expenditure is reported up by only 2.2%, with current 
expenditure advancing by 10.3% and capital expenditure falling by 
26.1%, holding total spending to just 37.9% of GDP, well below the 40.8% 
average over the past 5 years. Although the estimated deficit is a marked 
improvement from 9.2% of GDP in 2012 and double-digit deficits in 
previous years, the actual deficit will likely be higher, as financial data 
suggested a cash deficit of 13.4% of GDP.
Because of chronic fiscal deficits, government domestic debt has 
soared to reach 47.8% of GDP in 2013 (Figure 3.18.5). Moreover, rising 
demand for financing is pushing interest rates significantly higher, as 
Treasury bill rates of all maturities were over 10% by December 2013. 
Meanwhile, bank-lending rates to the country’s large nonfinancial public 
corporations have also sharply escalated (Figure 3.18.6). Worsening 
financing difficulties have driven the government to rely heavily on 
the Maldives Monetary Authority, with claims, mostly holdings of 
government securities, mounting to 18% of GDP in 2013. Moreover, 
the government appears to have accumulated payment arrears that 
are estimated to be nearly 4% of GDP in 2012. Government data show 
domestic and external public debt together estimated at 72% of GDP at 
the end of 2013; the International Monetary Fund, meanwhile, estimates 
a much higher total equal to 96% of GDP. 
The current account deficit is estimated to have narrowed to 20.5% 
of GDP in 2013 from 23.0% a year earlier, on higher tourism receipts, 
improved exports (mainly re-exports of jet fuel), and sizably reduced 
net income outflows to pay interest (Figure 3.18.7). Though the deficit 
narrowed, it remains high, reflecting the country’s heavy reliance on 
imports (82.8% of GDP), particularly for food and petroleum products. 
Financial inflows, errors and omissions, and the overall balance 
remain unrecorded, reflecting weak data. Nevertheless, financing was 
sufficient to increase gross international reserves by $35.8 million 
to $340.3 million, which is still low, equivalent to only 1.7 months of 
projected imports of goods and services.
Economic prospects 
Tourism remains the major driver of the economy. Favorable global 
economic prospects—particularly in the euro area and the PRC—are 
expected to increase tourist arrivals and have a positive spillover into 
the rest of the economy. Following the election of the new President 
in November 2013, after nearly 2 years of political turmoil, greater 
stability is expected to prevail, bolstering a favorable outlook. The new 
government is expected to take steps to advance economic activity, 
including implementing plans to ensure that the Maldives maintains 
its high-end position in the world tourism market. Economic growth 
is projected to pick up moderately to 4.5% in 2014 and further to 5.4% 
in 2015.
The budget deficit is likely to expand. Although some measures 
were introduced to improve fundamentals, such as increasing the 
tourism goods and services tax from 8% to 12% effective July 2013 
and broadening the base for the general goods and services tax, 
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actions fell short of identifying specific policies to effect needed cuts 
in expenditure. The budget for 2014 envisions a 22.6% expansion in 
spending and a reduction in the deficit to 3.2% of GDP. Budget revenues 
are seen increasing by 30%, or by a full 5% of GDP, which would be an 
extraordinary accomplishment. 
In an expanding economy that must continue to rely heavily on 
imports, inflation is expected to increase slightly to 5.0% in 2014 but 
may ease a bit in 2015 as global prices subside. The current account 
deficit is projected to widen over the next 2 years to 22.1% of GDP, as 
increased tourism pushes imports and other payments higher. 
Risks to the outlook center on large, simultaneous current account 
and fiscal deficits, high government debt and an exchange rate that 
is fixed in practice—circumstances that are increasingly difficult to 
sustain. Adverse shocks to income in tourist source countries or spikes 
in global oil prices continue as downside risks.
Policy challenge—reining in fiscal 
and external imbalances
The most pressing macroeconomic priority for the Maldives is containing 
its substantial fiscal and external imbalances. The government has 
very high expenditures, averaging 40.6% of GDP over the past 5 years 
and reflecting mainly expansion in current expenditure (Figure 3.18.8). 
Current expenditures comprise over two-thirds of total expenditure, 
with around one-third of it for salaries, wages, and allowances. Another 
22% of expenditures fund subsidies, transfers, and social welfare. Heavy 
subsidies for food and fuel, two of the country’s main imports, contribute 
increasingly to the widening of current account and fiscal deficits alike.
High fiscal deficits and rising public debt increasingly challenge 
financing the budget. The government relies mainly on domestic sources, 
even at escalating interest rates, to finance its deficit. The principal 
sources of finance are bank loans and the issuance of Treasury bills to 
banks, state-owned enterprises, and the private sector. Most recently, 
the government has resorted to heavy debt monetization at the Maldives 
Monetary Authority and further accumulation of payment arrears.
Fiscal consolidation is therefore an urgent priority. Slimming a 
civil service that employs 11% of the population and costs about 14% of 
GDP is an important task, though past efforts have had little impact. 
A redesign of subsidy and transfer mechanisms to improve targeting 
and minimize leakage would help ease the burden. Better targeting 
of health insurance and pension systems in particular would advance 
government efforts to rein in excessive expenditure. A review of 
forecasting methods, particularly for allocating expenditures among 
ministries or agencies, would be key to taming large variations in 
these accounts. Looking more to the midterm, developing a stronger 
and more diverse economic base beyond tourism will be important to 
address the country’s heavy reliance on imports and persistently large 
current account deficits.
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This chapter was written by Chandan Sapkota of the Nepal Resident Mission, 
Asian Development Bank, Kathmandu.
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A significant drop in agriculture and delay in introducing a full budget dragged down GDP 
growth. Inflation remained high, and the current account surplus contracted as remittance 
inflows decelerated. Growth is expected to pick up with a favorable monsoon, the timely 
adoption of a full budget, and political stability following the successful Constituent Assembly 
election in November 2013. 
Economic performance
GDP growth decelerated to 3.6% in FY2013 (ended 15 July 2013) because 
of an unfavorable monsoon, a shortage of chemical fertilizers, and the 
delay in introducing a full FY2013 budget (Figure 3.19.1). Agricultural 
output growth slowed sharply to 1.3%, the lowest rate in the past 
5 years, while services grew by 6% on improvements in wholesale 
and retail trade and in hotels and restaurants. Industry continued to 
languish, growing by a mere 1.6% as persistent electricity shortages, 
labor disputes, and political uncertainty soured the investment climate. 
Inflation crept up to average 9.9% in FY2013, even as prices for food 
and for other goods and services moderated from highs at the beginning 
of the year, to bring overall inflation to 7.7% in the 12 months to the 
end of the fiscal year (Figure 3.19.2). Subsequently, the low agricultural 
harvest and high prices for agricultural imports from India pushed up 
food inflation sharply to bring overall inflation to 9.7% in the month of 
February 2014. 
The delayed presentation of a full budget, which was introduced 
only in the 9th month of FY2013, combined with weak implementation 
capacity in the government, sharply curtailed total expenditure 
growth to 3.6%. Importantly, only 81% of the budget allocation for 
capital expenditure was actually spent, coming to a mere 3.1% of GDP 
(Figure 3.19.3). Strengthened revenue administration, a broadened tax 
base, and a boost in imports propelled tax revenue 22.6% higher, to 
bring total revenue including grants up to 19.8% of GDP, exceeding 18.6% 
a year earlier. As a result, the overall budget balance turned from deficits 
in recent years to a surplus equal to 0.4% of GDP.
Reflecting the central bank’s push to increase credit to productive 
sectors, lending to agriculture, industry, and energy picked up, and 
credit to the private sector grew by 20.2%, accelerating from 11.3% 
in the previous year (Figure 3.19.4). Construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, services, and mines saw the largest increases in lending. 
The increases in lending to construction, at 16.4%, and to retail and 
wholesale trade, at 22.9%, indicate recovery in these sectors from a 
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slowdown in the previous year. The annual average weighted lending 
rate remained stable at around 12%.
The current account surplus narrowed to 3.4% of GDP, mainly 
on deceleration of remittance inflows and a surge in the trade deficit 
(Figure 3.19.5). Exports declined by 2.9% as demand slowed and supply-
side constraints hurt competitiveness. Merchandise imports grew by 
10.9%—largely because reliance on imports to meet domestic demand 
continued to intensify despite the weakening of Nepalese rupee, and 
demand for petroleum products rose—pushing the trade deficit up to 
27.1% of GDP. Growth of remittance inflows eased to 11.3% after the large 
26.6% expansion in the previous year, yet remittances still amounted to 
25.6% of GDP. The overall balance of payments surplus moderated to 
$786.5 million, and foreign exchange reserves increased to $5.6 billion, 
equivalent to 9.3 months of imports of goods and services (Figure 3.19.6).
Economic prospects
The economic outlook is more optimistic than in FY2013, considering 
the successful second Constituent Assembly election in November 2013 
(following an 18-month hiatus from the end of the first assembly), 
the favorable monsoon, and expected strengthening in remittance 
inflows. The successful political transition to a new government has 
boosted business and investor confidence. The Constituent Assembly is 
expected to pass legislation that will promote investment in key sectors 
and mandate structural reforms. However, there is a downside risk of 
political instability arising from continued disagreement among the 
major political parties over unsettled constitutional and governance 
issues, especially those of federalism and the nature of parliament 
and the executive. These issues have the potential to create hurdles 
to drafting a new constitution like those that stymied the earlier 
Constituent Assembly. 
Taking into account the favorable monsoon, more rapid growth 
of remittance inflows, and the timely introduction of a full budget—
and assuming political stability—GDP is projected to grow by 4.5% in 
FY2014, somewhat less than the government’s target of 5.5%. Normal 
monsoon rains and adequate supplies of chemical fertilizers have 
allowed full paddy planting in most of the country. The budget—with 
a sharp 41.1% boost planned for expenditure and underpinned by 
positive political developments and clearer government direction—has 
strengthened business and investor confidence, and so prospects for 
a boost to industrial activity and exports. Higher remittance-backed 
consumer demand and an uptick in tourism will support services 
growth at around 5%. More than half of growth will come from 
services, and the balance largely from agriculture.
GDP growth is expected to pick up to 4.7% in FY2015, assuming a 
normal monsoon, a timely budget, continued strong remittance inflows, a 
revival in real estate and housing, and the better growth outlook in India.
Despite the improved agricultural harvest, numerous factors—wage 
pressures, upward adjustment of administered fuel prices, the continued 
weakening of the currency and high inflation in India, and persistent 
power shortages and other supply-side constraints—are expected to 
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drive inflation up to 10% in FY2014, well above the central bank’s 
targeted improvement to 8.5%. Notably, the FY2014 budget increased 
the civil service salary scale by 18% and provided an additional 
NRs1,000/month allowance for all government employees. Moreover, 
the minimum wage for workers outside of agriculture was raised by 
29% in June 2013. Inflation is projected to ease only slightly to 9.5% 
in FY2015, even assuming a good harvest, an appreciable reduction of 
inflation in India, cautious monetary and fiscal policies, and subsiding 
domestic wage pressures.
The balance of payments is expected to remain strong in FY2014. 
Exports are projected to increase by 3.0%, reflecting improving external 
demand and the gain in cost competitiveness owing to currency 
depreciation. Imports are projected to grow by 15% on the back of an 
upturn in domestic demand. Despite the widening trade deficit, higher 
growth in remittance inflows and increased tourism will sustain a 
current account surplus at 3.6% of GDP, slightly improved from a year 
earlier. The increase in the number of migrant workers going abroad, 
higher pay packages, and stronger incentives to remit money as the home 
currency depreciates underpin a favorable outlook for remittance inflows. 
Assuming a further pickup in export growth, some moderation in import 
demand, and a sustained advance in remittances, the current account 
surplus is expected to increase marginally in FY2015 to 3.7% of GDP. 
Even with a timely full budget for FY2014, capital expenditure may 
not be fully spent because of delays (some of them election related) 
affecting procurement, budget release, and the implementation of 
approved projects. No major tax changes have been made, and gains 
from ongoing revenue administration reform may not be sufficient to 
meet the revenue target of 19.9% set in the budget, especially if imports 
underperform budget forecasts. Nevertheless, with some shortfall in 
expenditure, the budget deficit is expected to be around 2.4% of GDP, as 
envisioned in the budget. 
The financial sector is stabilizing after the earlier excessive credit 
expansion and the subsequent break in the real estate boom in FY2011. 
FY2013 saw banks and other financial institutions consolidate further. 
The average capital adequacy ratio stands at 13.2%, well above the 10% 
threshold (plus 1% capital buffer), and real estate exposure continued 
to abate and is now well below the cap of 25% of loan portfolio that 
had been imposed by the central bank. Moreover, nonperforming loans 
declined to 3.8% of all loans. Nevertheless, banks and other financial 
institutions need to enhance their operational efficiency and explore 
further opportunities for consolidation. Credit and savings cooperatives, 
which fall outside of the purview of the central bank, need to be closely 
monitored, regulated, and supervised to ensure the soundness of the 
financial sector. 
Policy challenge—taming high inflation 
Average inflation has surpassed 9% in each of the past 5 years except 
for FY2012, when it was only slightly less. Inflation at 12.6% in FY2009 
was the highest in the past 2 decades, largely driven by 17.4% rise in 
the price of food, which occupies a 46.8% share of the consumer price 
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index basket. Since then, food inflation has slowed but remains high, 
averaging 11.8% in the past 4 years. Similarly, inflation for other items 
and services has surpassed 9% in the past 2 years (Figure 3.19.7). 
Taming high inflation, which erodes consumers’ purchasing power 
and makes producers less competitive, is one of the country’s major 
macroeconomic challenges.
Inflation in Nepal tends to move in tandem with inflation in India, 
which is Nepal’s largest trading partner and with whose currency 
Nepal has pegged its rupee. According to a study by the International 
Monetary Fund, inflation in India and international oil price movements 
account for about one-third of the variability in Nepal’s inflation. 
Moreover, after FY2007 inflation became more responsive to changes 
in international oil prices and the nominal effective exchange rate. 
Food price inflation, which has contributed about three-fourths of 
all consumer price index inflation in recent years, is more responsive 
to spillover from oil price movement and India’s food inflation 
(Figure 3.19.8). The impact of international oil price movements seems 
more pernicious because a rise in petroleum product prices is quickly 
felt in the price of chemical fertilizers and transportation. Monetary 
factors affect both food and nonfood inflation, but their effect tends to 
fade away quickly.
Other factors that have driven inflation in recent years are weak 
currency, wage pressures, and supply-side constraints. The depreciation 
of the Nepalese rupee against the currencies of its trade partners 
has inflated costs not only for final goods but also for imported 
raw materials and intermediate goods. Furthermore, 161 products, 
mostly industrial raw materials, are imported from India in exchange 
for US dollars. Supply-side constraints such as power outages, 
transportation bottlenecks, and market price distortions imposed by 
middlemen and syndicates have also played major roles in keeping 
inflation high. These factors appear to have intensified since FY2007, 
when inflation in Nepal started to diverge from its usual path in tandem 
with inflation in India (Figure 3.19.9). Syndicates’ arbitrary hikes in 
transportation costs and the widening gap between farm gate prices 
and retail prices—estimated to be at least 40% in the case of fresh 
vegetables—have propped up high inflation. 
Though the government has banned syndicates and anticompetitive 
practices, enforcement remains weak. Effective market supervision 
and monitoring are needed to rectify market distortions. Another need 
is to check inflationary expectations by ensuring prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies. A way to diminish inflationary expectations would 
be to remove uncertainty over supplies of motor fuel and cooking gas. 
Appropriate steps to boost agricultural production would also help meet 
market demand and limit the impact of imported inflation. Taming 
inflation requires that financial policies and structural bottlenecks alike 
be effectively addressed.
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Pakistan
Macroeconomic and security challenges continue to weigh on the economy. Growth is expected 
to remain modest in FY2014, largely reflecting fiscal consolidation to deal with high deficits 
that have caused macroeconomic imbalances. The government has embarked upon a program 
of fiscal and structural reform, supported by an Extended Fund Facility Arrangement with the 
International Monetary Fund, to restore macroeconomic balance, relieve energy shortages, and 
guide the economy toward faster and more sustainable growth.
Economic performance
Moderate GDP growth in FY2013 reflected weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals in recent years. Investment remained low as energy 
shortages and security concerns continued to undermine investor 
confidence. Fiscal pressures kept the budget deficit very high for the 
second consecutive year. At the same time, however, inflation fell into 
single digits. Stable global commodity prices, Coalition Support Fund 
(CSF) inflows, and continued growth in worker remittances reined in 
the current account deficit. 
GDP growth slowed to 3.6% in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013) as weak 
expansion in the large service sector more than offset improved growth 
in manufacturing (Figure 3.20.1). Growth in agricultural production 
slowed slightly on weaker output of major crops, especially cotton 
and rice. Manufacturing expanded by 3.5%, reflecting a 4.4% pickup 
in large-scale manufacturing, though the sector remained hobbled by 
a continued power crisis and weak internal security. Textiles, food 
processing, and construction materials showed faster growth. Improved 
performance in construction was supported by flood rehabilitation, 
other public sector development projects, and their positive spillover 
effects to rest of the economy. Low growth in services was caused 
mainly by a slowdown in telecommunications. This countered 
improvement in finance and insurance that, however, reflected little 
more than commercial banks’ profits from their high investment in 
government securities.
Investment continued its downward trend, with fixed investment 
falling from 13.3% of GDP in FY2012 to 12.6%. Private investment fell 
to 8.7% of GDP in large part because investment in manufacturing 
weakened, likely reflecting power shortages and low confidence 
in the country’s economic prospects, while investment in services 
also slipped (Figure 3.20.2). Consumption growth slowed to 4.6% in 
FY2013 from 6.0% in the previous year but still outpaced GDP growth. 
Private consumption eased as growth in remittance inflows slowed. 
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Government spending, on the other hand, continued to exhibit strong 
growth. Positive net exports reflected improved export volume and a 
decline in imports as investment fell.
Headline inflation slowed from 11.0% in FY2012 to average 7.4% 
in FY2013, as food shortages eased (Figure 3.20.3). Gas tariff cuts and 
easing global commodity prices during the year moderated the rise of 
food and other prices. Greater exchange rate stability in FY2013—as 
compared with significant depreciation against the US dollar in the year 
before—also helped contain inflationary expectations. Inflation averaged 
7.1% for food and 7.5% for non-food items.
The fiscal deficit stood at 8.0% of GDP in FY2013, lower than the 
8.8% recorded in FY2012. It reflected low tax revenues and higher 
current expenditures on power subsidies, pensions, and interest on 
short-term domestic borrowing. The unbudgeted clearance of power 
sector debt amounted to 1.4% of GDP. Consolidated development 
expenditures in FY2013 were 6.3% lower than the target, on account of 
smaller provincial development outlays. 
Federal tax revenues grew a meager 3.2%, undermined by lower 
income tax and general sales tax collection and falling short of the 
FY2013 annual target. Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) tax revenues 
grew by only 2.9% and, at PRs1.94 trillion, were below the revised target 
of PRs2.01 trillion. As such, they cover only about half of current budget 
expenditure (consolidated), which is a pattern that has prevailed over 
the past 5 years (Figure 3.20.4). The shortfall in tax collection in FY2013 
was partly compensated by higher nontax revenues, including the 
receipt of $1.8 billion under the CSF. 
Monetary policy was accommodating. As inflation began to 
decelerate, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the central bank, began in 
August 2012 to cut its policy rate gradually by a cumulative 300 basis 
points to 9.0% at the end of June 2013 (Figure 3.20.5). Government 
borrowing from the SBP and commercial banks remained high, as 
foreign financing was negligible. Budgetary borrowing from banks 
increased by 28%, or PRs1.5 trillion, in FY2013, including net borrowing 
of PRs536 billion from the SBP. To maintain market liquidity, the SBP 
injected, through open market operations, double the amount of funds 
injected in FY2012. However, credit to the private sector showed a slight 
net contraction in FY2013, as banks preferred to invest in government 
securities and economic activity remained weak. The heavy reliance 
on short-term borrowing has increased the government’s exposure to 
interest rate and rollover risks. 
The current account deficit narrowed to $2.3 billion, or 1% of 
GDP, in FY2013 with improvement in the trade deficit, a lower service 
account deficit following receipts under the CSF, and continued inflows 
of worker remittances. Imports declined by 0.6% while export growth 
remained positive at 0.4%. A fall in external loan and nondebt financing, 
larger external debt repayment, and SBP interventions in the foreign 
exchange market to limit local currency depreciation drained foreign 
exchange reserves to a critically low $6.0 billion, enough to cover only 
1.3 months of imports of goods and services by the end of June 2013. The 
Pakistani rupee depreciated against the dollar to Rs98.5, a decline of 
4.5% over the year. 
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Economic prospects
GDP growth is projected at 3.4% for FY2014, marginally slower than in 
FY2013. Agriculture is expected to be weaker due to a drop in cotton 
output, which partly offset the improvement in sugarcane and rice 
crops. Ongoing rains, however, may benefit the upcoming wheat crop, 
despite a reduction in the sowing area this year.
Weak agriculture will be partly compensated by the pickup in 
large-scale manufacturing, which grew by 6.7% during the first 
6 months of FY2014, three times the rate during the same period a 
year earlier (Figure 3.20.6). Larger and more reliable power supply, 
partly reflecting better controls on unscheduled load shedding, as 
well as increasing use of alternative fuels is helping to revive the 
production of food, fertilizers, chemicals, electronics, and leather 
products, while petroleum refinery output continued its robust growth. 
Textiles are expected to recover from existing weak growth as they 
benefit from Generalized Scheme of Preferences Plus status granted 
by the European Union from January 2014. Improved manufacturing 
performance will spur retail and trade activity. Performance in 
transport and communication will, however, continue to be affected 
by financial losses incurred by Pakistan Railways and Pakistan 
International Airlines.
On the demand side, private consumption will remain the main 
driver of economic growth, supported by the sustained inflow of 
remittances, low real interest rates, and better credit availability at 
banks. Government spending will be contained by fiscal consolidation 
to bring down the budget deficit, but accelerated credit flows to the 
private sector during the first 7 months of FY2014 indicate an uptick in 
private investment. Net exports are expected to be modestly negative 
as import growth quickens to support improved capacity utilization in 
manufacturing. GDP growth is expected to be higher in FY2015, at 3.9%, 
as the impact of fiscal consolidation eases somewhat, energy supplies 
improve, and the global economy strengthens.
In the first 8 months of FY2014, inflation averaged 8.6%, reflecting 
the increase in the general sales tax rate by 1 percentage point to 17%, 
increases in power tariffs in August and October 2013 for commercial 
and bulk residential and industrial users, and significant currency 
depreciation against the major currencies. Reflecting short supply of 
perishable items and higher wheat prices, food inflation rose to 13.0% in 
November 2013 before receding to 7.2% in January 2014 for an average 
of 9.3% over the 8 months (Figure 3.20.7). Core inflation was relatively 
stable and averaged 8.4% during the period. Further adjustments to 
electric and gas tariffs, as well as a levy to support gas infrastructure 
development, are expected to keep inflation elevated over the forecast 
period. Average consumer price inflation is projected at 9.0% in FY2014 
and 9.2% in FY2015.
Monetary policy was tightened in response to a depreciating 
currency and rising inflation during the first half of the FY2014. The 
SBP raised the policy interest rate by 50 basis points in September 
2013 and again in November, bringing it up to 10% from 9% in FY2013 
(Figure 3.20.8). While inflation eased in January 2014, the SBP kept the 
policy rate unchanged in its monetary policy meeting that month. 
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Monetary management continues to be challenged by high 
government borrowing from the banking system in FY2014. As 
a result, the end-December International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
ceiling for government borrowing from SBP was breached. As foreign 
inflows remained negligible, and commercial banks lacked interest in 
government securities because short-term money market rates had 
risen more quickly than the policy rate, the burden of borrowing once 
again shifted from commercial banks to the SBP. During 1 July 2013 to 
21 February 2014, government borrowing from the SBP increased to 
PRs890 billion, against net retirement of PRs184 billion to commercial 
banks. Credit to the private sector picked up to PRs280 billion during this 
period from PRs107 billion a year earlier, largely reflecting credit to private 
businesses for fixed investment and working capital as business activity 
in textiles, power, and trade improved, as well as for consumer credit. 
Weighted average bank lending rates have been relatively stable at just over 
10%. Broad money growth slowed to 4.9% during this period from 7.5% in 
the previous year, as the marked contraction in the banking system’s net 
foreign assets reflected a deteriorating overall balance of payments. 
The fiscal framework under the 3-year extended fund facility agreed 
in September 2013 with the IMF focuses on strengthening the revenue 
base, limiting power subsidies, ending the drain on the budget from 
loss-making state-owned enterprises, and compressing non-salary 
expenditure. With the framework, the budget deficit is expected to be 
held to 5.8% of GDP (excluding grants) in FY2014, which is somewhat 
lower than the original budget target of 6.3% (Figure 3.20.9). The fiscal 
deficit was contained at 2.1% of GDP during the first half of the FY2014 
mainly by higher sales tax and nontax revenues from CSF receipts 
($322 million), as well as by containing expenditure. The increase in tax 
revenues partly reflects measures already taken under the federal budget 
for FY2014, including raising the general sales tax rate and eliminating 
some tax exemptions. Tax collection of PRs1.031 trillion during first 6 
months is broadly consistent with the fiscal framework target of PRs2.3 
trillion for FY2014.
Consolidated expenditure for the first half of FY2014 was contained 
partly by reduced interest payments following the earlier clearance of 
accumulated power sector arrears—the circular debt. Interest payments 
are likely to be high in second half of FY2014 as domestic borrowing 
finances the deficit. In addition, the risk of a rebuild of circular debt in 
FY2014 remains high. Public sector development spending was subdued 
(PRs243 billion) in the first 6 months of FY2014 and is likely to remain 
so to contain the budget deficit due to high current expenditures. This 
will have negative implications for long-term investment and growth.
While the government’s commitment to severely limit energy 
subsidies is underscored by various initial measures, such efforts need 
to be more comprehensive. Apart from further price adjustments, 
substantial governance reforms to reduce theft and losses in 
transmission and distribution are needed. Similarly, it will be necessary 
over the medium term to change the energy mix through very large 
investments in new generation capacity. While the energy sector 
measures will help contain the expenditure overruns, efforts on 
widening the revenue base need to be accelerated. 
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Fiscal devolution under the 18th constitutional amendment in 2011 
has made consolidated budget outcomes more dependent on provincial 
fiscal performance. Expenditure containment envisaged under the 
federal budget for FY2014 called for a combined provincial budgetary 
cash surplus of PRs23.1 billion. Provincial fiscal operations for the first 
half of FY2014 indicate a consolidated cash surplus for the period, 
which needs to be sustained during the second half in order to meet the 
overall fiscal deficit target for FY2014. A slower-than-expected progress 
towards the issuance of 3G spectrum licenses and issues around pending 
proceeds from telecom privatization, raise concerns over whether these 
receipts will be realized during FY2014. The delays in expected CSF 
receipts ($878 million) could also be a challenge for the fiscal target. 
To protect the poor from adverse effects of fiscal adjustments 
and other negative shocks, the federal government is providing cash 
transfers through the Benazir Income Support Program to families 
identified through a poverty scorecard system. The number of program 
beneficiaries increased to 4.8 million in FY2013 (Figure 3.20.10). 
The federal government budget for FY2014 plans to nearly double the 
allocation for the program to PRs75 billion. The program has started 
piloting a number of additional initiatives for beneficiaries, including 
health insurance, skills training, loans to develop small businesses, and 
primary education co-responsibility cash transfers for children.
Deficits in trade and services accounts worsened with revived 
imports and delays in CSF receipts, widening the current account 
deficit during the first 7 months of FY2014 to $2.1 billion (Figure 
3.20.11). Imports grew by 4.2%, compared with negligible growth in the 
corresponding period a year earlier, as the textile and power industries 
bought machinery. Export growth also picked up to 3.3% in the first 7 
months of the fiscal year, stimulated by 8% growth in textile exports, 
which offset the decline in exports of other manufactures and slow 
growth in food exports. Exports overall are expected to grow further 
in the remainder of the fiscal year, as benefits from the Generalized 
Scheme of Preferences Plus are realized. With worker remittances 
showing a 10.1% increase in the first 7 months of FY2014, the current 
account deficit is projected at 1.4% of GDP. The current account deficit 
for FY2015 is forecast to be marginally lower at 1.3% of GDP, as lower 
global commodity prices partly compensate for higher imports needed 
to support the modest pickup in GDP growth.
Key risks emanate from low official foreign exchange reserves 
as weak official inflows and high debt repayments outweighed IMF 
disbursement during the first half of FY2014. Net foreign direct 
investment inflows, at $523 million during first 7 months of FY2014, 
were essentially unchanged from a year earlier, and net financial 
account inflows totaled only $251 million, though improved from a 
slight deficit in the earlier period (Figure 3.20.12). Gross official reserves 
having plunged from $6.0 billion at the end of June 2013 to $3.1 billion 
in January 2014, equal to less than 1 month of imports, resurged to 
$3.9 billion at end February reflecting foreign inflows during this 
month (Figure 3.20.13). The Pakistani rupee, as a result appreciated to 
PRs100.3/$, following a 6.5% depreciation during the first 7 months of 
FY2014.
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Policy challenge—achieving fiscal sustainability
Achieving fiscal sustainability is a major recurring challenge for 
policy makers in Pakistan. Fiscal discipline has eroded in recent 
years with the persistent need to finance expanding energy sector 
subsidies, growing losses incurred by state-owned enterprises, and 
high expenditures for security. 
Pakistan’s (FBR collected) tax-to-GDP ratio stood at 8.5% in 
FY2013, which is one of the lowest in the region and reflects structural 
and administrative issues. As a result, spending for badly needed 
infrastructure has relied largely on foreign inflows. Additional spending 
requirements have emanated from consecutive natural disasters in 
the past few years, as well from the need to establish social safety 
nets. Higher fiscal deficits and very limited foreign inflows during 
the past 2 years have significantly increased short-term domestic 
borrowing, causing interest payments to balloon. Moreover, high 
government borrowing from commercial banks also contributes to low 
private sector credit. 
The domestic portion of public debt increased sharply for the second 
year in a row, from 38.0% of GDP at the end of FY2012 to 41.5% in 
FY2013, to finance high fiscal deficits (Figure 3.20.14). Foreign debt fell 
by 4.6% of GDP in FY2013, mainly as IMF debt was repaid. Total public 
debt (including external liabilities) at the end of FY2013 amounted to 
63.3% of GDP, exceeding the legal limit of 60% set under the Fiscal 
Responsibility Debt Limitation Act, 2005. Although a generally favorable 
negative differential between real interest rates and GDP growth has 
eroded the real value of government debt, growth in the primary deficit 
would endanger debt sustainability. 
The federal government is implementing its fiscal framework 
under the IMF’s 3-year program. Immediate measures affecting the 
federal budget for FY2014 pertain to raising the general sales tax rate 
and certain power tariffs to contain subsidies. Structural reforms 
to widen the revenue base are, however, critical for restoring fiscal 
sustainability. These include improving tax administration, eliminating 
exemptions to certain sectors, and bringing all sectors including 
agriculture under the tax net. Efforts would be required from federal 
and provincial governments alike, as some taxes (notably on agriculture) 
fall under provincial administration and reforms would help enhance 
their own revenues. Currently, over 90% of provincial revenues are 
transfers of federal shared taxes. As provinces have assumed a greater 
share of federal resources and spending responsibilities through 
devolution, their fiscal performance has become even more important 
in relation to the national fiscal outcomes. For instance, collecting sales 
tax on services is now a provincial government responsibility, and 
most social sector responsibilities have been transferred to provinces. 
Clearly, the allocation of 57.7% of the national shared tax base to 
provinces determined under the 2010 National Finance Commission 
award requires greater fiscal prudence and discipline on the part of the 
provinces. A mechanism to ensure provincial fiscal discipline is likely to 
be a crucial consideration in upcoming discussions for the 2015 award. 
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Sri Lanka
Growth rebounded last year from a slowdown in 2012, and the current account deficit narrowed 
substantially. As inflation eased, the central bank relaxed monetary policy. The outlook is for 
sustained rapid growth leveraging easy private access to credit and the government’s continued drive 
to expand infrastructure. An improving external environment will lift trade, but the current account 
deficit will expand on higher imports. Fiscal consolidation will focus on revenue enhancement.
Economic performance
GDP growth rebounded to 7.3% in 2013 (Figure 3.21.1). The recovery 
reflected domestic demand strengthening and a pickup in exports 
and tourism. Faster growth in wholesale and retail trade, hotels 
and restaurants, transport, banking, insurance and real estate lifted 
performance in the large service sector to 6.4% from 4.6% a year earlier, 
providing the impetus for the rebound. Industry grew by 9.9%, slightly 
less than a year earlier, as slower growth in mining and quarrying 
and in construction offset a pickup in manufacturing and utilities. 
Favorable weather helped maintain agriculture growth at a relatively 
favorable 4.7%.
Inflation trended downward in 2013, averaging 6.9% for the year. 
Food inflation was at about 12% during the first quarter, as drought 
late in 2012 had disrupted domestic food supplies, but then dropped 
markedly to 0.9% in February 2014 (Figure 3.21.2). Nonfood inflation 
also moved lower over the year but picked up to 7.1% in January 2014 on 
large increases in communications and transport prices that month. 
The 2013 fiscal deficit is estimated at 5.8% of GDP, in line with the 
target (Figure 3.21.3). The target was hit, despite unexpectedly weak 
revenues, by compressing current expenditure. Capital expenditure 
was largely maintained but was again slightly below the target of 6% 
of GDP. Revenue including grants is estimated at 13.8% of GDP, lower 
than both the budget and the 2012 performance. The shortfall in 
revenue partly reflected measures that curbed certain imports such as 
automobiles, which suppressed value-added tax (VAT) collections and 
import-related taxes.
The ratio of government debt to GDP fell to 78.4% in September 2013 
from 79.1% in 2012 (Figure 3.21.4). Debt composition is changing with 
the gradual move toward marketable and non-concessional instruments 
and foreign investment in government securities with the rise in income 
levels as a middle income country. 
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To address weak growth evident in 2012, the Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka relaxed its monetary stance for 2013, which was facilitated 
by a declining trend in inflation during the year. The bank began its 
relaxation in mid-December 2012 by cutting policy rates by 25 basis 
points and continued in May and October 2013 with rate reductions 
of 50 points in each adjustment (Figure 3.21.5). Commercial bank 
lending interest rates declined markedly during the year from 14.3% in 
January 2013 to 9.9% in December. However, credit to the private sector 
continued to decelerate with year-on-year growth slowing to 7.5% in 
December 2013 from 17.6% at the end of 2012. 
After the sharp depreciation of the Sri Lanka rupee in the early 
months of 2012, when the exchange rate was allowed to float, the 
currency has been broadly stable against the US dollar (Figure 3.21.6). 
Foreign investors’ exit from emerging markets in mid-2013 had only 
a modest and temporary effect on the exchange rate. The rupee 
depreciated against the dollar by only 1.9% over 2013. The real effective 
exchange rate has risen markedly since April 2012, essentially moving 
back to the rate prevailing prior to the decision to let the currency float. 
Exports and imports both posted positive growth only in the 
second half of 2013, following weakness a year earlier. Export earnings 
increased by 6.3% for the year to $10.4 billion, reflecting gradual 
recovery of demand in partner countries, with garment exports 
increasing by 13.0% and agricultural exports, mostly tea, advancing 
by 10.7%. Imports, on the other hand, declined by 6.2% during 2013 
to $18.0 billion, as a result of less demand for oil, policy measures 
adopted in 2012 to rationalize imports, and subdued commodity prices 
in international markets. Most of the fall was due to reduced imports of 
transport equipment by 32.7% and fuel by 14.7%. The trade deficit fell to 
11.4% of GDP, a marked decline of 4.4 percentage points from 2012.
The tourism boom continued in 2013 with the number of visitors 
growing by 27% to reach 1.2 million and earnings expanding by 
35% to $1.4 billion. Tourist arrivals from the People’s Republic 
of China and the Russian Federation increased significantly, but 
Western Europe continued to be a large source of visitors. Workers’ 
remittances expanded by 13% to $6.8 billion in 2013. The main factors 
boosting remittance inflows were increased labor migration under the 
professional and skilled category, the expansion of formal channels for 
remitting money, and the introduction of a swift web-based money-
transfer system. These earnings held the current account deficit to an 
estimated $1.4 billion, which is an estimated 2.0% of GDP and a marked 
improvement on the 6.6% deficit seen a year earlier (Figure 3.21.7). 
Portfolio investments recorded a net inflow of $269.9 million for 
the year, of which about half went into the Colombo Stock Exchange 
in the form of secondary market transactions. Foreigners’ monthly net 
purchases on the exchange were broadly stable throughout the year. 
Foreign direct investment increased by 42% to $870.1 million in the 
first 9 months of 2013 from the corresponding period in 2012. Financial 
account net inflows brought the balance of payments surplus to an 
estimated $700 million. Consequently, Sri Lanka’s gross official reserves 
increased to $7.2 billion in December 2013, equal to 4.5 months of 
imports (Figure 3.21.8).
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Economic prospects
An improving external environment, higher investments, and a recovery 
in domestic consumption will sustain a rapid pace of GDP growth in the 
next 2 years. The recent relaxation in monetary policy will allow more 
lending to the private sector and provide an impetus for expansion. 
Sri Lanka’s post-conflict growth has been buoyed by construction, which 
has increased its share of GDP from 6.6% in 2009 to 8.1% in 2012, and 
by transport and telecommunications, its share up from 12.8% to 14.3% 
in the same period. The government’s focus on infrastructure and post-
conflict reconstruction and development has supported this expansion 
and will continue to drive growth in the medium term. The expansion 
in tourism and related construction has been noteworthy and is 
reflected in hotel and restaurant expansion, though modest scale limits 
the contribution to growth. As tourist numbers continue to rise rapidly 
and large hotel projects in the pipeline open their doors, economic 
growth and foreign exchange earnings from tourism will continue to be 
buoyant over the next several years. 
On the demand side, the investment ratio improved from 28% 
in 2010 to 31% in 2013. This gradual gain reflects the government’s 
infrastructure drive and the expansion in construction. Monetary 
policy relaxation will start to take effect on private sector credit 
around mid-2014 and continue in 2015, facilitating private investment. 
Moreover, foreign direct investment is expected to continue to expand 
as the economy strengthens and the investment climate improves. 
Exports, having recovered since mid-2013, will continue to expand. 
With these factors pushing up income, private consumption will pick 
up after slowing in 2013 and contribute significantly to higher growth. 
Growth is thus expected to accelerate to 7.5% in 2014 and maintain that 
rate in 2015.
While high inflation has been a problem in the past, it has been 
contained below 10% since 2009. Inflation is expected to remain in the 
middle single digits in 2014 and 2015. Broadly stable international fuel 
and food prices will help to keep inflation in check over the next 2 years, 
assuming normal weather. While high inflation in the past has been 
attributed to government’s borrowing from banks, among other things, 
improved fiscal discipline and a falling fiscal deficit have eased such 
inflationary pressures in recent years. 
As the pace of economic growth picks up, the central bank will use 
monetary policy to keep inflation acceptable. In January 2014 the bank 
compressed the policy rate corridor, now renamed the standing rate 
corridor, to reduce variability in the transmission of its policy intentions, 
and then continued with monetary easing. The standing lending facility 
rate (the upper band) was cut by 50 basis points to 8.0%, narrowing the 
corridor to 150 basis points from 200. Credit to the private sector, which 
decelerated throughout 2013, will expand in 2014 by 16%, according to 
central bank projections. However, broad money is expected to grow 
at a slower pace as credit demand from the public sector will decline. 
Average inflation in 2014 is expected to fall to 5.0% from 6.9% in 2013, 
then accelerates slightly to 6.0% in 2015. 
The fiscal deficit steadily shrank to 5.8% of GDP in 2013 from a peak 
of 9.9% in 2009. The government has deployed both revenue measures 
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and expenditure reduction to narrow the deficit. However, the revenue 
ratio—tax collections as a percentage of GDP—has not picked up as 
expected, so deficit reduction has been achieved mainly by rationalizing 
expenditure. The government expects the deficit to narrow further 
over the medium term. The 2014 budget estimates the deficit at 5.2%, 
with a higher revenue ratio and expansive 16% growth in expenditure. 
Better economic performance and more imports will catalyze higher 
revenue collection in 2014 and 2015, but continued policy action is also 
needed, together with improved revenue administration, to achieve 
a higher revenue ratio. Some measures are being introduced through 
the 2014 budget to broaden the revenue base, such as expanding the 
nation building tax (NBT) to the financial sector and lowering the VAT 
threshold for retail and wholesale trade. The NBT is an indirect tax 
that has been levied since 2009 to help finance rehabilitation of conflict 
damage; it is passed on in the sales price of goods or services sold. 
One risk to achieving the targeted revenue ratio is that the 
measures to expand the revenue base may take effect more slowly than 
anticipated. If revenue collection is lower than anticipated, the capital 
budget will be hard pressed to meet its target of 6%–7% of GDP, as 
expenditure rationalization is already substantial in the 2014 budget and 
2015 projections. 
Exports are expected to strengthen with better economic 
performance in the EU and the US, Sri Lanka’s main export 
destinations. After declining in 2013, imports will pick up in 2014 as 
domestic demand normalizes. However, policy measures taken to limit 
food imports to support local production will affect imports in the 
medium term. Measures that helped improve remittances will continue 
to bolster such inflows in 2014 and 2015. The current account deficit is 
projected to widen from an estimated 2.0% in 2013 to 2.6% in 2014 and 
3.5% in the following year (Figure 3.21.9).
Policy challenge—boosting fiscal revenues
Sri Lanka has been focusing on fiscal consolidation and taking many steps 
in recent years to improve revenue collection. However, the revenue ratio 
(excluding grants) remains low, at 13.6% of GDP in 2013 (Figure 3.21.10). 
In fact, it has fallen over the past few years, underperforming its target 
each year. As the government continues its fiscal consolidation, reversing 
the revenue ratio’s declining trend is critical.
The main cause for the erosion of the revenue ratio has been the 
VAT, which accounts for 25% of tax revenue. VAT revenue has declined 
from 5.8% of GDP in 2004 to 2.7% of GDP in 2012 (Figure 3.21.11).
The VAT was introduced in 2002, replacing the goods and services 
tax with rates of 0%, 10%, and 20%. There are many exemptions: food 
such as rice, wheat, tea, and domestically produced sugar; machinery, 
including that for agriculture and construction; and other items such 
as crude oil, diesel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, electricity, and 
public transportation. Many amendments to the VAT Act have taken 
place since 2002, mainly to improve collection. However, VAT collection 
has relentlessly declined, affected by exemptions, the unification of the 
rate at 12% in 2011, and the poor performance of imports since 2009. 
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In the context of faster growth reached in the post-conflict 
years and increased income per capita, the low revenue ratio implies 
that revenue generation has not kept pace with the rising capacity 
of the population to pay. Average tax buoyancy—how well revenue 
mobilization tracks GDP growth—has hovered for the past 5 years 
at 0.78, which is significantly below unity. This indicates that tax 
collection has been unresponsive to the pace of economic expansion. 
A study released in 2013 by the International Monetary Fund 
entitled Understanding Countries’ Tax Effort estimates Sri Lanka’s tax 
capacity at 21.9% of GDP, one of the lowest in South Asia. This suggests 
that strengthening institutions and improving administration can 
increase tax capacity. With regard to efforts at fiscal consolidation, so 
far the reduction in the deficit has come about mainly by rationalizing 
expenditure. However, improving the revenue ratio is key to reining 
in the fiscal deficit to a sustainable level and ensuring that public 
investment is not curtailed. As interest payments are a large drain 
on Sri Lanka’s budget, higher revenue collection will contribute to 
lowering the borrowing requirement and future borrowing costs to the 
government. 
The government recognizes the importance of improving the 
revenue ratio and has set up a tax reform committee. The committee 
submitted reform recommendations in 2009 that began to be 
introduced through the 2010 budget. The major tax reform in 2011 
reduced rates as it sought to broaden the tax base. Many rationalization 
measures were introduced, including simplifying the economic service 
charge (a tax withholding system) and lowering the tax slabs of the 
personal income tax. In 2013, the government expanded the VAT base 
by bringing in the retail trade, which had been exempt. The 2014 
budget introduced further measures to expand coverage and lower the 
threshold for certain taxes, such as expanding the nation building tax 
to the financial sector and lowering the VAT threshold for the retail 
and wholesale trades. 
The government has brought the Board of Investment under the 
Inland Revenue Act in an effort to limit exemptions and tax holidays 
provided to new companies that apply for incentives. Many existing 
concessions are ending in the near future, which will broaden the tax 
base. The government expects the reforms introduced in recent years to 
contribute to a higher revenue ratio in 2014. It is currently implementing 
in the Inland Revenue Department the new Revenue Administration 
Information System to make revenue collection more efficient.
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Brunei Darussalam
Weakness in the oil and gas sector continued to weigh on economic growth in 2013. Services, 
construction, and manufacturing expanded, helping to broaden the base of this hydrocarbon-
dependent economy. Inflation remained low, and the current account surplus high. Modest 
economic growth and low inflation are forecast for this year and next. 
Economic performance
The latest official data, covering January–September 2013, show GDP 
declining by 0.4% from the same period in 2012. GDP for the full year 
declined by an estimated 1.4% due to contraction in the oil and gas 
sector (Figure 3.22.1). 
The oil and gas sector contracted by 3.7% in January–September 
from the year-earlier period (Figure 3.22.2). The production of crude oil 
and condensate fell to 134,460 barrels a day in the second quarter from 
154,240 in 2012. Since 2006, daily oil output has declined by nearly 40% 
due to managed production, maintenance of production facilities, and 
depletion of oil fields (Figure 3.22.3). The production of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) fell to 992 billion British thermal units a day in the second 
quarter from 1,254 billion in 2012.
The rest of the economy, comprising mainly services, construction, 
and manufacturing, expanded by 2.5% in January–September and by an 
estimated 3.6% for the year. Services drove most of this growth last year, 
with construction and manufacturing also contributing. Output from the 
small agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sector declined. 
In a positive sign for private sector development, the privately owned 
part of the economy outside the oil and gas sector expanded by slightly 
over 3% in January–September, compared with growth of less than 1% 
for the public sector.
From the demand side, private consumption grew in January–
September last year, but at a slower pace than a year earlier. Government 
consumption spending was flat, and the weakness in oil and gas 
production eroded net exports. However, growth in fixed investment 
accelerated from 2012. 
Merchandise exports, mainly crude oil, LNG, and methanol, fell by 
11.9% to $11.4 billion in 2013 (Figure 3.22.4). Imports, which provide most 
of the country’s food, consumer goods, and capital goods, rose by 1.2% 
to $3.6 billion. A still-substantial trade surplus of $7.8 billion generated a 
current account surplus estimated at 43% of GDP. International reserves 
rose to $3.4 billion, cover for 9.9 months of imports of goods. 
A reweighting of the consumer price index last year to take into 
account changes in spending patterns, based on a household expenditure 
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survey in 2010–2011, put average inflation at 0.4% in 2013, compared 
with revised inflation of 0.1% in the 2 previous years. Higher costs 
for automobiles and their maintenance largely accounted the increase 
last year. Price controls and government subsidies on many goods and 
services keep inflation low. 
Income from hydrocarbons through taxes, dividends, and royalties 
provides the government with revenue to fund a relatively large public 
sector and to invest in infrastructure and subsidize consumer goods 
and services. In FY2012 (ended 31 March 2013 and applicable only to 
government finances), revenue fell by 9.0%. Government spending rose 
by 4.2%, which still left a large fiscal surplus equal to 20.2% of GDP. 
Reflecting the weakness in oil production, revenue fell a further 10.4% in 
the first half of FY2013 and the fiscal surplus for that period fell by 43.4%. 
The Brunei dollar, which is pegged at par to the Singapore dollar 
through a currency board arrangement, depreciated by 3.6% against 
the US dollar during 2013. In March 2013, the monetary authority 
introduced interest rate controls on lending and Brunei dollar deposits, 
which may hamper financial intermediation.
Economic prospects
Modest GDP growth at 1.1%–1.2% is forecast for this year and next, based 
on gradual expansion in sectors outside of oil and gas and assuming 
some recovery in hydrocarbon production. Forecasting is hampered by 
uncertainty over the timing of oil and gas production from new fields and 
of stoppages for maintenance of wells and pipelines. The limitations of 
economic data and delays in their release are further constraints.
The pace of growth depends in part on the expeditious 
implementation of public projects under the national development plan 
for 2012–2017. The implementation of public projects in the past has 
sometimes lagged behind schedule, but additional efforts to expedite 
projects under the plan in the fiscal year ended 31 March 2013 meant 
that 96.3% of the B$1.55 billion allocated for that period was spent. 
Economic growth this year and next will be supported by 
infrastructure construction. Projects under way or planned to start in 
the forecast period include the construction of a port and industrial 
zone at Pulau Muara Besar, development of a technology park and high-
speed broadband network, construction of three major bridges, and 
expansion of the international airport to double its handling capacity by 
the end of 2014. 
Site preparations are scheduled for the first phase of an oil refinery 
and aromatics cracker planned for Pulau Muara Besar, which is 
expected to involve the investment of $2.5 billion over several years 
from a company in the People’s Republic of China. Brunei Darussalam’s 
first petrochemical project, a $450 million methanol plant at Sungai 
Liang Industrial Park, has been operating since 2010. A third 
petrochemical project has been proposed by a Japanese company, but its 
timing is unclear. 
In addition to petrochemicals, the government is encouraging 
the development of halal products, including food, cosmetics, and 
pharmaceuticals for export. A halal-certified pharmaceuticals 
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manufacturing plant—a joint venture with a Canadian company—plans 
to increase production. The Halal Science Center for food analysis is 
scheduled to open this year. 
To improve financial services, the monetary authority is developing 
a national payment and settlement system, a credit bureau to improve 
lenders’ asset quality, and a strategy to expand the Islamic insurance 
industry. The government approved last year an upgraded securities 
market law to support the development of capital markets.
Inflation is expected to stay below 1% through the forecast period, 
owing to subdued global food and fuel prices and domestic price 
controls and subsidies. In February 2014, the consumer price index rose 
by just 0.05% year on year. 
Soft global oil prices will dampen merchandise exports, while 
construction projects will put upward pressure on imports. Still, exports 
of oil, LNG, and methanol will, together with income from the country’s 
overseas investments, sustain substantial current account surpluses 
forecast at 44%–46% of GDP. External and fiscal surpluses provide 
significant buffers for the economy. 
Policy challenge—diversifying the economy
Brunei Darussalam benefits from substantial reserves of oil and natural 
gas that generate one of the highest GDPs per capita in developing Asia, 
at $41,127 in 2012 for a population of 412,000. However, heavy reliance 
on this sector makes the economy vulnerable to swings in global energy 
demand and to the gradual depletion of hydrocarbon reserves.
Aiming to diversify the economy, the government has identified 
certain industries and provides incentives to attract foreign investment 
to develop export-oriented businesses. The industries include 
petrochemicals, halal products, information and communications, 
Islamic financial services, and aviation and oilfield support services. 
Incentives include the public provision of infrastructure, liberal trade 
and labor policies, competitively priced utilities, and tax breaks. 
In this regard, the investments made and planned by foreign 
companies, plus gradual expansion of the domestic private sector, 
indicate that the strategy is enjoying some success. 
Steps are being taken to redress some of the weaknesses in the 
investment environment. The government strengthened its patent 
system and stepped up efforts to enforce intellectual property rights. 
As a result, the US trade representative last year removed Brunei 
Darussalam from the US watch list of countries with inadequate 
protection for intellectual property rights. 
Brunei Darussalam jumped 20 places to 59th of 189 economies in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 2014 ranking, owing mainly to improved 
access to credit. However, the country’s rankings in the categories of 
starting a business, registering property, and trading across borders fell 
slightly from 2013. 
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Cambodia 
Agriculture slowed but industry and services expanded in 2013, maintaining economic growth 
at just above 7% for the third consecutive year. Political tensions and labor unrest suggest 
growth will ease in 2014 before picking up next year. Inflation, at modest rates last year, is seen 
edging higher in 2014. Spurring the development of small and medium-sized firms would help 
to sustain and diversify economic growth. 
Economic performance
Robust growth in services and expanding export industries drove 
economic growth of 7.2% in 2013 (Figure 3.23.1).
Services remained the largest source of growth from the supply side, 
expanding by an estimated 8.4% in 2013. This stemmed largely from 
growth in wholesale and retail trading, real estate services, and tourism-
related services. Bank credit to wholesale and retail trading increased 
by 24.5% to $2.5 billion and to real estate by 36.5% to $250.5 million. 
Tourist arrivals rose by 17.5% to 4.2 million (Figure 3.23.2).
Industry grew by an estimated 10.5% on strong demand for Cambodian 
garments and footwear in the European Union. Exports of garments and 
footwear to that market surged by 26% to $2.0 billion in 2013 and those to 
the US rose by 6.0% to $2.1 billion, according to customs data. 
Construction and rice milling also contributed to industry growth. 
Bank credit to construction rose by 29% to $577 million, and exports of 
milled rice almost doubled to 366,000 tons, valued at $262 million. 
Floods in September and October 2013 damaged crops and reduced 
growth in agriculture to 1.8% last year. 
Increased private consumption, fueled by higher household incomes, 
contributed much of the GDP growth from the demand side. Investment 
also made a substantial contribution. Domestic investment remained 
solid, especially in small and medium-sized businesses. Inflows of net 
foreign direct investment (FDI) were buoyant at $1.3 billion, though that 
figure represented a decline from the previous year, partly a result of 
political tensions after Cambodia’s national elections in July 2013. 
Inflation picked up to 4.7% at the end of 2013, mainly because 
customs duty collection was tightened, which raised some import prices 
(Figure 3.23.3). The floods had only a modest impact on food prices. For 
the year, inflation averaged 2.9%, the same as 2012. 
The government continued to rein in the fiscal deficit last year, to an 
estimated 5.0% of GDP, excluding grants. Solid domestic demand and 
the stronger tax collection efforts raised revenue to an estimated 14.9% 
of GDP, while expenditure was an estimated 19.9% of GDP. Foreign loans 
and grants funded the fiscal deficit. 
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Credit to the private sector expanded by a rapid 26.7% 
(Figure 3.23.4). Total liquidity (M2), excluding foreign currency outside 
the banking system, rose by 14.6%. Dollarization remained high, 
with foreign currency deposits accounting for 82% of total liquidity. 
The Khmer riel was stable against the US dollar.
Buoyant demand for Cambodia’s garments, footwear, and milled rice 
pushed up merchandise exports by an estimated 15.9% to $6.5 billion in 
2013. Merchandise imports rose by an estimated 13.8% to $8.9 billion, 
largely imports of fabrics for the garment export industry, and imports 
of petroleum products. A trade deficit of $2.4 billion contributed to 
widening the current account deficit, excluding official transfers, to an 
estimated 10.8% of GDP. Some official data on past years’ trade, FDI, and 
the current account were revised in 2013. 
The current account gap was fully financed by FDI and official loans 
and grants. Gross official reserves edged up to $3.6 billion, covering 
4.1 months of imports of goods and services. 
Economic prospects
Political tensions since national elections last July, together with strikes 
for higher wages by garment workers, dented investor confidence and 
disrupted some production of garments and footwear in late 2013 and 
early 2014. Political uncertainty and the risk of further labor unrest 
suggest some dampening of investment this year. The uncertainties 
could weigh as well on tourism and real estate activity. Consequently, 
economic growth is forecast to ease to 7.0% this year before picking up 
to 7.3% in 2015 (Figure 3.23.5). 
Garments and footwear will benefit during the next 2 years from 
economic recovery projected for the European Union, which grants 
Cambodia’s exports duty-free access, and the US. These markets 
together buy 76% of the country’s exports of garments and footwear. 
Industry as a whole is forecast to grow this year by 8.7% and services by 
7.1%, both decelerating from 2013.
Agriculture is seen recovering from last year’s floods to grow by 4.7% 
in 2014, assuming better weather. Crops and livestock are benefiting from 
an increase in the area under cultivation and by investment in irrigation. 
Fiscal consolidation efforts should narrow the fiscal deficit further in 
2014. Government revenue is budgeted at 15.0% of GDP, helped by measures 
taken to improve the efficiency of customs and tax collection. Spending is 
budgeted at 19.8% of GDP. The effective implementation of the revenue-
raising efforts is critical to rebuild fiscal space and close monitoring of 
contingent liabilities will be important to safeguard fiscal space. 
The tightening of customs duty collection will maintain some 
upward pressure on import prices into 2014. Inflation was 4.6% year 
on year in January 2014 but is expected to average 3.5% for the year 
as a whole, up from 2013. It will likely remain around 3.5% in 2015 
(Figure 3.23.6).
Growth in merchandise exports could be dampened by the 
disruptions to garment and footwear production and by downward 
pressure on global rice prices. Robust domestic demand will sustain 
growth in imports, so that the current account deficit, excluding official 
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transfers, is forecast to widen to 11.3% of GDP in 2014 before narrowing 
to 10.9% next year (Figure 3.23.7). 
The government’s development policy for 2013–2018 targets average 
annual economic growth at 7% and a reduction in the poverty rate 
by at least 1 percentage point a year. This latest policy framework 
heightens the emphasis on commercializing agriculture, building 
urban infrastructure, supporting the development of the private sector, 
expanding vocational training, and strengthening social protection 
including health and nutrition. Importantly, the government’s 
commitment to economic reform appears to have intensified.
Policy challenge—strengthening the private sector
Cambodia’s private sector has a few large, modern businesses but is 
dominated by informal and very small enterprises and farms. Micro 
enterprises, mostly wholesale and retail trading and vehicle-repair 
services, accounted for 97.7% of the roughly 500,000 enterprises covered 
by a recent economic census. Large enterprises—primarily in garments, 
light manufacturing, construction, tourism, and agribusiness—
represented a fraction of a percent. 
A weakness in the structure of the private sector is the “missing 
middle,” as only 2.1% of enterprises fall into the category of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. The absence of this segment hinders 
development and diversification in the economy. 
The Investment Climate Survey conducted in 2012 by international 
development banks showed that Cambodian enterprises ranked 
electricity supply as the major constraint on their growth, citing 
insufficient access and high price. Since then, new hydropower plants 
have come on line, and more will join the grid in the next few years, 
helping to address the shortage of power. 
Other constraints, ranked in the order respondents cited them 
in the survey, were macroeconomic uncertainty, corruption, difficult 
transportation, anticompetitive practices, the high cost of finance, and 
deficient skills and education.
The government is addressing some of these issues, including 
through reforms unveiled in March 2014 to facilitate domestic and 
international trade and to simplify business registration procedures. 
More broadly, the government’s development policy identifies private 
sector development as a core objective. It is pressing ahead with a 
program to support public–private partnership that will encourages 
the private sector to invest in infrastructure.
Other steps that would strengthen the private sector include 
developing sustainable business associations, promoting inclusive 
businesses and social enterprises to serve the interests of farmers and 
small enterprises, and supporting the incubation of new businesses. 
It would be helpful for the government and private sector to work 
together to improve competitiveness and assist integration into regional 
supply chains in preparation for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations Economic Community in 2015. 
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Indonesia
Moderating investment and sluggish external demand curtailed growth in Southeast Asia’s 
biggest economy in 2013. The authorities took steps to dampen domestic demand after inflation 
spiked, the rupiah weakened, and the current account deficit widened. Growth is forecast to dip 
slightly in 2014 before recovering next year. Inflation is seen easing and the external position 
improving through the forecast period. 
Economic performance
GDP growth moderated to 5.8% in 2013 from an average of 6.3% over 
the previous 3 years, as investment decelerated sharply (Figure 3.24.1). 
Bank Indonesia, the central bank, raised interest rates to restrain 
domestic demand at a time of rising inflation and a widening current 
account deficit.
Growth in fixed investment slowed to 4.7% in 2013 after strong 
increases of about 9% annually in 2010–2012. This largely reflected the 
impact higher interest rates and rupiah depreciation had on investment 
in machinery and equipment. Investment in buildings held up relatively 
well. The central government’s capital spending moderated, though it 
still expanded by 18.4%. Gross fixed investment as a share of GDP edged 
down to 31.7% (Figure 3.24.2).
Private consumption remained robust in 2013, expanding by 5.3% 
and contributing half of the growth in GDP on the expenditure side. 
Consumption spending was supported by tax reductions for lower-
income earners and government cash transfers to poor households in 
the second half of the year, which helped to counter the impact of rising 
inflation and tighter consumer credit. 
Government consumption grew by 4.9%, which signaled some 
improvement in budget execution. Higher net exports of goods and 
services made a significant contribution to GDP growth last year, 
despite weakness in major export markets. This improvement resulted 
from import restraint caused by the rupiah depreciation and slower 
investment, together with modest growth in export volumes. 
From the production side, growth in services ebbed to 7.1%, but this 
sector still contributed 3.3 percentage points of total growth. Robust 
growth of at least 7.0% was recorded in transport, communications, 
finance, and hotels. Manufacturing expanded by 5.6%, little changed from 
the previous year, and it added 1.4 percentage points to GDP growth. 
Bad weather and sagging global prices for palm oil and rubber 
slowed growth in agriculture to 3.5%. Mining output grew by just 1.3%, 
reflecting growth in coal and metals but contraction in oil and 
natural gas. Crude oil production fell to 826,000 barrels a day last year, 
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about half the amount produced in 1995 because oilfields had aged and 
received little investment. 
Inflation accelerated sharply from 3.8% at the start of 2013 to a peak 
of 8.2% in August, propelled by increases of 44% in the price of gasoline 
and 22% for diesel in June when the government cut fuel subsidies 
(Figure 3.24.3). Inflation was also spurred by disruptions to supplies 
of some foodstuffs because of bad weather and import restrictions. 
For the year, inflation averaged 6.4%. The statistics office rebased the 
consumer price index and changed the regional weightings in 2014, 
which lowered historical inflation. The government made cash transfers 
to the poor for 4 months to compensate for the rise in fuel prices.  
Higher inflation and a weakening rupiah prompted the central bank 
to raise its policy interest rate by 175 basis points to 7.5% between June 
and November. The monetary authorities lifted the overnight deposit 
rate, also called the Fasbi rate, by 175 basis points to 5.75%. 
Bank Indonesia also introduced macroprudential measures to curb 
credit growth, including more stringent loan-to-valuation ratios for 
certain mortgages and a reduction in the upper band of the loan-to-
deposit ratio for banks. By December 2013, growth in credit eased to a 
still-robust 21.6%. Commercial banks raised lending interest rates but by 
much less than the policy rate hike.
Fiscal policy provided some support as the economy slowed. 
The fiscal deficit widened to equal 2.3% of GDP from 1.9% in 2012 
(Figure 3.24.4). Government spending on social policies rose while tax 
revenue was eroded by declines in prices for export commodities and 
weaker imports. 
The government secured all its funding of $27.2 billion for the 
budget, though it needed to raise yields on government debt and 
increase its issuance of securities with maturities of 1 year or less. 
Rupiah depreciation contributed to an increase in the ratio of national 
government debt to GDP to an estimated 26.1% in 2013. The average 
time to maturity for government debt shortened only marginally to 
9.6 years from 9.7 years. However, a high 44.6% of government debt is in 
foreign currency.
Slower economic growth weakened the labor market. 
The unemployment rate rose to 6.3% in August 2013, the first such 
increase since 2005 (Figure 3.24.5). The economy lost 10,000 jobs in the 
12 months through August, compared with employment generation of 
1.2 million in the year-earlier period. 
A weaker labor market and higher inflation nudged up the poverty 
rate to 11.5% in September 2013 from 11.4% in March 2013, an increase 
of 480,000 people. 
External accounts deteriorated sharply last year. Lower global prices 
for export commodities such as coal, copper, and palm oil reduced 
the value of merchandise exports by 2.6% from 2012, to $183 billion. 
Merchandise imports fell by 1.4% to $177.4 billion, reflecting the 
softening in machinery and equipment imports and the rupiah’s 
depreciation. 
Consequently, the trade surplus fell to $6.1 billion, the smallest in a 
decade. The smaller trade surplus, coupled with deficits in income and 
services, widened the current account deficit to 3.3% of GDP.
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Inflows of foreign direct investment in the balance of payments fell 
slightly, but at $18.4 billion they remained substantial. Despite financial 
market turbulence in the second half of 2013, portfolio investment 
recorded a net inflow of $9.8 billion for the year. A surplus in the capital 
and financial account was more than offset by the current account 
deficit, pushing the balance of payments into a deficit of $7.3 billion, the 
first such deficit since 2008 (Figure 3.24.6). 
Gross international reserves declined by $13.4 billion to $99.4 billion 
over 2013, a result of the widening current account deficit and central 
bank actions to support the rupiah in May and June (Figure 3.24.7). 
Reserves at year-end represented 5.4 months of imports and government 
debt payments. Since late July 2013, Bank Indonesia has allowed greater 
flexibility in the rupiah’s exchange rate to help correct the external 
imbalance. 
High inflation, a widening current account deficit, and declining 
foreign reserves shook financial markets. The Jakarta Stock Exchange 
index of share prices dropped by 15.5% from May to December, though 
the index closed for the year with a loss of only 1%. Yields on 5-year 
government bonds rose by 327 basis points, and the rupiah depreciated 
by 20.7% against the US dollar in 2013.
In addition to the steps to stabilize the economy, the authorities 
introduced a package to strengthen the supply side. To support exports, 
the government provided tax breaks to labor-intensive industries that 
export at least 30% of their production, relaxed quotas on mineral 
exports, and removed value-added and other taxes on imports of raw 
materials used in exporting industries. To reduce fuel imports, the 
government increased the mandatory minimum percentage of diesel 
that must be derived from biofuel made using domestic palm oil. To rein 
in other imports, it raised taxes on luxury goods from overseas. 
Recognizing the need to attract investment to finance the current 
account deficit and support economic growth, the authorities provided 
tax holidays and tax allowances to investors in selected industries and 
simplified the application process for investment permits. 
Quotas on some food imports were eliminated to ease upward 
pressure on food prices. To support the stock market, the Financial 
Sector Supervisory Authority made a temporary change that allowed 
companies to buy back shares without having to hold a stockholders 
meeting. 
Economic prospects
Forecasts assume that the government follows through with the 
stabilization policies rolled out in the second half of 2013 and that 
parliamentary elections in April and presidential elections in July go 
smoothly. Projections also assume that steps are taken to improve the 
investment environment. 
On this basis, GDP growth is forecast at 5.7% in 2014 picking up to 
6.0% in 2015 (Figure 3.24.8).
The fiscal stance is expected to be similar to the one taken last year. 
The 2014 budget targets a fiscal deficit of 1.7% of GDP, but a revised 
budget is expected in May that could widen the deficit to 2.5% in view of 
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unexpectedly weak tax revenue and declining oil production. Reductions 
in electricity subsidies are scheduled to come into effect in May. 
As for monetary policy, further increases in interest rates are 
possible in 2014, if financial market sentiment weakens or the external 
position does not improve as anticipated. As the year progresses, though, 
a projected deceleration in inflation should stem pressure to raise 
interest rates. 
Private consumption is expected to remain reasonably robust, 
assisted by election-related spending in the first half of 2014 and by 
easing inflation over the forecast period. While global commodity 
prices are anticipated to remain soft, the depreciation of the rupiah 
will support the incomes of commodity exporters. The cash transfers 
to cushion the impact of the fuel price increase in 2013 expired in 
December. Nevertheless, a Bank Indonesia consumer survey in January 
showed consumer confidence improving (Figure 3.24.9). 
Growth in fixed investment in 2014 is projected to be similar to 
last year’s pace. Uncertainties over domestic election outcomes and 
over the impact of the US tapering its monetary stimulus will dampen 
investment in the first half. Against this, continued solid growth in 
lending and improved international investment rankings support 
the outlook. Indonesia’s ranking in the World Economic Forum’s 
2013 Global Competitiveness Index rose by 12 places to 38th out of 
148 economies, reflecting in part improvements in infrastructure 
over recent years. In a survey of Japanese manufacturing companies 
conducted in 2013, Indonesia was ranked the favored investment 
destination. 
Investment is forecast to pick up in 2015 as the newly elected 
government clarifies its policies and likely accelerates investment in 
infrastructure. Investment prospects will improve on considerably lower 
inflation and current account deficits projected for 2015, as well as on 
strengthening world trade. 
Net foreign trade is expected to contribute to GDP growth this year 
and next, though not as strongly as in 2013. 
As a sign of how the year started for industry, the Manufacturing 
Purchasing Managers’ Index for February 2014 indicated that conditions 
had improved for a sixth consecutive month but that the pace of 
improvement had slowed (Figure 3.24.10). 
 In external accounts, the stabilization policies in the second half of 
2013 helped to rein in the current account deficit to 2.0% of GDP in the 
fourth quarter from 4.4% in the second quarter. In part this reflected 
the bringing forward of exports of unprocessed ores such as copper and 
nickel in anticipation of a scheduled ban on their export that came into 
effect in January 2014. This ban, aimed at impelling mining companies to 
add value to mineral exports, cut exports of unprocessed ores early this 
year. Exports of mineral ores usually account for 3.5% of total exports. 
Manufactured exports improved in the fourth quarter of 2013 and 
are expected to benefit during 2014 from the rupiah depreciation. Total 
exports are forecast to rise by 4.5% in US dollar terms this year and by 
6.0% in 2015, underpinned by gradual economic recovery in the US, euro 
area, and India. The rupiah’s depreciation will restrain imports, but they 
are nevertheless projected to rise by 3.4% this year and 4.2% in 2015.
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The impact of these factors, and of the other measures taken since 
last year to dampen imports and support exports, are expected to 
narrow the current account deficit to 2.9% of GDP in 2014 and 2.0% in 
2015 (Figure 3.24.11). Portfolio investment inflows, which bounced back 
since the fourth quarter of 2013, and inward foreign direct investment 
also will contribute to strengthening the balance of payments. 
Inflation has eased since August 2013 and is expected to moderate 
further as the effect of the fuel price hike subsides. In February 2014, 
month-on-month inflation was down to 0.3%, though the year-on-year 
rate was still elevated at 7.7%. The base effect of the June 2013 fuel price 
increase is projected to drive inflation down to average 4.2% in the 
second half of 2014. 
The pass-through to consumer prices of last year’s rupiah 
depreciation is expected to have a modest impact on the consumer price 
index. Moreover, the rupiah appreciated by 6.9% against the US dollar 
from the end of 2013 to mid-March 2014. Inflation this year is expected 
to average 5.7%. Next year, inflation is seen decelerating to an average of 
4.8%, near the top of Bank Indonesia’s 3.0%–5.0% target range for 2015. 
However, inflation would be higher if fuel prices were raised again or 
food supplies disrupted by bad weather.
Downside risks to this outlook center on further deterioration of 
export performance and changes in market sentiment that cause capital 
outflows. Deficits in the current account and the budget reinforce the 
importance of maintaining capital inflows. Gross funding to cover the 
fiscal gap remains sizeable at 3.8% of GDP in 2014. To manage risks the 
government has maintained a $5 billion contingent funding facility with 
development partners and increased currency swap agreements to more 
than $40 billion.
Policy challenge—the current account deficit
Financial markets were rattled by last year’s sharp deterioration in the 
current account deficit, to the equivalent of 4.4% of GDP in the second 
quarter, the widest gap since the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
A major immediate cause was the slump in export earnings 
stemming from a downturn in prices for agricultural and mineral export 
commodities, as well as soft demand from major trading partners. 
Imports have also played a role. Over several years, robust domestic 
demand pushed up imports of the capital goods demanded by stronger 
investment, and of consumer goods for a burgeoning middle class. 
Imports of capital and consumer goods together climbed by an average 
of about 18% annually during the years from 2008 to 2012. 
Structural factors have contributed to the problem. The current 
account fell into deficit in 2012, but the deterioration had started in 2003 
(Figure 3.24.12). This suggests that Indonesia’s export competitiveness, 
particularly in manufacturing, has eroded. The rupiah has appreciated 
in real effective terms, and labor productivity in manufacturing has 
fallen below rates achieved in neighboring countries (Figure 3.24.13). 
Further, the share of commodities in Indonesia’s exports has increased, 
making its external accounts more vulnerable to cyclical swings in 
global commodity prices (Figure 3.24.14). 
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Another structural factor—a doubling in the cost of oil imports 
since 2005—stems from declining domestic oil production and 
government subsidies on fuel. The subsidies stimulate fuel consumption 
and discourage the development of alternative energy sources. Imports 
of oil products cost $40 billion in 2013.
As noted, steps taken last year to slow domestic demand, spur 
exports, and dampen imports started, together with the rupiah’s 
depreciation, to rein in the current account deficit. Nevertheless, the 
impact may be relatively short-lived. For instance, the depreciation of the 
rupiah in 2008 boosted manufacturing exports for only a couple of years. 
Longer-term strengthening of the current account requires 
structural reforms to achieve sustained gains in productivity and 
competitiveness. One such reform is phasing out fuel subsidies by raising 
fuel prices. The government took a step in this direction in 2013 and is 
committed to market-based pricing in the years ahead. 
Further reduction in subsidies would help to curtail fuel imports 
and free up substantial budget funding for infrastructure and education, 
which would improve the country’s competitiveness. 
Government investment in infrastructure, including that from 
state enterprises, has returned to the level of 3% of GDP, last seen 
before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, private investment in 
infrastructure is largely missing. Faster development of infrastructure 
requires that the private sector participate more to complement the 
government’s limited resources.
Continued efforts to enhance the investment climate are key to 
attracting a substantial and steady inflow of foreign direct investment, 
which not only provides financing to cover current account deficits but, 
over the longer term, can spur technological innovation to improve 
productivity and competitiveness. In this regard, proposals to open more 
sectors to foreign direct investment are welcome.
Indonesia needs to boost labor productivity, which in turn requires 
better education outcomes, stronger incentives for firms to develop the 
skills of their employees, and a more flexible labor market. 
Overall, progress on structural reform has been uneven, as difficult 
policy changes are often delayed when the economy is performing 
well. Much could be gained if the government improved its process of 
formulating structural reforms and then implemented reforms in a more 
predictable manner.
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Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies supported economic growth in 2013. They also put 
stability at risk as inflation accelerated, fiscal and external deficits widened, and international 
reserves shrank. The government responded by cancelling some fiscal expenditure, which will 
take a toll on GDP growth in 2014. The key to maintaining economic stability and robust 
economic growth is to restore a sustainable fiscal position.
Economic performance
GDP grew by 7.6% in 2013, slightly below the pace of the previous 
2 years (Figure 3.25.1). Growth in services gathered momentum, but 
industry and agriculture slowed. 
Services expanded by 9.0% last year. Robust consumer spending, 
backed by a very large rise in incomes for the civil service, drove 
increases in wholesale and retail trade, while strong growth in credit 
boosted financial services. A 12% increase in tourist arrivals to 
3.7 million in 2013 benefited hotels, restaurants, and transportation. 
Double-digit growth in telecommunications stemmed from the 
extension of mobile phone and internet services. 
As for industry, copper production from the two main mines 
increased by 3.5% to 154,920 tons, slowing from the expansion rates of 
previous years. Growth in gold production also decelerated, with output 
rising by 6.6% to 219,880 ounces. Silver production jumped by 54.9% to 
955,360 ounces. After 3 years of sharply rising electricity generation, 
the rate of increase slowed to 3.6% in 2013 (Figure 3.25.2). Several new 
hydropower plants were under construction. About 70% of hydropower 
is exported.
Construction slowed, with the completion in the previous year of 
public projects in the capital city and delays in 2013 on some foreign-
invested property developments owing to economic slowdowns in the 
past 2 years in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Thailand, and 
Viet Nam, which provide much of the country’s foreign investment. 
Growth in industry as a whole slowed to 7.2% in 2013.
Agriculture was hit by floods in the third quarter, but production 
still grew by 2.7% for the year. 
Economic growth was supported by expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies. The government raised base wages for the civil service by 37% 
and approved large cost-of-living allowances for its employees, decisions 
that were estimated to double the government’s wage bill in FY2013 
(ended 30 September 2013). At the same time, revenue fell short of 
the target.
3.25.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
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These developments sharply widened the fiscal deficit (including 
grants but excluding off-budget spending) to an estimated 5.8% of GDP 
in FY2013 (Figure 3.25.3). The strain on the government’s cash position 
became evident when it fell into arrears in payments for wages and 
utilities that were estimated at 2.5% of GDP. 
Moving to stanch the deteriorating fiscal position, the government in 
October 2013 cancelled the cost-of-living allowance for the public sector 
and postponed a large number of public investment projects, including 
roads and government buildings. 
On the monetary side, growth in the M2 money supply expanded by 
22.7% and growth in credit was a rapid 36.1% (Figure 3.25.4). Concerned 
about the expansion of credit and about dwindling international 
reserves, the central bank in June 2013 directed commercial banks to 
curb lending in foreign currencies and in August it restricted sales of 
foreign currencies to the public.
The Lao kip started to soften against the US dollar after the 
central bank restricted sales of foreign currencies. However, reflecting 
relatively high domestic inflation, the kip has appreciated in real 
effective terms over recent years, hurting export competitiveness and 
contributing to the current account deficit. 
Robust domestic demand drove up imports of both consumer goods 
and capital equipment last year, while weakening global commodity 
prices curbed growth in export earnings. A larger trade deficit 
contributed to a wider current account deficit, estimated at 29.5% of 
GDP. A deficit in the balance of payments reduced gross international 
reserves to $666 million, providing limited cover estimated at 
1.2 months of imports of goods and services.
Strong consumer spending also added inflationary pressure. 
Higher food prices, particularly for meat and vegetables, drove inflation 
up to a 2013 peak of 7.4% in July (Figure 3.25.5). Year-average inflation 
accelerated to 6.4% in 2013 from 4.3% in 2012. 
Economic prospects
Domestic demand is expected to moderate in 2014, trimming GDP 
growth to 7.3%. Government investment will slow as it postpones 
254 public projects and cuts off-budget spending. Reduced government 
investment and delayed government payments to suppliers and 
employees will hurt business activity and confidence. Slowdowns in 
large and influential neighbors, the PRC and Thailand, also cloud the 
outlook, particularly for investment.
The government aims to gradually rein in its fiscal deficit 
through tighter controls on spending and by strengthening revenue 
administration. That said, the authorities have again raised wages for 
the civil service in FY2014 by nearly 40% and hired additional public 
employees. Moreover, civil service wages are scheduled to rise for a 
third year in FY2015. Deficit reduction is complicated as well by arrears 
carried forward from last year and uncertain prospects for mining 
revenue in light of soft global commodity prices. 
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Monetary policy aims to slow growth in credit and maintain 
restrictions on lending in foreign currencies in 2014. But the extent of 
fiscal and monetary tightening this year is uncertain.
Nevertheless, private consumption will remain buoyant, and foreign 
direct investment approvals are strong. Construction is continuing on 
eight new hydropower projects, including the $3.5 billion Xayaburi 
project, and four more plants are expected to start construction in 2014. 
Work is well advanced on the large Hongsa lignite coal power project, 
due to be finished in 2016. Several new mines are under construction. 
Against this, the Sepon mine stopped gold production in December 
2013 in response to lower global gold prices. 
Services are likely to maintain solid growth, particularly tourism-
related services, telecommunications, and wholesale and retail trade. 
Agriculture is projected to expand at about the same rate as last year. 
Next year, GDP growth is forecast to pick up to 7.5% as more export-
oriented projects come into production, Thailand recovers, and exports 
gain momentum with the brightening global outlook (Figure 3.25.6). 
Inflation averaged 5.8% in the first 2 months of 2014 and is forecast 
at 5.5% for the year, down slightly from 2013. Improved supplies of 
meat and moderation in domestic demand are expected to ease upward 
pressure on prices. The kip is projected to depreciate slightly against the 
US dollar, which will support exports and help rebuild foreign reserves. 
In 2015, inflation is seen escalating as the economy picks up.
The government has started to scrutinize the import valuation of 
vehicles and fuel to close loopholes that have caused revenue losses. 
That tighter control, together with restrictions on access to foreign 
currencies and reduced government capital outlays, should dampen 
growth in imports. The large current account deficit is seen narrowing 
only slightly over the forecast period (Figure 3.25.7). 
Policy challenge—a sustainable fiscal position
The sharp widening of the fiscal deficit last year raised serious concerns 
for the government, which is wrestling with persistent arrears in its 
payment of wages and resorting to postponing public projects and 
cancelling cost-of-living allowances for the civil service. Addressing the 
fiscal deficit in a sustainable manner is key to maintaining economic 
stability and future growth, even if it means accepting lower growth in 
the short to medium term.
The three major reasons for the large fiscal deficit have been overly 
optimistic revenue projections, large wage increases and allowances 
awarded without due regard for their impact on the country’s fiscal 
and external positions, and development projects financed off budget. 
In response to the emerging fiscal crisis, the government doubled its 
efforts to collect revenue and cancelled or postponed some expenditure. 
It is also preparing a new fiscal strategy.
The main challenge is to reduce expenditure to drive the fiscal deficit 
down to a sustainable 3% of GDP. Assuming real economic growth of 7.5% 
and nominal growth of 13.0%, slowing expenditure growth in real terms 
to 2%–3% over the next 3 years would bring the budget deficit down to a 
sustainable level. Also, off-budget spending needs to be reined in. 
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This chapter was written by Gary Krishnan of the Southeast Asia Department, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Malaysia
Domestic demand remained buoyant in 2013, but external demand weakened. This year, stronger 
exports are projected to lift economic growth, even as higher inflation and fiscal tightening 
act to moderate domestic demand. Current account surpluses will likely rise after narrowing 
last  year. Sharply rising household debt and housing prices pose risks for banks and for growth.
Economic performance
Buoyant domestic demand drove the economy in 2013, but weak 
external demand and subdued public investment constrained GDP 
growth to 4.7%, below the average of just over 5.0% since 2010 
(Figure 3.26.1). 
Private consumption rose by a vigorous 7.6%, similar to the pace in 
2012, and it contributed most of GDP growth in 2013. The expansion 
in consumption spending was underpinned by 4.8% growth in 
employment, a low 3.1% unemployment rate, and average real wages that 
rose by an estimated 0.9% in 2013. Also, a national minimum wage came 
into effect in January 2013. Additional factors were widespread cash 
transfers from the government and increases in public sector wages, 
bonuses, and pensions. 
Fixed capital investment grew by 8.2% in 2013, but this was less 
than half the rapid 19.9% pace recorded in 2012. From its high base, 
fixed investment made a smaller but still significant contribution to 
GDP growth. The ratio of fixed investment to GDP increased to 26.9%, 
maintaining a gradual improvement over recent years. 
Private fixed investment decelerated to a still-strong 13.6%, focused 
on mining, services, and manufacturing. Meanwhile, the government 
cut growth in public fixed investment to just 0.7% from 17.1% a year 
earlier (Figure 3.26.2). This largely reflected government reductions in 
development outlays. 
Government consumption spending rose by 6.3% in 2013, an election 
year, and made a small contribution to GDP growth. By contrast, net 
exports contracted, which dragged on growth. Import volumes of goods 
and services rose slightly, spurred by the robust domestic demand, 
while export volumes fell, reflecting slack external demand.
From the production perspective, services grew by 5.9% and 
contributed nearly 70% of the increase in GDP on strong expansion in 
communications, real estate and business services, government services, 
and wholesale and retail trade. Growth in finance and insurance slowed 
sharply, however.
3.26.1 Demand-side contributions to growth
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Manufacturing grew by 3.4%, the slowest pace in 4 years, in 
large part reflecting lackluster demand for exports of goods such 
as electronics and electrical products. Construction expanded by a 
buoyant 10.9%, though this too represented an easing of growth from 
2012. Civil engineering in particular moderated as major projects were 
completed, including the Second Penang Bridge, Sabah–Sarawak gas 
pipeline, and Sabah oil and gas terminal.
Crude oil production fell last year as maintenance idled production 
facilities, but natural gas output rose. Growth in agriculture picked 
up to 2.1% with palm oil recovering and growth in food production 
strengthening. Producers of natural rubber reduced tapping, though, 
when global rubber prices fell. 
Fiscal policy was less stimulatory in 2013 as the government started 
to address its fiscal deficit, which exceeded 4% of GDP every year from 
2008 to 2012. Fitch lowered its credit rating outlook on Malaysia from 
stable to negative in July 2013, citing its budget deficit, declining current 
account surplus, and rising household debt. 
The task of curbing the fiscal deficit was complicated by the decline in 
prices for export commodities and oil, which held growth in government 
revenue to 2.6%. The government cut development expenditure by 8.2%, 
slowed growth in operating expenditure to 2.8%, and trimmed some 
subsidies. Further, it decided to stretch the construction of certain public 
projects out to relieve the strain on fiscal and external accounts alike. By 
year-end, the fiscal deficit had narrowed to 3.9% of GDP from 4.5% in 
2012 (Figure 3.26.3). 
Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank, kept its policy interest rate 
steady at 3.0%, as it has done since May 2011. The average base lending 
rate of commercial banks was unchanged at 6.5% in 2013. Lending to 
consumers maintained robust growth, increasing by 12.0% year on year 
in December 2013. Lending to businesses rose by a more sedate 8.3%.
Inflation edged higher to 3.2% in December 2013, nudged up by 
the impact of bad weather on food prices and government decisions in 
September to reduce subsidies for fuel and sugar and to increase the 
excise duty on tobacco (Figure 3.26.4). Another factor was a weaker 
Malaysian ringgit, which depreciated by 6.6% against the US dollar over 
2013. For the year, inflation averaged 2.1%. 
Slack external demand had a deep impact on Malaysia’s trade accounts. 
Merchandise exports fell by 3.6% to $219.4 billion in 2013, reflecting 
reduced volumes and prices for the country’s commodities, such as 
palm oil and rubber, as well as a soft global market for the country’s 
manufactures, including electronics. Robust domestic demand contained 
to 0.1% the decline in merchandise imports, valued at $186.8 billion. The 
trade surplus fell by 19.8% to $32.6 billion, the smallest in 9 years. After 
accounting for deficits in services trade, income, and transfers, the current 
account surplus narrowed to $11.8 billion, equivalent to 3.8% of GDP.
The financial account posted net outflows. Malaysians’ direct 
investment abroad totaled $12.9 billion, less than in the previous 3 years. 
Portfolio investment recorded a smaller net inflow while inward foreign 
direct investment rose to $11.6 billion. The balance of payments remained 
in surplus, and international reserves totaled $134.6 billion at year-end, 
cover for 7.0 months of goods and services imports. 
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Economic prospects
Malaysia has high exposure to global trade, with exports of goods and 
services equivalent to 83% of GDP. Thus, projected improvement in the 
economies of major industrial countries and in world trade bode well for 
its growth in 2014 and 2015. At the same time, rising inflation and fiscal 
tightening will moderate domestic demand.
Taking these factors into account, GDP is forecast to grow by 5.1% 
this year, quickening from 2013, and by 5.0% in 2015 (Figure 3.26.5).
Merchandise exports were trending up late in 2013, and that 
trajectory was maintained in early 2014 (Figure 3.26.6). For the year, 
exports are forecast to rise by 6.3% in US dollar terms, spurred by 
ringgit depreciation and stronger demand, in particular from the US 
and the euro area as their economies gather momentum. Prospects for 
growth in exports to the PRC are clouded by softer economic growth 
there. Still, in January 2014, exports rose by 12.2% year on year, with 
significant increases in shipments of electrical and electronic products.
Private consumption and fixed investment are projected to 
expand in 2014, but both at more moderate paces than in 2013. Private 
consumption will benefit from the firm labor market and rising wages. 
Cash transfers from the government’s 1Malaysia People’s Aid program 
(known as BR1M) have been increased and extended to as many as 
7.9 million Malaysians in 2014. However, rising inflation and other 
concerns have dented consumer confidence, which will temper growth 
in consumption spending. The index of consumer sentiment declined 
last year (Figure 3.26.7). The business conditions index compiled from a 
survey of manufacturers also declined.
Fixed investment is expected to be slightly dampened by the 
government’s fiscal consolidation, the ringgit’s depreciation, and 
possibly by higher borrowing costs. Nevertheless, the government’s 
Economic Transformation Programme, which aims to lift Malaysia 
into the ranks of high-income nations by 2020 by upgrading industry 
and infrastructure, is generating a pipeline of investment projects. 
Also, recovery in exports will spur investment in export-oriented 
manufacturing.
Government consumption spending is seen decelerating. 
The government has narrowed its fiscal deficit target to 3.5% of GDP. 
Among other measures, the budget for 2014 raised electricity tariffs by 
15.0% from January. 
A 6.0% goods and services tax (GST) is scheduled to come into effect 
from April 2015. This is a broad-based tax that will replace existing sales 
and service taxes. It should be an important revenue source that reduces 
current heavy reliance on revenue from oil production. 
One likely effect of the GST schedule is that consumers bring 
forward into 2014 and early 2015 planned spending on costly items such 
as automobiles and household appliances and furniture. Personal income 
tax rates will likely be trimmed in 2015 and cash transfers expanded to 
mitigate the impact of the GST on households.
As the government plans to narrow the fiscal deficit to 3.0% in 2015, 
fiscal tightening could weigh on GDP growth next year, as could higher 
inflation. But the export recovery is projected to continue in 2015. 
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Monetary policy may become less accommodating during the forecast 
period, particularly if inflationary expectations build and second-round 
effects emerge after reductions in subsidies and the implementation of 
the GST. Rising inflation has made the policy interest rate negative in 
real terms. 
Inflation is forecast to trend up to average 3.2% in 2014 
(Figure 3.26.8). Reductions in subsidies and the spillover effects on 
other goods and services has put upward pressure on prices. Last year’s 
depreciation of the ringgit has contributed to inflation. In the first 
2 months of this year, inflation rose to 3.4%, the highest since July 2011. 
Next year, inflation is seen rising to 3.5% and perhaps higher if 
inflationary expectations and second-round effects are not contained 
as the GST is introduced. The government plans further reductions in 
subsidies, which means higher prices for consumers, to help address 
its fiscal pressures, as the cost of subsidies has grown to 4.7% of GDP. 
However, it is unclear when subsidies will be reduced further.
Imports are seen growing at a similar pace to exports this year. 
The expansion of export-oriented manufacturing will draw in greater 
volumes of intermediate goods, but moderating domestic demand will 
dampen some other categories of imports. The trade surplus is forecast 
to turn up in both 2014 and 2015, contributing to larger current account 
surpluses (Figure 3.36.9).
Policy challenge—high household debt
Malaysian households are among the most highly indebted in Asia. 
Household borrowing for houses, automobiles, and other home and 
personal expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 12.1% 
over 2003–2013 to reach the equivalent of 86.8% of GDP in 2013 
(Figure 3.26.10). Furthermore, increased borrowing has contributed 
to sharply higher housing prices. These trends heighten risks to the 
banking system and the sustainability of household spending. 
The central bank has addressed this issue with a range of 
macroprudential regulations aimed at slowing property price inflation 
and credit growth. They include moves last year to set the maximum 
tenor for personal loans at 10 years and for property loans at 35 years, 
and to prohibit banks from offering to households preapproved personal 
financing such as unrequested credit cards. 
For its part, the government has raised the capital gains tax on 
property transactions and the minimum price of properties that foreign 
investors can buy to curb speculation in real estate. The policies seem 
to be working, as the increase in household debt slowed in 2013. Banks 
are generally in good financial shape and loan impairments are low at 
this time.
Still, rising debt could test household debt-servicing capacity when 
interest rates rise or growth in employment and incomes falters. Also, 
the higher housing prices rise, the greater the scope for them to deflate. 
Such developments could erode the strength of the banks and hurt their 
ability to finance the economy. 
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This chapter was written by Peter Brimble of the Myanmar Resident Mission , 
Asian Development Bank, Yangon; and Poullang Doung of the Cambodia Resident 
Mission, Asian Development Bank, Phnom Penh.
Myanmar 
Stronger investment contributed to faster GDP growth last year and is expected to drive further 
expansion this year and next. The government maintained momentum on policy reform. Sustaining 
this reform agenda depends on strengthening institutions and capacity development at all levels of 
government. It also requires concerted efforts to reform and develop electricity supply.
Economic performance
GDP growth accelerated to an estimated 7.5% in FY2013 (ended 
31 March 2014) from a revised 7.3% in FY2012. Growth was supported 
by rising investment propelled by improved business confidence, 
commodity exports, buoyant tourism, and credit growth, complemented 
by the government’s ambitious structural reform program.
Higher imports of capital goods reflected the stronger investment. 
Capital goods imports surged by 59.5% to $5.8 billion in 2013 (Figure 3.27.1). 
Business confidence has markedly improved in recent years, as 
reflected in a rapid increase in new business registrations, which 
exceeded 5,000 in the 10 months to January 2013, more than in the 
whole of the previous fiscal year. Registrations of new foreign-owned 
businesses rose to 375. Private sector credit maintained a rapid growth 
pace of 46% in FY2013. 
Agriculture, which employs more than half the workforce, recovered 
in FY2013 after being hit by flooding in mid-2012. Natural gas output 
expanded with the Shwe and Zawtika gas fields starting production.
Exports of natural gas increased by 68.8% to 7.7 trillion cubic 
feet in the 12 months to September 2013. Gas exports were valued at 
$3.6 billion, accounting for almost 40% of all exports. 
Inflation quickened to an estimated 5.8% in FY2013, driven by 
higher food prices and some pass-through to domestic prices since 
the depreciation of the Myanmar kyat (Figure 3.27.2). Following the 
adoption of a managed float in April 2012, the kyat has depreciated 
against the US dollar, falling by 11% from April 2013 to March 2014.
The current account deficit widened to an estimated 4.8% in FY2013, 
reflecting the strong imports of capital goods. This deficit was partly 
financed by foreign direct investment and a surge in remittances from 
abroad. The balance of payments recorded an estimated surplus equal to 
0.6% of GDP, and gross official reserves rose to an estimated $4.9 billion 
in FY2013, covering 3.3 months of imports.
The government budget for FY2013 amounted to $19.5 billion, equal 
to 32.8% of GDP. Spending on education was boosted by 30% from the 
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previous year, and on health care by 78%. The consolidated fiscal deficit 
widened to an estimated 4.9% of GDP in FY2013 from 3.8% in FY2012. 
Total external debt declined to $10.7 billion, or 19% of GDP, in FY2013 
from $13.5 billion in FY2012, following a restructuring of debt arrears.
Economic prospects
The economy is forecast to post higher growth of 7.8% in both FY2014 
and FY2015, benefiting from rising investment and improved business 
confidence since the government started to rejuvenate and open the 
economy 3 years ago (Figure 3.27.3). 
A number of developments last year contributed to raising Myanmar’s 
international profile as an investment destination, including the award of 
telecommunications licenses to Norway’s Telenor and Qatar’s Ooredoo, 
selection of investors from the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Japan 
as preferred bidders for developing airports, and hosting of the World 
Economic Forum on East Asia and of the Southeast Asia Games.
Inflation is forecast to accelerate to 6.6% in FY2014 and 6.9% in 
FY2015 (Figure 3.27.4). Factors contributing to inflation include a boost 
to public sector wages, higher electricity tariffs, and rising property 
prices in cities. Reduced credit to the government from the central bank 
should help to contain inflationary pressures over the medium term.
Liberalized import restrictions coupled with relaxed foreign exchange 
controls are likely to maintain the current account deficit in FY2014 and 
FY2015 at around 5% of GDP (Figure 3.27.5). Gross official reserves are 
expected to reach $6 billion in FY2014, covering 3.6 months of imports. 
The fiscal deficit is seen narrowing to 4.5% of GDP in FY2014, partly 
due to one-time revenue from telecommunications licenses and higher 
gas revenue. The restructuring of debt arrears under agreements with 
Japan, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank has paved the 
way for the government to receive new lending. 
External debt is projected to increase to $11.7 billion, or 19.4% 
of GDP. Myanmar’s risk of debt distress is expected to remain low, 
reflecting less reliance on  commercial financing as more concessional 
resources become available following the resolution of debt arrears.
The government has initiated a broad array of reforms: unifying 
the exchange rate, improving monetary policy, increasing tax 
collection, reorienting public expenditure toward social and physical 
infrastructure, improving the business and investment climate, 
developing the financial sector, and liberalizing agriculture and trade. 
A new central bank law grants the central bank greater operational 
autonomy. The government has also prepared a strategy for sequenced 
and comprehensive public financial management reforms. 
Efforts have been made to strengthen transparency and accountability 
with the establishment of a senior anticorruption committee and the 
government’s commitment to join the global Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. Notably, the award of telecommunications 
licenses in a strongly contested public tender went to established 
international companies without domestic partners.
Nevertheless, the World Bank ranked Myanmar 182 of 189 countries 
for ease in its Doing Business 2014 report, illustrating the challenges still 
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to be met to improve the business climate (Figure 3.27.6). Sustaining the 
reform agenda will depend on strengthening institutions and capacity 
development at all levels of government. Progress in reform and ensuring 
access to public services and employment, especially in rural areas and 
among disadvantaged groups, would help make growth more inclusive. 
Risks to the outlook come from ethnic and sectarian tensions, and 
vulnerability to bad weather. 
Policy challenge—powering the economy
Myanmar has abundant energy resources, notably hydropower and 
natural gas. However, its power sector is one of the least developed 
in Southeast Asia. Only just over half the total installed capacity 
of 3,593 megawatts is firm, or highly reliable, because weather-
dependent hydropower accounts for 75% of total electricity generation. 
Consequently, the supply of electricity is limited and unreliable.
With a population estimated at 60 million, Myanmar’s per capita 
electricity consumption was only 160 kilowatt-hours in 2011, the 
lowest in Southeast Asia (Figure 3.27.7). This is the result of a low 
electrification rate estimated that year at 28% of the population, weak 
industrial development, and a lack of investment. Electrification is 
concentrated in cities.
On the cost side, electricity tariffs are heavily subsidized and among 
the lowest in Southeast Asia. However, in March 2014 the government 
announced reforms to electricity pricing that will largely eliminate 
existing unsustainable subsidies while maintaining lower tariffs for 
low-income users. 
A study by development partners estimated that investment of 
around $18 billion would be required through 2030 to fuel annual 
average economic growth of 7.5%. Efforts by the government and 
development partners to address the needs of the energy sector include 
the preparation of plans, regulatory tools, and legal instruments to 
guide investments aimed at improving power distribution and reducing 
energy losses, supporting renewable power sources, rehabilitating 
existing energy infrastructure, and stimulating new generation and 
transmission capacity.
The required investments are far beyond the combined means of 
the government and its development partners, so steps are being taken 
to promote public–private partnership, especially in power generation, 
by developing power purchase agreements that meet international 
standards, building the capacity of government agencies to handle open 
and transparent bidding and tendering processes, and catalyzing private 
sector investments. 
Given large gaps between cities and rural and remote areas, 
attention is being paid to developing off-grid energy sources such as 
mini hydropower, biomass, wind, and solar energy. 
Meeting the energy challenge will play a major role in poverty 
reduction and stimulating regional development. In addition, improved 
power supply to all ethnic groups will contribute to the peace dividend. 
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Philippines
Robust private consumption and investment drove economic growth higher in 2013. Strong 
growth is expected to continue in the forecast period, though moderating from last year. 
Rehabilitation and reconstruction in areas hit by natural disasters may have a significant impact 
on the economy in late 2014 or 2015. Inflation is forecast to pick up this year but remain within 
the central bank’s target range. The challenge is to translate solid economic growth into poverty 
reduction by generating more and better jobs.
Economic performance
Despite natural disasters that devastated parts of the country in the 
fourth quarter of 2013, GDP grew by a solid 6.5% in that period, bringing 
full-year growth to 7.2% (Figure 3.28.1), well above the 4.7% average 
recorded from 2008 to 2012. 
An earthquake of magnitude 7.2 on the Richter scale struck the 
Central Philippines in October, followed by Super Typhoon Haiyan in 
November, which left nearly 8,000 people dead or missing and destroyed 
buildings, infrastructure, and livelihoods in some parts of the Visayas. 
Nevertheless, broad-based domestic demand drove economic growth 
through last year. Private consumption grew by 5.6% and contributed 
more than half of the increase in GDP. Consumer spending benefitted 
from growth in employment, largely in services and construction, as 
well as in remittances from overseas Filipinos, which rose by 8.6% to 
$25.4 billion, or by 9.4% in peso terms.
Fixed investment increased by 11.7%, accelerating from 2012 and 
adding significantly to GDP growth (Figure 3.28.2). Construction 
contributed about one-third of this growth. Encouragingly, investment 
in machinery and equipment rose by a robust 14.4%. The ratio of fixed 
investment to GDP improved by nearly 1 percentage point, to 20.2%. 
Buoyant government spending was linked in part to legislative 
elections in May. The government raised spending on infrastructure and 
social services, including the national health insurance program and 
conditional cash transfers to poor families. Relief efforts following the 
natural disasters added to government spending. However, net exports 
of goods and services fell, acting as a drag on growth.
From the production side, the expansion last year was driven by 
services, manufacturing, and construction. Services, accounting for 
57% of the economy, grew by 7.1% and contributed more than half of 
the increase in GDP. Strong growth was recorded in retailing, finance, 
real estate, and business services, which includes business process 
outsourcing (BPO). Manufacturing expanded by 10.5%, double the pace 
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of the previous year, as domestic demand strengthened and exports 
expanded for some industries including processed food, furniture, and 
chemical products. Construction sustained double-digit expansion, with 
increases in both the public and the private sector. Industry as a whole 
contributed more than 40% of GDP growth.
Bad weather contained growth in agriculture to just 1.1% in 2013. 
Rice production increased slightly, while harvests of corn, coconut, 
sugar, and banana declined.
Notwithstanding buoyant domestic demand, inflation eased for most 
of 2013, turning up late in the year when the natural disasters disrupted 
food supplies (Figure 3.28.3). Soft global commodity prices and a good 
domestic harvest early in the year helped to contain prices until then. 
For the year, inflation averaged 3.0%. 
With inflation at modest rates, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the 
central bank, kept policy interest rates at record lows of 3.5% for the 
overnight borrowing rate and 5.5% for the overnight lending rate. 
Low interest rates, buoyant economic growth, strong remittances, 
and capital inflows fueled the rapid expansion of domestic liquidity, 
accelerating growth in broad money (M3) to 32.7% in December, the 
fastest rate since 2002. Actions by the central bank to encourage a shift 
of funds out of its special deposit accounts into lending for productive 
purposes added to liquidity. Lending to the private sector increased 
by 17.3%. 
Faster growth in government revenue than in expenditure narrowed 
the fiscal deficit to 1.4% of GDP from 2.3% in 2012 (Figure 3.28.4). Revenue 
increased by 11.8%, getting a lift from higher taxes on alcohol and tobacco 
and from stronger tax enforcement. The ratio of tax collection to GDP 
improved to 13.3%. Expenditure, excluding interest payments, rose by 
6.3%, with nearly one-third channeled to infrastructure. 
Merchandise exports fell by 3.6% in US dollar terms last year, largely 
due to a slump in semiconductors, which comprise one-third of the total. 
Exports turned up slightly in the fourth quarter. Imports fell by 3.1% in 
US dollar terms, reflecting weak demand for electronic components for 
processing, while imports of consumer and capital goods rose. 
A narrower trade deficit, coupled with higher inflows from 
remittances, BPO, and tourism, raised the current account surplus by 
35.6% to $9.4 billion, equivalent to 3.5% of GDP (Figure 3.28.5). Net 
inflows of foreign direct investment rose to $3.9 billion, improving from 
an average of $2.0 billion over recent years but still low by the standards 
of other major Southeast Asian countries. Portfolio investment inflows 
fell. Gross international reserves were little changed at $83.2 billion, 
providing a high 11.5 months of import cover. 
Along with other Southeast Asian currencies, the peso weakened when 
the US reported it would reduce its monetary stimulus. It depreciated by 
7.6% against the US dollar over 2013. 
Economic prospects
Relatively high rates of economic growth are projected over the forecast 
period, though easing from the fast pace in 2013. GDP growth is forecast 
at 6.4% in 2014 and 6.7% in 2015 (Figure 3.28.6).
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Signs are positive for continued growth in investment. Improved 
business confidence and rising inflows of foreign direct investment 
will support private investment. Confidence has been reinforced by the 
achievement last year of investment grade sovereign credit ratings and 
improvements in several global competitiveness indices. For example, 
the Philippines’ ranking in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey 
jumped by 30 places to 108th of 189 economies in 2013.
Other positive indicators for investment are sustained expansion in 
credit to businesses, increased investment in machinery and equipment, 
and a buoyant stock market, backed up by rising corporate earnings. 
Private consumption will continue to benefit from remittance 
inflows and positive consumer sentiment, though higher inflation 
and interest rates will likely dampen the pace of growth in consumer 
spending. Remittances rose by 6.8% in January, easing after the 
year-end holiday season (Figure 3.28.7).
The pace of increase in government spending is also expected to 
ease from 2013. That trend started late last year when government 
spending slowed after the elections and government agencies appeared 
to become more cautious about disbursing funds in response to a public 
outcry over allegations of misuse of some government funds. This issue 
has continued into 2014. The government targets a budget deficit of 2.0% 
of GDP in 2014.
Rehabilitation and reconstruction in areas hit by the natural 
disasters may not have a significant impact on the economy until late in 
2014 and 2015. The direct and timely transfer of national government 
resources to local governments and affected communities has been 
hindered by highly centralized national government systems. Also, 
regional and local administrations have limited capacity to implement 
reconstruction and rehabilitation programs. These matters are being 
addressed, which could accelerate work in the affected areas. 
The damaged regions contributed 17% of GDP in 2010–2012, with 
Eastern Visayas, the worst hit, accounting for 2.5% of GDP. 
From the production side, manufacturing is expected to perform 
well during the forecast period, underpinned by robust domestic 
demand and an improvement in exports as demand picks up in the 
US and the euro area. Manufacturing production indices continued to 
expand through January with gains in chemicals, furniture and fixtures, 
rubber and plastic products, and transport equipment. Sustained growth 
in credit to manufacturers, rising by 12.7% year on year in January, and 
high manufacturing capacity utilization bode well for investment in 
manufacturing (Figure 3.28.8).
Construction is forecast to remain buoyant, though the rapid 
growth in building approvals seen in recent years started to cool 
in 2013. Private investment focuses on offices, shopping malls, 
and housing, where demand is strong. The government raised its 
infrastructure budget in 2014 to the equivalent of 3.0% of GDP for 
projects such as constructing national roads and bridges, rail systems, 
and ports to provide better access to the provinces.
Growth in services will be driven by consumption spending and 
the expansion of BPO and tourism. Tourist arrivals rose by 10.0% to 
4.7 million in 2013 with revenue up by 15.1% to an estimated $4.4 billion. 
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The government aims to attract 6.8 million tourists in 2014 and 
10.0 million by 2016, and it has liberalized aviation policy and removed 
two taxes on international airlines to spur growth.
BPO revenue rose by an estimated 16% to $15.5 billion in 2013, and 
the number of full-time employees in the industry reached 900,000.
Inflation in the first 2 months of 2014 quickened to 4.2% as bad 
weather drove up food prices. It is forecast to average 4.3% in 2014, 
increasing from 2013 due to the impact of last year’s natural calamities 
on food supplies, rising domestic demand, and expected increases in 
utility tariffs (Figure 3.28.9). Peso depreciation from last year will push 
up import prices. In 2015, inflation is seen abating to 4.0%, assuming 
softer global commodity prices. 
There is, however, a risk that inflation expectations could build 
if M3 liquidity continues to surge; it accelerated by 38.6% in January 
2014 (Figure 3.28.10). The central bank increased the bank reserve 
requirement effective April 2014 to guard against the risks from strong 
liquidity growth and rapid credit expansion.
As inflation is projected to be within the central bank’s target range 
of 3%–5% in 2014 and 2%–4% in 2015, monetary stance could remain 
accommodative to economic growth, though policy rates are likely to be 
nudged up from record lows. 
In light of the uptrends in consumption and investment, imports of 
goods and services are likely to rise relatively strongly, outpacing export 
growth. This is reinforced by the import intensity of electronics, the 
main export products. Consequently, declining net exports are expected 
to restrain economic growth. 
Current account surpluses are projected to ease as a ratio to GDP 
during the forecast period. Merchandise exports picked up in late 2013 
and, though they decelerated in January 2014, still grew by 9.3% 
(Figure 3.28.11). For 2014 as a whole, merchandise exports are expected to 
increase by 8.2% in US dollar terms, but imports are likely to rise by 9.4%.
A risk to the outlook comes from the possible impact on investment 
of national elections scheduled for May 2016. Investors could become 
increasingly cautious until the new government clarifies policy 
directions. Steady progress on reform will be important to sustaining 
market confidence. 
A trend of improved fundamentals over several years has 
strengthened the economy’s resilience to shocks. The current account 
has been in surplus since 2003. Total external debt as a share of 
GDP has been on a downtrend since 2003, to 21.5%. Fiscal and debt 
consolidation give the government greater flexibility to respond to 
downturns. Public debt has fallen steadily since 2008 to reach in 
December 2013 the equivalent of 49.2% of GDP, and the government has 
sourced its financing largely from domestic sources. Finally, the banking 
system’s capital adequacy ratio is well above 10%, and nonperforming 
loans remain low at about 3% of all loans.
Policy challenge—generating more and better jobs
While economic expansion has exceeded 6% in the past 2 years, it has 
not generated enough jobs to reduce poverty (Figure 3.28.12). 
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The unemployment rate rose to 7.5% in January 2014 from 7.1% in 
January 2013, and the rate of underemployment remained elevated at 
19.5%. The youth unemployment rate stood at 17.3%, up from 16.8% 
a year earlier and more than double the unemployment rate for the 
workforce as a whole. Improving the quality of jobs also remains a 
challenge, as nearly 40% of the workforce is in the informal sector or in 
vulnerable employment (Figure 3.28.13). 
Reflecting the lack of good jobs, the poverty rate was 25.2% in 2012, 
only a small improvement on 26.3% in 2009. Persistent poverty has 
hindered progress toward achieving Millennium Development Goals 
relating to maternal health and primary education.
In an update to its development plan for 2010–2016, the government 
has heightened the emphasis on employment generation and poverty 
reduction. Its goals are to cut the unemployment rate to 6.5%–6.7% and 
underemployment to 17.0% by 2016, and to reduce poverty to 18.0%–20.0% 
by that year. 
The government’s strategy is to raise public investment on 
infrastructure, agriculture, education, and health, while improving 
the investment climate and expanding manufacturing. Public-private 
partnerships are a key strategy to raising investments and enhancing 
competitiveness. Poor infrastructure is a nagging constraint on 
investment. The Philippines ranks behind most major Southeast Asian 
countries in terms of infrastructure. 
Although manufacturing grew at a brisk pace last year, it accounts 
for a small share of GDP and employment compared with other major 
economies in the subregion. A stronger manufacturing industry 
would generate more and better jobs, and manufacturing linked to 
agriculture would enable the poor in rural areas to rise out of poverty. 
Manufacturing sector roadmaps are being prepared by the private sector 
and the government to identify constraints on growth in manufacturing 
and decide what type of support would address them. 
The government is also improving its approach to poverty reduction 
by adjusting interventions in accordance with local socioeconomic 
conditions. Provinces are categorized in terms of resource 
endowments, sector growth, and employment opportunities to ensure 
that government policies are well targeted. The strategy takes into 
consideration which areas are prone to disasters and how to make them 
more resilient. The poverty rate in the Eastern Visayas was a very high 
45.2% even before the region was battered by Typhoon Haiyan.
Progress achieved in the Bangsamoro agreement, a roadmap 
for a political settlement between the government and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), should lead to development on the 
large southern island of Mindanao, where poverty is worse than 
in the central Visayas or on the large northern island of Luzon. 
The government and the MILF signed the Comprehensive Agreement 
on the Bangsamoro in March 2014, which includes agreements such as 
those on revenue and wealth sharing, power sharing, and transitional 
arrangements. The government aims to have the Bangsamoro Basic 
Law approved by 2016. 
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Singapore
GDP will continue to grow at a modest pace in 2014 and 2015. This highly trade-dependent 
economy will benefit from the expected recovery of the global economy, but ongoing domestic 
economic restructuring will weigh on growth. A tight labor market will put upward pressure on 
inflation. Economic and macroprudential policies should be calibrated and targeted to support 
the transition toward high-productivity growth.
Economic performance
Propelled by improving exports, Singapore’s economy expanded by 4.1% 
in 2013, surprising markets. Export growth more than doubled to 3.6% 
from 1.4% in 2012, while import expansion slowed from 4.0% in 2012 
to 3.0% in 2013. Thus, net exports rebounded from a contraction in 
the previous year, contibuting 2.2 percentage points to growth (Figure 
3.29.1). Domestic demand added only 1.2 percentage points to growth 
in 2013—in contrast to 2012, when it was the main driver of growth—as 
weakening private consumption and faltering investment outweighed 
rising public spending. The contribution of private consumption dropped 
to 0.9 percentage points. Investment contracted, owing mainly to a 
sharp decline in private investment on transportation following tighter 
rules on financing vehicle purchases.
On the supply side, the services sector, which accounts for over 
70% of total value added, was the engine of growth. Services, including 
ownership of dwellings, expanded by 5.2%, contributing 3.3 percentage 
points to GDP growth in 2013, up from 1.3 percentage points in 2012 
(Figure 3.29.2). Growth was robust across the services sector but highest 
in finance and insurance. Banking activity, which accounts for half of 
the sector’s value added, was driven by the expansion of business loans, 
while tighter regulation moderated growth in consumer loans. 
Industry, which accounts for the remainder of output, as agriculture 
accounts for less than 1%, grew by 2.2% in 2013, adding 0.7 percentage 
points to growth. Improved global demand fueled the rebound of 
electronics manufacturing from a huge contraction in 2012, and of other 
manufacturing related to rig building projects. 
The consumer price index rose by 2.4%, slowing from 4.6% in 2012 
with moderation in both housing and transport inflation, which together 
account for over 40% of the index. This reflected property prices and 
vehicle quota premiums easing in response to policies that dampened 
demand. Core inflation, which excludes the costs of accommodation 
and private road transport, also decelerated, from 2.5% in 2012 to 1.7% 
on easing oil prices and a moderation in services and food inflation. 
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The appreciation of the Singapore dollar has helped temper inflation, 
given about 40% of what is consumed domestically is imported. 
Domestic price pressures intensified late in the year as core inflation 
rose in sync with food prices, which may carry over into 2014 inflation 
(Figure 3.29.3). 
Interest rate developments are largely outside the control of the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), as it implements monetary 
policy by targeting an undisclosed nominal effective exchange rate 
band in the context of an open capital account. The Singapore interbank 
offered rate, to which mortgage rates are usually pegged, generally 
follows movements of the US federal funds rate.
The MAS has kept the Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange 
rate (NEER) policy band on its current modest and gradual pace of 
appreciation since April 2012. In 2013, the NEER appreciated by 2.3% 
was below the 4.9% recorded in 2012 and 5.4% in 2011 (Figure 3.29.4). 
This policy was complemented by macroprudential measures to counter 
the rapid increases in residental property and private transportation 
prices.
Nevertheless, the low interest rate environment fueled a robust 17.0% 
expansion in credit, with loans to businesses substantially outpacing 
those to households. Money supply grew by 7.8%, almost unchanged 
from 7.2% the previous year.
The budget recorded a surplus of S$3.9 billion, or 1.1% of GDP, 
in FY2013 (ended 31 March 2014), higher than the budgeted 0.7%. 
Receipts from stamp duties and vehicle quota premium collections were 
higher than expected and boosted revenues by S$2.1 billion more than 
budgeted, while delays in implementing public infrastructure projects 
reduced expenditures to S$1.1 billion below projections. Compared with 
FY2012, revenues expanded by 2.4% and expenditures by 6.8%.
Exports of manufactured equipment recovered from a 1.9% 
contraction in 2012 to 2.9% growth in 2013, boosted by exports of 
electronic components and parts. Imports fell largely because crude 
petroleum imports declined by 10.8%. Net services receipts narrowed 
to $311 million from $594 million in 2012, as transport and travel 
service payments offset gains in financial services. Nevertheless, the 
current account surplus reached 18.2% of GDP, and the overall balance 
of payments recorded a surplus of $18.0 billion, or 6.1% of GDP, despite 
increasing net capital outflows (Figure 3.29.5). Official foreign reserves 
rose to 9 months of imports.
Economic prospects
The expected global economic recovery and the consequences of 
ongoing domestic economic restructuring will shape economic trends 
in Singapore in the forecast period. With export of goods and services 
equivalent to twice of GDP, the economy will benefit from improved 
external demand. On the other hand, the tighter labor market will 
weigh on growth, with 1.8% unemployment and on a downward trend 
and vacancies far exceeding job seekers (Figure 3.29.6). On balance, 
GDP is forecast to grow by 3.9% in 2014, near the upper bound of the 
government’s forecast of 2%–4%, and by 4.1% in 2015.
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The MAS is expected to closely monitor inflation dynamics, 
particularly in the property and transport markets, and to tweak the 
macroprudential measures already in place to ensure gradual price 
corrections in these markets. It will likely maintain its current policy 
for a gradually appreciating nominal effective exchange rate to help 
contain domestic costs, albeit tempered by how interest rates respond 
to US Federal Reserve tapering of quantitative easing. However, the 
moderation of inflation experienced in 2013 may not be sustained as the 
pass-through of higher business costs, particularly wages, starts to creep 
into consumer prices. Reflecting these influences, overall inflation is 
expected to be 3.0% this year and to ease marginally to 2.9% in 2015.
Fiscal prudence has been the hallmark of public policy in Singapore. 
Recent budgets, however, put the emphasis on incentives for firms to raise 
productivity and on budgetary transfers to encourage social mobility and 
equal opportunity for citizens. A deficit of S$1.16 billion is forecast for 
FY2014 (ending 31 March 2015), as these social transfers are expected to 
rise (Figure 3.29.7). This deficit will be easily financed by drawing down 
government deposits, which are substantial owing to past surpluses. 
A pickup in external demand is expected in line with higher growth 
in developed economies. Recent data signal expansion in new orders, 
and industrial production is on an uptrend (Figure 3.29.8). Exports are 
expected to expand by 5.0% in US dollar terms in 2014 and 8.3% in 2015, 
accompanied by similar growth in imports, generating a commensurate 
expansion in the trade surplus. The current account surplus is expected 
to expand to 19.1% of GDP in 2014 and then fall back to 18.6% in 2015.
In contrast to last year, when risk flowed mainly from uncertainty 
over the global economy, the next 2 years will pose risks mainly 
from domestic developments. The pace of the US Federal Reserve 
tapering and moderating economic growth in the People’s Republic 
of China continue to pose important risks. Of more serious concern, 
however, are labor costs rising without corresponding improvement in 
productivity, which could hinder growth and stoke inflation. In 2013, 
labor productivity was flat, albeit an improvement on the previous 
year’s 2% contraction. Singapore’s experiment in orchestrating higher-
quality economic growth has gained steam since it started in 2010, and 
disbursements under its productivity incentive schemes overshot the 
budget in 2013. But productivity gains take time to be realized. Another 
domestic risk to the forecast arises from possible abrupt corrections 
in the property market, which could weaken the balance sheets of 
banks and households alike. These risks remain manageable within the 
forecast period, and Singapore enjoys substantial financial resources to 
respond to them if they materialize. 
Policy challenge—making macroprudential 
policy more effective
The MAS plays a central role in the development, management, and 
oversight of the financial system, identifying and providing surveillance 
on systemic financial risk, and designing and calibrating policy 
instruments to effectively address any weaknesses. Although the 
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highly developed financial system of Singapore is well regulated and 
supervised, some risks to financial stability have emerged in recent 
years stemming from galloping real estate prices, which have surpassed 
their 2008 peak (Figure 3.29.9). There is concern that these price trends 
could rekindle inflation expectations and threaten financial stability. 
Housing loans continue to grow at an elevated rate, and household debt 
has increased rapidly for 3 years to reach 74% of GDP at the end of 2013, 
with a corresponding increase in the exposure of locally incorporated 
banks to the property sector.
The MAS has relied heavily on a number of macroprudential 
policy instruments to mitigate systemic risks arising from the housing 
market, fine-tuning them frequently to market conditions (Table 3.29.2). 
Most recently, it has introduced the total debt servicing ratio (TDSR) 
framework, the loan-to-value ratios, and restricted retirees’ use of 
Central Provident Fund resources to buy or rent property—a restriction 
that affects ever more people in an aging population. The measures 
have largely targeted the more speculative segments of the market, 
but further tightening has been recommended on the segment of 
the market owned mainly by foreigners and permanent residents. 
The measures have been broadly successful. Housing price inflation has 
moderated recently, and housing affordability metrics remain contained. 
But risks remain. 
If domestic income growth falters or global interest rates start to 
rise abruptly, the ability of borrowers to service their mortgages can be 
severely affected, as the majority of housing loans carry variable rates. 
If home prices fall sharply and a large number of borrowers are affected, 
the health of financial institutions could be impaired, threatening 
overall financial stability. Also, as host to a large number of financial 
institutions that intermediate funds into and out of the economy, 
Singapore is exposed to cross-border contagion. 
To address these concerns, the authorities should continue 
to respond proactively to new sources of systemic risk as they 
emerge, enhance their surveillance and analytical frameworks for 
assessing the likelihood and impact of emerging systemic risks, 
and design new policy instruments to effectively respond to such 
risks. As recommended by the International Monetary Fund’s 
Financial Sector Assessment Program for Singapore, conducted in 
November 2013, Singapore needs to enhance its existing supervisory 
and regulatory frameworks, further develop its crisis management 
arrangements, and remain vigilant over credit growth. The bank 
resolution framework should also be strengthened by enhancing the 
operational independence of the resolution agency and allowing speedy 
and decisive action by the MAS to address bank fragility. 
3.29.2 Macroprudential measures
September 2009
 • Increased government land sales
 • Disallowed interest-only housing loans and 
interest-absorption schemes
February and August 2010
 • Introduced the sellers’ stamp duty (SSD) of 
1%–3% for residential properties
 • Lowered the loan-to-value (LTV) limit
 • Extended SSD applicability to 3 years
 • Doubled minimum cash payment for 
second mortgages
 • Lowered the LTV for second mortgages
January and December 2011
 • Increased the SSD, tiered up to 16% 
 • Lowered the LTV to 60% for second 
mortgages and to 50% for corporate buyers
 • Introduced an additional and different 
buyers’ stamp duty (ABSD) for foreigners, 
permanent residents, and citizens
October 2012
 • Restricted loan tenure for residential 
properties
January to December 2013
 • Raised the ABSD by 5–7 percentage points
 • Imposed the ABSD on first mortgages 
for permanent residents and on second 
mortgages for citizens
 • Lowered the LTV for second and third 
mortgages and corporate buyers
 • Increased the minimum cash payment to 
25% for second and third mortgages
 • Capped the Housing Development 
Board (HDB) mortgage servicing ratio to 
30%–35% of monthly income
 • Restricted permanent residents subletting 
and owning HDB properties
 • Introduced various limits on executive 
condos
 • Introduced SSD on industrial property 
 • Increased property taxes
 • Introduced total debt servicing ratio (TDSR) 
to 60% of income
 • Tightened terms for granting HDB loans 
and for using Central Provident Fund funds 
to buy HDB properties
 • Reduced tenor of HDB loans
 • Refined the executive condominium 
housing scheme
Sources: International Monetary Fund Article IV 
Staff Report; JP Morgan Economic Research Note. 
This chapter was written by Luxmon Attapich of the Thailand Resident Mission, 
Asian Development Bank, Bangkok.
Thailand
The economy slowed sharply in 2013 as domestic demand weakened and exports were sluggish. 
Political disruptions hurt the economy in the second half of last year and cloud the outlook for 
2014. Growth is forecast to remain subdued before rebounding in 2015. Policy deficiencies have 
prompted calls to improve the design and implementation of public programs.
Economic performance
Political tensions weighed on the economy in the second half of 2013, 
dampening consumption, investment, and government spending. Slack 
domestic demand and sluggish exports confined GDP growth for 
the year to 2.9% (Figure 3.30.1). Growth in the fourth quarter, when 
political unrest intensified, decelerated to 0.6% year on year. 
Private consumption edged up in the first half of 2013 but then fell, 
finally contributing just 0.1 percentage points of GDP growth for the 
year. In part, this reflected a base effect from 2012, when spending was 
stimulated by demand to replace household goods after severe floods 
late in the previous year, and by government flood relief payments. Also, 
the labor market softened in 2013, and falling prices for major crops 
hurt farm incomes. Sales of passenger cars dropped by 5.9% last year 
after a tax rebate expired for first-time buyers of domestically made 
automobiles. Consumer confidence weakened during the second half as 
political tensions worsened.
These tensions, together with a lackluster outlook for merchandise 
exports, weighed on fixed capital investment, which fell steeply in the 
second half and declined by 1.9% over the year. This result reflected 
mainly weakness in private investment, but public investment slowed 
when the government became distracted by political issues and hobbled 
by legal challenges. Fixed investment also came off a high base in 2012, 
when it was propelled by reconstruction and replacement after the 
floods. Total investment made a small contribution to GDP growth in 
2013 because of an increase in inventories.
A sharp slowdown in import volumes contributed to higher net 
exports of goods and services, which added to GDP on the demand side 
for the first time in 4 years. 
On the supply side, nearly all the growth in GDP was generated 
by services, while agriculture and industry barely contributed 
(Figure 3.30.2). Services got a boost from a 19.6% increase in tourist 
arrivals to 26.6 million in 2013, with the rate of increase ebbing in the 
fourth quarter as political strife worsened. Tourism contributed to 
12.1% growth in hotel and restaurant business and solid expansion in 
transport and communications.
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Manufacturing was flat in response to slack demand for exports and 
subdued domestic demand. The production of electronics fell by 6.2% 
and of electrical appliances by 3.3%. Automobile production, which had 
soared by 68.3% in 2012 on stimulation from the tax rebate after the 
floods, rose by only 0.1% in 2013. Construction increased by 1.2% for the 
year, with all gains in the first half followed by contraction in the second. 
Agriculture and fisheries grew by a lackluster 1.4%, hit by a disease 
that cut shrimp production, a slight fall in the rice harvest, and drop in 
cassava output. Increases were recorded for natural rubber, palm oil, 
and livestock.
Inflation abated from 3.6% at the end of 2012 to 1.4% in September 
2013 before picking up a little (Figure 3.30.3). The year-average inflation 
rate at 2.2% was the lowest in 4 years. Lackluster domestic demand 
and soft world prices for oil and commodities helped ease inflationary 
pressures.
In the context of low inflation and weak economic growth, the Bank 
of Thailand, the central bank, lowered its policy interest rate by 50 basis 
points to 2.25% in 2013 (Figure 3.30.4). Money supply (M2) growth 
slowed to 7.3%, and growth in credit to the private sector eased to 
12.4% as domestic demand weakened and banks became more stringent 
about lending.
Inadvertently, fiscal policy tightened in FY2013 (ended 30 
September 2013) as legal challenges and political distractions frustrated 
the government’s pursuit of planned infrastructure projects. Only 
$261 million was disbursed from a $11.7 billion off-budget program to 
build water-management infrastructure. Tax breaks and relief payments 
to stimulate private consumption after the 2011 floods expired in 
2012, though the program to boost farm incomes through government 
rice purchases continued into 2013. On the revenue side, collections 
exceeded the target by 2.7% in FY2013. Consequently, the fiscal deficit, 
including budget and off-budget items, halved to 2.0% of GDP from 4.1%. 
In the external accounts, merchandise exports fell by 0.2% to 
$225.4 billion in 2013 as a result of tepid global demand, a decline in 
prices for some agricultural export commodities, and the shortfall in 
shrimp production. Exports of electronics declined by 0.7% and rice by 
4.6%, deepening a 28% drop in rice export income in 2012. Shipments of 
autos and parts rose by 7.6%. 
Imports fell by 0.4% to $219.0 billion, owing to weak demand 
domestically and for use in exports. Purchases of capital goods from 
abroad dropped by 4.5%, reflecting the decline in fixed investment. By 
contrast, imports of gold jumped by 21% to $15.0 billion, spurred by a 
lower global price.
Surpluses in trade in goods and services were more than offset by 
deficits in income and transfers, producing a current account deficit 
of $2.8 billion in 2013, equal to 0.7% of GDP (Figure 3.30.5). A big 
increase in repatriated profits and dividends, particularly by the auto 
industry, widened this deficit. Also, the current account surplus in 
2012 was revised to a deficit of 0.4% of GDP. The capital and financial 
account recorded net inflows of $1.4 billion, off much larger inflows of 
$14.4 billion in 2012. Foreign direct investment rose to $12.8 billion, 
but portfolio investment showed net outflow of $7.6 billion in 2013. 
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The balance of payments fell into deficit by $5.0 billion, the first such 
deficit in 13 years.
International reserves dropped by $14.4 billion to $167.2 billion 
over 2013 but still maintained a strong position equal to 7.3 months 
of imports and 2.9 times short-term external debt. The Thai baht 
fluctuated widely against the US dollar, from B28.55 to B32.86. Over the 
year, it depreciated by 7.0% against the US dollar. The Stock Exchange of 
Thailand index fell by 6.7% over 2013.
Economic prospects
The outlook is subject to unusually high uncertainty. After 
antigovernment protests intensified in November 2013, the government 
dissolved the parliament in December and scheduled national elections 
for 2 February. However, disruptions to registration and voting in 
some areas meant the elections were not completed, leaving the 
administration in a caretaker role. Such status imposes restrictions on 
its ability to borrow, spend, or make policy decisions. The Constitutional 
Court later nullified the 2 February election. 
Forecasts assume that government policy making will remain 
constrained through the first half of 2014. On this basis, economic 
growth is projected at a modest 2.9%, accelerating to 4.5% in 2015 
provided that a stable government is formed this year (Figure 3.30.6).
Major public infrastructure programs had been expected to drive 
growth in 2014 and 2015: the $11.7 billion water-management projects to 
mitigate the country’s vulnerability to floods and $67 billion in proposed 
investments through 2020 to upgrade transport infrastructure using 
off-budget loans. The water-management projects are delayed by legal 
challenges, and the transport investment program was ruled in March 
2014 unconstitutional as structured. 
Some significant investments by state-owned enterprises, such as 
in telecommunications, were on hold in the first quarter of 2014, and 
many large private sector investments faced delays as the Board of 
Investment could not approve investment privileges under the caretaker 
government. Further, the budget for the fiscal year starting in October 
2014 could suffer delayed approval. 
The political deadlock has damaged consumer and business 
confidence (Figure 3.30.7). This has hurt private consumption, business 
activity, and investment. The tourism industry reported that tourist 
arrivals were virtually flat in January 2014 compared with a year earlier 
(Figure 3.30.8). 
Private consumption faces additional headwinds from delays in 
government payments to farmers under the rice-pledging program and 
uncertainty about the program’s future. Moreover, high household debt 
weighs on borrowing for consumption. Household debt is the equivalent 
of 80.1% of GDP, and households spend on average 33.8% of monthly 
incomes repaying loans, according to a survey by the Bank of Thailand. 
Illustrating the weakness in private consumption early this year, 
imports of consumer goods fell by 12% in January 2014 year on year and 
passenger car sales plunged by 60% in that month. A survey of small 
and medium-sized enterprises conducted by the Ministry of Industry 
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in January showed significant declines in sales in garments, leather 
products, and electrical appliances (Figure 3.30.9).
Subdued private investment will likely persist well into 2014. 
Investors are expected to be cautious, waiting for the new government’s 
policy direction. Imports of capital goods continued to fall in January 
2014 and tax revenue from real estate transactions declined, further 
signs of subdued investment. 
Consumption and investment are forecast to rebound in 2015, assuming 
the political situation improves. Low domestic interest rates will assist the 
investment revival, as will better international economic prospects. 
External demand is expected to improve both this year and next. 
Major trading partners in the US and euro area will record stronger 
performances, countered to some degree by more sedate growth in the 
People’s Republic of China. The baht’s depreciation will help exports 
(Figure 3.30.10). 
As noted, the government is constrained in pursuing its fiscal policy. 
The disbursement rate of budget funding fell in the first 3 months of 
FY2014. Disbursement on larger projects that require cabinet endorsement 
is difficult during the caretaker period. Only small amounts are likely to 
be spent this year on the water-management program. The fiscal deficit is 
projected to be similar to that of FY2013 at about 2% of GDP. 
With such limits on fiscal policy, the Bank of Thailand set monetary 
policy to support the economy, reducing its policy rate by a further 
25 basis points to 2.0% in March 2014. The central bank is expected to 
keep this rate through 2014, edging it up to more normal levels when 
growth rebounds and international interest rates move higher.
While the FY2015 budget may be delayed because of the political deadlock, 
the eventual formation of a new government should allow investment in 
infrastructure to step up in 2015, bolstering the economy next year. 
Inflation is forecast to edge up to 2.4% this year because of the 
baht’s depreciation and the phased reduction in the subsidy on gas 
for household use. In February 2014, inflation quickened to 1.9% year 
on year as food prices rose. Stronger domestic demand in 2015 is seen 
lifting inflation slightly next year. 
The current account is projected to record a small deficit in 2014 
before turning into a surplus in 2015 as exports of goods and services 
gather momentum (Figure 3.30.11).
Downside risks to the outlook center on the political polarization 
that could cause political uncertainty to persist longer than currently 
expected. The unwinding of US monetary stimulus could prompt capital 
outflows and further baht depreciation, particularly if the domestic 
political tension drags on. Foreign investors were net sellers of Thai 
stocks and bonds in the first 2 months of this year. On the upside, GDP 
growth in 2014 could be significantly above the forecast if a stable 
government is formed sooner than expected.
Over the past 6 years, Thailand has suffered bouts of political unrest 
on top of the global financial crisis and severe flooding. Nevertheless, 
the economy maintains solid economic fundamentals that support its 
resilience, with high international reserves, relatively low inflation, 
a moderate amount of government and external debt, and a strong 
manufacturing base.
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Policy challenge—policy design 
and implementation
Thailand has pursued a number of policies over recent years that 
absorbed considerable public funds only to produce dubious outcomes. 
Such policies included subsidies to consumers for fuel and to farmers 
for rice production, tax breaks for first-time purchases of cars, and a 
debt moratorium for borrowers from state-owned banks. In some years 
the policies provided useful counter-cyclical stimulus, but they were 
not well targeted to the most vulnerable groups in society, nor did they 
strengthen the economy’s long-term productive capacity. 
The most controversial policy has been the rice-pledging program 
started in October 2011 to bolster rural incomes. Under this plan, the 
government tapped funding from a state-owned bank to buy rice from 
farmers at 40%–50% above the market price. It hoped to sell much of 
the rice on a rising world market. The program distorted the domestic 
rice market, reduced exports as other producers undercut Thai rice on 
the world market (Figure 3.30.12), pushed up domestic rice inventories 
to an estimated 18 million tons, and imposed losses on the government 
over 2 years that could exceed 2% of GDP. Further, it mainly benefited 
larger farmers with surplus rice to sell and reduced incentives for 
farmers to improve their productivity and reduce costs. 
From late 2013, the government fell behind in payments to farmers. 
In February 2014, the program expired. Its future will be determined by 
the next administration. 
Instead of unsustainable subsidies to farmers, government programs 
to address large rural-urban and regional income gaps could focus on 
greater public investment in rural infrastructure and social services 
(Figure 3.30.13). Direct cash transfers targeted to poor farmers, 
perhaps conditioned on school attendance to improve labor market 
opportunities for their children, also would promote inclusive and 
sustainable growth. 
Deficiencies in rice pledging, and in other fiscal programs, have 
prompted calls for improvement in the design and implementation of 
public policies and for more rigorous analysis of their fiscal sustainability. 
One proposal is for a nonpartisan agency, modeled on the 
Congressional Budget Office in the US, to project the potential cost, 
revenue, and other outcomes of legislation and fiscal proposals, with 
the aim of better informing parliamentary and public discussions. 
Wider public participation in and scrutiny of policy making would be 
useful, as would the strengthening of policy institutes and networks of 
nongovernmental organizations.
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This chapter was written by Dominic Mellor, Chu Hong Minh, and Nguyen Luu Thuc 
Phuong of the Viet Nam Resident Mission, Asian Development Bank, Ha Noi.
Viet Nam 
This economy now enters its third year of macroeconomic stability with lower inflation, strong 
external trade and capital flows, and a firmer exchange rate. GDP growth edged up in 2013 and 
is expected to recover further over the next 2 years. Inflation is forecast to remain relatively 
subdued. A return to the faster economic growth of previous years is hampered by the cautious 
pace of reform to banks and state enterprises. 
Economic performance
Economic growth picked up slightly to 5.4% in 2013 (Figure 3.31.1), still 
well below the 7.0%–8.0% pace seen in 2004–2007. Services accelerated 
to 6.6%, making the biggest contribution to GDP growth. Hotels and 
restaurants grew by 9.9%, buoyed by an 11% increase in tourist arrivals, 
and banking and finance expanded by 6.9%, helped by easier credit. 
Reflecting subdued private consumption, growth in wholesale and retail 
trading decelerated to 6.5%. 
The improved services performance offset a slowdown in industry, 
which grew by 5.4%. Mining output contracted as coal and crude oil 
production fell, but manufacturing expanded by 7.4%, driven by exports 
of manufactures from foreign-invested factories. Construction continued 
to recover from a slump to grow by 5.8% last year. 
Agriculture and fisheries maintained modest growth at 2.7%. 
Fisheries now contribute 20% of this sector’s output, about double their 
share 10 years ago. 
From the demand side, increases in foreign direct investment 
and off-budget government outlays on infrastructure drove a 5.5% 
expansion of investment. This was from a low base in 2012, and 
gross capital formation as a ratio to GDP remained, at 27% in 2013, 
far below earlier peaks. Weakness in the labor market and lackluster 
consumer confidence held growth in private consumption to 5.2%. 
Public consumption rose by 7.3% in line with the government’s policy 
to grow recurrent expenditure. Net exports of goods and services also 
contributed to GDP growth. 
Inflation abated to average 6.6% last year, maintaining a steep 
decline from 18.6% in 2011 (Figure 3.31.2). Subdued domestic demand, 
steady food production, and soft international commodity prices 
contributed to dampening inflation. With food price inflation under 
control, the government raised administered prices for electricity, fuel, 
and medical services. 
To help struggling businesses and lift growth, the State Bank of 
Viet Nam (SBV), the central bank, lowered its key policy interest rates 
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by 200 basis points in 2013, following cuts of 600 basis points in 2012 
(Figure 3.31.3). The SBV also reduced caps on certain deposit and 
lending rates.
Nevertheless, growth in credit was sluggish until late in 2013, when 
some banks extended temporary credit to meet a government target of 
12.0% credit growth. For the year, credit grew by an estimated 12.5% 
(Figure 3.31.4). Credit growth remained constrained by uncertainties 
over the prevalence of nonperforming loans (NPLs), the slow progress of 
banking reform, and slack demand for credit. Broad money supply (M2) 
increased by an estimated 18%, above the SBV’s 2013 target range of 
14%–16%.
The Viet Nam dong was relatively stable through 2013. The currency 
was supported by easing inflation, strong external accounts, and positive 
real interest rates. An additional factor was the active sterilization of 
excess liquidity through the issuance of central bank bills. The SBV 
devalued the dong by 1% against the US dollar in June to stimulate 
exports. 
Fiscal policy provided support to economic growth, with tax 
breaks for small- and medium-sized enterprises and increases in 
recurrent spending (Figure 3.31.5). The budget deficit as defined by 
the government widened to 5.5% of GDP in 2013 from 4.3% in 2012. 
Off-budget spending likely added to the overall fiscal deficit, though 
shortcomings regarding transparency in fiscal information make 
estimates difficult. Tax revenue has been hurt by the sluggish economy 
over the past 2 years, tax concessions, and reductions in import tariffs. 
The government responded to revenue constraints by taking steps 
to improve the efficiency of public investment and by restraining capital 
spending from the budget. Total capital spending was estimated at 
5.8% of GDP in the past 2 years, down from 8.4% in 2004–2011. Capital 
spending declined from roughly 72% of total spending in 2010 to 40% in 
2013, partly because of a government decision to maintain in real terms 
recurrent spending to social sectors.
In the external accounts, merchandise exports rose by an estimated 
15.3% on a balance of payments basis, with foreign-invested companies 
contributing 13 percentage points of this growth. Customs data showed 
exports of mobile phones jumped by 69% last year, computers and 
electronics by 36%,and textiles by 19%. Gains in manufactured exports 
offset declines in the value of agricultural and crude oil exports. 
Merchandise imports rose by an estimated 15.1%, driven by raw 
materials and inputs for manufacturing. 
A trade surplus of $11.6 billion contributed to a current account 
surplus estimated at 6.5% of GDP, the third consecutive surplus 
achieved through growth in merchandise exports, tourism receipts, and 
remittance inflows. Net inflows of foreign direct investment were down 
a bit from the previous year at $7 billion, and net financing and portfolio 
inflows also fell. The balance of payments recorded a surplus estimated 
at 0.4% of GDP, and international reserves were estimated at 2.3 months 
of imports of goods and services (Figure 3.31.6).
To mitigate vulnerabilities in the banking sector, the government 
took several steps that addressed impaired bank balance sheets, 
insufficient bank capital, and inadequate prudential standards. 
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Most notably, it established the Viet Nam Asset Management Company 
(VAMC) primarily to acquire, restructure, and sell NPLs. By year-end, 
the VAMC had purchased the equivalent of $1.9 billion in bad debts from 
35 banks (estimated at 1.1% of all outstanding loans). As payment, the 
VAMC issued special bonds of up to 5 years with zero interest, which 
the banks can use as collateral to access the SBV’s refinancing facility. 
The SBV reported that the NPL rate had declined to 3.6% of all loans 
by the end of 2013, owing mainly to transfers to the VAMC, but it added 
that NPLs could be 9% if restructured loans were included. Rating 
agency Moody’s estimated NPLs could exceed 15% if international 
accounting and provisioning standards were applied (Figure 3.31.7). 
In addition, the government is gradually implementing a program 
to strengthen state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This plan includes 
equitizing, or partly privatizing, more state firms and sharply reducing 
the number of SOEs to 690 by 2015 and 200 by 2020. SOEs have been 
instructed to divest themselves of risky noncore operations. In June 
2013 the government simplified SOE reporting requirements in a move 
expected to encourage their disclosure of financial information. 
Economic prospects
Official statements indicate that the government will act to support 
economic growth in the next 2 years, though its priority is to maintain 
macroeconomic stability. The forecasts below assume policy stimulation 
will be moderate and that the government will make further gradual 
progress on structural reform to the financial and SOE sectors.
The budget deficit target for 2014 is close to last year’s, but the 
government increased the bond-issuance ceiling, which suggests that 
it could raise off-budget spending. Growth should get a lift from efforts 
to accelerate lagging programs as illustrated by a $1.4 billion housing 
assistance package unveiled in early 2013. Only 4% of this amount was 
disbursed by February 2014. 
On the monetary side, the SBV further trimmed policy rates by 
50 basis points in March 2014, taking the refinancing rate down to 6.5% 
and the discount rate to 4.5%. It also reduced the caps on certain deposit 
and lending rates. With policy rates at the lows seen in the last easing 
cycle, there is limited room for further monetary support. Interest rates 
could start to turn up next year.
To meet a target of 7% inflation, the SBV set targets of 12%–14% for 
credit growth, and 16%–18% for growth in total liquidity, all slightly 
higher than the 2013 targets. 
Growth in private consumption will get support from lower inflation, 
but the labor market remains slack and consumer confidence lackluster. 
Strong disbursements from committed foreign direct investment, 
particularly from Japan and the Republic of Korea, will bolster 
investment in high-tech manufacturing (Figure 3.31.8). On the other 
hand, private domestic investment will still be dampened by banking 
system weaknesses. 
Prospects for better performances in the US and euro area 
economies, two of Viet Nam’s major markets, suggest that growth 
in exports can be maintained. Coffee exports should get a lift 
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from stronger global coffee demand in 2014 and export-oriented 
manufacturing industries continue to expand. However, growth in the 
manufacture of high-tech products also propels imports, because inputs 
to these factories are sourced largely from abroad. 
Data for the first quarter of 2014 show that GDP rose by 5.0%, slightly 
faster than in the year-earlier quarter. Services expanded by 6.0% in 
January-March, industry and construction by 4.7%, and agriculture 
by 2.4%. As a sign of how the year started for manufacturing, the 
purchasing managers’ index for February showed that output continued 
to grow, but the pace eased to the slowest in 4 months. 
Considering these factors, GDP growth is forecast to rise slightly 
to 5.6% in 2014, picking up further to 5.8% in 2015 (Figure 3.31.9) with 
economic recovery in the US and the euro area and as progress is made 
in addressing domestic banking sector weaknesses. 
Inflation is expected to average 6.2% in 2014, assuming reasonably 
stable food production, moderate policy stimulation, and only slight 
depreciation of the dong (Figure 3.31.10). Inflation eased to 4.4% in 
March 2014. Changes in assumptions, or unexpectedly large price 
increases for subsidized goods and services, would generate higher 
inflation. Inflation is forecast to average 6.6% in 2015 as economic 
activity picks up.
Trade and current account surpluses are projected over the forecast 
period, but narrowing from 2013. A relatively stable dong exchange 
rate since April 2011 has improved perceptions about the currency, 
but periodic internal flight to foreign currency and gold suggests that 
sentiment toward the dong remains fragile. Prices for gold that are 
higher domestically than overseas indicate that investors favor gold as 
an inflation hedge. 
Negative errors and omissions in the balance of payments swelled to 
an estimated 6% of GDP in 2013, which may reflect large volumes of gold 
outside the banking system (Figure 3.31.11).
A return to the faster economic growth of previous years is 
hampered by the cautious pace of reform to the banking system and 
SOEs. The SBV has stepped up its supervision of bank lending, merged 
and restructured some of the weaker banks, and eased restrictions on 
foreign investment in domestic banks. After a year’s delay, new loan 
classification and provision standards intended to close the gap with 
international norms will come into effect in June 2014.
However, these new standards are less ambitious than originally 
intended, and further delay affects some key measures such as the 
requirement to adjust loan classifications based on credit information 
center data. Also, banks will continue to enjoy flexibility when 
restructuring overdue loans and the discretion to avoid declaring them 
as bad debt. Accelerating progress on resolving NPLs is likely to require 
setting firm targets and timelines for closing the gap between national 
and international standards.
In 2014, the VAMC plans to purchase the equivalent of up to 
$4.8 billion of bad debt from banks. Among the challenges facing the 
asset-management company are to build sufficient capacity to undertake 
complex debt restructuring and to pursue the task with initial capital of 
only $24 million. Effective mechanisms to price and auction bad debts, 
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and to auction collateralized assets, have yet to be put in place. Changes 
are required in the regulatory framework and bankruptcy law to allow 
the VAMC to handle debt and related collateral in a timely way. 
As the banks clean up NPLs they will still need capital injections, 
but it is unclear how and when they will be recapitalized. Bank 
recapitalization and SOE reform need to be pursued together with NPL 
resolution.
On SOE reform, the government aims to partly privatize 432 SOEs 
during 2014–2015 (Figure 3.31.12). That appears ambitious, considering 
that only 99 SOEs were equitized during 2011–2013. The domestic stock 
market has rallied to push the share price index up by 30% from August 
2013 to March 2014. But total stock market capitalization remains fairly 
small relative to the capital needed to ensure a successful equitization 
program. The government has approved share sales at below par value, 
which could help set prices that attract investors. 
A new constitution for Viet Nam approved by the National Assembly 
in November 2013 reaffirmed the dominant economic role of SOEs, 
disappointing business groups and others who hoped the role of the 
private sector would be more explicitly recognized. In a decision 
that should improve the accountability and management of SOEs, the 
government also approved a new procurement law that extends coverage 
to include SOEs. 
In another reform, a new land law that takes effect in July 2014 will 
improve transparency in land administration. If implemented well, this 
law will help minimize conflicts and delays in infrastructure projects. 
Policy challenge—public–private partnership
The quality of infrastructure in Viet Nam lags behind that of most 
other major Southeast Asian economies (Table 3.31.2). According to 
the government, Viet Nam needs to invest $170 billion in physical 
infrastructure such as electricity and water supply, transportation, and 
sewerage from 2011 to 2020. Public funding and official development 
assistance are expected to meet only half this need. The government’s 
capital spending is constricted by a persistent fiscal deficit, which 
averaged 5% of GDP in 2010–2013. 
Attracting private investment in infrastructure, mainly through 
public–private partnership (PPP), could substantially contribute to 
funding projects but also help gain access to international expertise and 
technology that improves efficiency and service delivery. 
So far, however, private investment in infrastructure has been very 
limited. For a start, the existing regulatory framework is not conducive 
to facilitating PPP transactions. Also, government agencies have 
developed their own practices in build-operate-transfer projects, the 
favored PPP structure, that depart from standard international practice. 
Most such projects have not been awarded through competitive bidding. 
The private sector views the bidding and negotiating process for 
PPPs in Viet Nam as unpredictable and lengthy. It is further concerned 
about the adequacy of PPP feasibility studies. 
To address these issues, the government established the National 
Steering Committee on PPPs in 2012, chaired by the deputy prime 
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minister. The committee is an advisory board to the government, not 
the PPP authority for projects. The Ministry of Planning and Investment 
established a PPP office that has become the central coordinator of 
PPP projects. 
Last year, the government directed the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment to draft a decree that would improve the regulatory 
framework for PPP, replacing earlier PPP-related legislation in favor of a 
framework that is more user-friendly and easier to administer. The draft 
decree, now undergoing consultation with government officials, 
development partners, and the private sector, proposes comprehensive 
regulation of PPP and includes greater emphasis on competition in the 
selection of investors. It further introduces principles for sharing risk 
between private investors and the government. 
The decree is expected to be adopted by the government later this 
year. Separately, a new procurement law that will govern selection 
procedures for PPP investors will take effect in July 2014. 
The financial viability of some infrastructure—urban transport, 
waste water, sanitation, and renewable energy—needs to be enhanced, 
given low tariffs the public pays for these services. The government 
could consider options to provide viability gap funding by, for example, 
making land available at no cost or through grants to selected projects. 
Such subsidies should be time-bound and targeted, and backed 
by explicit government policy, to achieve their declared outcomes 
regarding, for instance, environmental and social equity objectives. 
While the authorities have committed to a level playing field 
for bidders competing for PPP opportunities, the private sector is 
concerned about bidding transparency and SOE access to state-directed 
or preferential financing. A level playing field will require progress on 
SOE reform, including improved corporate governance. Also important 
is to ensure greater policy clarity and consistency with respect to 
private sector participation in the economy, including through PPPs, 
and continuing government attention to constraints faced by partners 
involved in PPPs.
Another need is to develop the domestic financial system to improve 
access to long-term funding for infrastructure through bank loans and 
debt markets. The Viet Nam capital market remains relatively shallow 
(Figure 3.31.13). Foreign banks are a potential source of medium- and 
long-term lending in foreign currencies but require credit enhancements 
and guarantees, such as those from export credit agencies. Until Viet 
Nam has a more established track record for PPP, the government may 
need to provide credit enhancements and underwrite guarantees.
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Fiji
Economic growth picked up in 2013, stimulated by an expansion of government expenditure to 
rehabilitate and upgrade the country’s road network, and by increased domestic investment and 
consumption. Business confidence continues to strengthen as clear progress is made toward elections 
scheduled for September 2014. Sustaining recent increases in domestic demand and private sector 
investment is vital to maintaining growth and achieving fiscal sustainability in the long run.
Economic performance
The latest official estimate is that Fiji posted 3.6% GDP growth in 2013 
as the economy rebounded from poor performances in agriculture and 
mining, and from severe flooding at the start of 2012 (Figure 3.32.1). 
Recovery in agricultural output and stronger performances in 
wholesale and retail trade, transport and storage, communication, and 
financial intermediation contributed to broad-based economic growth. 
As preparations for elections in September 2014 have achieved their 
milestones, domestic investor confidence has improved and private 
sector activity has rebounded after a weak 2012.
The government’s expansionary fiscal policy increased expenditure 
by 12% in 2013, boosting both public and private investment. Projects to 
rehabilitate and upgrade the country’s road network drove an increase 
of more than 30% in capital expenditure during the year. Buoyant 
construction drove domestic cement sales up by 20% in 2013 and imports 
of investment goods up by 27% from January to November 2013. 
Consumption indicators also showed consumer spending 
strengthening over the course of the year, supported by higher disposable 
incomes. Tax cuts and higher tax thresholds, combined with strong 
remittance inflows—which rose by 6.9% over the year to October—fueled 
consumption growth. Higher consumption spending was reflected in 
higher value-added tax revenues, which increased by 11.1%.
The performance of Fiji’s leading production sectors—sugar, tourism, 
and gold—was mixed in 2013. Total production of sugar, Fiji’s primary 
agricultural commodity, increased by 16.2%, reversing a contraction of 
7.1% in 2012. Better-quality cane and recent investments that improved 
the operational efficiency of mills contributed to growth. Latest data 
from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics indicate that the value of sugar 
exports in 2013 was only 3.6% higher than in the previous year because 
international prices for the commodity fell (Figure 3.32.2). 
Gold production, which declined by 8.0% in 2012, fell even 
further by 15.6% in 2013 as production performed below expectations. 
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Lower gold prices meant that the value of gold exports fell by 36.4% 
during the year. Vatakoula Gold Mines, the operator of the country’s 
single gold mine, is investing in capital works and exploration aimed at 
improving production from the mine.
Tourist arrivals stabilized over the first 3 quarters of 2013 with 
a small increase of 0.4%, following a 2.5% fall in 2012. Arrivals from 
Australia, by far the largest source of foreign tourists, mirrored 
this trend, growing by 0.4% in 2013. The number of arrivals from 
New Zealand, Fiji’s second-largest overseas tourist market, posted 
7.2% growth over the year (Figure 3.32.3). Tourism receipts registered 
a 1.7% increase over the first 3 quarters of the year, suggesting rising 
expenditure per tourist.
Inflation moderated to an average annual rate of 2.9% from 3.4% 
in 2012 (Figure 3.32.4). Early inflationary pressures from supply 
disruptions caused by Cyclone Evan dissipated quickly, then lower 
international commodity prices kept inflation low until late in the year, 
when rising fuel prices began to push it up again.
The current account deficit spiked last year, rising from 1.5% in 
2012 to 18.5% in 2013 (Figure 3.32.5). Fiji Airways’ purchase of three 
new aircraft at a total cost of about $600 million was the main factor 
behind the large deficit. Also, export revenues contracted by 5.0% 
during the year as revenues from gold and other commodity exports 
such as mineral water declined. The value of the country’s imports 
of manufactured goods increased by 5.8% from January to October 
2013. At the end of January 2014, foreign reserves stood at almost 
F$1.8 billion, equivalent to 4.7 months of import cover.
Economic prospects
Growth is projected to moderate to 2.8% in 2014, as record investment 
growth levels off and the stimulatory effects of one-off tax cuts and 
higher tax thresholds in 2013 dissipate. The economic outlook continues 
to improve on previous projections, though, and early growth indicators 
are positive for 2014. In the near term, recently completed, ongoing, and 
planned projects including the Damodar City project in Suva, a couple 
of large hotel and resort developments, and the upgrading of Nadi 
International Airport, are expected to boost employment and economic 
activity. In the longer term, these projects are seen to benefit tourism 
and related sectors such as transport and wholesale and retail trade. 
Growth is projected to accelerate to 3.0% in 2015 with development 
partner financing in the post-election period, continued improvement 
in investor confidence, and rising private sector activity stemming from 
greater policy certainty. The current dependence on consumption-
driven growth is unsustainable in the medium term, however, and some 
rebalancing toward broader-based growth is essential. One downside 
risk to growth is the large public debt, which was equal to 48% of GDP 
in 2013. A related risk is high contingent liabilities, which equaled 30% 
of GDP in the same year. 
Fiji’s inflation rate has moderated in recent years and is expected 
to remain at 3.0% in 2014, as projected declines in international food 
and fuel prices are offset by continued fiscal expansion. Inflation is 
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seen to accelerate to 3.5% in 2015 in line with the projected acceleration 
in growth.
The current account deficit is expected to show an improvement 
over 2013, narrowing to 6.1% of GDP in 2014 as tourism earnings and 
personal remittances rise. Exports are forecast to grow by 5.3% in 
2014, while imports are expected to decline by 16.4% toward a more 
typical level following last year’s aircraft purchases. The 2015 current 
account deficit is projected to widen to 7.1% of GDP, reflecting stronger 
investment and consumer demand in the economy. 
Government expenditures are set to increase further by 28% in 
the 2014 budget as both recurrent and capital expenditure increase 
(Figure 3.32.6). Free primary and secondary education is a significant 
addition to recurrent expenditure. The budget forecasts a deficit 
equivalent to 1.9% of GDP, which would improve on the deficit of 2.8% 
recorded in 2013. The government’s revenue forecast anticipates that 
continuing high domestic investment and consumption spending will 
bring an 11% increase in tax revenues, led by a projected 14% rise in 
value-added tax collections. If actual economic performance falls short 
of projections, the deficit will be wider. The target deficit counts revenue 
from the one-time sale of strategic assets, including overseas embassies 
and some of the better-performing state-owned enterprises, which will 
boost revenue only temporarily.
Policy challenge—balancing fiscal sustainability 
and inclusive growth 
The government is stepping up to the challenge of promoting inclusive 
growth to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals. A poverty benefit scheme budgeted at F$22 million will more 
than double coverage of the poor, from 3.0% to 6.4%. A F$3 million 
social pension fund will support those aged 70 and over who have no 
other pension, and a separate F$4.5 million fund will protect children. 
The introduction of free education, while untargeted, is a pillar of the 
government’s strategy to alleviate poverty. 
However, financing the increased public expenditure on social 
programs could require the government to take on substantial new debt 
or sell off public assets unless growth accelerates sharply. Balancing 
the goals of inclusive growth and fiscal sustainability will require 
the reinvigoration of private sector investment, which depends on 
improvements in the business environment. The main issues investors 
report relate to barriers faced in starting a business, trading across 
borders, and paying taxes. A return to elected government should be 
an important step toward restoring investor confidence. Greater public 
participation in policy development and progress in regional cooperation 
and integration initiatives should catalyze external demand and foreign 
investment.
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Papua New Guinea
Growth is forecast at 6.0% in 2014 and a record 21.0% in 2015, led by the commencement of 
gas exports in late 2014. In contrast with mining and petroleum, the rest of the economy will 
grow by just 1.6% in 2014. A challenge for the government is to share the benefits of growth 
and to narrow regional inequality by expanding services in rural areas and employment through 
a more conducive business environment. 
Economic performance
Economic growth in Papua New Guinea (PNG) slowed to 5.1% in 2013 
as construction on a $20 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project 
wound down toward completion in mid-2014 (Figure 3.33.1). Growth 
in construction halved from 24% in 2012 to 12% in 2013, and this 
deceleration spilled over into the broader economy, slowing growth in 
wholesale and retail trade from 20% in 2012 to 5% in 2013. Long-term 
declines continued at a number of older mining and oil operations, but 
they were more than offset by increased output from a new nickel project, 
such that mining and quarrying as a whole expanded by 15% in 2013.
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries grew at a modest 0.5% in 2013. 
Although this improved on the 1.6% contraction in 2012, conditions 
in the sector continue to be hampered by falling commodity prices, 
declining yields from aging plantations, inadequate pest control, and 
poor transport infrastructure. Further, an elevated exchange rate for 
much of the year discouraged farm output, especially of labor-intensive 
cash crops like copra, cocoa, and coffee.
National budget appropriations grew by 20% in 2013, while revenue 
growth was a more modest 9.5%. This widened the official fiscal gap 
to the equivalent of 7.9% of GDP and brought central government debt 
to 31% of GDP, up from 26% in 2012 (Figure 3.33.2). Funding for the 
government’s four priority “development enablers”—infrastructure, 
education, health, and law and order—continued to grow rapidly, 
increasing by 38% over 2012 (Figure 3.33.3). The share of total funding 
for these four priorities doubled from 20% of the budget in 2003 to 40% 
in 2013. 
A major challenge to budget execution continues to be 
implementation capacity, particularly for new national infrastructure 
projects, which suffer weak monitoring and oversight. Allocations 
continue to be assigned to many projects before the completion of their 
feasibility studies and preparatory design. As of November 2013, only 
35% of the budget allocation for new capital projects had been spent, 
with most allocations sitting unused in project trust accounts rather 
3.33.2 Fiscal balance and public debt
% of GDP % of GDP
Fiscal balance (ocial)
Fiscal balance (adjusted
for trust funds) Public debt 
–10
–5
0
5
10
201220102008200620042002
Forecast
–80
–40
0
40
80
20152014
Sources: PNG Department of Treasury. National Budget. 
Various years; ADB estimates. 
240  Asian Development Outlook 2014
than flowing into the economy (Figure 3.33.4). As a result, the planned 
fiscal stimulus for 2013 had only a limited effect on economic activity 
during the year.
Inflation continued to remain moderate in 2013, with the consumer 
price index estimated to have risen by 4% at year-end (Figure 3.33.5). 
Subdued international food and commodity prices and low inflation in 
key trading partners, notably Australia, contributed to this outcome. 
The relatively high value of the PNG kina helped restrain import prices 
(Figure 3.33.6).
Motivated by moderate inflation and slowing growth in the economy, 
the central bank continued to ease monetary policy during 2013, 
lowering the target policy rate to 6.25% in March 2013 from a peak of 
7.75% in September 2011. However, persistently high excess liquidity in 
the commercial banking system keeps policy rates largely disconnected 
from actual market rates. Even as aggregate output growth slowed 
during the year, growth in credit to the private sector accelerated, 
expanding by 18% in 2013, up from 7% in 2012. This somewhat 
counterintuitive trend reflects the winding back of runaway profit 
growth in many sectors resulting from investment in the LNG project. 
As profit growth has slowed, many firms are now looking again to the 
commercial banking system to fund their investment plans, rather than 
self-financing them through retained earnings. 
The current account recorded a deficit of 13.7% of GDP in 2013, 
driven by large capital imports and service payments related to LNG 
project construction (Figure 3.33.7). As these payments are primarily 
funded by foreign direct investment and medium- and long-term loans, 
they pose little risk to PNG’s external stability. Although international 
reserves declined by 18.0% during the first half of 2013, they remain 
healthy, sufficient for 10.9 months of import coverage.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast at 6.0% in 2014, picking up to a record 21.0% 
in the following year although ongoing challenges with the quality of 
macroeconomic data continue to limit the accuracy of these forecasts 
(Box 3.33.1). Leading this growth is oil and gas, as LNG production 
is expected to commence in late 2014, making 2015 the first full year 
of production. The rebound in mining and quarrying is expected to 
continue as new operations further expand production, boosting real 
growth in that sector to 14.0% in 2014 before it falls back to 3.1% in 2015. 
In contrast with mining and petroleum extraction, activity in 
the rest of the economy is expected to continue to slow, with growth 
forecast at just 1.6% in 2014. Construction is forecast to contract by 6.4% 
in 2014, following the completion of the LNG production facilities and 
pipeline by the middle of the year. Growth in transport and logistics, 
wholesale and retail trade, and financial services will ease from the 
highs recorded over the previous 3 years. The agriculture, forestry, 
and fisheries sector is expected to recover, with growth of 4.0% in 
both 2014 and 2015. Agricultural output is expected to be boosted by 
the kina’s decline at the end of 2013, which has improved the export 
competitiveness of cash crops. 
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Although GDP growth is expected to hit record highs in 2015, 
this will have only limited immediate impact on the broader economy 
and job creation. As international investors own some 80% of the 
LNG project, it is likely most earnings will remain offshore. And, as 
the project comes onstream, employment in the project will drop 
dramatically, from a peak of about 16,000 workers during construction 
to a few hundred once the project is fully operational. As a result, 
the project will have much less impact on gross national income 
than on GDP. The project’s key transmission mechanism to the 
domestic economy will be dividend and tax payments to the national 
government, which are expected to peak in the early 2020s. During 
the initial years of production, some of these revenues will likely be 
required to service loans that fund the state’s equity holding in the 
project. They may also be used for investment in further resource 
development. 
3.33.1  Macroeconomic data limitations
The accuracy of macroeconomic monitoring and forecasting in PNG 
is increasingly hampered by deficiencies in official data collection and 
compilation. GDP data were last published by the National Statistics 
Office for 2006 and last reported to the International Monetary Fund for 
2004. The Treasury Department has made do with its own GDP estimates 
since 2002, but they suffer from extremely limited source data and their 
coverage from the perspective only of sector-based production. Income 
and expenditure accounts have remained unavailable since 2007. 
Further undermining GDP data is the use of the outdated base year 
of 1998 for calculating real GDP figures. As the structure of the PNG 
economy has changed rapidly over the past decade—a trend that will 
likely continue during the forecast period—this problem continues to 
create significant biases in GDP growth rates overall and by sector. 
The National Statistics Office compiles a quarterly consumer price 
index and an unpublished wholesale price index. Both are based 
on expenditure weights that are 39 years old, and the lack of data 
collection means the index now excludes a number of key items such as 
accommodation. These limitations significantly hinder the reliability of 
inflation calculations and estimates. 
Regarding external accounts, official data on exports and imports of 
goods differ markedly from those reported by trading partners. Financial 
accounts data suffer from deficiencies in collection, especially regarding 
private external debt and foreign direct investment.
Poor macroeconomic data significantly hamper the ability of policy 
makers to monitor emerging economic trends and risks, or to implement 
in a timely way countercyclical monetary policies. They also create 
financial costs for the economy. Standard and Poor’s highlighted in 
its January 2014 update that gaps in PNG macroeconomic statistics 
constrained the country’s creditworthiness.
In partnership with the International Monetary Fund, the government 
has begun to address some of these issues. Prioritizing this effort during 
2014 will be vital to ensure that official macroeconomic statistics are able 
to give more accurate insights into PNG’s real economy and to improve 
the quality of macroeconomic management in the future. 
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The 2014 budget remains expansionary, with a planned fiscal deficit 
equivalent to 5.9% of GDP. Despite the dampening effect of lower 
global commodity prices and a growth slowdown in the non-mineral 
economy, revenue collection is forecast to grow by a record 23% in 
2014, underpinned by planned improvements in tax compliance and 
enforcement. The depreciation of the kina against major currencies 
such as the Australian and US dollar during the latter part of 2013 
is expected to bolster tax receipts from commodity exports and 
development assistance, both of which are largely denominated in these 
foreign currencies. 
Despite the implementation challenges experienced in 2013, 
infrastructure is again a major recipient of new funding in 2014, with 
allocations increasing by 42%. Additional expenditure in the 2014 
budget remains broadly aligned with the government’s other medium-
term development enablers: education, health, and law and order.
Central government debt is expected to reach 35% of GDP in 2014. 
While this is broadly sustainable and in line with the limits established 
in the government’s medium-term fiscal strategy for 2012–2017, a 
number of additional liabilities raise fiscal risks. Unpaid superannuation 
arrears and the financing of the government’s equity stake in the LNG 
project bring gross public debt to approximately 56% of GDP. Further, 
the inclusion of public enterprise debt estimated at 7.5% of GDP 
(as recorded in 2010) would bring combined indebtedness to over 63%. 
Inflation is anticipated to accelerate to 6.5% in 2014, as public 
investments originally planned for 2013 finally roll out and as kina 
depreciation in late 2013 passes through to imported prices. In 2015 
inflation is expected to return to its long-run average and is forecast 
at 5.0%, but this depends on the government reining in expenditure 
growth and on the central bank maintaining prudent monetary 
policies. Domestic deposit rates are anticipated to remain near zero for 
the foreseeable future unless the central bank undertakes monetary 
interventions sufficient to soak up liquidity in the banking system. 
The current account deficit is expected to narrow to 7.0% of GDP 
in 2014 before becoming a surplus of 13.0% in 2015. The improvement 
in the external balance is driven largely by the commencement of LNG 
exports in late 2014, but also by expanding nickel production at the new 
mine. In line with LNG exports, payments from abroad are expected to 
increase substantially from 2015, mainly through income and dividend 
payments to the government. 
Policy challenge—addressing regional fiscal 
inequality for inclusive growth
Royalty payments from resource projects and larger value-added 
tax collections in major urban centers mean that the ability of PNG’s 
22 provincial governments to raise own-source revenues varies 
significantly. In 2009, the Government of PNG undertook reforms to 
address this, allocating 5.6% of non-mineral revenues to create a pool 
of national funds to compensate poorer provinces with higher national 
government grants. The compensation provided to each province would 
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be based on its ability to raise own-source revenue relative to what the 
government’s National Economic and Fiscal Commission estimates 
it should cost the province to deliver 11 minimum priority activities: 
the provision of school materials, the supervision of education staff, 
district education office operations, rural health facility operation, 
integrated health patrols, medical supply distribution, road and bridge 
maintenance, airstrip maintenance, wharf and jetty maintenance, 
agricultural extension services, and operational materials. 
Following these reforms, significant progress has been made in 
narrowing provincial fiscal inequality. Prior to reform, six provinces 
received less than half of what the commission calculated they needed 
to fund the minimum set of activities, and another four received less 
than 70%. By 2012, only three provinces received less than 70% of their 
needs, with the lowest-funded province receiving 65% (Figure 3.33.8). 
This has placed previously marginalized provinces in a much stronger 
fiscal position to fund routine service delivery. 
Further, because provinces rely increasingly on so-called function 
grants from the national government, and because function grant 
spending is tied to a priority list of activities, the proportion of 
provincial government spending on key development activities has 
increased. Spending on the national government’s development enablers 
has increased by 160% since the reforms. 
Yet, while provincial fiscal reform has helped to equalize the 
financial capability of provincial governments, a number of challenges 
remain to translating this additional money into inclusive development 
outcomes. 
One challenge is the allocation of Provincial Government’s own 
source revenues which continue to fund non-priority activities—in 
particular those related to wages and salaries of government staff. 
The National Economic and Fiscal Commission calculates that in 2012 
provincial governments overspent on administration by 123%.
Another challenge is the timing of function grant release, which is 
often slow and unpredictable. In many cases, provinces receive their 
allocations too late in the year to use them effectively. In 2012, for 
example, eight provinces had to wait until the final fiscal quarter to 
receive more than 40% of their annual allocations. 
Yet another challenge is weak implementation capacity in provincial 
governments, which lack skills for project costing, contracting, and 
management. Greatly expanded funding has strained procurement 
systems, while control and accountability mechanisms are rarely able to 
account for funds once they have been released. 
Ensuring that improved provincial fiscal equity translates into 
inclusive development outcomes will require focusing not just on 
financing capacity but also on improving provincial governments’ 
underlying systems of accountability and implementation for essential 
public services.
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Solomon Islands
Economic growth moderated in 2013 as forestry, agriculture, and mining declined. A slight pickup 
in growth is forecast for 2014, but rapid population growth will rule out much improvement in 
GDP per capita. Slower growth in recent years has placed pressure on the government budget 
and reinforced the need to control government expenditure and improve its quality to meet the 
needs of an expanding population.
Economic performance
Growth slowed to 2.9% in 2013 from 4.8% in the previous year 
(Figure 3.34.1). This weak outcome, which reflected mainly declines in 
earnings from gold and agriculture, only slightly outpaced population 
growth at 2.5%. The value of gold production fell by 15% in 2013, mainly 
because gold prices were lower and the gold processing plant underwent 
major refurbishment. Agricultural production fell in 2013, with most 
agricultural commodities recording output declines because of poor 
weather in the first half of the year and lower prices. 
Logging fell by 3.0% because of weather and prices but still recorded 
the country’s third-largest annual harvest (Figure 3.34.2). This rate 
of extraction, and its heavy reliance on logging previously harvested 
forests, appears unsustainable, such that production is expected to 
continue to contract as forest stocks decline.
Growth in 2013 was driven by expansion in construction, 
manufacturing, and services. In particular, investment in the Gold Ridge 
mine and expanded production at the Noro tuna-processing factory 
boosted growth.
Consumer price index inflation averaged 6.0%, up slightly from 
5.9% in 2012 (Figure 3.34.3). Inflation was high in the first half of 2013, 
largely because unusually heavy rains in the second quarter drove 
up food prices, but it moderated in the second half. Falling prices for 
imported goods helped subdue the inflation average for the whole year. 
The appreciation of the Solomon Islands dollar against the Australian 
dollar in particular helped tame inflation because Australia is the main 
source of imports. 
After a small current account deficit in 2012, the deficit widened 
to 2.0% of GDP in 2013 as export earnings from gold, logging, and 
agricultural commodities fell and imports expanded to support major 
investment projects. Despite the deteriorating current account deficit, 
foreign reserves remained high, bolstered by large inflows of grants 
and foreign direct investment. As of December 2013, foreign exchange 
reserves provided 7.8 months of import cover, down from 8.5 months in 
December 2012.
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In 2013, the Central Bank of Solomon Islands undertook short-
term measures to alleviate inflationary pressure, including mopping up 
liquidity by issuing short-term bills. Although the central bank formally 
moved to peg the Solomon Islands dollar to a basket of currencies in 
October 2012, it has continued in practice to intervene in currency 
markets to limit fluctuations in the US dollar–Solomon Islands dollar 
exchange rate. The appreciation of the US dollar in 2013 therefore 
meant that the Solomon Islands dollar appreciated strongly against 
the Australian dollar over the year. Following a major Australian 
bank’s withdrawal of trade financing for logging exports in response to 
environmental concerns about logging practices, the Solomon Islands 
government offered additional banking licenses. So far, however, only 
one provisional license has been granted—to a domestically incorporated 
bank with ties to Sri Lanka—and this bank has yet to start operations.
The government budgeted a small fiscal surplus in 2013, but revenue 
growth disappointed. Domestic revenues actually fell, inducing the 
government to reduce capital expenditures. The buildup of large 
spending arrears necessitated the approval of a supplementary budget in 
September 2013. For the year, the overall deficit equaled 0.7% of GDP.
The government continued to make progress in controlling external 
debt, which fell from the equivalent of 13.0% of GDP at the end of 2012 
to 11.4% a year later. The government’s debt-management strategy 
provides for an annual limit on new borrowing based on an annual 
analysis of debt sustainability undertaken as part of the budget process. 
A debt-management advisory committee composed of senior government 
officials with expertise in debt management, planning, and economic 
and monetary policy was established to provide advice to the finance 
minister on proposed new borrowing by the public sector.
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to pick up slightly, to 3.0%, in 2014. Agricultural 
production and gold output are projected to increase and offset declining 
log production as forest resources dwindle. Gold mining is expected to 
scale up as the Gold Ridge mine moves towards full production capacity 
of 95,000 ounces per year, well above the production of 57,400 ounces 
in 2013. The recovery in agriculture output in the second half of 2013 is 
predicted to continue in 2014.
In 2015, growth is projected to hold steady at 3.0%, driven by 
fiscal stimulus from investment projects and their spillover effects on 
the economy. Modest increases in gold production are also expected 
as planned improvements in production processes are implemented. 
Logging is expected to continue to decline in the medium term at an 
average annual rate of 8.0%.
Inflation is expected to moderate slightly in 2014, falling to an 
average annual rate of 5.5% as the inflationary impact of poor weather 
in mid-2013 dissipates. Reflecting the country’s modest growth 
expectations and continued declines in import prices, inflation is 
expected to moderate further, to 5.0%, in 2015.
A balanced budget is planned for 2014, but its achievement appears 
uncertain. The target assumes a 7.2% increase in recurrent revenue, but 
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this will depend upon stronger economic growth and improvements in 
revenue administration and compliance (Figure 3.34.4). In 2014, some 
increase in expenditure is expected to cover the 2014 election, including 
one-time grants worth more than $50,000 to politicians upon their 
leaving office. The government has decided to reduce constituency and 
discretionary funding for members of parliament by one-third in 2014 to 
offset expected election costs, but this is one area where expenditures 
could exceed estimates. Tertiary education is another, as expenditure 
has exceeded the budget in recent years.
The central bank is expected to continue to soak up excess liquidity 
by selling short-term bills as credit growth recovers from the lows 
of recent years. Over time, the effects of the central bank’s use of a 
currency basket rather than a peg to the US dollar should become 
more pronounced, and the Solomon Islands dollar can be expected to 
track more closely the movements of the currencies of its major trading 
partners, particularly Australia.
The current account deficit is expected to deteriorate further in 
2014, widening to the equivalent of 6.0% of GDP in 2014 and 10.0% in 
2015 (Figure 3.34.5). Rising deficits will stem primarily from expected 
declines in logging exports, while import growth is seen to continue, 
driven by imports of construction and mining equipment. The deficit 
will be funded through continued assistance inflows from development 
partners and foreign direct investment. Import cover is expected to 
remain comfortable at 6–7 months through 2014 and 2015.
Policy challenge—improving the quality 
of government spending
The strong growth outcomes experienced by Solomon Islands since 
2003, in the years following ethnic tensions, have translated into only 
mixed outcomes in terms of improved social indicators. This suggests 
that the government needs to free up fiscal space for essential 
development expenditures to facilitate more inclusive growth. 
To accomplish this with slower growth and weaker revenues will 
require significant adjustments to government spending priorities and 
improvement in the quality of public expenditure.
Spending on tertiary scholarships is a concern that warrants 
particular attention. The 2014 budget describes the government’s 
decision to provide free university education last year as the most 
significant risk to fiscal sustainability in Solomon Islands. Funding for 
tertiary education grew fivefold from 2009 to 2013. Scholarships are 
supposed to be allocated through a nomination review committee, 
but it appears that committee review has often been sidelined by 
ministerial intervention. A result is more scholarships being granted 
than initially budgeted. There appears to be inadequate linkage 
between the skills demanded by the labor market and the areas of 
study enjoying scholarship support. Finally, the large increases in 
tertiary funding seem to have crowded out much-needed expenditure 
on basic education, which tends to be more inclusive because the cost of 
access is low.
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Another concern in regard to the government’s ability to spend to 
promote inclusive growth is the rapid expansion of the public payroll in 
recent years. Expenditure on public sector employees has been growing 
at an average annual rate of 10% over the past 6 years. While base 
salaries have not increased substantially, growth in rental subsidies, 
allowances, and overtime payments has fueled higher expenditures, as 
have “grade creep” and proliferation in the number of public workers. 
Controlling payroll expenditure and ensuring sufficient funding for 
other budget items are essential to the sustainable delivery of other 
government services.
Constituency funds, which are funds allocated directly to 
parliamentarians to spend on projects in their districts, are another area 
where expenditure overruns have been common. 
Government action is under way to address these problems 
and ensure that public expenditure promotes inclusive growth. 
The government has agreed to limit the number of scholarships 
awarded for Solomon Islands National University after 2013, and an 
education sector review scheduled to take place this year will assess 
the balance of funding between primary and tertiary education. This 
year will also see a review of public sector remuneration. Regulations 
for operationalizing the Constituency Development Funds Act, 2013 
are being introduced, and a 2012 audit of constituency fund spending 
is being finalized. These measures are being incorporated into the 
performance benchmarks for an extended credit facility arrangement 
with the International Monetary Fund and for budget support 
programs. They warrant close monitoring in the run-up to the election 
scheduled for late 2014.
This chapter was written by Christopher Edmonds of the Pacific Department, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila; and David Freedman, consultant, Timor-Leste Resident 
Mission, Asian Development Bank, Dili.
Timor-Leste
The strong growth of the past 6 years continued on the back of public expenditure and private 
sector activity, and this performance is expected to be maintained. Inflation moderated in 2013 
but will likely reaccelerate if planned increases in public spending are fully implemented. A major 
policy challenge is to design fiscal policies to translate oil and gas revenues into sustainable and 
inclusive growth.
Economic performance 
GDP excluding the offshore petroleum industry is estimated to have 
grown by 8.0% in 2013 as rapid private sector growth helped offset 
reductions in public investment (Figure 3.35.1). The public sector 
continues to be the main source of demand. While government 
expenditure of $1.3 billion was lower than in 2012, it remained close to 
recent highs, equivalent to 86% of non-oil GDP. 
Royalty payments to the government from offshore oil and gas 
production totaled $3.1 billion in 2013. This dwarfed tax and other 
non-oil revenues of $150 million and enabled the government to post a 
$2.1 billion budget surplus that was deposited in the Petroleum Fund. 
Public savings, defined as the Petroleum Fund plus foreign exchange 
reserves, are $14.9 billion, which is 9.2 times annual non-oil GDP or 
about $12,400 per capita.
The 2013 budget planned $807 million in capital investment, but 
delays in project implementation meant only 43% of this was spent. 
The budget planned a 22% increase in recurrent expenditure over 2012, 
but actual spending was only 4% higher as reduced expenditures on 
transfers offset increased spending on salaries, wages, goods, and services.
Slower growth of total government expenditure (in particular 
recurrent expenditure), lower international food prices, and US dollar 
appreciation against the currencies of most of Timor-Leste’s major 
trading partners contributed to lower inflation in 2013. Average annual 
inflation fell to 9.5% from 10.9% in 2012 (Figure 3.35.2). Toward the end 
of 2013, inflationary pressures waned as government expenditures and 
import prices fell, taking year-on-year inflation in December to just 4%. 
Agricultural production declined in 2013. Coffee exports slipped 
from the high recorded in 2012, and cereal production fell by 20% 
because of reduced rice planting and unfavorable weather. Spending 
on imported grain fell by 27% in 2013, though global and regional 
grain prices were down by less than 10%, implying weaker demand 
and reduced grain imports. A 13.6% expansion in private sector credit 
supported strong business growth, but financial markets remain 
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underdeveloped, with the ratio of private sector credit to non-oil GDP 
only 11.3%.
Export growth lagged behind the rise in imports despite strong 
growth in services exports reported by the International Monetary 
Fund. Timor-Leste had another large trade deficit, but income from 
oil and gas royalties greatly exceeded the deficit, allowing the country 
to register a large current account surplus of $1.9 billion, or 1.2 times 
non-oil GDP (Figure 3.35.3). 
Economic prospects
Growth is forecast to remain strong at 8.5% in 2014 and 2015 as 
government expenditure increases and the private sector continues 
to expand. Although earlier plans for major capital investments have 
been scaled back amid concerns about implementation capacity and 
expenditure effectiveness, the 2014 budget projects a 38% rise in 
recurrent expenditure and a 47% increase in government capital 
investment. However, the effect of this spending on growth and inflation 
is hard to gauge, as actual expenditures have fallen short of budgeted 
amounts in recent years.
The development of basic infrastructure is a government priority, 
with 27% of spending from the government’s multiyear infrastructure 
fund allocated to road and bridge construction in 2014. Funding for 
the Tasi Mane project—intended to catalyze development on the 
south coast—has been reduced but still accounts for 13% of planned 
infrastructure spending, while spending to expand electricity service 
accounts for 15%. 
In previous years, infrastructure bottlenecks and limited private 
sector capacity meant that rising government expenditure—especially 
recurrent expenditure that is weighted toward local content—has caused 
inflation. Strong demand flows from increased government spending 
mean that inflation is forecast to remain high at 9.5% in 2014, easing to 
9.0% in 2015 as growth in government spending slows and global prices 
trend lower. 
The offshore Bayu-Udan gas field brings in 95% of Timor-Leste’s 
oil and gas royalties. Estimates of the field’s size have recently been 
downgraded and production is now thought to have peaked in 2012. 
Conservative forecasts project that reserves in the field will be 
exhausted by 2021, which is 4 years earlier than previously forecast 
(Figure 3.35.4). This, together with softening oil prices, is expected to 
reduce the fiscal surplus from 141% of non-oil GDP in 2013 to 44% in 
2014 and 2015 (Figure 3.35.5) and the current account surplus, from 
125% of non-oil GDP in 2013 to 47% in 2014 and 50% in 2015. 
The downward revision in production forecasts also has longer-
term implications. The forecasted net present value of future petroleum 
revenue has been cut from $13.2 billion to $7.0 billion. This lowers the 
sustainable amount that can be withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund 
each year by 22% to $632 million which is only 70% of the planned 2014 
budget withdrawal of $903 million. Expenditures planned for 2015–2018 
are also expected to exceed the estimated sustainable income but by 
amounts that are small relative to the value of the Petroleum Fund.
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Policy challenge—fiscal policy for 
inclusive growth
An enduring challenge for policy makers in Timor-Leste is to translate 
the country’s petroleum wealth into sustainable and inclusive growth 
that will reduce poverty and provide jobs for the country’s young 
population.
Timor-Leste has made significant progress in expanding primary 
education and reducing infant and maternal mortality, but recent 
poverty assessments cast doubt on the inclusiveness of growth from 
2006 to 2011. A 2007 survey of living standards found 49.9% of the 
population living in poverty and high rates of malnutrition in young 
children. The 2009–2010 Demographic and Health Survey did not 
measure poverty but found little improvement in childhood nutrition 
since 2007, with 45% of children under 5 years old underweight and 58% 
stunted, of whom 33% were severely stunted. 
Strong economic growth since 2007 likely reduced measured poverty 
rates, but the data on childhood nutrition raises questions about the 
inclusiveness of this growth. Analysis of newly published national 
accounts for 2000–2011 suggests that the amount the poor spend on 
food has not kept pace with GDP growth and that high inflation has 
reduced purchasing power and food consumption (Figure 3.35.6). 
Timor-Leste’s Strategic Development Plan, 2011–2030 identifies 
increased agricultural production as a driver of inclusive growth. 
Ongoing programs to rehabilitate rural roads, improve crop storage, 
and disseminate improved seed varieties have the potential to make 
food more available and improve rural livelihoods, provided the rural 
poor have access to land. The government safeguards food security 
through a range of policy measures including rice subsidies, a school 
lunch program, and transfer payments to vulnerable groups such as the 
elderly and single mothers of school-aged children. In the 2014 budget, 
funding for the school lunch program rose to $25.8 million, boosting 
spending per child per day from $0.15 to $0.25. The largest government 
transfer program pays pensions to veterans of the country’s long fight 
for independence toward achieving a peaceful transition to democracy 
but does not target poverty reduction as its main objective.
Timor-Leste’s policy makers face a trade-off between using scarce 
public funds for current consumption or for longer-term investment. 
Targeted transfers to the poor can immediately reduce poverty, but the 
effect is likely to be temporary and inflationary without accompanying 
investments that improve poor families’ income prospects. Large 
infrastructure investments like those planned for 2014–2018 have the 
potential to raise productivity in the long term, but in the short run 
they risk stoking inflation that undermines real incomes. So it is crucial 
that the investment program be scaled appropriately and targeted to 
relieve infrastructure bottlenecks. The government can enhance the 
contribution that new infrastructure makes to inclusive growth by 
continuing its reforms to improve service delivery and support job 
creation in the private sector.
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3.35.1 Social transfers as a tool for inclusive growth in Timor-Leste
Following the 2006 conflict, the Government of Timor-
Leste initiated ambitious fiscal transfer programs to 
provide social assistance to selected segments of the 
population. It could afford these expenditures because 
its revenues had ballooned from fees and royalties 
derived from offshore oilfields. While expenditures on 
social transfers rose rapidly, the country still managed to 
accumulate significant resources into its Petroleum Fund, 
which holds $14.9 billion ($12,400 per capita). Three main 
transfer programs were established along with a number 
of smaller programs. The largest program pays pensions 
to veterans of the struggle for independence. The second-
largest pays pensions to the elderly and disabled, and the 
third-largest, a conditional cash transfer program, benefits 
single mothers with children enrolled in school. The three 
programs currently have about 110,000 beneficiaries. 
The number of beneficiaries has increased by more than 
16% per annum since 2009 as the government registered 
eligible citizens. Transfer payments vary greatly across 
programs. Conditional cash transfers are limited to $240 
per year, elderly pensions are $360 per year, and annual 
veterans’ pensions range from $2,760 to $9,000. 
From 2009 to 2013, spending on transfer programs 
averaged 14.0% of government expenditure, or 11.4% 
of non-oil GDP, making Timor-Leste’s social transfers 
larger than those of its peer countries (box figure 1). 
The transfers have contributed to post-independence 
stability and economic recovery, supporting consumption 
that has fueled retail business formation and associated 
job creation. 
In an economy dominated by energy exports that 
generate little domestic employment, these transfers 
have helped to transfer benefits of the oil boom to the 
population. They have been relatively easy to administer 
and have directly benefited many citizens. Budget execution 
on the three main social transfer programs averaged 91.1% 
from 2008 to 2013. This compares favorably with a rate of 
70.0% for government capital expenditures (box figure 2).
Before 2012, transfer programs were funded from 
government revenue and sustainable Petroleum Fund 
withdrawals. Since 2012, increases in government 
spending, mainly to develop infrastructure, have required 
larger withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund, but the 
transfer programs remained affordable. Although the 
number of beneficiaries has increased, total payments for 
veteran pensions will decline over time. This program 
currently accounts for 60% of transfers, and the Ministry 
of Finance is applying actuarial modeling to assess its 
long-term fiscal impact. 
How much existing transfer programs reduce poverty 
is little understood. A few of the transfers are allocated 
according to need, but younger households with 
children—the largest demographic group in the country—
are underserved. To ensure transfers are sustainable and 
benefit recipients over the longer term, the economy must 
expand opportunities for recipients to invest in productive 
activity, not just consumption. The Government of Timor-
Leste clearly recognizes this, as shown by its ambitious 
plans to expand market access to its more impoverished 
rural areas.
2  Budget execution in Timor-Leste across 
major expenditure categories
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North Pacific economies
Weak GDP performance prevailed across the North Pacific, including contraction in Palau. 
However, growth is seen recovering in the near term as delayed infrastructure projects resume 
in the Marshall Islands and tourism recovers in Palau, though slow growth will likely persist 
in the Federated States of Micronesia. Along with current fiscal adjustments, stimulating the 
private sector through improved trade will be crucial over the longer term. 
Economic performance
Economic growth in the North Pacific was subdued in FY2013 (ended 
30 September 2013 in all three economies). The economy of the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands (RMI) grew by only 0.8%, slowing from 3.2% in 
FY2012 (Figure 3.36.1). The slowdown stems from the postponement of 
construction projects funded by development partners. Also, a severe 
drought hit the northern RMI midyear, sharply reducing harvests of 
food crops and copra. However, fisheries continued to perform well, 
with higher license fees raising revenues.
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) remained on a low growth 
path, with growth of 0.6% in FY2013 only slightly improving on the 
0.4% recorded in FY2012 (Figure 3.36.2). Growth was largely driven by 
fisheries, construction, and their associated activities. However, the lack 
of private investment, subdued business activity, and a slowdown in major 
public infrastructure projects continue to weigh on the FSM economy.
Palau’s economy is estimated to have contracted by 1.0% in FY2013, 
a sharp reversal from 4.8% growth the year before (Figure 3.36.3). 
In FY2012, Palau posted a record 116,856 visitor arrivals, but arrivals 
declined by 7.1% to 108,522 in FY2013, falling steeply in the second 
half. This was partly because Palau Airways suspended operations 
to Taipei,China (the largest source market in FY2012) from late 
April 2013 amid issues affecting the airline’s aircraft leases. Limited 
accommodation capacity and base effects stemming from 3 consecutive 
years of rapid growth appear to have contributed to the poorer 
tourism performance. Aside from the sharp fall in tourist arrivals from 
Taipei,China, Palau recorded fewer visitors from Japan and the Republic 
of Korea, both important markets. Despite the sharp decline, FY2013 
ranks second after FY2012 in the number of tourist arrivals. 
Inflation in the North Pacific declined during the year, tracking 
international food and fuel price movements. Inflation decelerated 
to 1.6% from 4.3% in the RMI, 2.2% from 5.8% in the FSM, and 3.0% 
from 5.4% in Palau. In addition to global price falls, the appreciation 
of the US dollar helped ease inflation in these economies by reducing 
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the cost of imports not denominated in that currency. All three North 
Pacific economies use the US dollar as their official currency and none 
has a central bank. This largely precludes the conduct of independent 
monetary policy.
The RMI is estimated to have incurred a fiscal deficit equivalent to 
0.7% of GDP, unchanged from FY2012, with increased transfers to state-
owned enterprises offsetting increased revenues from fishing licenses. 
Palau’s fiscal position similarly remained negative, its deficit growing 
from the equivalent of 0.2% of GDP in FY2012 to 1.2% as increased 
tax collections were insufficient to offset higher recurrent spending. 
The FSM was the only North Pacific economy to achieve a fiscal surplus, 
having significantly cut recurrent expenditure to realize a surplus 
equivalent to 2.4% of GDP in FY2013. This marked the FSM’s second 
consecutive year of surplus and its fourth in the past 5 years.
In the North Pacific, large merchandise trade deficits drive current 
account imbalances that are reduced by official transfers coming 
primarily from the US. The FSM saw its current account deficit narrow 
to the equivalent of 9.8% of GDP from 12.0% in FY2012, or to 41.5% 
from 44.2% excluding official transfers. Palau’s current account deficit 
widened to 12.4% from 7.7%, or to 27.6% from 23.3% excluding official 
transfers. The RMI’s current account deficit expanded to 8.8% from 
7.6% but improved to 35.1% from 37.3% excluding official transfers, on a 
narrower trade deficit and a wider income surplus. 
Economic prospects
Progress in infrastructure construction is expected to drive growth in 
the near term. Growth in the RMI is projected to accelerate to 3.0% in 
FY2014 as work proceeds in earnest on delayed projects, such as the 
airport runway extension, funded by development partners. Recovery 
in agricultural production in areas affected by bad weather last year 
is, along with continued strong fisheries performance, expected to 
support growth. Growth is projected to moderate to 1.5% in FY2015 
as annual decrements continue in sector grants from the US under the 
Compact of Free Association, and as stimulus from public infrastructure 
construction wanes. 
Similarly, Palau’s economy is seen to rebound from contraction. 
New tourism facilities, which could increase accommodation capacity 
by about 6%, are seen to drive GDP growth at 3.0% in FY2014. 
Reconstruction to repair damage from Cyclone Haiyan in November 
2013 will likely contribute to output. Growth is expected to fall back to 
2.0% in FY2015 as the effects of the capacity upgrade dissipate, but this 
will be somewhat offset by fiscal stimulus tied to the start of at least one 
large infrastructure project funded by development partners. 
The low growth experienced by the FSM is seen to persist for lack 
of significant new investment or business formation, combined with 
a paucity of large infrastructure projects. GDP growth is projected to 
remain at 0.5% in FY2014 and FY2015, supported mostly by a steady 
fisheries performance.
The North Pacific’s high dependence on imports combines with 
expectations of falling international food and fuel prices in the near 
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term to suggest that low inflation will persist. Inflation is projected to 
slow only marginally to 1.5% in FY2014 and FY2015 in the RMI but 
more steeply in the FSM, to 2.0% in FY2014 and then to 1.5%, and in 
Palau, to 2.5% in FY2014 and then to 2.0% (Figure 3.36.4).
Declining international prices are expected to lower food and fuel 
import bills, and contribute to improving current account positions 
in the FSM and Palau (Figure 3.36.5). With income flows from fishing 
licenses expected to remain robust, the FSM’s current account deficit is 
projected to narrow slightly to the equivalent of 9.6% of GDP in FY2014 
and 9.3% in FY2015. A rebound in tourism arrivals and receipts as 
hotel capacity expands is seen to significantly narrow Palau’s current 
account deficit to the equivalent of 9.3% of GDP in FY2014. This deficit 
is projected to fall further, to 7.4% of GDP, in FY2015 with continuing 
modest growth in tourist arrivals and receipts.
The RMI will likely widen its current account deficit, as falling 
prices for food and fuel imports are more than offset by increased 
imports of capital inputs for the resumption of work on delayed 
infrastructure projects. In particular, two ships imported by 
development partners for interisland transport are expected to raise 
the RMI’s current account deficit to the equivalent of 20.6% of GDP in 
FY2014. The deficit is expected to revert to 10.9% of GDP in FY2015 as 
capital imports return to normal and revenues from fish exports and 
fishing license fees continue to grow. Annual budget support and capital 
grants from the US play an important role in enabling North Pacific 
economies to finance their current account deficits.
The governments of the RMI and the FSM are proceeding with 
fiscal adjustments to prepare for the scheduled expiration in 2023 of 
their respective Compacts of Free Association with the US. They are 
seeking to build up trust funds able to generate investment returns 
sufficient to fund government expenditures and replace annual compact 
grants. While the FSM has generated modest fiscal surpluses in 4 of 
the past 5 years, the latest estimates suggest that current rates of saving 
are inadequate. Tougher fiscal consolidation will likely be required 
to mobilize revenue through reform to taxes and tax administration, 
and to make public expenditure more efficient, if the FSM is to avoid 
graver fiscal adjustments and public service cuts after 2023. Compared 
with the FSM, the RMI is closer to achieving its Compact Trust Fund 
target value by FY2023, though further reform is required to generate 
fiscal buffers to safeguard against possible shocks and variability in 
investment returns.
The renewal of the economic provisions of Palau’s Compact of Free 
Association has awaited approval from the US Congress for more than 
3 years. In the meantime, Palau receives financial assistance in the form 
of discretionary funding under a continuing US Congress resolution. 
As with the current RMI and FSM compacts, the proposed renewal for 
Palau includes provisions that would offset declines in annual grants 
by increased funding for trust fund contributions and infrastructure 
projects. Resources arising from a renewed compact will need to be 
properly managed to avoid sharp fiscal adjustments in the future. In all 
three North Pacific economies, structural reform to develop the private 
sector is key to maintaining growth while ensuring fiscal sustainability. 
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Policy challenge—improving trade performance
Because their domestic markets are small, North Pacific economies must 
rely on external demand to absorb expanded output from productive 
sectors and thereby sustain growth. However, their remoteness poses 
persistent challenges to merchandise trade. Recent cross-country 
comparisons show North Pacific economies falling further behind 
in terms of integrating with global markets and easing structural 
impediments to trade. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development uses its Liner Shipping Connectivity Index to measure 
an economy’s integration into global shipping networks by the number 
and size of ships and shipping services visiting its ports. Results show 
the three North Pacific economies ranked in 2013 among the bottom 
10 of 164 countries. Similarly, the World Bank’s Doing Business survey 
shows all three economies’ rankings in cross-border trade deteriorating 
in 2014. Among 189 countries covered, the RMI fell from 57th to 62nd, 
the FSM from 101st to 103rd, and Palau from 95th to 96th. 
A measure of trade costs that considers insurance and freight 
costs as a proportion of free-on-board value found that trade costs 
increased in the three North Pacific economies in the latter half of the 
2000s (Figure 3.36.6). From 1996 to 2003, all three exhibited relatively 
low trade cost indexes (TCIs) linked to the predominant goods being 
exported to the US in those years (e.g., coconut oil from the RMI, and 
garments from the FSM and Palau). Garment exports from Palau to 
the US ceased in 2004 following the expiration of the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. From 2005 to 
2007, Palau’s TCI climbed as fish became its primary export to the US. 
Similar upward trends in the TCIs of the RMI since 2002 and of the 
FSM in particular from 2008 to 2010 also reflect greater fish exports. 
The shift in export composition from coconut oil and garments, which 
are easy to package, store, and transport, to highly perishable fish, 
which require refrigerated storage and expedited delivery, appears to 
have raised the average costs to these economies of exporting goods. 
The low TCIs exhibited by the FSM and Palau in recent years again 
coincide with much lower fish exports to the US than previously. 
The North Pacific economies’ poor rankings in international 
comparisons of trade performance appear to reflect high transport and 
logistics costs. Trade costs can be reduced by improving port facilities 
and customs efficiencies toward enhancing capacity for higher-volume 
shipments. Export diversifications toward niche products can help these 
economies absorb high transport costs, and hence overcome challenges 
arising from remoteness. Palau’s declaration of its entire exclusive 
economic zones as a marine sanctuary creates a potential niche market 
for services trade. With parallel upgrades in basic services, Palau can 
develop as a high-end ecotourism destination and generate greater 
tourism revenues. 
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3.37.2  Growth in tourist arrivals 
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South Pacific economies
South Pacific economies still depend on tourism earnings and public infrastructure spending 
funded by development partners. The winding down of public investments slowed growth in the 
Cook Islands and Tonga, while construction and increased tourism contributed to expansion in 
Vanuatu. Samoa’s economy contracted following natural disasters. Growth is expected to pick 
up in the near term as infrastructure spending rises in most South Pacific economies.
Economic performance
Growth in GDP generally weakened in the South Pacific in FY2013 
(ended 30 June 2013 in the Cook Islands, Samoa, and Tonga, and 
31 December 2013 in Vanuatu) (Figure 3.37.1). In the Cook Islands, 
GDP growth decelerated to 3.2% from 4.4% in FY2012 because 
capital investments funded by development partners fell by 24.8%. 
Tourism boosted the economy as arrivals increased by 3.5%, though 
well below the 8.7% recorded in FY2012 (Figure 3.37.2). Samoa’s 
economy contracted by 0.5% in FY2013 following devastation caused 
by Tropical Cyclone Evan in December 2012. The cyclone damaged 
public infrastructure in the capital and the southern part of the island 
of Upolu. It badly affected tourism and agriculture, driving Samoa’s 
tourist arrivals and receipts down by 6.0% in FY2013 and agriculture 
output down by an estimated 3.0%. Growth in Tonga slowed to 0.3% 
from 0.8% in FY2012 with the withdrawal of the stimulus arising from 
construction financed by development partners, and continuing declines 
in private commercial lending.
Only Vanuatu maintained its upward growth path in 2013, as GDP 
growth accelerated to 3.2% from 1.8% in 2012. Tourist arrivals rose by 
2.1% overall as air arrivals recovered from declines in 2012 and cruise 
ship visitors increased. Agricultural production recovered slightly after 
declining in 2012.
Inflation slowed in the South Pacific in FY2013, cooled by declines 
in international food and fuel prices and by weaker economic activity in 
most subregional economies (Figure 3.37.3). Inflation in the Cook Islands 
averaged 1.9%, down from 3.0% in FY2012 despite an increase of 10.8% 
in the cost of tobacco and alcohol and of 7.2% for household services. 
Despite disruption from the cyclone, prices in Samoa contracted 
by 0.2%, a reversal of 6.2% inflation recorded in FY2012. Widespread 
replanting and recovery of supply networks in the wake of the cyclone, 
together with the continued declines in international food and fuel 
prices, helped subdue domestic prices.
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In Tonga, inflation dropped to 0.2% from 2.5% in FY2012. Apart 
from international price movements, the appreciation of the pa’anga 
against the currencies of Tonga’s main trading partners helped reduce 
the cost of imports and slow inflation. In Vanuatu, inflation averaged 
1.4% in 2013, unchanged from a year earlier, as higher domestic demand 
related to increased economic activity offset lower international food 
and fuel prices.
Governments in the South Pacific have implemented fiscal reforms 
in recent years, but most continue to run budget deficits. The Cook 
Islands recorded a fiscal deficit of 2.0% of GDP, roughly the same as 
in FY2012. Unexpectedly high tourism revenues and below-budget 
expenditures to underwrite Air New Zealand routes helped keep the 
shortfall below the 2.3% target. Samoa’s fiscal deficit is estimated at 
4.4% of GDP, only slightly improved from the 5.0% deficit in FY2012 as 
post-cyclone reconstruction and rehabilitation spending stalled fiscal 
reforms. The deficit was financed largely by soft loans and grants from 
traditional development partners. Tonga recorded a budget deficit of 
4.9% of GDP. Although this improved on the 6.9% deficit in FY2012, 
it underperformed relative to the 0.1% surplus targeted in the budget, 
largely because external grants disappointed expectations and a 
supplementary budget funded land purchases for airport development. 
Reductions in current expenditures only partly offset the additional 
spending. Vanuatu, on the other hand, improved its monitoring of 
value-added tax receipts and reaped unexpectedly high revenues, 
which increased by 10% year on year in January–September 2013. 
Vanuatu recorded a small fiscal surplus equivalent to 0.3% of GDP 
during this period and estimates its fiscal position to be close to balance 
in 2013 as a whole.
Monetary policy generally remained expansionary across the 
South Pacific. Central banks in Samoa and Tonga kept interest rates 
low to unlock tight credit, spur private borrowing, and promote 
economic activity. The National Reserve Bank of Tonga’s loose monetary 
policy was enabled by its plentiful foreign reserves, equivalent to 8–9 
months of import cover. The growth of credit to the private sector 
nevertheless continued to slow, though recent signs suggest this is 
bottoming out. Personal loans other than for housing grew steadily in 
the second quarter of FY2013, driven by aggressive lending from MBf 
Bank, a Malaysian-owned commercial bank, and withdrawals from the 
National Retirement Benefits Fund to pay school fees. In March, the 
Reserve Bank of Vanuatu cut, for the first time since 2008, its main 
policy interest rate (the rediscount rate) from 6.0% to 5.5%. Unlike 
Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu, the Cook Islands has no central bank, as it 
uses the New Zealand dollar.
South Pacific economies continued to run current account deficits 
driven by large imbalances in merchandise trade (Figure 3.37.4). 
Samoa’s current account deficit widened to 13.4% of GDP from 11.1% 
in FY2012, mainly on a 5.2% increase in the merchandise trade deficit 
coupled with reduced inflows of services income. In Vanuatu, the 
current account deficit is estimated at 6.2% of GDP, slightly improved 
from 6.4% in 2012. The gap was more than covered by foreign direct 
investment and development partner inflows. Tonga‘s current account 
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deficit was estimated to have narrowed slightly to 5.9% of GDP from 
6.9% in FY2012, as remittances increased by 3.3%. The Cook Islands 
does not report balance of payments estimates.
Economic prospects
Tourism and public infrastructure spending are seen to continue driving 
growth in the South Pacific in FY2014 and FY2015. 
In the Cook Islands, growth in FY2014 is forecast to slow to 2.2% as 
business activity traces the fall in capital expenditures and continued 
weakening in tourist arrivals. Growth is expected to recover to 2.5% in 
FY2015, assuming tourist arrivals revert to long-term trends and capital 
projects resume. 
The Samoan economy is expected to expand by 2.0% in FY2014 as 
post-cyclone reconstruction and rehabilitation continues, and tourism 
bounces back following the reopening of a key resort in Apia and the 
opening of two new resorts in late 2013. Driven by higher domestic 
demand and increased fish exports, agriculture is emerging as a 
significant contributor to growth in FY2014. Growth is seen accelerating 
further to 2.5% in FY2015.
Tonga is expected to rebound in FY2014, and growth of 1.5% is 
forecast as the development partner-financed airport runway upgrade 
proceeds in earnest. Response to the damage caused by Tropical 
Cyclone Ian, which hit Tonga’s Ha’apai islands in January 2014, is 
expected to trigger additional economic activity through development 
partner-financed reconstruction and increased remittances in response 
to lost livelihoods. Stimulus from rehabilitation is expected to carry over 
into FY2015 and boost growth to 2.0%. 
Growth in Vanuatu is expected to pick up to 3.5% in 2014, driven 
mostly by increased construction spending. A modest increase in 
tourist numbers is expected from the strengthening Australian and 
New Zealand economies. These trends are expected to continue and the 
economy to expand by 4.0% in 2015.
Inflation in the Cook Islands is projected to remain low at 2.5% in 
FY2014 and FY2015 as major imports are sourced from New Zealand and 
fuel prices stay stable. Samoa will likely shift out of price contraction and 
record inflation at 2.0% in FY2014 and FY2015, reflecting higher prices 
for local agricultural produce. Inflation in Tonga is seen to accelerate 
to 2.0% in FY2014 and FY2015, and in Vanuatu to 2.5% in 2014 and 
3.0% in FY2015, driven in both economies by construction projects and 
continuing economic recovery.
Monetary policy in the South Pacific will likely remain 
accommodative to promote domestic economic activity amid 
expectations that inflation will remain within central bank targets. 
Although lending to businesses continues to contract in Tonga, lending 
to households grew steadily in the first half of FY2014. Commercial 
lending in Samoa continued to contract over the same period as 
declines in loans to public institutions offset marginal rises in lending 
to households and private business. This credit crunch will remain a 
concern as commercial interest rates have started to move upwards. 
The Reserve Bank of Vanuatu expects to retain its loose monetary 
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stance in the near term but should monitor bank activity to mitigate 
credit risks amid expectations of higher growth. 
Samoa’s current account deficit is projected to widen to 16.2% of 
GDP in FY2014 because of imports for reconstruction, before falling 
to 15.6% in FY2015. Tonga’s external position will likely continue 
to improve as its current account deficit narrows to 3.7% of GDP in 
FY2014 and 3.2% in FY2015 on the back of modestly higher growth and 
improving remittances. Vanuatu’s current account deficit is expected 
to dip to 6.0% of GDP in FY2014, then increase slightly to 7.0% in 
FY2015 as imports to a recovering domestic economy rise and ongoing 
construction is funded through continued foreign direct investment and 
development partner inflows.
Policy challenge—creating the right policy 
environment for private sector development
Tourism and development partner-funded public infrastructure 
spending strongly influence growth in the South Pacific, the impact 
of their fluctuations in recent years highlighting that domestic 
private sector contributions are limited. This makes promoting 
entrepreneurship and private investment, and generating employment 
through greater private business activity, integral to achieving 
sustainable economic growth and poverty alleviation in the South 
Pacific. The challenges posed by the remoteness and small size of 
national markets can be mitigated by reform to the laws and policies 
that shape the business environment. Making public infrastructure more 
efficient and reducing the cost of doing business can also contribute to 
an enabling environment for private business development.
Governments in the South Pacific have implemented a number of 
legal reforms to promote private sector development, aided by technical 
assistance from development partners. Vanuatu’s Companies Act, 2012 
and Companies Insolvency and Receivership Act, 2013—passed to 
promote local business activity and facilitate administrative process 
with the government—are prime examples of the type of reform that 
is needed. The new laws allow the establishment of companies with a 
single shareholder or director, as well as community-based companies, 
and provide for an electronic business registry to reduce the cost of 
opening, running, and closing a business. Samoa has launched such a 
registry to promote private business in both urban and remote areas. 
The Cook Islands and Tonga are pursuing similar business law reform.
Samoa took steps to simplify private businesses’ access to secured 
financing by passing its Personal Property Securities Act, 2013. Tonga 
and Vanuatu have also implemented reforms addressing secured 
transactions. Mindful of the complexities of landownership in the 
Pacific, these measures facilitate the use of vehicles, farm equipment, 
and other moveable assets as collateral.
Only limited data are currently available on the impact of these 
new reforms. However, experience indicates that business law reform 
dramatically decreases processing time and fees, thereby increasing the 
number of companies formed and secured loans issued. 
260  Asian Development Outlook 2014
Other constraints on private sector investment and development 
are being addressed. Reform to public financial management and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) can lighten the fiscal burden of public service 
wages that crowd out other government expenditure (Figure 3.37.5), 
while improving public service quality and transparency. By creating 
new fiscal space, such reform can increase the government resources 
available for purchases of goods and services from the private sector. 
It can remove the need to increase revenue collection through tax or 
utility charges, leaving more disposable income. Further, SOE reform 
can level the playing field and generate new business opportunities for 
the private sector.
Private sector development reforms have been incorporated in joint 
policy action matrices agreed by South Pacific governments and their 
development partners. However, much work remains to ensure actual 
progress. Apart from continuing with prudent public expenditure 
management to keep public wages reasonable, further efforts are needed 
to improve the governance and rationalization—or privatization—of SOEs. 
3.37.5 Subsidies and public sector wages
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Small island economies
Sustained increases in fishing license revenues have supported GDP growth and solidified fiscal 
positions in Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. These and other inflows are expected to boost growth 
in 2014. Inflation returned after Kiribati and Nauru recorded deflation in 2012, but it is expected 
to track Australia’s relatively low rate. Windfall gains create opportunities for these economies 
to rebuild fiscal buffers to fund future service delivery.
Economic performance
Economic growth in 2013 in the small island economies of the Pacific 
was close to rates in the previous year and largely in line with forecasts 
(Figure 3.38.1). Growth reflected sustained revenue increases from 
fishing license fees and progress in the construction of major public 
infrastructure projects.
In Kiribati, GDP growth was 2.0%, slightly down from 2.5% in 
2012 despite increases in fishing license revenues, because scheduled 
infrastructure projects—most notably road construction—suffered 
delays. In contrast, Tuvalu saw progress in upgrading its airport, strong 
growth in fishing license revenues, and increased retail activity, which 
lifted growth to 1.1% from 0.2% in 2012. In Nauru, Australian-financed 
construction related to the expansion of the Regional Processing Centre 
(RPC) for asylum seekers supported GDP growth at 4.5% in FY2013 
(ended 30 June 2013). This was slightly slower than in 2012, mainly 
because phosphate production and exports declined (Figure 3.38.2).
Revenues from fishing license fees continued their strong 
performance for a second consecutive year, with 2013 revenues 
exceeding budget projections by 62% in Kiribati, 37% in Tuvalu, and 4% 
in Nauru (Figure 3.38.3). As parties to the Nauru Agreement, all three 
economies have benefitted from rising rates under a vessel day scheme, 
wherein foreign fishing vessels are charged by the number of days they 
spend in the parties’ waters. 
In addition to the revenue from fishing licenses, higher income from 
visa fees and customs duty attributable to the RPC has boosted Nauru’s 
fiscal position, and Tuvalu’s position improved with the collection of tax 
arrears from state-owned enterprises. 
Kiribati recorded another large current account deficit, equivalent 
to 30.2% of GDP, from substantial imbalances in the merchandise and 
services accounts. In contrast, Tuvalu had a small current account 
surplus equal to 3.5% of GDP supported by inflows of fishing license 
revenue and official development assistance. No estimates of Nauru’s 
current account balance were available.
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All three countries use the Australian dollar as legal tender, and 
none has a central bank, which precludes their having independent 
monetary policies or exchange rate flexibility. Since the collapse of the 
Nauru economy in FY2004, the population has been without access 
to formal banking services. However, the government developed an 
information memorandum with international assistance to attract 
a commercial bank to the island. Prospects are positive for the 
re-introduction of some banking services this year, as the government 
is in advanced discussions about this with a preferred bank. A weaker 
Australian dollar, particularly in the middle of 2013, brought inflation 
back to Kiribati and Nauru, which experienced deflation in 2012, but 
inflation remained low at 2.0% in Kiribati and Tuvalu and 1.4% in Nauru 
(Figure 3.38.4). 
Economic prospects
Infrastructure upgrades are expected to drive growth over the 
next 2 years. Kiribati’s economy is projected to grow by 3.0% in 
2014 and 2.0% in 2015 as construction picks up on projects funded 
by development partners: upgrades of the airports at Tarawa and 
Kiritimati and of the South Tarawa Road, and the extension of 
Betio Port. In Nauru, growth is projected at 10% in FY2014 and 8% 
in FY2015. This will reflect rebuilding and expansion the RPC and 
associated resettlement villages, higher government spending, and 
payments to landowners from the liquidation of the Nauru Phosphates 
Royalties Trust (NPRT). In Tuvalu, the airport upgrade and increased 
retail competition are seen to drive economic growth at 2.0% in both 
2014 and 2015.
Inflation is generally expected to be similar to that experienced 
in Australia, which targets inflation within a band of 2%–3%. Over 
2014 and 2015, inflation is projected to remain at 2.5% in Kiribati. In 
Tuvalu, inflation is projected to accelerate to 2.5% as growth picks up 
in 2014, then moderate to 2.0% in 2015 in line with expected declines 
in international food and fuel prices. Robust economic activity and the 
introduction of a A$6,000 business visa fee are fueling price pressures 
in Nauru, and inflation is projected to accelerate to 5.0% in FY2014 and 
then to 7.0% in FY2015.
Island governments plan to increase expenditure to support 
economic growth in the near term. The governments of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu plan higher recurrent expenditures, to be financed in part 
by the continuing strength of fishing license revenues and budget 
support grants, and higher capital spending associated with ongoing 
infrastructure projects. In Nauru, the FY2014 budget continues recent 
large increases in spending. Spending will exceed A$96 million, which is 
more than three times the amount spent 3 years ago. As Nauru is unable 
to borrow because of its recent history of debt distress, higher spending 
depends on the government meeting its revenue targets. One additional 
source that the government is looking toward is a large but controversial 
increase in visa fees, which are projected to raise A$18 million. 
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Policy challenge—saving windfalls to rebuild 
fiscal buffers that finance services
All three of the small island economies urgently need to rebuild fiscal 
buffers to fund future service delivery. Recent windfall gains from 
fishing licenses and other revenues provide opportunities for these 
countries to save the proceeds in trust funds and gradually reduce their 
reliance on financial assistance from development partners. Near-term 
revenue generation must be balanced, however, with ensuring the 
sustainability of revenue sources to the extent that individual country 
policy can do so.
Proper management of windfall revenue streams from the new 
fishing license regime can help stabilize trust funds in Kiribati 
and Tuvalu, whose values fell during the global financial crisis and 
have struggled to recover amid continuing withdrawals to finance 
annual budget deficits. Although Kiribati has been able to contain its 
fiscal deficit using higher fishing license revenues in 2012 and 2013, 
government revenues have not been sufficient to enable the government 
to add funds to its Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund, which has 
recently declined in value in per capita terms and is now well below 
the government’s benchmark of A$4,500 per head (Figure 3.38.5). 
To improve the financial outlook for the fund over the long run, the 
government needs to deposit more revenue into it, but this requires 
enhanced revenue collection and restrained expenditures. 
The Tuvalu Trust Fund has also languished below its target 
maintenance value since 2008. This has prevented the government from 
transferring resources to the Consolidated Investment Fund, which 
finances budget deficits, during the past several years. The Consolidated 
Investment Fund was nearly depleted in 2012, which prompted an 
A$4 million contribution from Australia (Figure 3.38.6). 
In Nauru, the mismanagement of the NPRT almost completely 
depleted it in the early 2000s from a peak value of about A$1.5 billion 
in 1990. Remaining assets are now being liquidated and the capital 
distributed to landowners. Meanwhile, the emergence of windfall gains 
from the RPC and fishing licenses has again focused attention on the 
need for a new trust fund to save excess revenues toward providing a 
source of income when the phosphate is mined out. Primary phosphate 
reserves are almost completely exhausted, and secondary phosphate 
reserves are expected to last only 10–20 years. Such a trust fund would 
also be useful in managing emerging inflationary pressures, but would 
need to incorporate lessons from the Tuvalu and Kiribati trust funds to 
avoid repeating the mistakes of the NPRT.
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Statistical notes and tables
The statistical appendix presents selected economic indicators for 
44 developing member economies of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and for Brunei Darussalam, an unclassified regional member, in 
18 tables. The economies are grouped into five subregions: Central Asia, 
East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Most of the tables 
contain historical data from 2009 to 2013; some have forecasts for 2014 
and 2015.
The data were standardized to the degree possible in order to 
allow comparability over time and across economies, but differences 
in statistical methodology, definitions, coverage, and practices make 
full comparability impossible. The national income accounts section is 
based on the United Nations System of National Accounts, while the 
balance-of-payments data are based on International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) accounting standards. Historical data were obtained from official 
sources, statistical publications and databases, and documents of ADB, 
IMF, and World Bank. Projections for 2013 and 2014 are generally staff 
estimates made on the basis of available quarterly or monthly data, 
although some projections are from governments.
Most countries report on a calendar-year basis. Some economies 
record their government finance data on a fiscal year basis, such as: 
Armenia; Azerbaijan; Cook Islands; Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; 
Kyrgyz Republic; Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR); 
Samoa; Singapore; Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Thailand; and Uzbekistan. 
Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Republic of Marshall Islands, 
and Republic of Palau (hereafter Palau) report government finance and 
balance-of-payments data on a fiscal year basis. South Asian countries 
(except for Maldives and Sri Lanka), Myanmar, Samoa, and Tonga report 
all variables on a fiscal year basis.
Regional and subregional averages/totals are provided for seven 
tables (A1, A2, A6, A11, A12, A13, and A14,). For tables A1, A2, A6, and 
A14, the averages are computed using weights derived from levels of 
gross national income (GNI) in current United States dollars (US$) 
following the World Bank Atlas method. The GNI data for 2008–2012 
were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
online. Weights for 2012 were carried over through 2015. The GNI 
data for Cook Islands were estimated using the Atlas conversion factor. 
Myanmar and Nauru have no GNI data. For tables A11 and A12, the 
regional and subregional averages were computed on the basis of a 
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consistent sum, which means that if there are missing country data for a 
given year, the sum of the prior year used for computing the growth rate 
excludes the corresponding country data. Data for Myanmar and Nauru 
are excluded from the computation of all subregional averages/totals.
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5. These tables show related data 
on output growth, production, and demand. Changes to the national 
income accounts series for some countries have been made owing 
to a change in source, methodology and/or base year. The series for 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan reflects fiscal rather 
than calendar year data, while those for Timor-Leste reflects non-oil, 
non-United Nations GDP. 
Table A1: Growth rate of GDP (% per year). The table shows annual 
growth rates of GDP valued at constant market prices, factor costs, 
or basic prices. GDP at market prices is the aggregation of the value 
added of all resident producers at producers’ prices including taxes 
less subsidies on imports plus all nondeductible value-added or similar 
taxes. Constant factor cost measures differ from market price measures 
in that they exclude taxes on production and include subsidies. Basic 
price valuation is the factor cost plus some taxes on production, such as 
property and payroll taxes, and less some subsidies, such as labor-related 
subsidies but not product-related subsidies. Most countries use constant 
market price valuation. Fiji Islands, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka use 
constant factor costs, while Maldives and Nepal use basic prices. GDP 
growth for 2008 is excluded for Nauru due to consistency issues.
Table A2: Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year). The table 
provides the growth rates of real per capita GDP, which is defined 
as GDP at constant prices divided by the population. The series for 
most of the Pacific countries were revised due to a change in source of 
population data. Data on per capita gross national product in US$ terms 
for 2011, sourced from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 
online, are also shown. 
Table A3: Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year). 
The table shows the growth rates of value added in agriculture and 
its corresponding share in 2011. The agriculture sector comprises 
agricultural crops, livestock, poultry, fisheries, and forestry.
Table A4: Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year). 
The table provides the growth rates of value added in industry and its 
corresponding share in 2011. This sector comprises manufacturing, 
mining and quarrying, construction, and utilities. However, construction 
in Uzbekistan is included in the services sector.
Table A5: Growth rate of value added in services (% per year). 
The table gives the growth rates of value added in services, as well as 
its corresponding share in 2011. Subsectors generally include trade, 
banking, finance, real estate, public administration, and other services.
Table A6: Inflation (% per year). Data on inflation rates represent 
period averages. Except for India, which reports the wholesale price 
index, inflation rates presented are based on consumer price indexes. 
The consumer price indexes of the following countries are for a given 
city or group of consumers only: Afghanistan is for Kabul (until 2010), 
Cambodia is for Phnom Penh, Marshall Islands is for Majuro, Solomon 
Islands is for Honiara, and Nepal is for urban consumers.
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Table A7: Growth in money supply (% per year). This table tracks 
the annual percentage change in the end-of-period supply of broad 
money as represented by M2 (for most countries). M2 is defined as the 
sum of M1 and quasi-money where M1 denotes currency in circulation 
plus demand deposits and quasi-money consists of time and savings 
deposits including foreign currency deposits. Data for the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic is as of end-December 2014.
Tables A8, A9, and A10: Government finance. This set of tables 
refers to the revenue and expenditure transactions as well as the fiscal 
balance of the central government expressed as a percentage of GDP 
in nominal terms. For Cambodia (since 2006), PRC, India, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and Tajikistan, transactions are those 
reported by the general government. 
Table A8: Central government revenues (% of GDP). Central 
government revenues comprise all nonrepayable receipts, both current 
and capital, plus grants. These amounts are computed as a percentage 
of GDP at current prices. For the Republic of Korea, revenues exclude 
social security contributions. For Singapore, revenues includes the 
Net Investment Returns Contribution. For Kazakhstan, revenues 
include transfers from the national fund. Grants are excluded in 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; revenues from 
disinvestment are included for India; only current revenues are included 
for Bangladesh; and grants and privatization proceeds are excluded for 
Sri Lanka. 
Table A9: Central government expenditures (% of GDP). Central 
government expenditures comprise all nonrepayable payments to 
both current and capital expenses, plus net lending. These amounts 
are computed as a share of GDP at current prices. For Thailand, 
expenditures refer to budgetary expenditures excluding externally 
financed expenditures and corresponding borrowing; while that for 
Tajikistan includes externally financed public investment programs. 
One-time expenditures are excluded for Pakistan.
Table A10: Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP). Fiscal 
balance is the difference between central government revenues and 
expenditures. The difference is also computed as a share of GDP at 
current prices. Data variations may arise due to statistical discrepancies, 
e.g., balancing items for both central and local governments, and 
differences in the concept used in the individual computations of 
revenues and expenditures as compared with the calculation of the 
fiscal balance. For Fiji, the fiscal balance excludes total loan repayments. 
For Thailand, the fiscal balance is a cash balance composed of the 
budgetary and nonbudgetary balances. Some off-budget accounts are 
included in the computation of the fiscal balance for Turkmenistan.
Tables A11, A12, A13, and A14: Balance of payments. This set of 
tables show selected international economic transactions of countries 
as recorded in the balance of payments (BOP). These items cover annual 
flows, except for some countries which show data as of a specified 
period only. 
Tables A11 and A12: Growth rates of merchandise exports and 
imports (% per year). The annual growth rates of exports and imports, 
in terms of merchandise goods only, are shown in these tables. Data 
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are in million US$, primarily obtained from the balance-of-payments 
accounts of each country. Exports are reported on a free-on-board 
(f.o.b.) basis. Import data are generally reported on an f.o.b. basis, 
except for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, and Thailand, which 
value them on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f.) basis. 
Table A13: Trade balance (US$ million). The trade balance is the 
difference between merchandise exports and merchandise imports. 
Figures in this table are based on the exports and imports levels used to 
generate Tables A11 and A12.
Table A14: Current account balance (% of GDP). The current 
account balance is the sum of the balance of trade for merchandise, 
net trade in services and factor income, and net transfers. The values 
reported are divided by GDP at current prices in US$. In the case of 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, official transfers are excluded from 
the current account balance. 
Table A15: Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average). The 
annual average exchange rates of each economy are quoted in local 
currencies per US dollar. 
Table A16: Gross international reserves (US$ million). Gross 
international reserves are defined as the US$ value of holdings of foreign 
exchange, special drawing rights (SDR), reserve position in the IMF, and 
gold at the end of a given period. For Turkmenistan, gold is excluded in 
the computation. For Marshall Islands and Taipei,China; this heading 
refers to foreign exchange reserves only. In some countries, the rubric 
comprises foreign assets and reserves of national monetary authorities 
and national oil funds, i.e., foreign assets of the Maldives Monetary 
Authority, net foreign reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan, assets 
of the National Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, and official external assets of 
Kiribati. The data for India is as of 14 March 2014.
Table A17: External debt outstanding (US$ million). For most 
economies, external debt outstanding—public and private—includes 
medium- and long-term debt, short-term debt, and IMF credit. For 
Cambodia, Georgia, and Lao PDR, only public external debt is reported. 
For Azerbaijan; India; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia, 
Philippines; and Singapore the figures for 2013 are as of end-September.
Table A18: Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services). 
This table generally presents the total debt service payments of each 
economy, which comprise principal repayments (excluding on short-
term debt) and interest payments on outstanding external debt, as 
a percentage of exports of goods and services. For Cambodia and 
Lao PDR, debt service refers to external public debt only. For Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, and Viet Nam, exports of goods are used as the 
denominator in the calculation of the ratio; for the Philippines, exports 
of goods, services, and income are used as the denominator. For 
Bangladesh, the ratio represents debt service payments on medium- and 
long-term loans as a percentage of exports of goods, nonfactor services, 
and workers’ remittances; while for Azerbaijan, the ratio represents 
public and publicly guaranteed external debt service payments as a 
percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services. 
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Table A1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
3.2 6.8 6.8 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.5
–14.1 2.2 4.7 7.2 3.5 4.6 5.0
9.3 5.0 0.1 2.2 5.8 5.0 4.8
–3.8 6.3 7.2 6.2 3.2 5.5 6.0
1.2 7.3 7.5 5.0 6.0 6.0 6.4
2.9 –0.5 6.0 –0.1 10.5 6.5 5.5
3.9 6.5 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.0 5.8
6.1 9.2 14.7 11.1 10.2 11.0 10.0
8.1 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.8
6.8 9.8 8.2 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7
9.2 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.4
–2.5 6.8 4.8 1.5 2.9 3.5 3.6
0.3 6.3 3.7 2.0 2.8 3.7 3.8
–1.3 6.4 17.5 12.4 11.7 9.5 10.0
–1.8 10.8 4.2 1.5 2.1 2.7 3.2
7.6 8.4 6.4 4.7 4.8 5.3 5.8
21.0 8.4 7.2 11.9 3.3 3.5 4.5
5.7 6.1 6.7 6.2 6.0 5.6 6.2
5.7 9.3 10.1 6.5 5.2 6.0 6.8
8.6 9.3 6.7 4.5 4.9 5.5 6.0
–3.6 7.1 6.5 1.3 3.7 4.5 5.4
3.9 4.3 3.8 4.5 3.6 4.5 4.7
0.4 2.6 3.7 4.4 3.6 3.4 3.9
3.5 8.0 8.3 6.3 7.3 7.5 7.5
1.4 8.0 4.8 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.4
–1.8 2.6 3.4 0.9 –1.4 1.1 1.2
0.1 6.0 7.1 7.3 7.2 7.0 7.3
4.6 6.2 6.5 6.3 5.8 5.7 6.0
7.3 7.5 7.8 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.5
–1.5 7.4 5.1 5.6 4.7 5.1 5.0
5.1 5.3 5.9 7.3 7.5 7.8 7.8
1.1 7.6 3.6 6.8 7.2 6.4 6.7
–0.8 15.7 6.0 1.9 4.1 3.9 4.1
–2.3 7.8 0.1 6.5 2.9 2.9 4.5
5.4 6.4 5.9 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8
4.3 6.1 8.9 6.1 4.8 5.4 13.3
1.0 –3.0 1.0 4.4 3.2 2.2 2.5
–1.4 3.0 2.7 1.7 3.6 2.8 3.0
–0.7 –0.5 3.3 2.5 2.0 3.0 2.0
–1.8 5.8 0.6 3.2 0.8 3.0 1.5
1.0 2.5 2.1 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5
–18.2 0.0 3.8 4.9 4.5 10.0 8.0
–10.2 –1.1 6.9 4.8 –1.0 3.0 2.0
6.1 7.6 11.3 7.7 5.1 6.0 21.0
–5.6 0.5 1.4 2.7 –0.5 2.0 2.5
–1.0 7.9 10.6 4.8 2.9 3.0 3.0
12.8 9.5 12.1 8.2 8.0 8.5 8.5
3.2 3.3 2.9 0.8 0.3 1.5 2.0
–2.3 –1.4 –0.6 0.2 1.1 2.0 2.0
3.3 1.6 1.2 1.8 3.2 3.5 4.0
6.0 9.2 7.4 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.4
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Table A2 Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Per capita GNI, 
$, 2012
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
1.4 5.2 5.2 4.0 5.1 5.3 5.5
–14.4 1.9 4.2 6.8 3.2 4.3 4.7 3,720
7.1 3.8 –1.1 0.9 4.4 4.5 4.8 6,220
–3.9 5.0 6.4 5.5 3.5 5.1 5.9 3,270
–0.7 5.5 5.9 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.9 9,780
0.7 –1.6 4.6 –2.1 9.7 5.0 4.0 990
1.8 5.5 7.4 4.7 5.8 4.4 4.2 860
4.5 7.6 13.1 9.5 8.6 9.4 8.4 5,410
6.3 6.8 5.3 5.6 6.3 6.9 6.6 1,720
6.3 9.3 7.6 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.2
8.7 9.9 8.8 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.9 5,720
–2.7 6.0 4.1 0.4 2.5 2.8 2.8 36,560
–0.2 5.8 2.9 1.6 2.3 3.3 3.4 22,670
–2.4 4.5 15.5 10.3 9.4 10.3 7.7 3,160
–2.2 10.6 3.9 1.1 1.8 2.5 3.0 20,910
6.1 6.2 4.9 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.4
18.6 6.3 5.2 9.7 1.3 1.5 2.5 680
4.4 4.7 4.1 4.9 4.7 4.2 4.8 840
3.8 7.3 8.1 4.7 3.4 4.3 5.1 2,420
7.1 7.4 5.3 3.2 3.5 4.2 4.7 1,580
–5.2 5.3 4.7 –0.4 2.0 2.8 3.6 5,750
2.3 2.7 3.1 3.1 2.2 3.1 3.3 700
–1.4 –3.2 1.6 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.9 1,260
2.4 6.9 7.1 9.2 6.2 6.4 6.4 2,920
0.1 6.0 2.8 4.7 3.4 3.7 4.2
–3.1 0.8 1.7 –0.7 –5.6 –0.2 –0.1 31,590
–1.4 4.8 5.2 5.0 5.8 5.5 5.9 880
3.3 3.4 3.6 6.0 3.6 4.5 4.8 3,420
5.0 5.3 5.7 6.5 4.6 5.2 5.4 1,270
–2.8 4.8 3.4 4.0 3.2 4.3 3.4 9,820
3.8 4.2 4.9 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.8 ...
0.5 6.1 1.6 5.0 5.5 3.4 4.9 2,500
–3.7 13.7 3.8 –0.6 2.4 2.4 2.6 47,210
–3.1 7.2 –0.4 6.0 2.3 2.4 4.0 5,210
4.3 5.3 5.1 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.7 1,550
2.6 3.8 6.5 5.9 3.1 3.6 11.3
8.6 8.4 –18.2 7.3 6.2 5.1 5.4 ...
–1.9 –0.6 1.4 12.2 3.3 2.3 2.5 4,110
–2.5 –3.9 –0.3 0.9 1.7 0.9 –0.1 2,520
–2.1 5.1 –0.4 2.1 –0.2 2.0 0.6 4,040
1.6 3.2 2.7 0.9 –0.5 0.6 0.6 3,230
–19.8 –10.9 –0.9 4.9 1.4 8.5 6.5 ...
–10.7 –1.7 6.2 4.2 –1.6 2.3 1.4 9,860
3.9 5.3 8.9 5.4 2.9 3.7 18.4 1,790
–5.9 0.2 1.2 2.4 –0.7 1.8 2.2 3,260
–3.3 3.5 7.8 2.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1,130
10.0 6.6 9.0 5.6 5.5 5.9 5.9 2,810
2.9 3.0 2.6 0.6 0.0 1.2 1.7 4,220
–2.8 –1.9 –1.1 –0.3 4.5 0.2 0.2 5,650
1.1 –0.8 –0.9 –0.7 0.9 1.2 1.7 3,000
5.2 8.2 6.4 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.6
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Table A3 Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sector share, 2012, % 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
5.8 –16.1 14.0 9.5 8.1 20.9
3.5 –2.2 –8.0 5.8 4.9 5.5
–6.8 –4.8 8.0 –3.7 9.6 8.6
13.5 –11.6 23.0 –17.6 10.6 4.5
6.7 –2.6 1.9 1.2 2.9 19.2
10.5 6.8 7.9 10.4 7.6 ...
... 7.8 0.1 8.1 10.0 8.4
5.7 6.8 6.6 7.0 6.8 19.1
4.2 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.0 10.1
–4.6 3.9 0.9 –3.2 1.5 0.1
3.2 –4.4 –2.1 –0.6 5.6 2.6
3.6 –16.6 –0.5 21.6 13.5 16.3
–3.0 1.7 6.4 –1.6 0.2 1.8
44.6 –6.4 –7.9 31.5 1.6 27.0
4.1 5.2 5.1 3.1 2.2 17.7
1.7 1.7 1.6 2.9 2.6 17.5
0.8 8.6 5.0 1.4 4.6 17.9
–2.5 –0.9 1.1 –0.0 1.7 4.1
3.0 2.0 4.5 5.0 1.3 35.7
3.5 0.2 2.0 3.5 3.3 24.4
3.2 7.0 1.4 5.2 4.7 11.0
5.6 –5.8 4.6 11.8 ... 0.7
5.4 4.0 3.1 4.3 1.8 35.6
4.0 3.0 3.4 4.2 3.5 14.5
2.4 2.0 1.8 2.5 2.7 27.0
0.1 2.4 5.8 1.0 2.1 10.2
0.4 –0.1 –2.0 1.5 ... 30.7
–0.7 –0.2 2.6 2.8 1.1 11.8
3.1 8.6 3.2 1.9 –3.7 0.0
1.3 –2.3 4.1 3.8 1.4 12.3
1.9 3.3 4.0 2.7 2.7 19.7
7.2 1.5 –6.2 3.1 ... 4.5
–8.1 –2.6 8.1 2.6 ... 12.3
–8.2 –2.5 5.7 ... ... ...
12.4 24.3 4.7 12.4 ... 16.5
–0.8 0.5 4.5 6.6 ... 29.9
1.7 ... ... ... ... ...
–19.4 –7.7 –3.2 –0.9 ... 5.9
0.7 2.9 8.6 –2.7 0.5 28.5
–12.3 –2.6 –0.1 –5.4 –3.0 5.3
–1.3 ... ... ... ... ...
8.1 –2.9 –19.6 ... ... ...
–1.4 0.5 2.0 0.5 0.3 18.8
0.7 2.2 0.5 ... ... ...
0.7 4.8 6.1 2.2 ... 26.7
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Table A4 Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sector share, 2012, % 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
–29.6 6.1 –0.0 5.4 –1.8 32.2
10.6 4.4 3.4 –0.6 4.9 63.4
–3.5 9.1 9.4 9.5 0.9 24.5
1.4 7.2 0.7 1.7 2.3 39.2
–0.3 2.5 7.0 –11.7 28.0 25.6
–6.5 9.7 5.9 10.4 3.9 ...
... 8.7 26.5 8.6 7.3 51.1
9.7 8.3 6.7 8.0 9.8 32.2
10.0 12.3 10.3 7.9 7.8 45.3
–5.1 7.6 8.9 4.4 0.4 6.9
–0.6 10.7 5.1 1.7 3.0 39.1
–0.4 4.3 9.1 9.9 20.1 31.9
–4.1 23.1 6.1 1.7 1.8 30.0
6.1 6.3 9.8 7.2 2.5 21.5
6.5 6.5 8.2 8.9 9.0 28.5
4.8 8.0 8.0 3.5 5.0 42.2
9.2 7.6 7.8 1.0 0.7 27.2
–26.1 4.3 12.1 1.2 –1.2 16.9
–0.6 4.0 4.3 3.0 1.6 14.9
–5.2 3.4 4.7 2.7 3.5 22.0
4.2 8.4 10.4 10.3 9.9 31.5
–5.0 1.7 3.2 –1.8 ... 71.1
–9.5 13.6 14.5 9.2 10.5 24.3
3.6 4.9 5.2 5.2 5.0 46.8
17.4 14.5 14.2 13.7 7.2 30.6
–7.2 8.5 2.1 5.1 3.4 38.9
11.9 13.2 17.5 8.1 ... 32.3
–1.9 11.6 1.8 6.8 9.5 31.1
–1.3 24.9 7.3 1.4 2.2 26.1
–5.0 12.8 –3.9 7.2 0.3 43.6
6.0 7.2 6.7 5.7 5.4 38.6
–2.2 –8.7 12.1 10.6 ... 9.5
1.0 6.5 2.0 1.4 ... 21.5
21.3 –9.9 11.8 ... ... ...
–8.0 –5.5 –6.4 –1.3 ... 11.7
35.8 17.1 12.3 –2.2 ... 9.1
–41.1 ... ... ... ... ...
–34.1 –8.5 12.4 0.2 ... 8.5
8.1 10.8 13.0 14.7 9.9 44.4
–15.5 2.7 1.8 4.9 –4.5 25.6
1.3 ... ... ... ... ...
41.7 7.3 33.7 ... ... ...
12.9 11.6 5.5 1.2 –4.4 21.1
–14.4 –6.9 –28.7 ... ... ...
27.6 12.6 –19.4 –22.2 ... 8.1
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Table A5 Growth rate of value added in services (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sector share, 2012, % 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
–3.6 4.5 6.1 7.0 5.9 46.8
9.1 7.2 –2.1 6.9 7.2 31.1
–3.4 7.8 5.7 6.2 3.3 66.9
–1.1 7.1 6.0 10.6 7.5 56.3
2.3 –1.1 6.9 6.5 5.1 55.3
9.5 4.6 13.5 14.5 19.3 ...
... 9.9 8.3 14.7 13.9 40.5
9.3 11.6 12.7 10.4 8.0 48.7
9.6 9.8 9.4 8.1 8.3 44.6
–1.7 6.9 5.2 1.8 3.0 93.0
1.1 3.9 2.6 2.5 2.5 58.2
0.8 9.8 16.8 16.3 10.0 51.8
–0.2 4.8 3.2 1.2 1.5 68.2
17.2 18.1 12.7 7.3 4.3 51.5
6.3 6.5 6.2 6.0 5.7 53.9
9.1 12.7 13.7 8.0 3.8 40.3
10.5 9.7 6.6 7.0 6.9 54.9
1.7 8.0 5.8 1.4 4.7 79.1
6.0 5.8 3.4 4.5 6.0 49.4
1.3 3.2 3.9 5.3 3.7 53.6
3.3 8.0 8.6 4.6 6.4 57.5
2.1 3.8 3.7 3.8 ... 28.2
2.3 3.3 5.0 8.1 8.4 40.1
5.8 8.4 8.5 7.7 7.1 38.7
6.2 8.0 8.5 8.0 9.0 42.4
2.9 7.4 7.0 6.4 5.9 50.9
6.7 6.4 6.4 12.1 ... 37.0
3.4 7.2 4.9 7.6 7.1 57.1
–0.7 12.0 5.7 2.0 5.2 73.9
–0.2 4.6 3.8 6.2 5.9 44.2
6.5 7.2 6.8 5.9 6.6 41.7
2.4 –2.6 0.1 2.7 ... 86.0
–0.8 2.9 2.0 1.6 ... 66.1
1.1 1.4 –1.2 ... ... ...
–1.0 3.5 1.2 1.6 ... 71.8
–1.6 1.5 0.2 –1.0 ... 61.1
1.0 ... ... ... ... ...
–5.2 0.3 6.4 5.2 85.6
9.7 8.5 11.5 9.7 3.4 27.1
0.9 0.1 1.5 2.9 1.8 69.1
–1.3 ... ... ... ... ...
13.4 11.1 11.2 ... ... ...
0.8 1.0 1.8 0.5 1.1 60.1
3.5 2.5 6.4 ... ... ...
3.3 3.0 3.2 4.4 ... 65.2
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Table A6 Inflation (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
5.9 7.0 8.9 5.1 5.9 9.0 7.4
3.4 8.2 7.7 2.6 5.8 4.5 4.0
1.5 5.7 7.9 1.1 2.4 4.0 3.5
1.7 7.1 8.5 –0.9 –0.5 4.0 5.0
7.3 7.1 8.3 5.1 5.8 11.5 8.8
6.8 7.8 16.6 2.8 6.6 7.0 6.0
6.5 6.5 12.5 5.8 5.1 5.5 6.0
–2.7 4.4 5.3 5.3 6.0 6.7 6.2
14.1 9.4 12.8 12.1 12.1 11.0 10.0
–0.1 3.1 5.0 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.9
–0.7 3.3 5.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.0
0.6 2.3 5.3 4.1 4.3 3.8 3.7
2.8 3.0 4.0 2.2 1.3 2.1 2.5
7.6 10.1 9.2 14.3 10.4 11.0 8.0
–0.9 1.0 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.1 1.3
5.6 9.4 9.5 7.8 6.2 6.4 6.2
–12.2 7.7 11.8 6.2 7.4 6.8 7.1
7.6 6.8 10.9 8.7 6.8 7.5 6.5
7.1 4.8 8.6 10.1 8.6 10.2 8.5
3.8 9.6 8.9 7.4 5.9 6.0 5.8
4.5 6.1 11.3 10.9 4.0 5.0 4.8
12.6 9.6 9.6 8.3 9.9 10.0 9.5
20.8 10.1 13.7 11.0 7.4 9.0 9.2
3.5 6.2 6.7 7.9 6.9 5.0 6.0
2.7 4.1 5.5 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.0
1.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6
–0.7 4.0 5.5 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5
4.8 5.1 5.3 4.0 6.4 5.7 4.8
0.0 6.0 7.6 4.3 6.4 5.5 6.0
0.6 1.7 3.2 1.7 2.1 3.2 3.5
2.2 8.2 2.8 2.9 5.8 6.6 6.9
4.2 3.8 4.6 3.2 3.0 4.3 4.0
0.6 2.8 5.2 4.6 2.4 3.0 2.9
–0.9 3.2 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.4 2.6
6.9 9.2 18.7 9.1 6.6 6.2 6.6
5.2 4.7 8.5 4.2 4.5 5.9 5.1
6.7 –0.3 2.2 3.0 1.9 2.5 2.5
3.2 3.7 7.3 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.5
9.8 –3.9 1.5 –3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
0.5 1.8 5.4 4.3 1.6 1.5 1.5
7.9 3.9 4.6 5.8 2.2 2.0 1.5
21.2 –0.6 –3.5 –0.5 1.4 5.0 7.0
4.7 1.1 2.6 5.4 3.0 2.5 2.0
6.9 6.0 8.4 2.2 4.0 6.5 5.0
14.6 0.0 3.1 6.2 –0.2 2.0 2.0
7.1 1.0 7.4 5.9 6.0 5.5 5.0
–0.2 5.2 13.2 10.9 9.5 9.5 9.0
1.2 5.1 3.8 2.5 0.2 2.0 2.0
–5.5 –1.9 0.5 1.4 2.0 2.5 2.0
4.3 2.8 0.9 1.4 1.4 2.5 3.0
1.4 4.4 5.9 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.7
276  Asian Development Outlook 2014
Table A7 Change in money supply (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor–Leste, Dem. Rep. of
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
15.1 11.8 23.7 19.5 14.8
–0.3 24.3 32.1 20.7 15.4
8.2 33.1 14.5 11.4 24.5
19.5 13.3 15.0 7.9 10.2
17.9 21.1 14.9 23.8 4.4
39.6 18.6 33.1 20.1 20.1
10.9 43.4 36.3 35.6 29.5
40.9 52.4 32.3 27.5 26.4
27.6 19.7 17.3 14.4 13.6
5.3 8.1 12.9 11.1 12.3
9.9 6.0 5.5 4.8 4.6
26.9 62.5 37.0 18.8 24.1
5.8 5.4 4.8 3.5 5.8
33.1 26.9 21.3 8.9 9.7
19.2 22.4 21.3 17.4 16.7
24.6 30.1 21.2 –1.0 18.6
16.8 16.0 13.2 13.9 11.7
14.4 14.6 20.0 5.0 18.4
27.0 30.5 12.3 22.6 16.4
9.6 12.5 15.9 14.1 15.9
18.6 15.8 19.1 17.6 16.7
9.7 4.8 10.1 0.9 ...
36.8 20.0 21.4 20.9 14.6
13.0 15.4 16.4 15.0 12.7
31.3 39.5 28.7 31.0 22.7
9.5 7.2 14.7 9.7 8.4
34.8 36.3 26.3 46.6 37.4
9.9 10.0 7.1 8.9 32.7
11.3 8.6 10.0 7.2 4.3
6.8 10.9 15.1 10.4 7.3
29.0 33.3 12.1 18.5 18.5
65.9 –2.3 –13.4 ... ...
7.4 4.2 14.8 6.3 15.4
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
21.9 10.0 17.6 10.9 ...
7.7 10.9 –0.8 –4.0 –0.8
16.8 13.3 25.8 17.4 14.5
29.6 18.2 9.3 26.2 22.9
–1.9 5.1 2.7 –2.0 7.4
... ... ... ... ...
0.5 –6.0 1.3 –0.6 ...
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Table A8 Central government revenues (% of GDP)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
22.0 22.6 23.3 23.7 25.0
29.0 26.9 30.1 31.6 33.8
29.3 28.3 28.2 28.9 27.3
20.6 19.7 19.5 19.2 19.0
32.2 30.5 27.2 34.5 29.0
23.4 23.2 24.9 25.1 26.9
20.4 16.1 18.3 21.0 17.9
33.8 32.4 32.0 32.8 31.8
20.1 20.7 22.0 22.6 22.7
19.2 21.2 22.6 21.7 21.1
20.4 20.1 20.5 21.0 21.5
30.3 37.1 40.3 35.4 33.8
12.4 11.1 12.2 11.9 11.9
20.6 22.0 20.8 24.7 26.6
10.4 10.9 11.7 12.5 12.4
40.4 46.4 35.6 35.2 35.7
19.6 21.0 19.5 20.9 22.0
22.6 24.0 31.4 31.2 33.2
16.7 18.2 17.8 18.6 19.8
14.0 14.0 12.4 12.8 13.0
15.0 14.9 14.5 14.1 13.8
39.4 51.9 60.6 55.5 ...
11.9 13.2 13.2 15.2 14.9
15.1 15.4 16.3 16.3 15.7
14.9 15.7 16.4 17.7 18.1
22.3 20.0 21.0 22.1 21.7
10.7 11.4 12.0 23.3 22.3
14.0 13.4 14.0 14.5 14.9
14.3 14.5 14.9 15.7 15.4
16.4 17.3 18.0 18.3 18.1
25.8 27.6 26.1 22.9 22.1
33.9 32.6 31.7 40.5 39.8
25.2 25.5 27.6 27.4 27.2
70.9 72.5 62.1 102.3 98.0
64.5 62.0 58.5 52.0 48.3
65.9 68.0 64.9 66.0 67.0
80.7 49.5 62.1 85.4 110.9
39.1 44.2 41.6 41.3 41.7
29.8 31.4 30.4 29.8 30.3
38.6 40.4 42.1 37.8 40.8
53.9 57.5 63.8 50.3 41.2
249.7 293.0 341.9 321.1 227.3
28.5 22.8 22.1 23.3 19.6
86.5 68.0 70.2 85.9 77.7
25.9 24.6 22.3 21.8 16.1
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Table A9 Central government expenditures (% of GDP)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
29.6 27.6 26.1 25.2 25.4
29.7 27.7 29.6 31.8 33.1
38.4 34.9 31.8 31.7 30.2
23.5 22.1 21.5 22.2 21.1
36.1 36.6 31.8 39.8 32.8
28.6 26.1 27.0 24.7 27.7
13.4 14.1 14.6 14.7 16.4
34.3 32.0 31.9 32.7 32.7
22.4 22.4 23.1 24.3 24.6
17.6 17.0 18.9 18.5 20.5
24.5 21.2 21.6 22.4 23.3
35.5 36.6 45.1 42.8 35.2
16.0 14.0 14.0 13.5 13.2
22.1 21.1 21.3 24.3 24.5
14.3 14.6 16.1 16.6 16.9
38.5 44.7 37.7 36.3 36.6
28.6 27.6 26.9 28.1 28.4
43.1 39.6 38.8 40.4 37.9
20.0 20.1 20.1 20.8 19.4
19.2 20.2 18.9 21.5 21.0
24.9 22.8 21.4 20.5 19.7
40.9 35.9 33.6 35.3 ...
20.5 21.3 20.7 21.6 19.9
16.7 16.2 17.5 18.1 18.0
20.7 24.6 24.4 25.6 30.5
28.9 25.5 25.8 26.5 25.6
15.6 16.6 16.9 27.2 27.2
17.7 16.9 16.0 16.8 16.3
15.1 14.3 13.6 13.8 14.1
18.4 16.6 16.4 19.6 18.2
34.3 34.3 29.9 29.3 29.2
36.2 34.7 36.3 42.6 41.8
29.3 27.7 29.0 28.5 30.0
82.9 85.2 83.2 109.0 104.0
52.1 48.4 48.7 48.7 48.0
63.9 67.6 65.5 65.2 64.6
80.4 43.5 61.4 86.5 110.5
39.9 45.1 40.5 41.4 43.0
29.9 30.7 28.1 34.1 38.2
42.0 47.8 48.0 42.8 45.2
52.2 51.8 54.2 46.6 41.9
107.2 114.5 122.4 107.1 86.4
33.2 32.3 33.7 30.2 24.5
84.8 90.5 79.2 75.2 77.3
24.9 27.1 21.9 21.9 15.8
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Table A10 Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
–7.6 –5.0 –2.8 –1.5 –0.4
–0.7 –0.9 0.6 –0.2 0.7
–9.2 –6.6 –3.6 –2.8 –2.9
–2.9 –2.4 –2.1 –2.9 –2.1
–3.7 –6.3 –4.8 –5.4 –4.0
–5.4 –3.7 –2.5 0.4 –0.8
7.0 2.0 3.6 6.4 1.5
0.2 2.0 2.0 0.1 –0.9
–2.3 –1.7 –1.1 –1.7 –1.9
1.6 4.2 3.7 3.2 0.6
–4.1 –1.1 –1.1 –1.4 –1.8
–5.2 0.5 –4.8 –7.4 –1.4
–3.5 –3.0 –1.8 –1.6 –1.3
–1.6 0.9 –0.6 0.4 2.1
–3.9 –3.7 –4.4 –4.1 –4.5
1.9 1.6 –2.1 –1.1 –0.9
–8.9 –6.6 –7.4 –7.2 –6.4
–20.5 –15.6 –7.5 –9.2 –4.7
–3.3 –1.9 –2.4 –2.2 0.4
–5.2 –6.2 –6.5 –8.8 –8.0
–9.9 –8.0 –6.9 –6.4 –5.8
–1.5 15.9 26.9 20.2 ...
–8.6 –8.1 –7.5 –6.5 –5.0
–1.6 –0.7 –1.1 –1.9 –2.3
–5.8 –8.9 –7.9 –7.9 –12.4
–6.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.5 –3.9
–4.9 –5.5 –4.6 –3.9 –4.9
–3.7 –3.5 –2.0 –2.3 –1.4
–0.3 0.3 1.2 1.6 1.1
–4.4 –2.6 –0.9 –4.1 –2.0
–8.5 –6.7 –3.8 –6.4 –7.1
–2.2 –2.1 –4.7 –2.1 –2.0
–4.1 –2.2 –1.4 –1.1 –2.8
–12.0 –12.7 –21.1 –6.7 –6.0
1.5 3.5 2.2 –0.8 –0.7
2.0 0.5 –0.6 0.8 2.4
0.3 6.0 0.6 –1.2 0.4
–0.8 –0.9 1.2 –0.2 –1.2
–0.2 0.7 2.3 –4.3 –7.9
–3.5 –7.4 –5.9 –5.0 –4.4
1.7 5.7 9.6 3.7 –0.7
142.5 178.5 219.5 214.0 140.9
–4.7 –9.5 –11.6 –6.9 –4.9
1.6 –22.5 –9.0 10.8 0.4
1.0 –2.5 0.4 –0.1 0.3
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Table A11 Growth rate of merchandise exports (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
–32.0 28.4 37.2 1.4 –0.5 3.8 3.3
–32.7 57.0 34.4 2.5 8.5 6.2 6.5
–31.0 25.5 30.3 –6.1 –1.8 –15.0 –3.3
–22.0 30.0 32.2 7.6 27.6 19.0 22.0
–39.0 39.8 38.8 2.0 –4.0 6.5 2.5
–9.6 5.0 27.7 –13.1 4.8 8.0 8.0
–28.2 18.3 5.2 41.0 –0.8 5.1 6.4
–24.0 8.0 73.1 18.9 2.0 12.6 7.0
–4.2 6.0 20.3 –7.6 14.7 11.9 6.0
–16.0 30.0 18.4 5.6 6.3 8.8 9.6
–16.1 31.4 20.4 8.0 7.9 10.3 10.5
–10.6 22.8 12.5 7.0 6.8 8.0 8.3
–17.6 28.8 19.6 0.4 3.0 6.0 8.0
–25.6 54.3 65.6 –9.0 –2.6 25.0 15.0
–20.2 34.6 12.3 –2.3 1.4 4.2 7.8
–3.3 31.1 24.6 –0.9 4.8 7.7 10.4
2.1 12.3 –5.1 2.6 –3.4 1.9 4.9
10.1 4.2 39.2 6.2 10.7 9.0 12.0
–14.9 3.0 26.8 –7.3 –3.9 3.5 9.2
–3.5 37.3 23.7 –1.0 4.7 8.0 10.5
–49.0 16.8 75.4 –9.2 18.6 4.3 11.0
–4.7 –6.3 11.7 5.7 –2.9 3.0 5.0
–6.4 2.9 28.9 –2.6 0.4 2.7 6.0
–12.7 21.0 23.2 –7.4 6.3 10.0 15.0
–14.7 30.5 15.6 4.7 –0.6 6.5 8.2
–33.0 30.3 33.2 4.4 –11.9 –5.5 1.0
–10.2 25.1 27.8 11.9 15.9 13.4 15.9
–14.3 32.1 27.0 –6.1 –2.6 4.5 6.0
–5.5 57.5 43.2 6.1 3.3 10.0 15.0
–21.0 26.9 14.9 –0.4 –3.6 6.3 8.0
4.7 13.9 16.6 2.2 27.5 12.4 15.9
–16.0 26.2 4.1 21.2 –3.6 8.2 7.3
–14.2 31.7 6.5 6.4 –2.7 5.0 8.3
–13.9 27.1 14.3 3.1 –0.2 6.0 5.5
–8.9 26.5 34.2 18.2 15.3 15.0 15.0
–24.2 31.0 24.7 –4.4 –11.3 19.7 57.9
–16.2 11.3 –1.8 –24.4 ... ... ...
–29.6 34.0 28.8 14.3 –5.0 5.3 4.2
–25.7 –39.5 123.6 –32.6 0.6 0.6 5.3
2.7 55.2 55.2 18.0 5.4 ... ...
–6.6 19.4 27.5 33.1 ... ... ...
–29.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
–53.8 8.7 27.6 19.9 –22.5 3.5 2.8
–23.9 30.9 21.8 –9.2 –12.9 24.2 71.7
7.8 53.7 25.8 38.9 –12.6 12.0 5.7
–21.4 35.6 85.6 18.7 –9.4 1.0 5.1
–27.3 93.3 –13.8 32.0 12.1 13.5 9.5
–43.3 9.7 –16.2 –25.1 36.0 138.6 8.7
–11.7 –4.0 81.0 –50.1 15.5 –7.0 8.1
33.2 –8.4 24.9 –13.9 ... ... ...
–15.4 30.1 18.6 4.7 4.3 8.1 9.2
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Table A12 Growth rate of merchandise imports (% per year)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
–16.3 7.1 28.1 17.1 4.4 9.5 7.6
–25.0 13.4 14.0 2.2 2.5 3.5 4.3
–14.0 3.6 50.7 0.3 9.4 3.4 4.0
–31.4 17.7 33.6 14.3 –0.5 21.5 17.4
–24.6 13.7 22.7 21.6 1.0 10.1 6.2
–25.0 5.9 32.0 26.2 8.8 10.0 10.0
–21.4 3.5 19.9 16.8 9.8 7.9 9.3
50.4 –8.0 40.6 27.9 9.4 7.0 6.0
–2.7 –4.8 23.4 8.2 9.0 10.3 10.9
–15.4 36.0 22.1 3.5 5.2 7.9 9.0
–11.2 39.1 25.1 4.5 7.1 8.7 9.3
–7.9 27.1 15.4 9.5 7.7 5.7 8.1
–25.4 31.5 23.4 –1.1 –0.8 9.0 9.0
–34.1 49.7 106.2 2.1 –5.7 0.0 15.0
–26.9 43.1 12.9 –3.7 –0.4 4.1 8.1
–3.8 –39.3 30.7 1.3 –5.8 8.9 11.6
–0.8 11.6 3.3 10.1 –0.1 0.6 –2.1
4.2 5.4 52.1 2.4 0.8 10.0 14.0
–9.5 36.1 41.7 –10.0 –6.5 7.8 8.2
–2.6 26.7 31.1 0.5 –7.0 9.0 12.0
–34.4 14.8 38.9 0.3 9.7 6.5 10.1
8.3 35.5 8.9 4.7 10.9 15.0 9.9
–10.3 –1.7 14.9 12.8 –0.6 4.4 5.0
–27.6 31.8 50.7 –5.4 –6.2 18.0 18.0
–26.9 36.9 34.8 3.8 5.9 11.8 9.3
–20.2 2.0 9.8 39.7 1.2 2.5 0.7
–13.4 22.2 23.8 16.3 13.8 12.8 13.0
–24.0 43.7 30.3 8.4 –1.4 3.4 4.2
2.0 21.2 31.7 34.5 11.8 5.0 8.0
–20.6 33.8 14.4 4.4 –0.1 6.2 8.2
1.9 15.8 27.5 19.1 37.5 7.2 16.2
–19.4 24.7 9.5 11.3 –3.1 9.4 8.0
–19.2 30.5 8.1 8.8 –3.9 4.8 9.0
–25.1 37.0 24.9 8.8 –0.4 8.0 10.0
–14.3 19.6 25.8 7.5 15.1 19.9 17.0
–14.9 19.7 19.0 11.9 4.8 –3.8 –2.3
–20.6 3.9 19.3 7.4 ... ... ...
–37.3 25.4 23.4 2.9 34.0 –16.4 4.4
–3.7 3.3 26.2 17.7 –5.7 –11.1 –11.1
4.8 41.1 –10.8 5.8 0.4 ... ...
2.9 4.3 9.0 5.0 ... ... ...
13.6 ... ... ... ... ... ...
–27.8 9.3 21.7 8.4 –1.1 1.1 0.7
–8.1 23.0 21.5 11.5 –8.3 –1.8 –9.5
22.9 10.8 1.7 19.8 3.5 9.1 2.5
–14.1 50.8 16.9 5.8 9.9 10.7 3.9
19.1 –8.7 22.2 79.7 14.4 13.3 9.1
–17.3 –0.1 4.1 4.1 1.3 –0.8 8.9
–18.2 22.3 15.1 1.0 –5.0 –3.9 –3.4
–6.1 –2.7 1.7 2.8 ... ... ...
–14.9 14.7 24.5 3.5 3.6 8.4 9.3
282  Asian Development Outlook 2014
Table A13 Trade balance ($ million)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Total
... = data not available.
25,295 46,196 69,686 56,885 51,614 47,379 43,811
–2,081 –2,033 –2,078 –2,119 –2,075 –2,100 –2,149
14,583 19,730 24,328 22,182 20,621 15,460 14,100
–2,399 –2,590 –3,494 –4,214 –3,213 –4,016 –4,470
15,004 28,500 44,844 37,852 33,836 34,200 33,000
–1,120 –1,202 –1,665 –2,993 –3,336 –3,710 –4,126
–1,559 –1,463 –1,930 –1,949 –2,328 –2,562 –2,854
891 2,253 6,312 6,566 5,710 7,247 7,910
1,976 3,000 3,367 1,561 2,400 2,860 2,400
330,966 323,774 294,257 371,749 430,544 498,554 567,127
249,511 254,180 243,549 321,595 359,900 426,683 494,852
13,288 3,290 –7,477 –18,917 –25,000 –15,000 –15,000
37,866 40,083 31,660 39,817 60,712 49,049 47,411
–252 –292 –1,781 –2,354 –2,082 –1,014 –1,166
30,553 26,513 28,306 31,608 37,014 38,836 41,030
–148,735 –164,633 –233,720 –245,091 –191,877 –213,596 –243,145
–6,355 –7,070 –7,539 –8,507 –8,590 –8,611 –8,240
–4,710 –5,155 –9,935 –9,320 –7,010 –7,977 –9,673
–74 –269 –460 –396 –354 –408 –435
–118,202 –130,593 –189,759 –195,656 –146,090 –162,448 –187,141
–913 –1,044 –1,379 –1,417 –1,526 –1,633 –1,795
–2,733 –4,084 –4,422 –4,623 –5,263 –6,170 –6,830
–12,627 –11,536 –10,516 –15,765 –15,431 –16,536 –17,108
–3,122 –4,881 –9,710 –9,409 –7,613 –9,814 –11,924
134,904 154,954 155,647 112,993 105,112 102,991 97,684
4,890 7,014 9,884 9,410 7,823 7,103 7,186
–1,308 –1,508 –1,710 –2,208 –2,393 –2,660 –2,791
30,932 30,627 34,783 8,618 6,149 8,377 12,181
–1,372 –1,109 –1,185 –2,567 –3,179 –3,150 –3,112
39,823 42,455 49,531 40,668 32,603 34,844 37,235
511 487 –198 –2,205 –2,480 –1,825 –2,324
–13,860 –16,859 –20,429 –18,926 –18,525 –20,790 –22,776
50,275 69,232 68,432 64,304 67,123 71,209 74,442
32,620 29,751 16,989 6,015 6,355 2,355 –8,161
–7,607 –5,136 –450 9,884 11,637 7,527 5,804
–493 13 385 –983 –2,002 –173 5,044
–83 –86 –130 –131 ... ... ...
–627 –733 –860 –763 –1,496 –1,001 –1,048
–65 –69 –84 –103 –97 –85 –75
–74 –101 –69 –67 –64 ... ...
–127 –128 –134 –129 –129 –132 –130
–8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
–81 –88 –106 –113 –117 –118 –118
1,524 2,221 2,712 1,574 1,151 2,576 7,920
–239 –260 –260 –306 –322 –351 –358
–74 –137 –6 47 –43 –91 –89
–320 –277 –349 –639 –732 –829 –904
–123 –123 –129 –136 –136 –126 –137
–13 –15 –17 –18 –17 –16 –16
–193 –191 –183 –198 ... ... ...
341,936 360,305 286,255 295,552 393,392 435,154 470,520
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Table A14 Current account balance (% of GDP)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
0.4 4.6 6.9 3.3 2.7 2.9 3.5
–15.8 –14.8 –10.9 –11.2 –9.5 –8.7 –8.0
23.0 28.4 25.7 21.4 16.7 16.0 15.0
–11.2 –10.2 –12.7 –11.4 –5.9 –8.0 –7.5
–3.6 0.9 5.4 0.3 0.1 0.6 2.3
–2.2 –7.2 –6.1 –15.3 –10.4 –15.7 –15.1
–5.9 –1.2 –4.8 –2.0 –1.9 –2.1 –2.3
–14.7 –10.6 2.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 2.0
2.2 6.1 5.7 2.7 3.7 4.7 3.6
5.3 4.3 2.4 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.7
4.9 4.0 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9
9.9 7.0 5.6 1.6 2.1 3.5 3.5
3.9 2.9 2.3 4.3 5.8 4.1 4.0
–7.5 –14.3 –31.5 –32.6 –27.4 –20.0 –15.0
11.4 9.3 9.0 10.7 11.7 12.3 12.5
–2.7 –2.3 –3.7 –4.1 –1.8 –2.2 –2.6
–2.8 3.9 3.1 3.9 2.5 1.7 1.2
2.7 3.7 –1.5 –0.4 1.9 –0.5 –1.5
–6.3 –22.2 –29.8 –21.3 –23.6 –28.6 –26.4
–2.8 –2.7 –4.2 –4.7 –2.2 –2.5 –2.8
–11.4 –8.9 –19.1 –23.0 –20.5 –21.8 –22.1
4.2 –2.3 –0.9 4.9 3.4 3.6 3.7
–5.5 –2.2 0.1 –2.1 –1.1 –1.4 –1.3
–0.5 –2.2 –7.8 –6.6 –2.0 –2.6 –3.5
7.0 6.1 5.4 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.9
40.2 48.5 52.4 47.0 43.0 44.0 46.0
–6.0 –7.9 –7.0 –10.0 –10.8 –11.3 –10.9
2.0 0.7 0.2 –2.8 –3.3 –2.9 –2.0
–26.9 –18.3 –15.8 –28.5 –29.5 –27.4 –26.0
15.5 10.9 11.6 6.1 3.8 4.1 4.6
–1.3 –1.5 –2.1 –4.4 –4.8 –5.1 –4.8
5.0 3.6 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.4 3.2
17.8 26.8 22.5 17.8 18.2 19.1 18.6
8.3 3.1 1.2 –0.4 –0.7 –0.1 0.5
–6.2 –3.7 0.2 5.8 6.5 4.1 3.0
14.5 19.1 41.3 27.2 11.3 2.3 13.4
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
–4.1 –4.5 –5.7 –1.5 –18.5 –6.1 –7.1
–22.7 –16.7 –29.3 –31.5 –30.2 –36.2 –31.3
–17.3 –28.8 –9.0 –7.6 –8.8 –20.6 –10.9
–18.3 –14.9 –17.4 –12.0 –9.8 –9.6 –9.3
–7.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...
–10.3 –10.9 –9.1 –7.7 –12.4 –9.3 –7.4
–7.2 –6.5 –1.3 –14.9 –13.7 –7.0 13.0
–7.6 –8.3 –4.9 –11.1 –13.4 –16.2 –15.6
–20.9 –28.3 –7.4 –0.2 –2.0 –6.0 –10.0
155.7 179.5 207.4 202.1 125.0 47.0 50.3
–17.4 –4.9 –9.3 –6.9 –5.9 –3.7 –3.2
22.1 –6.3 –36.3 1.3 3.5 –9.6 –10.5
–7.9 –5.4 –8.4 –6.4 –6.2 –6.0 –7.0
4.0 3.4 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.9
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Table A15 Exchange rates to the United States dollar (annual average)
Currency Symbol 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central Asia
Armenia dram AMD
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan new manat AZN
Georgia lari GEL
Kazakhstan tenge T 
Kyrgyz Republic som Som
Tajikistan somoni TJS
Turkmenistan Turkmen manat TMM
Uzbekistan sum SUM
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of yuan CNY
Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar HK$
Korea, Rep. of won W
Mongolia togrog MNT
Taipei,China NT dollar NT$
South Asia
Afghanistan afghani AF
Bangladesh taka Tk
Bhutan ngultrum Nu
India Indian rupee/s Re/Rs
Maldives rufiyaa Rf
Nepal Nepalese rupee/s NRe/NRs
Pakistan Pakistan rupee/s PRe/PRs
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka rupee/s SLRe/SLRs
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar B$
Cambodia riel KR
Indonesia rupiah Rp
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. kip KN
Malaysia ringgit RM
Myanmar kyat MK
Philippines peso P
Singapore Singapore dollar S$
Thailand baht B
Viet Nam dong D
The Pacific
Cook Islands New Zealand dollar NZ$
Fiji Islands Fiji dollar F$
Kiribati Australian dollar A$
Marshall Islands US dollar US$
Micronesia, Fed. States of US dollar US$
Nauru Australian dollar A$
Palau US dollar US$
Papua New Guinea kina K
Samoa tala ST
Solomon Islands Sol. Islands dollar SI$
Timor-Leste US dollar US$
Tonga pa’anga T$
Tuvalu Australian dollar A$
Vanuatu vatu Vt
... = data not available.
363.3 373.7 372.5 401.8 409.6
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
147.5 147.4 146.6 149.1 152.1
42.9 46.0 46.1 47.0 48.4
4.1 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.8
2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
1,465.6 1,576.8 1,710.9 1,885.4 2,097.2
6.8 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.2
7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
1,275.0 1,155.4 1,107.4 1,125.7 1,094.2
1,437.8 1,347.2 1,265.2 1,359.2 1,523.9
33.1 31.6 29.5 29.6 29.7
49.3 45.8 47.7 50.9 55.5
68.8 69.2 71.2 79.1 79.9
47.8 46.7 45.3 50.3 54.9
47.4 45.6 48.1 54.0 61.5
12.8 12.8 14.6 15.4 15.4
76.6 74.2 72.1 80.7 87.7
78.5 83.8 85.5 89.2 96.7
114.9 113.1 110.6 127.6 130.0
1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3
4,148.3 4,188.5 4,065.9 4,033.0 4,027.0
10,408.1 9,086.9 8,776.0 9,384.2 10,460.5
8,501.0 8,248.6 8,011.4 7,994.0 7,818.0
3.5 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1
918.0 1,062.0 936.0 880.0 ...
47.7 45.1 43.3 42.2 42.4
1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3
34.3 31.7 30.5 31.1 30.7
17,065.0 18,621.0 20,490.0 20,828.0 20,934.6
1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9
1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 ...
2.7 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.2
2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
8.1 8.1 7.6 7.4
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
2.1 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.8
1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
105.9 97.2 94.6 ... ...
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Table A16 Gross international reserves ($ million)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
2,004 1,866 1,932 1,799 2,253
5,364 6,409 10,274 11,277 14,401
2,110 2,264 2,818 2,873 2,823
23,091 28,275 29,328 28,280 24,678
1,588 1,719 1,835 2,067 2,238
278 476 572 650 694
19,000 18,800 22,400 26,400 29,300
12,226 14,579 18,049 18,346 19,380
2,453,177 2,914,184 3,255,786 3,387,863 3,951,756
255,816 268,731 285,408 317,336 305,787
269,995 291,571 306,402 326,968 346,460
1,294 2,197 2,457 4,126 2,248
348,198 382,005 385,547 403,169 416,811
4,209 5,403 6,208 6,867 6,660
7,471 10,750 10,912 10,364 15,315
675 759 796 674 917
279,057 304,818 294,397 292,647 297,287
261 350 335 305 340
2,872 2,759 3,836 4,960 5,614
9,527 13,112 15,662 10,856 6,047
5,097 6,610 5,958 6,877 7,200
1,357 1,563 2,487 3,285 3,377
2,367 2,653 3,032 3,463 3,642
66,105 96,207 110,123 112,781 99,387
633 727 679 740 666
96,744 106,590 133,257 139,698 134,601
2,809 3,951 4,026 4,591 4,913
44,243 62,373 75,302 83,831 83,187
187,809 225,754 237,737 259,307 273,065
138,418 172,129 175,124 181,608 167,233
14,148 12,382 13,531 25,399 25,745
... ... ... ... ...
565 716 831 915 919
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
35 37 54 56 ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
2,623 3,092 4,323 4,296 4,684
104 176 158 158 163
144 266 412 500 520
250 406 462 884 213
68 88 ... 141 143
24 24 25 27 22
137 155 172 ... ...
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Table A17 External debt outstanding ($ million)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
2,967 3,299 3,568 3,739 3,904
3,422 3,734 4,841 5,470 6,059
3,658 4,219 4,507 4,829 4,463
112,867 118,223 125,350 136,925 147,965
4,118 4,381 4,872 5,403 6,004
1,692 1,911 2,093 2,260 2,149
485 2,392 2,923 6,364 7,951
4,922 5,804 6,090 6,660 10,700
428,648 548,938 694,997 736,986 810,000
712,463 879,034 985,042 1,030,583 1,166,362
345,677 359,757 398,724 409,381 416,595
2,986 5,928 9,627 15,386 15,387
81,963 101,581 122,528 124,325 122,290
1,150 1,303 1,242 1,333 1,360
20,859 20,336 22,086 22,095 23,319
798 887 1,326 1,398 1,705
260,935 317,891 360,719 400,259 400,250
934 962 913 816 800
3,495 3,442 3,658 3,491 3,506
52,331 61,567 66,366 65,478 59,779
20,913 24,830 29,387 33,674 22,858
... ... ... ... ...
2,854 3,295 3,643 4,290 4,822
172,871 202,413 225,375 252,364 264,060
2,694 2,809 2,990 3,037 4,611
67,965 73,641 81,009 82,646 96,932
13,207 10,862 13,506 14,042 13,090
54,856 60,048 60,442 60,337 58,506
1,263,953 1,343,053 1,415,335 1,437,268 1,527,241
75,306 100,561 104,634 133,201 139,800
27,929 32,501 ... ... ...
... ... ... 67 79
430 464 612 674 1,026
14 18 14 14 19
94 106 103 100 97
85 84 87 87 88
... 63 ... ... ...
70 66 63 68 ...
1,028 922 979 1,142 1,272
208 280 294 341 427
134 147 125 139 ...
... ... ... ... 44
98 116 162 188 183
11 11 10 10 9
103 101 111 108 105
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Table A18 Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific
Cook Islands
Fiji Islands
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
... = data not available.
5.4 4.7 4.2 9.8 32.3
1.3 ... ... ... ...
5.2 4.9 7.5 11.9 ...
63.2 32.1 24.2 33.7 26.0
41.4 25.9 11.1 11.3 11.3
20.3 7.5 5.1 ... ...
5.1 23.3 16.8 29.0 34.1
5.8 4.2 3.5 6.4 3.3
2.9 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.2
52.7 45.8 47.5 46.9 48.0
7.8 6.8 6.4 7.5 7.5
12.4 11.0 29.4 24.7 33.3
2.6 1.2 2.2 1.5 1.2
0.8 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.9
3.2 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.5
30.5 30.7 51.7 127.1 215.6
5.8 4.3 6.0 5.9 6.2
2.9 2.5 2.8 3.4 2.9
10.2 11.5 11.1 10.6 9.8
17.2 16.7 11.3 14.5 19.0
22.4 16.7 12.8 21.3 25.7
.... ... ... ... ...
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6
21.1 19.8 21.7 34.9 42.7
5.7 4.4 4.4 ... ...
6.5 7.5 10.4 10.1 10.3
6.6 5.6 9.1 2.2 2.2
11.0 9.9 9.9 7.3 7.6
... ... ... ... ...
7.6 4.7 3.5 4.2 3.0
4.2 3.4 3.5 1.3 ...
... ... ... ... .....
2.0 1.3 12.6 1.1 1.0
5.4 3.7 2.8 2.5 2.6
22.9 16.5 8.6 10.2 9.1
6.3 6.3 6.7 5.5 5.4
2.0 ... ... ... ...
5.2 5.9 4.6 4.0 ...
0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
56.9 55.5 0.8 5.3 ...
3.6 3.0 1.3 0.7 ...
... ... ... ... ...
5.2 9.3 9.3 9.6 9.6
50.0 120.0 62.5 50.0 120.0
1.5 1.4 1.4 –0.6 1.9
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
AsiAn Development BAnk
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org Printed on recycled paper
Printed in the Philippines
Asian Development Outlook 2014
Fiscal Policy for Inclusive Growth
The annual Asian Development Outlook provides a comprehensive analysis of economic performance in the 
past year and offers forecasts for the next 2 years for the 45 economies in Asia and the Pacific that make up 
developing Asia.
In 2014 and 2015, developing Asia is seen to chart a steady growth path as the slowing effect of moderating 
growth in the People’s Republic of China counterbalances improved demand for Asian exports expected 
from the major industrial economies as growth there gains traction. Despite accommodative monetary policy 
in the advanced economies, the growth outlook is vulnerable to volatility in financial markets that could arise 
from the monetary policy shift in the United States. 
This edition takes a close look at the role of fiscal policy in reversing widening inequality in developing Asia. 
It recognizes that, as emerging demographic and environmental challenges are expected to compete for 
public resources in the years ahead, regional governments will need to explore options for mobilizing more 
revenue as they build equity objectives into their fiscal plans.
About the Asian Development Bank
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacific region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing member 
countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the region’s many successes, 
it remains home to approximately two-thirds of the world’s poor: 1.6 billion people who live on less than 
$2 a day, with 733 million struggling on less than $1.25 a day. ADB is committed to reducing poverty through 
inclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main instruments for 
helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity investments, guarantees, grants, 
and technical assistance. 
A
SIA
N
 D
EVELO
PM
EN
T O
U
TLO
O
K 2014
FISCA
L PO
LICY FO
R IN
CLU
SIVE G
RO
W
TH
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
OUTLOOK 2014
FISCAL POLICY FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH
